Richard Butler

 

The US elections campaign has set-up a deeply negative framework for the future management of US/Russia relations. If Hillary Clinton is President her past attraction to military solutions to foreign policy problems will need revision, if conflict is to be avoided.

Speaking at the Alfred Smith dinner, in New York, on October 20^th, Hillary Clinton referred to a difficulty Donald Trump had apparently encountered in his use of a teleprompter, during a campaign event. She said to Trump:

“They’re hard to keep up with, and I’m sure it’s even harder when you’re translating from the original Russian”. The audience was, largely, amused.

This wasn’t merely a joke. It reflected her assessment that there was domestic political mileage in hostility towards Russia and Putin and harm to be done to her opponent by calling attention to, and misrepresenting his stated preference for trying to get on with Russia, rather than fight it. Another Clinton aside illustrated further her assessment of the “Russia card”: “We all know who Putin wants to win, and it’s not me”. (more…)

 

In 1995 Prime Minister Keating established the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. He did this because he was appalled at the intensity of the, mainly US/USSR, nuclear arms race. He wanted to find a safe way in which nuclear weapons could be eliminated, to which international agreement might be given. The Commission was composed of 16 eminent persons from relevant fields. Keating appointed me as Convenor of the Commission.

In 1996, Keating having lost the national elections, I presented the completed Commission Report to Prime Minister Howard. His demeanor was as if I was handing him a funnel web, but I had taken with me to the meeting, Commission member Sir Josef Rotblat, 1995 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate. I asked Joseph to make the speech. Howard was obliged to be polite to him.

A month or so later, in New York, Australia broke a deadlock on the text of a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which was then adopted by the General Assembly. It makes illegal the conduct of all nuclear explosions, in all environments, for all time.

A month later it was signed by all Permanent Members of the UN Security Council – the recognized Nuclear Weapon States. I was present at the table when President Clinton signed for the US. Although its terms are being observed by all signatories, CTBT has not yet formally entered into force because it has not been ratified by a few essential states, including the US.

Last week, in Geneva, a negotiation involving all state members of the UN Conference on Disarmament, came to an end. The agreed report, to be sent to the UN General Assembly, proposed that the Assembly institute a multilateral negotiation on a Treaty to ban all nuclear weapons.

It had been understood in Geneva that the report would be adopted by consensus. It had been the subject of much negotiation and compromise. At the last moment, Australia’s representative, objected and insisted that there be a vote. The vote had the following result: 69 in favour, 22 against, (all 7 nuclear weapon states ),13 abstentions. Although there was deep concern, indeed some anger, that Australia had insisted on a vote, the result was considered to be clear enough. So, the proposal of a Ban negotiation will go to the General Assembly. It is considered certain that the Assembly will adopt the proposal and establish a negotiating mechanism to commence work, next year, on a Ban Treaty. (more…)

Summary:

For fifty years, since Australia entered the war in Vietnam in 1965, Australian foreign policy has been made increasingly subservient to a specific concept of Australia’s relationship with the United States. That concept, first enunciated by Prime Minister Menzies in 1955, was that for its survival, Australia needed ”a great and powerful friend”. All of our key decisions in foreign policy since then have been shaped by our own construct of what loyalty to the United States and the Alliance demanded. That construct has been to follow the US practice and to identify foreign policy with military and security policy. (more…)

 

The so-called Chinese Curse: “ May you live in interesting times”, is apparently not of Chinese origin, but certainly apocryphal and wonderfully ironic.

I think it is hard to recall more “interesting times” than those in which the world finds itself today, nor a time fraught with more danger, since the sleepwalking towards World War I.

Here’s a list of today’s main issues in international politics, 15 of them.

By way of necessary preface, I caution that this will almost certainly be found to be incomplete, and that it refers almost exclusively to politics. (more…)

 

There was anxiety about why it had taken 7 years for the result of the UK’s Iraq Enquiry to be published. Would it prove to be a whitewash of Tony Blair and his decisions?

Within minutes of watching its Chair, Sir John Chilcot, introduce to the public the Enquiry’s report, yesterday, it was clear that those apprehensions were not be fulfilled. (more…)

It is widely acknowledged by those who have had anything substantive to do with nuclear weapons that as long as they exist they will, one day, be used, either by accident or decision. Equally, it is acknowledged that any such use would be a catastrophe. Thus, the logical and human solution is to eliminate them.

Three months after he assumed his office, President Obama publicly joined those who accept these truths when, in Prague on April 9^th, 2009, he said: “ I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”

Further, he said: “ as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act.”

He said the US could not succeed alone in seeking the objective of a secure world without nuclear weapons, but would lead the process and include all nuclear weapons states in it.

The Nobel Peace Prize Committee reacted to his Prague pledge by awarding him the 2009 Peace Prize. To some that seemed to represent a hasty judgment by the Committee, but the terms of Obama’s attitude towards the elimination of nuclear weapons seemed to constitute a major new policy commitment. In fact, there have been precedents.

In his farewell speech in January, 1961. President Eisenhower had warned against the influence over US policy of a “military industrial complex”, and stated, above all, that nuclear disarmament was essential. His warnings came to nought and at the height of the Cold War, in the 1980s, some 70,000 nuclear weapons had been made, over 90% of which were held by USA and USSR.

In October 1986, USSR President Michael Gorbachev and US President Ronald Reagan met at Rekjavick. They agreed, initially, to seek the elimination of all nuclear weapons because of their conviction that the danger they posed was unacceptable. Reagan had famously asserted that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. Their initial agreement foundered however, on Reagan’s refusal to suspend his proposed missile defense shield. But, they did agree to eliminate their intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe and the resultant INF Treaty became the first instance of the elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons.

On May 27^th, 2016, seven years after his speech at Prague, and eight months before he will take his farewell from office, President Obama visited Hiroshima becoming the first US President to do so, 71 years after that first use of a nuclear weapon.

In his remarks there he said: “among those nations like my own that hold nuclear stockpiles, we must have the courage to escape the logic of fear and pursue a world without them…persistent efforts can roll back the possibility of catastrophe. We can chart a course that leads to the destruction of these stockpiles.”

Somewhat characteristically, President Obama injected a philosophic reflection: “The scientific revolution that led to the splitting of the atom requires a moral revolution as well”, and, “ … what makes our species unique. We’re not bound by genetic code to repeat the mistakes of the past. We can learn. We can choose”.

Two key nuclear arms reduction treaties were negotiated between the US and Russia, after the Prague speech, the Start I and New Start Treaties and today, the number of deployed warheads allowed under those agreements is: 1780 and 2080 for Russia and the US, respectively and the same figures for “other” warheads are 5720 and 5180.

Overall, arms control agreements have led to a reduction by two thirds, in the number of nuclear weapons in existence, globally, from that figure of 70,000 of the 1980s.

Clearly, there has been progress in nuclear arms control, a step back from the profound insanity of the nuclear arms race, which was the hallmark of the Cold War.

But, there remains at least three Key problems, which have not been addressed, nothwithstanding Obama’s statements and commitments.

First, in order to secure consent by the US Senate to New Start and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Obama has authorized a $1 trillion 30 year upgrade of the US nuclear arsenal. It is impossible to reconcile this action with his stated posture of wishing to lead the way to a secure world without nuclear weapons, and the consent he sought on CTBT has not been given.

Russia has also embarked on an expansion of the size and quality of its nuclear arsenal. Nuclear analysts have suggested that, in fact, Obama’s legacy upon leaving office will be a “second nuclear age”. Whether that perspective will prove to have merit, the postures and actions of Russia, on one side and the US and NATO on the other supports the apprehension that a new Cold War is underway.

Secondly, there have been widely supported calls for the US and Russia, which together still hold at least 90% of nuclear weapons in existence, to take them off hair trigger alert. This would significantly reduce the possibility of accident or miscalculation, without eliminating their alleged utility in terms of deterrence.

Thirdly, while Obama has spoken of the need for action with respect to all nuclear weapon States, of which there are 6 others (and an active contender in North Korea), there has been inaction. He seems not to have exercised the leadership on this that he promised. And, apart from the issues with Russia, there is the reality of the frightful dangers posed by the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, and by Israel’s nuclear weapons capability, in the miasma of Middle East politics.

The International Court of Justice, unsurprisingly has pointed out that any use of nuclear weapons would violate customary international law, and with virtual certainty would constitute a crime against humanity. It has called attention to the fact that the Nuclear Weapon States identified in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (the Permanent Members of the Security Council) are obliged, under that Treaty to negotiate reductions in their weapons, without any further delay. And, some two thirds of the member States of the UN have called for the negotiation of a global Treaty banning nuclear weapons.

In recent times Australian coalition Governments have sided with the US in voting against this proposal. Its neighbors, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and New Zealand have supported it.

Where is the debate in Australia about the reality of the threat to our life, nation and environment caused by the continuing existence of nuclear weapons? Is it within our character and values to accept that the only way our survival, our life, is allegedly guaranteed is by the US being prepared to use, against others, weapons of mass destruction and radiation?

Some say that to ask this question is hysterical. They assert that, clearly the US would never use its weapons but only threaten to do so, as a matter of deterrence. The notion of deterrence is, at best, a chimera, the failure of which would be a more than academic experience.

President Obama resisted calls that he should apologize at Hiroshima, presumably because of the current dominance in the US of militant nationalism. But at Hiroshima, he did mention “mistakes”, and suggested that it is not necessarily in our human genus to be condemned to repeat them.

The part of his remarks and reflections on which Australian leaders should act are those in which he acknowledged the need for the US to lead in efforts to end the servitude of nuclear weapons. That’s where we could and should help, politically and diplomatically. This would, of course, require us to demonstrate the “courage to escape the logic of fear”, to stand on our own feet, with a principled, aware, and independent foreign policy.

Richard Butler AC, is former Ambassador to the United Nations and was appointed by PM Keating, in 1995, Convenor of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

Seven years ago, President Obama spoke in Prague Square and undertook to “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”. He cautioned that this outcome would be immensely difficult to achieve and may not be reached in his own lifetime, but his speech was heard and widely taken as signaling an enhanced US commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

A year later he called the first meeting of a Nuclear Security Summit, to be attended by Heads of State/Government. It was held in 2010 and then followed, in 2012, 2014, and last week, the 2016 Summit, held in Washington DC, was designated as the last such gathering, at Summit level.

Australia was represented in Washington by Foreign Minister Bishop, who claimed that no country has done more to ensure nuclear security than Australia. That airy claim aside, what she did do at the Summit was sign a bilateral agreement under which Australia would supply Uranium to Ukraine.

Even though they interact in critical ways, a distinction needs to be drawn between the goal of the elimination of Nuclear weapons, and the agenda and objectives of the Nuclear Security Summits.

As was evidenced in the final communiqué, the Summit was focused, virtually exclusively, on preventing nuclear materials from being obtained by non-state groups –terrorists – and criminal groups, in other words, on a particular aspect of non-proliferation.

Unquestionably, this is a deeply important objective and the mechanisms, and international cooperation that the Summit process has established, are impressive.

About half of the areas of the world in which relevant nuclear materials have been held or stored have been cleared of them and a low enrichment nuclear fuel bank is being established in Kazakhstan, with IAEA involvement, so that States needing fuel for electricity generation can obtain it from and return it, when spent, to the bank. The point is that spent uranium fuel can be reprocessed into weapons grade plutonium. Sending it back to the bank is designed to prevent this.

The Summit was characterized as taking place not only in the light of the need to address the special challenges posed by the contemporary phenomenon of actions by non-state groups and criminal organizations, but also the wider need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The cornerstone of that regime is the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT).

It is essential to recall that NPT, in fact, has two objectives; preventing new acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the elimination of those already held by states, specifically the five states recognized in the treaty as the “Nuclear Weapon States” (NWS): US, Russia, China, France, UK.

In the past, the NWS have argued that these two objectives are separate and do not rely on each other. This has enabled them to argue that their tardiness in nuclear disarmament in no way reduces the obligation of non-NWS to abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons. Few have agreed with this obviously self-serving argument, not simply because that is evidently its purpose, but also because it contradicts the negotiating history of the NPT. Indeed, it seeks to re-write it.

During the course of the Summit there was discussion of the increasingly serious matter of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and there was a side meeting of the five NWS plus EU and the IAEA, on progress in the implementation of the recently concluded agreement with Iran. These were and remain palpable issues in non-proliferation.

On the other hand, it is not clear what attention was given to the nuclear weapons programs of India, Pakistan and Israel, the three non parties to NPT, each of which have nuclear weapons, have already proliferated. These are critical issues of nuclear arms control and disarmament.

Of further importance, are the facts that: the US has embarked on an extensive program of modernization of its nuclear arsenal and the development of a new Long Range Stand-off nuclear missile; the Russians are developing new nuclear weapons and longer range missiles and torpedoes; China is developing the DF-41 long range missile, with possibly the longest range of any in existence; UK is planning to renew its massively expensive Trident nuclear force.

On March 30^th, the day before the Summit opened, the Washington Post published an Op-Ed by President Obama in which he claimed that he has “ruled out developing new nuclear warheads”. This attracted responses of incredulity in the US, including from former Defense Secretary William Perry. The fact is, 6 years ago, the President gave an undertaking to Congress to expend some $85 billion on warhead renewal in order to obtain its agreement to the ratification of the New Start Treaty with Russia, which set limits on their deployed nuclear weapons systems, leaving between 1800-2000 each. In fact, the overall planned upgrade of the US arsenal now approved by Obama is expected to cost some $3trillion in the next 30 years. The President may claim that this is not inconsistent with what he stated in his Op-Ed, by arguing that “renewal’ does not involve new weapons, just stockpile maintenance. Such semantics will be lost on others.

Furthermore, for the first time in the series of Nuclear Security Summits, Russia declined to attend last weeks Washington Summit.

India and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons developments signal unambiguously that they are engaged in a nuclear arms race.

And, the US continues to refuse to allow any discussion of Israel’s undeclared, but believed to be substantial, nuclear weapons capability. That refusal has come to threaten the existence of the NPT.

I have argued on earlier occasions, in Pearls and Irritations, in a number of contexts, that what we are witnessing now, in international politics, is a turning away from a will to live by and implement the key purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the post- World War II compact, and a reversion to the more traditional determinants of action by states; national interests, military power, the threat of use of force. There is possibly no clearer evidence for this claim than the insistence by NWS that their nuclear weapons capability is their right, and that it is legitimate for them to determine who else may or may not hold such weapons.

While, self evidently, the NWS are able to make such claims, and such muscularity is all too evident in history, including in its disastrous outcomes, the simple historicism which asserts that such behavior has always been the case, especially with strong and competitive States, is deeply flawed and today, unacceptably dangerous, given the horrendous destructive capacity of nuclear weapons.

In addition, the NWS have given the undertaking in NPT that they will progressively eliminate their nuclear weapons. Whether the NWS care to accept this or not, the undertaking on nuclear disarmament is fundamental to other states continuing to eschew obtaining nuclear weapons. Their current policies violate that undertaking.

It seems that the Nuclear Security Summit process has established some means to reduce or contain the dangers posed by nuclear materials, but in sidelining the gut issue of reductions in nuclear weapons already in existence and being further sought by those who already have them, it addressed only a portion of the nuclear security task. How much more encouraging it would have been if the Summit had been able to announce that the eight states possessing nuclear weapons had agreed to commence a process of working together to pursue overall reductions in their weapons arsenals.

The NPT was and is a two- way bargain. It is not being kept.

It is worth recalling an axiom identified by the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: as long as nuclear weapons exist they will, one day, be used either by accident or decision, and any use would be a catastrophe.

This truth was discerned before the emergence of contemporary terrorist groups, the suicide bomber and, the miniaturized, portable nuclear weapon.

Both in his Op-Ed and in his statement at the Summit, President Obama said that he believed that, as the US is the only state that has used nuclear weapons, it had a moral responsibility to pursue ridding the world of the unacceptable danger they pose. Doubtlessly, his acknowledgement of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have infuriated many in the US. He deserves credit for that courage, but he would move from the zone of sentiment into reality were he to seek to promote nuclear disarmament amongst holders of those weapons.

 

Richard Butler AC is former Ambassador to the United Nations and served as Convenor of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

The Defence White Paper 2016 has now been published. An engaging, critical, analysis of it has been offered by Professor Hugh White, ANU, (Pearls and Irritations March 10^th ).

Rightly, the purpose of the White Paper is to outline how Australia’s security can be assured in the current and expected environment.

A central assertion of the paper, with respect to that assurance, can be found at page 121, in paragraph 5.20.

“ Only the nuclear and conventional military capabilities of the United States can offer effective deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats against Australia. The presence of United States military forces plays a vital role in ensuring security across the Indo-Pacific and the global strategic and economic weight of the United States will be essential to the continued effective functioning of the rules-based global order.”

This assertion about the US role in assuring the security of Australia, would make sense to the many Australians who have absorbed the notion that Australia’s security requires what Prime Minister Menzies declared, in 1955, “a great and powerful friend”.

Consequently, candidates for election to our national Parliament, from both major parties have demonstrated, for years, their belief that they would ignore Menzies’ doctrine at their electoral peril.

This stance has led Australia to support the United States in all of its wars, from Vietnam to Iraq and Syria.

In this light, Paragraph 5.20, deserves analysis.

First, it posits the existence of possible nuclear weapons based threats to Australia. Given the existence of nuclear weapons able to strike Australia, that can be seen to make sense, even be prudent. But, there needs to be an assessment of the likelihood of their use. This is complex, involving strategic motivations of others, the costs and benefits of the use of nuclear weapons and, above all, the notion and mechanics of nuclear deterrence.

It also engages “the security dilemma”; the notion that the act of arming to appear to be of superior strength to a perceived adversary, simply brings about an increase in their armament directed at you, thus increasing the danger and probably beginning an arms race.

We have sought to avoid a nuclear security dilemma by eschewing nuclear weapons of our own. The Gorton Government dallied with nuclear weapons in 1969, delaying our accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT), but a decision on acquisition was not supported and we joined NPT.

It is generally calculated that nuclear weapons would not be used on states that do not possess them and, nuclear weapon States have given assurances to that effect. But, Australia’s continuing participation in US nuclear strategy could be taken as invoking the security dilemma. Specifically, that Australia has on its soil US nuclear control and Command systems can be seen not only as facilitating a US nuclear threat to others but also as making more likely the use of nuclear weapons against Australia, in the event of a nuclear crisis, say, between the US and China.

Secondly, the fundamental assertion that the US would act to defend Australia against a nuclear threat, including through the use of its nuclear weapons, needs to be questioned. The US can be expected, as a rational actor, to consider the full implications of any such use or threat of use. This would obviously engage far wider considerations than the security of Australia.

In the past, a simplistic, perhaps crude way of posing this question has taken the form of asking; “ Would the US, in reality, be prepared to trade Los Angeles for Sydney, if those were the alternatives in a nuclear crisis?” The answer seems obvious, unless of course the bases in Australia had to be saved in order to ensure the US’ wider ability to conduct nuclear war.

As already noted, this is all very complex, but all that can be said of it accurately, is that paragraph 5.20, represents an act of faith.

Thirdly, the assertion is also made that what is at stake in all of this is not simply Australia’s security, but something possibly even more fundamental; “ the continued effective functioning of the rules-based global order”.

It is on this notion, that the White Paper reveals its glaringly blind eye.

There is a rules-based global order. It is the one set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and derived solemn agreements, not least the NPT.

The central point to be made about that order, is that it has come to be routinely ignored and abused, particularly by those powers intended to be its main guardians: the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Outstanding results of this have been; the emergence of DAESH, following the illegal invasion of Iraq by two such permanent members, US and UK, in which Australia participated (consistent with its record from Vietnam onwards), the failure of the Council for 4 years to agree on action on the Syrian civil war, and the western attack upon Libya, engineered by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (see the NY Times’ analysis of Clinton and Libya, February 28^th, 2016 ).

That action in Libya exceeded the Security Council mandate to afford protection to Libyans from its government and moved on to regime change, an event never authorized and for which no replacement Government was seriously planned. This resulted in the chaos now seen not only in Libya, but across northern and western Africa and added to the conflicts already underway in Iraq and Syria.

The massive humanitarian and refugee crises in the region are the profound outcome of these failures of the rules-based order; and, they are beginning to threaten another deeply important rules-based system, the EU.

In addition to these disasters, the US and Russia have resumed the development of new nuclear weapons, in violation of their NPT obligations.

There seems to have emerged a preference amongst key States to return to power and interest as the determinants of policy not the compact agreed at the end of the Second World War and Colonialism, as set forth in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (see my; Nuclear North Korea, Pearls and Irritations, November 1^st 2015).

Is this “rules- based order”, now in disarray, the one of which Australia’s Defence Department speaks?

Clearly not. What it manifestly has in mind is the US version of order, presumably because it represents “our side”.

The problem with this is that so many others in the world, West and East, not just obvious adversaries or actors with whom we have little or no sympathy, but also friends, do not look comfortably upon what the White Paper declares to be “US leadership”. How could they, when the US has declared itself to be the “exceptional country”, meaning that it does not have to obey the rules that they say all others must keep?

And now, the US election campaign is revealing that there is a widespread notion, in the US electorate, that the US has been abused and exploited, by the rest of the world.

Whether the ever more grotesque Trump or the proven to be bellicose Clinton prevails, we cannot expect any diminution in the militarization of US foreign policy.

Indeed President Trump may break new ground in revealing how disturbing it can be to be obligated to an Alliance that is shaped by the forces and psychology of US domestic politics

The White Paper, inevitably deals in detail with force structure, equipment, military resources. But, a major resource Australia has at its disposal, for the protection of its security, is its skilled diplomacy. It needs to exercise much more of it, especially in its region. For example, as I have argued previously, (Pearls and Irritations, An Independent Australian Foreign Policy, May 13^th, 2015), we must not accept that our relations with both China and the US are an either/or proposition, in which we must make a choice. We can maintain constructive and principled relations with both.

And, we must reassess with a clear, not a blind eye, and not simply as a matter of faith, our alliance relationship with the US.

Finally,we should also strive, with others, to restore authority to the only valid rules-based system in existence, the Charter of the UN, and seek a new dispensation in the constituency and decision making methodology of the Security Council.

An overwhelming majority exists in the General Assembly of the UN in support of major reform of the Security Council. This must be pursued, because surely the point about rules is that they will only attract faith in them, be followed, if they are applied equally to all.

Richard Butler AC is a former Australian Ambassador to the United Nations.

During the last 10 years, North Korea has resigned its membership of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and conducted four nuclear test explosions. It claimed that the latest of these, detected four days ago, was of a hydrogen (fission-fusion) bomb. It made no such claim for the earlier three tests; said to be merely atomic (fission) bombs.

Argument about the veracity of the current claim is underway. There was seismic evidence of a test, but there is good reason to doubt that it was of a hydrogen bomb. We might have a clearer reading on that soon. The UN Security Council has condemned the test, as it has done in the past, describing it as constituting a “threat to international peace and security”. North Korea’s statements have spoken of a remarkable scientific achievement and their ability to threaten the destruction of its enemies, chiefly the United States.

Any rational appreciation of this current piece of theatre would begin by recognizing its elemental ludicrousness, but then acknowledge the great dangers and deadly earnest politics it incorporates.

Life in North Korea is appalling. Its people have little to eat and as Justice Michael Kirby has reported to the UN, there are virtually no human rights there, just widespread and relentless abuses. Expenditure by the regime of its resources and technological efforts on nuclear weapons is cruel.

Interested western oriented countries, particularly US, Japan, South Korea have attempted to have North Korea end its nuclear program, offering a range of economic and political incentives In return. These have failed. Attempts have also been made to engage China and Russia in diplomatic efforts to the same end. These have also foundered.

China is crucial to any solution given its alliance with North Korea and the depth of the latter’s reliance upon China for economic survival. China is known to be angry with its partner and has joined in the Security Council’s condemnation of the nuclear testing program, but it has taken no serious action against it.

At a fundamental level, the North Korean nuclear weapons issue is now emerging as possibly the paradigm case, even more so than the Iran case, of two pervasive phenomena in contemporary international relations.

1. The reversion by most States to traditional forms of competition and balance of power politics as the determinant of outcomes in international relations. This development has specifically rejected the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN; the post Second World War compact.It has resulted in the wretched failures we have witnessed in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and a number of countries in Africa and the Middle East.
   The abiding aspect of these failures has been the refusal of key States, particularly Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, to permit collective action to make or keep peace, if it would disadvantage them as such, or in their competition with others. Permanent members have also been the most egregious violators of the Charter by invading or attacking other States, for which actions they have not been sanctioned.

2. As the key extension of this first notion, which places the possession of power, particularly military power, at the centre of legitimacy; the second phenomenon is the insistence by those States which possess nuclear weapons that they alone are legitimately able to determine who else might and might not have those weapons.
   That they are able to make this determination, including through the use or threat of use of their own weapons, is beyond doubt, in the short term. That it is legitimate for them to do so, given global legal and moral commitments to nuclear arms control and disarmament, and the dangers nuclear weapons pose, is preposterous.
   Above all, the consequence of the elemental hypocrisy involved in the attempt to manage the world on such a basis is that it will fail and possibly lead to horrendous war.

The first of the two phenomena identified above is not new, as such. But the extent to which relations amongst States have become militarized is extreme. It has been the result of: the failure to reach a new compact, following the end of the Cold War, then the convulsions consequent upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union and, the wests attempts to treat Russia as the loser. Russia will not accept this and overall, the world has progressively rejected an imperial America. The principle victim in this situation has been the UN Charter system for the resolution of conflict.

The application of these circumstances to the North Korean case is illustrated by China’s obvious interest in the North Korean irritant to the US, Japan and South Korea, given its conflict with them over it’s South China Sea policies and actions. Simply, it can be expected to indicate that a price for it stepping up pressure on North Korea will be that the others make concessions on the South China Sea and more particularly recognize that if North Korea were to collapse it would not be acceptable for it to be folded into South Korea, as a State allied to the US. Russia could be expected to support China in such a stance.

On the specific issue of North Korea’s bomb, the previous policy of Obama’s first term – “strategic patience”- will need to be supplemented by a refreshed diplomacy and some new incentives, but only if China has significantly stepped up its effort with The North Koreans.

But, the current global situation described above, where nuclear weapon states attempt to hold the ring on the possession of such weapons, is failing. Israel, India and Pakistan have won that game. They have nuclear weapons and have refused to join the NPT and the Test Ban Treaty. Iran is on ice, for now, but Saudi Arabia is not. This is an unstable situation.

The hypocrisy which is intrinsic to the NPT, which privileges States with nuclear weapons, is coming home to roost. NPT is only acceptable if those privileged States implement their Treaty obligation to progressively eliminate their nuclear weapons. Instead what we see today is their expansion of their arsenals and their manifest reversion to power, not law or principle, as the reliable determinant of political and security outcomes.

If states were ever to become serious about ending the threat posed to all by the continued existence of nuclear weapons, they would begin a process of negotiated reductions in which all such weapons were in the frame. This is in fact what they have undertaken to do in NPT, a commitment which the International Court of Justice has ruled is an obligation in international law.

Interestingly, Australia was once a leader in the search for progress on nuclear non proliferation and disarmament. A practical process for the safe elimination of nuclear weapons was outlined in 1996 by the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, established by Prime Minister Keating. The Commission’s report continues to be recognized as a realistic one. But, Australia’s leadership in this field was terminated by Prime Minister Howard. To widespread dismay, this saw Australia actually vote against a resolution of the UN General Assembly calling for enhanced action on nuclear disarmament.

The Canberra Commission report was supplemented, in 2009, by a Japan/Australia study on nuclear dangers, managed by Gareth Evans.

Axioms which the Canberra Commission identified and thought were of enduring importance were: as long as nuclear weapons exist, they will be used, whether by accident or decision; any use would have catastrophic effects; as long as any State has nuclear weapons, others will seek to acquire them.

Were the Commission to meet again today, presumably it would add a further basic warning about the consequences of the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons capability by a group such as DAESH.

Only if the nuclear hypocrisy ends will we avoid these outcomes whether at the hands of North Korea or any other State.

On Australian actions, as a country possessing a major proportion of known reserves of uranium and as a permanent member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Turnbull government should review the resumption by Australia of an active role in global efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Richard Butler AC is former Ambassador to the UN and was Convenor of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

On December 2^nd, the UK House of Commons debated for 10 hours, a motion moved by the Government, that it should authorise bombing of DAESH targets in Syria by UK airforces. (Prime Minister Cameron announced early in his statement that, henceforth, ISIL should be referred to as DAESH: the acronym of its name in Arabic).

Some 150 members of the House took part in the debate. The motion was approved by a vote of 397 for, 223 against. Leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn had approved a “free vote” for members of his party. 66 Labour members exercised that right and voted with the Government.

The debate saw repeated interventions on points of order and points of detail from both sides. More significantly, it was somewhat overshadowed by repeated opposition demands that the Prime Minister withdraw and apologize for remarks he was heard to have made, the previous day, that those who would vote against his motion would do so because they were “terrorist sympathizers”. He refused to do this.

The debate was certainly lively, if not always edifying. It served to justify the notion of a house of elected representatives of the people as the key place in which matters of undoubted public importance and policy should be aired.

That airing included the reliance, by both sides, on their gut political credo, rather than on hard evidence for any particular point of view. Prime Minister Cameron, was particularly light on evidence for his views.

On the Conservative side, the main elements of that credo, were the beliefs in: the efficacy of military action in bringing about political outcomes; fighting the enemy abroad would keep the homeland safe; and, the notion that Britain had an indispensable role in maintaining a civilized world. This last idea seems not dissimilar from the US’ notion that it is the “exceptional country”, or indeed former Prime Minister Abbott’s now revealed notion that the current crises in the Arab and Russian worlds meant that history had, once again, handed to the “Anglosphere” the unique duty to put things to rights

On the Labour side, the fundamental concerns expressed were: that military action was not the solution to the problem of DAESH; what was needed was concerted political/diplomatic action to bring about an end to the Syrian war, and extreme doubt that expanded military action would be effective in both curtailing DAESH or preventing further terrorist acts outside the Middle East, indeed, it might fuel them.

The undoubtedly remarkable feature of the debate was that it took place. It was never going to fully satisfy the evident need for an improved public and revealed official understanding of the dreadful complexity of the situation in the region extending from Turkey in the North West to Yemen and the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, in the South East. The same would appear to be true of the extent to which the turmoil in that region is authoring a post-Cold War competition, by proxy, between the US and Russia.

But, the debate will surely prove to be an important marker in the passage towards resolution of the challenges now posed by the disorder in the post colonial Arab world, the need for what could be termed a post Cold War settlement, and the challenges posed to international law and order posed by non-State actors such as DAESH.

Where is the debate in the Australian Parliament? The Abbott government committed Australian military assets to action in both Iraq and Syria without any such debate. Labor acquiesced, for reasons unstated.

Infamously, Prime Minister Howard committed Australia to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, ignoring massive public demonstrations against it and without Parliamentary debate. That invasion is now widely regarded as having stimulated the formation of DAESH.

We now learn from Peter Hartcher’s series, “Shirtfronted” (SMH), that the basis of Abbott’s decisions on these matters was gut instinct.

We have not yet heard from Prime Minister Turnbull on how he might arrive at decisions on matters which might involve Australian forces, although we also learn from Hartcher that Abbott exclude him from membership of the National Security Committee of Cabinet because he knew Turnbull would not support his gut instincts.

In the new circumstances of a growing international coalition against DAESH and the UN Security Council resolution following the Paris attacks, authorizing states to “take all necessary measures”, the Australian people have a right to know what it is the Government proposes to do, why, and what it hopes to achieve. A debate in Parliament would serve that purpose.

 

 

Richard Butler AC, is former Ambassador to the United Nations and Head of the UN Special Commission to disarm Iraq

In their addresses to the UN General assembly, last week, Presidents Obama and Putin focused on the civil war in Syria. Both emphasized the need for the war, now in its 5^th year, to be brought to an end. They both said that a political solution needed to be found, but they differed on a central issue: the role of Syrian President Bashir Al Assad.

The US position widely supported by western and key regional states and, of course, Syrian groups fighting the regime, was that Assad and his government must go. The Russian position was that Assad’s government is the legitimate authority in Syria and it must have a role in any negotiations to bring about an end to the conflict and determine the future government of Syria. Even before Putin’s public address, Obama stated in his, that Assad might be given a transitional role, but could not be left standing at the end. This was seen as a concession by the US. Indeed, conservative critics of Obama decried this as yet another sign of his inherent weakness.

Importantly, both Presidents agreed that it was essential for the Islamic State (IS) to be removed. There was an expectation that, in their subsequent private meeting, they might be able to identify ways in which, despite their differing basic positions, they might forge a political/diplomatic process through which an end to the war was negotiated.

While there was no substantive indication of what took place in that meeting, other events which took place immediately thereafter, were very clear.

Obama invited States prepared to form a coalition against IS to join him in a meeting, which he chaired. Sixty States took part. Australia was one. Extradordinarily, given the history of US/Iraqi involvement, Iraq was not. This group pledged to step up and coordinate action to defeat IS.

Putin announced the formation of a group with a similar purpose. It was formed by 4 States: Russia, Iran, Iraq and Syria. It mirrored the establishment in Baghdad, a few weeks earlier, of a common intelligence and coordination center targeted on the situation in Syria.

Within the same period and while this public political discourse was taking place at the UN, Russia was moving significant military assets, mainly although not exclusively, aerial assets into western Syria.

Three days after the UN speeches and talks had concluded, Russia launched its first attacks on targets on the ground in Syria. They have continued daily since then. Credible reports indicate that their targets have been, in the main, forces opposed to the Assad government, not IS. Russia has not stated why this has occurred, what exactly is intended, for how long or far this military action goes.

But, these things are clear. Russia has now entered the Syrian and regional contest in a significant way. Putin gave some of the reasons for this in his UN speech. Russia is not prepared to accept a world shaped by US power or the notion so favored by the US that is “the exceptional country”. It believes that the west abused the authority given by the UN Security Council to protect threatened citizens in Libya by extending that to regime change in Libya. Russia will never accept external intervention to change a legitimately constituted government.      (See my paper on Russian foreign policy, Pearls and Irritations, January 5^th, 2015)

As ever, in international politics, the stated reasons for extraordinary action, especially military action, are never the whole or real reasons. Naturally, Putin has not highlighted publicly other issues which clearly are of concern to him because of the threat they pose to his hold on power; The existence of potentially jihadist groups within Russia, and his reliance upon support from small but immensely powerful groups in Russia, principally with economic interests.

He is convinced that this pressure demand from him the visible exercise of strength, of strong government, and this in turn, is a crucial element in his wider public popularity.

The Russians and others have watched US bombing in Syria for almost a year and have noticed that its usefulness in “degrading and defeating” IS has been questionable, to say the least, but that the impact of the actions of Syrian rebels, supported by the west have been starting to threaten the Assad regime. It is the latter trend that has more likely stimulated Russian military intervention.

The complexity of the situation in the region, with facets not unlike a rubic cube, is now underlined by immediate reactions to Russia’s military actions and its 4-power coalition.

Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf States see it entirely through the lens of their obsession with the rise of Iran. They take virtually no refugees from Syria, they supply arms and money to the Syrian rebels, the very groups the Russians are now bombing, because they are opposed to Assad, and that because he is supported by Iran. They welcome some of the US’ actions but not necessarily the nuclear agreement with Iran.

Turkey, with its long and troubled border with Syria and what it sees as its Kurdish problem, and its fairly good relationship with Russia, but bitter opposition to Assad, has promoted the idea of a safe, no fly zone, in northern Syria. The entry of the Russian air force into the area has rendered that untenable.

Perhaps above all, the US at least for the current moment seems to have no clear idea what to do, although it has just been reported that it is to increase military support to anti IS forces in Syria. It is now faced with the fact that its main nuclear armed rival has now entered, militarily, into a sphere, the gut politics of which it has thought it controlled, no matter how ineptly, and expected to continue to control. What can be done about the significantly increased possibility of military accidents between them?

The underlying philosophy advanced by Putin at the UN, a conservative, state centered philosophy, has widespread appeal in UN circles and it is in large measure supported by international law. The US/UK/Australia invasion of Iraq in 2003 was contrary to international law. The removal of the Qadaffi regime in Libya was not what the UN authorized. Russia claims that its current military intervention in Syria is at the invitation of the legitimate government of Syria, and if this is so, then it’s legal. The action Russia then takes within Syria may be another matter and, it’s lying about its targets there is a case in point.

Von Clausewitz’s now classic observation that, “war is the continuation of politics by other means”, would appear to be alive and well in Syria today and much of the region in which it lives. It is the approach the US has mostly employed, parlayed as pursuing peace through strength, and the Russians have now plainly adopted.

The trouble with it is that it constitutes a continuum between violence and political settlements. It is always so costly and stupid because the settlement will come, even though it almost certainly will not be the one some would have preferred, yet only after insupportable cost. As Australia has chosen to be a participant in the US led coalition to address problems in Syria and Iraq, indeed has sent military assets there without public or parliamentary debate, we should in these new circumstances, seek respectful inclusion in policy discussion within the coalition. It should not be acceptable for our military simply to be given deployment orders. We should check ourselves any proposed deployments given the shocking errors in the US bombing of Doctors Without Borders in Kunduz.

As, it seems that military competition between the US and Russia in a common theater is now more likely, and this could lead to calls for further engagement by Australia, the task of clarifying the legitimate legal and political means by which Australia decides to go to war has become urgent .

(See www.warpowersreform.org.au)

Richard Butler AC, Former Australian Ambassador to the UN and Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission to Disarm Iraq (UNSCOM)

Within the next ten days, the National Security Committee of Cabinet will discuss the US request to Australia to deploy RAAF assets in bombing IS targets in Syria. Presumably, senior defense, foreign affairs, intelligence and government policy staff will be preparing assessments of such military action for Committee consideration. It would be normal for such assessments to include: the nature, aims and duration of possible military actions, including target selection, their command and control, risk assessment, actions needed in the event of downing of RAAF aircraft, relationship to Australia’s national security and the impact of such action on its international relationships.

Whatever might be a rational preparation of analyses for consideration by Cabinet, Prime Minister Abbott has already stated his preferred position, predictably, in an exclusive interview with The Australian newspaper.

He stated that the US request to Australia is “a very serious request…We’ll take it very seriously” and on the substance of what might occur, the depth of his analysis was to declare that there is no moral difference between attacking sites in Syria from those already subject to attack within Iraq, and on the international legal aspect, national borders for example, he asserted “This (ISIS) is an evil movement whether it is operating in Iraq or in Syria, it is an absolutely evil movement, and in the end, when they don’t respect where the border is, the question is why should we?”

In the light of these declarations from the Captain, the preparation of fundamental analyses of what our reply to the US might be can now stop and be replaced by papers simply describing operational and search and rescue arrangements.

The Prime Minister’s assertion that no difference should be drawn between what is now happening in Iraq and what is planned for Syria, apart from being glaringly wrong, shockingly illogical – justifying a dubious decision by arguing that it’s not as bad as an earlier one – further obscures the fact that the decision to commit Australian military assets to Iraq was itself done without consideration by the Parliament or any consultation with the public.

The absence of any such consultation on the decision by the Howard government to participate in the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the woeful inadequacy of mechanisms through which a decision by Australia to go to war is considered is fully explored by Australians for War Powers Reform. (www.iraqwarinquiry.org.au).

Abbott is continuing the conservative practice that asserts that such matters as Australia going to war are too difficult for ordinary people to understand. Ordinary people did understand Howard’s 2003 decision. They marched against it in Australia’s streets in record numbers, were ignored, and turned out to have been right. That invasion of Iraq violated international law, killed at least half a million people, settled nothing, and is widely regarded as having given rise to the present chaos in that region, including the emergence of ISIS.

Prime Minister Abbott is evidently guided by his belief that our national interest, and his domestic political interest, dictate that we agree to this latest US request. He appears to be amongst the most enthusiastic supporters of the notion first enunciated by Menzies to justify our sending troops to support the Americans in Vietnam, that Australia must have a “great and powerful friend”, and crisply encapsulated by Prime Minister Holt at the height of the Vietnam War; “all the way with LBJ”. According to reports just published and not denied, Abbott in fact asked the Americans to request Australia to undertake this proposed action against Syrian targets. This echoes the action by Menzies in 1962 when he claimed Vietnam had invited Australian participation in the war. This was shown to have been false. Menzies had misled the people and the Parliament. Australia had in fact asked Vietnam to invite it to enter the war. So an infamous conservative tradition is extended.

The idea that we are obliged to align ourselves with the US, abandoning an independent foreign policy, raises among other important things such as our integrity, the risk described by Michael McKinley ( Pearls and Irritations, July 16^th, 2015): “minor powers aligned with major powers share the risks and eventually the significant costs of conflicts that are, at root, derived from a status that is beyond them”.

Virtually automatic commitment to the US’ wars is a prospect that is now almost as limitless as what has become the US’ current continuous commitment to war. On the latter reality, McKinley cites the 2014 report of the Congressional Research Service that, inter alia, between 1990 and August 2014, the US deployed military force 5 times more often than in the prior 193 years.

In Abbott’s version of great and powerful friendism, as is his wont, he has introduced a moralising element. The problem this raises is not to be found in the notion that there is a moral aspect to international relations, but in the entirely inconsistent and dogmatic application of notions of morality employed by Abbott. His attachment to morality in the field of dealing with “the death cult” stands in stark contrast with his sense of morality on a range of other issues: Aboriginal Australians, taxation of individuals and corporations, education, climate and the environment, asylum seekers. The list is well known and brutal.

When the current military commitment to Iraq was announced by the Prime Minister, in April 2015, he rejected the notion of mission creep. Yet, here it is, after only five months. Again, no Parliamentary or public discussion is planned. Abbott will consult with opposition leadership, but Leader Bill Shorten has already signaled his readiness to offer bipartisanship on the issue. A commentary published recently in the Guardian newspaper on the current argument in the UK Labour Party about the prospect of a new leader from the left of the Party, was headlined “What is Labour For”, meaning if not for defending social justice and decency in politics. Indeed.

Leaks from Tony Abbott’s Cabinet indicate that he has been insisting to his colleagues that the key issues for them to remain in power are taxes and national security. What else in new from the conservatives; the conviction that the important human motivations are greed and fear. Abbott is obviously convinced that the latter, in particular, is a winner. So, the drafters of position papers for the National Security Committee can indeed turn off their computers, they have received their basic instruction. The Captain has made his pick, we will again go to war with the USA.

The Americans can be certain of this as, after all, we asked them to ask us to do so. What Abbott may be less able to rely on however, is that in the crucial by-election in Canning, where environmental issues are considered to be very important, his belief that militarism and xenophobia will always work to his benefit may be tested.

Richard Butler AC, former Australian Ambassador to the United Nations, and Head of the UN Special Commission to disarm Iraq.

 

How is it possible that the Australian people: citizens, elected representatives, media staff, academics, to name just some relevant categories, allow the Abbott government to spend $1 billion this year on Australian participation in war in the Middle East, and accept that there is no need for this to be discussed? *

Prime Minister Abbott considered it enough to announce the commitment of 1000 ADF personnel and 8 military aircraft, immediately before they departed, saying that they were going to take part in the US defined and led fight against ISIS. The full majesty of his understanding of the ISIS phenomenon, the situation in the Middle East, and his assessment of the intellect of the Australian voter, has been displayed in his mantra that ISIS is a “death cult, a death cult”, which we must fight.

Abbott is simply continuing what John Howard started 12 years ago with his decision to take part in the US invasion of Iraq. That action violated international law and was based on US claims about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction that were false, fabricated by the Bush Administration and endorsed by Tony Blair. Even John Howard has recently admitted that the WMD data was “wrong”.

Then and now, it seems to be sufficient for us to commit Australian lives and money to war, simply in order to support the US’ actions. And, lamentably, the ALP opposition has acquiesced in, indeed now supports this source of policy determination.

Today, apart from being self evidently manipulative of the politically much favoured notion that we are under dire terrorist threat, the Abbott government’s analysis that there is simply one good side to the conflict in the Middle East, the one we are on, is pathetic: “Team Australia”, as if its all a bit like a footy match.

The situation in that region is the consequence of repeated western interventions for the last 100 years. 2015 has seen the Centenary of Gallipoli, but also of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, in which the British and French divided up the Ottoman Empire.

Among other deeply flawed dispositions, this created Syria and Iraq without respect to precisely the kinds of ethno-confessional conflicts that are now being played out.

The US/UK/Australian/Spain invasion of Iraq in 2003 was seen across the region as consistent with this interventionist history. It is now widely regarded as having provided the impetus for the growth in Al Qaida and the emergence of ISIS.

The purported cure for all of this, as currently envisaged in the US, NATO, and by the Australian Government, is more military intervention. Fix the problem by increasing the dose of what caused the problem.

But, it’s all become much more complicated since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, that is, the decision by Assad to crush protest against his hold on power. His group represents the Alawite minority in Syria, the group patronized by the UK in the Sykes-Picot disposition.

That war has endured for almost 5 years, has killed some quarter of a million people, and driven 11 million into external and internal displacement. The UN has declared it to be the worst refugee crisis since WWII.

The destruction of Syria and the impact of the 2003 intervention in Iraq has seen the entry into a region wide contest by Iran, Saudi Arabia, some other Gulf States, Russia, Jordan, and, Turkey. The non-State groups, in addition to ISIS; Al Qaida, AL Nusra Front etc. have proliferated This is to say nothing of what has obviously been the deep clandestine involvement of Israeli, US, British, French, Russian, and other intelligence services.

The decision, last week, by Turkey to commence direct military action in Northern Iraq and Syria and to allow the US to do the same from Turkey, is a significant development. Its origins are dubious.

The Turkish government did not gain a parliamentary majority in the elections held on June 7^th. It was prevented from achieving this by the substantial support given to the Kurdish based party. It is therefore engaged in negotiations to form a coalition with other parties. But, it has terminated peace negotiations with the Kurdish group in Northern Syria and in its bombing campaign against “terrorist” groups in Iraq and Syria, it is targeting both ISIS and Kurdish groups. NATO has endorsed Turkey’s actions.

It appears that Turkish President Erdogan’s aim is to destroy the influence of Kurdish groups within Turkey so that in a re-run election his Peace and Justice Party (AKP) will win a majority. Within Turkey the AKP caretaker government is contemplating banning the Kurdish party and arresting at least its leader and possibly other members as well, on the ground that they are connected to terrorists.

Consistent with this mess of mixed motives, within the overall region of conflict, there are areas, such as Yemen, where Saudis and Iranians are on the same side and others where they are deeply antagonistic. Similarly, there are areas where, incredible though it may seem, the US is enlisting the support of Al Qaida sympathetic groups. These are merely two examples of a diabolical patchwork. As John Stewart sometimes remarks, “ you can’t make this stuff up”.

On Australia’s role; we have not been told, without propaganda, what interests or values our commitment to war in the Middle East purports to advance, how our effort will contribute, what is its limits, important given the ubiquitous phenomenon of mission creep, when might it end, who’s in charge – us or the US command.

It is a terrible lapse that the ALP opposition has not demanded such explanations and has agreed that a debate in Parliament is not needed. These are distant days from those in which the ALP opposition demanded that the Menzies Government table the invitation it claimed to have received from the Government of South Vietnam to join it in war there. ALP action revealed that there had, in fact, been no such invitation. Menzies had misled the Parliament. Menzies had asked the South Vietnamese Government to invite us, because he believed that this was what the US wanted.

So, here we are again. This time in the Middle East because Abbott and friends believe this is what the US wants. This is the same US that is currently seeking to impose a Pacific Trade Treaty on us, which inter alia, would make pharmaceuticals more expensive in Australia and enable US corporations to sue Australia on the basis that our national policies might be impeding their right to operate without regulatory restraint.

There will be no externally induced solution, military or otherwise to the political and ethno-confessional conflicts in the Middle East. For the US to think otherwise is folly, but that’s perhaps understandable because there remains in the US a widespread reluctance to accept that they did not win the war in Vietnam.

Our participation with the US in this folly will bring us nothing but affirmation in the minds of others that we are a mere clone of the US and, thus possible heightened exposure to external terrorist attack. Above all, it will further retard the urgent need for us to craft an independent Australian foreign policy that serves our national values and interests.

As a first step, the ALP opposition should demand that the Government allow a debate in Parliament on our commitment in the Middle East.

Richard Butler AC is former Australian Ambassador to the United Nations and Head of the UN Special Commission to disarm Iraq.

* For more detail on the $1 billion, see, Anthony Ricketts article, Canberra Times, July 26^th.

 

The Joint Cooperative Plan of Action (JCPOA), signed with Iran by the UN Security Council’s five Permanent members, plus Germany and the EU, (Vienna, July 14^th), is unprecedented. No comparable arms control plan has been as detailed or thorough. Above all, it is vastly preferable to any of the proposed alternative approaches, the main one of which has been war.

If the negotiation of this agreement had failed, there would have been further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, in addition to whatever Iranian capability may have emerged. Israel already has them and Saudi Arabia has been contemplating them. Then, war with Iran, the preferred option in US Republican circles and Israel, would have almost certainly ensued with devastating and global effects, and, war would not have prevented Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capability thereafter, for which it would have been given a massive incentive.

The Plan and its technical annexes comprise some 150 pages. At root, it establishes four pillars:

1. Cutting off Iran’s access to the weapons grade fissile material needed for a nuclear explosive device. 98% of the relevant material it now holds will be removed, 65% of the centrifuges it has employed to enrich uranium will be removed and the core of its reactor at Arak will be modified to remove its ability to make plutonium.
2. The UN’s nuclear Agency (IAEA) will be given an unprecedented level and extent of access to all relevant materials and technologies within Iran to verify its compliance with the Plan. This access by the Agency exceeds the level given to the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) to disarm Iraq.
3. Sanctions on Iran will be phased out.
4. A review and dispute settlement process has been established comprised of the parties to the Plan and the role of the UN Security Council in seeking to enforce compliance with its decisions. The Council already exercises a similar role with respect to reports to it on compliance with the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It was such reports that triggered the existing sanctions on Iran.

JCPOA states that Iran “ reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear weapons”.

On the face of it and in its text, JCPOA is very much an agreement on material and technical matters, but it is overwhelmingly a political agreement. It is for this reason that if it is to be correctly understood and its chances for success are to be usefully assessed, a little of the relevant history needs to be recalled.

The discussion/negotiation on the subject of Iran’s possible attempts to develop nuclear weapons has been going on for 12 years. This originated in the IAEA reporting that it was having difficulty in verifying Iran’s compliance with its obligations as a non nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. The main such obligation is the one Iran has reaffirmed in JCPOA, quoted above: Never to acquire nuclear weapons.

Iran’s conduct had been disturbing and uncooperative and when this was reported to the UN Security Council, sanctions were imposed upon it. The US and the EU also imposed severe sanctions. These significantly harmed the Iranian economy.

On the other hand no unambiguous report that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons had been produced. Indeed, the CIA, in its last two major reports to the US government has stated that it has no evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program.

The motivations to find a negotiated solution to the Iranian problem have been various, but two concerns have been dominant: the wish of the Iranians to bring the sanctions to an end and, the wish of the Obama administration to avoid yet another war in the Middle East and to prevent Israel, from dragging it into a war with Iran.

Back a little further, in 1953, the UK and US external intelligence Agencies staged a coup in Iran removing its democratically elected government. They did this to protect the interests of their oil companies in Iran. They then propped up the Shah of Iran as their preferred Iranian leader until the Iranian Revolution overthrew him in 1979, The revolution instituted an Islamic government and installed Ayatollah Khomenei as supreme leader. Later that year the US Embassy hostage crisis began, lasting 444 days.

The Islamic Republic of Iran retains the system of government established by the Revolution, and continues to insist that the US is hostile to it and has a policy of seeking regime change in Tehran. It has also repeatedly expressed extreme, sometimes terminal hostility, towards Israel.

The Obama Administration has attempted to reset US relations with Iran, but its attempts to do so have been strongly opposed by Republican, Congressional, pro-Israel, and media circles, mainly Murdoch outlets in the US. Their stated preference is clearly for war with Iran. It has been farcical and deceitful that, in such circles, the past role of the US within Iran is never mentioned.

The negotiation of JCPOA also had at least surreal, if not farcical aspects. On one side of the table there were five nations, all nuclear armed. Two of them, the US and Russia possess tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, representing 90% of such weapons in existence globally, and as the negotiations proceeded they each announced plans to enhance their nuclear arsenals.

The position of each of the five, with varying degrees of emphasis, was that it was of supreme importance that Iran not become anything remotely like them. While they insist that their national security demands retention of these weapons, it is inadmissible for Iran to think the same.

Strictly excluded, not simply physically, but also as a subject for deliberation, was the only regional country possessing nuclear weapons – Israel. The staunchest defender of this abuse of the logic of proliferation is the US, which rejects any suggestion that Israel’s nuclear weapons status might encourage others in the region, including Iran, to obtain such weapons.

For reasons such as these, the agreement of Vienna represented a triumph of pragmatism.

The two main motivations, mentioned above, were satisfied, concessions were made all round, none proved to be deal breakers, and a basically sound set of behavioural conditions was established, designed to verify that Iran is not making nuclear weapons.

But, within hours of the agreement being announced, but not yet published, the Prime Minister of Israel denounced it as a mistake of historic proportions, the Republican leadership in the US Congress pledged to reject it, President Obama stated that he would veto any legislation that sought to reject the agreement, and a few days later, in a statement made at the end of Ramadan, the Supreme Leader of Iran said Iran would honor the agreement but did not intend to change any of its other policies, particularly given US arrogance. There was dancing in the streets of Tehran at the prospect of the lifting of sanctions.

It will be a rough ride in the US Congress, Iran will continue to support Shia causes in the region, including the Assad regime in Syria, and the P5+1 and the IAEA will try to make the agreement work in order to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East, all the while continuing to refuse to address the elemental hypocrisy of their own possession of nuclear weapons.

The central lesson of UNSCOM’s experience in Iraq was that the arms control system will work reliably if the subject country will let it work.

So, the outcome for the Vienna Plan will largely be in Iran’s hands.

It will work, if Iran wants to make it so and provided that some others are prepared to let that unfold, given the difficulty that they will clearly have at taking yes for an answer.

Richard Butler AC, Former Head of the UN Special Commission to disarm Iraq, (UNSCOM) appointed by Prime Minister Keating, Convenor of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

Tony Abbott and Julie Bishop have been playing loosely in our relations with Russia even thought those relations are quite modest, at least as far as the Russians are concerned. Threatening to ‘shirt-front’ President Putin is not a dignified way to behave with a major nuclear power.

Our recent behaviour towards Russia underlines that prejudices and rhetoric should be put aside. We should focus on evidence, principles and interest.

Major European powers being close to Russia and with far deeper experience of Russian behaviour do not afford themselves the luxury of playing politics the way we have been in recent months.

The Russian position deserves serious consideration. Richard Butler does this in the following article.  It is more lengthy than usual in this blog but the subject does require in depth consideration. And in a holiday period a longer read may be timely. It is a good read.  John Menadue.      

RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: NOW AND IN THE PERIOD AHEAD

THE CONSTRUCTS OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY.

Under Vladimir Putin, Russia’s foreign policy seeks to realize three fundamental objectives:

1. Rejection of what it assesses has become the post Cold War order, dominated by the interests of the United States;

2. Insistence on a role and status for Russia in international affairs, as a great power whose participation in and influence over the conduct of those affairs is recognized as essential.

3. Enter into a new set of political and economic relationships, not western in orientation, and designed to strengthen Russia at home and in the world.

The West’s insistence that Russia is obligated to conform to standards, both domestically and in its international relations, which are set by western policies and western institutions, is viewed by Russia as aggressive and dismissive of Russian interests and values.

Even more striking, in the Russian view, is the flagrant inconsistency of western actions. Russia sees these as having repeatedly violated those same purported standards. The United States invasion of Iraq, and NATO’s action to change the Regime in Libya, without the authorization of the Security Council, are seen as a prime examples of such behavior.

In October, 2014, in a presentation to the Russian International Affairs Council, President Putin spoke directly to Russians concerns about what it sees as imperious behavior:

“ The Cold War ended, but it did not end with the signing of a peace treaty with clear and transparent agreements on respecting existing rules and standards. This created the impression that the so called ‘victors’ in the Cold War had decided to pressure events and to reshape the world to suit their own needs and interests. If the existing system of international relations, international law and checks and balances got in the way of these aims, this system was declared worthless, outdated and in need of immediate demolition” (1)

In his second term as Russian President, Vladimir Putin has constructed  Russian foreign policy, in pursuit of the three fundamental objectives described above.

That he is determined to pursue these objectives is clear, and particularly his refusal to accept a uni-polar world, based on American leadership:

“ Today we are seeing new efforts to fragment the world, draw new dividing lines, put together coalitions not built for something but directed against someone, anyone, create the image of an enemy as was the case during the Cold War years, and obtain the right to this leadership, or diktat… The situation was presented this way during the Cold War… The United States always told its allies: ‘We have a common enemy, a terrible foe, the centre of evil, and we are defending you, our allies, from this foe,and so we have the right to order you around, force you to sacrifice your political and economic interests and pay your share of the costs for this collective defense, but we will be the ones in charge of all it all, of course.’ In short, we see today attempts, in a new and changing world, to reproduce the familiar models of global management, and all this so as to guarantee their (the US’) exceptional position and reap political and economic dividends.” (2)

While Putin’s policy determination is very clear, equally clear are: the divisions within western policy circles on how to respond to these circumstances, including Russia’s refusal to comply with western demands; the disarray within the American polity, and thus external policy formulation; and, the current proliferation of complex international political issues.

What needs to be underlined is that, during the period since the Maidan Revolution in Kiev, a major conflict of interests, between Russia and the United States, has, again, become a key dynamic in international relations.

On the Russian side, key sources of its deep dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs in international relations, has included the following:

1. While significant actions were taken to construct a post Cold War system for common security: Treaty on the reunification of Germany; the Helsinki process on mitigating the Cold War, beginning in 1975 which led to the establishment of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1994; the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1977, in which it was declared that “NATO and Russia do not consider themselves to be adversaries”; the US never the less commenced a series of unilateral actions which deeply disturbed Russia. For example; the partition of Yugoslavia and Serbia, the illegal invasion of Iraq, US withdrawal from the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and failure to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the application of the UN Security Council resolution on Libya, passed under the principle of the responsibility to protect, to instead, change the regime in Libya.

2. In spite of the undertakings given to Russia at the time of the reunification of Germany that there would be no eastward expansion of NATO, the alliance has expanded to the borders of Russia.

3. The US insistence, at the level of the President that it is “the exceptional country”, which Russia takes as meaning that the US does not feel bound by international law; a view which has some basis in fact.

President Putin addressed the notion of US exceptionalism, among other issues, in his Op-Ed published in the New York Times on September 11^th, 2013, responding to President Obama’s address to the Nation on the situation in Syria:

“ I would rather disagree with a case he made on American exceptionalism, stating that the United States’ policy is ‘what makes America different’. It’s what makes us exceptional”. It is extremely dangerous to encourage people to see themselves as exceptional, whatever the motivation.” (3)

In his address to the Nation on December 4^th, 2014, Putin accused the West of extreme hostility to Russia, to the point of attempting to dismember it.

WESTERN POLICIES

The major western concern about Russian policy and actions has arisen in the context of the crisis in Ukraine. The West has expressed alarm about Russian intervention in the Ukraine, inter alia on the ground that it violates Article 2.4 of the UN Charter, which forbids the ”use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state”; and, the incorporation of Crimea into Russia, on the basis of a referendum, the legality and authenticity of which was clearly dubious.

These actions are seen as breaching a deeply important principle, widely accepted in Europe, that the agreements reached at the end of the Second World War (the UN charter, the Treaty of Rome), put and end to any alteration of national borders by force.

There were also a series of agreements, some taking a number of years to be reached, which covered a range of post World War II, borders: the Oder-Neisse line between Poland and the GDR, the border between West and East Germany, the Soviet Union and the Baltic States, for example. All of these, together with the question of the status of Berlin were managed between the West and the USSR on what could be called a basis of equal participation.

The situation entered a new phase with the reunification of Germany, in 1991 and the coming to independence of 15 former Soviet Republics, including Ukraine, in 1991. The issue of Ukraine’s status as a nuclear weapon state (several thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons had been stationed in Ukraine) and its future security was immediately addressed by it and the depository States of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of nuclear Weapons. (US,UK,Russia)

Ukraine decided to repatriate those weapons to Russia, and join the NPT as a Non Nuclear Weapon State. In return, the depository States signed the Budapest Memorandum of 1954 in which they undertook to guarantee Ukraine’s security.

Another important event, consequent upon the dissolution of the USSR, was the assurance given to Soviet President Gorbachev by the United States, that if he agreed to the reunification of Germany and accepted the inclusion of Germany in NATO, the alliance would not move further east than Germany. Gorbachev accepted this.

Clearly, the Budapest Memorandum is now dead, following the events of the past year in Ukraine, and both Russian and Western  intervention in them. In addition, NATO has now been joined by three Former Soviet republics and four States previously members of the Warsaw pact and has, thus, moved well east of Germany, right up to the Russian border. Signficantly, the Ukrainian Parliament, elected in November 2014, immediately expressed support for Ukraine joining NATO.

The situation in Ukraine remains unresolved and continues to be a source of significant dispute between the West and Russia, neither of which are likely to, easily, soften their position. However, it is widely regarded that the likelihood of direct military conflict, war between, NATO for example and Russia, over Ukraine is unlikely.

While there is growing division of opinion within Western circles about the appropriate policy to pursue towards Russia, on sanctions for example, there remains abiding concern about the principle of borders not being able to be changed by force.

It is not clear how far Russia will act to secure its Ukrainian objectives. Putin, appears not to want major armed conflict. It would appear to be far too costly, in every respect, and in any case may not resolve things. But, nor does he want to give up important Russian objectives, including that of not accepting Western authority in determining issues of major importance to Russia. This school of thought posits that his preference will be for a continuation of an unresolved state of dispute, a so called “frozen conflict”, in Ukraine.

Possibly serious sources of restraint upon Putin maintaining conflict with the West over Ukraine are: the impact of sanctions on the Russian economy, the attitude of key Russian stakeholders in that economy, as expressed by them to Putin, what the ordinary people will accept; in other words the impact of sanctions upon standards of living.

THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY

The Russian economy is a developing rather than a relatively fully developed one. It was recognition of the failure of the command economy, and that Russia was slipping backwards, that led President Gorbachev to begin significant reforms in the USSR, which then contributed to its dissolution. Putin has declared that dissolution to be  one of history’s great mistakes.

Currently, the World Bank ranks the Russian economy as the world’s ninth largest, by nominal GDP, and sixth largest by purchasing power parity in 2014.

Russia has produced advanced goods, particularly in the aerospace sectors, but it has a widely scattered population, which in both rural and urban settings, includes a substantial portion of people who are poor, by any comparable standard, and live with a parlous level of infrastructure. Its middle class has grown, but the economy is in many respects a classic dual economy, in which those with economic means and those without operate in two very different spaces.

For the latter group, the social support structure of the Communist period, for example free education and health services have largely disappeared. This is of virtually no importance to the small but massively wealthy group of people, the so called oligarchs, who have built private sector economic interests, following the end of what was virtually total State control of the economy. They have done this with the consent of the Government, starting during the period of Boris Yeltsin but continuing under Putin. The extent to which they invest in Russia’s social and economic development is mixed at best.

It is important to note that Russia is not alone in being a dual economy. Many western states share this characteristic. For example, some 18% of the US’ population live below the official poverty line.

The current demographic profile of Russia is of immense importance to its economic prospects. It is assessed that in 1995, Russia entered into “ a black demographic patch” of population decline. The gap between deaths and births was 1 million people. In recent years, Russia’s population has declined by between 0.6-0.7 million, each year. This is attributable to: decreasing fertility rates, increasing mortality rates and population aging. This demographic situation puts pressure on the economy, principally with respect to the availability of labor, but also in terms of the maintenance of demand.

While there is a growing middle class in Russia and overall, standards of living have increased under Putin/Medveydev, serious problems, such as  imposed as a consequence of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, are hitting Russia hard. This is particularly the case with respect to the major source of wealth generation for Russia, its export of hydrocarbons.

The sanctions have led to the cancellation of the South Stream pipeline to deliver gas to Europe. This was at the direction of Brussels and cost Russia $50 billion. Russia has attempted to replace this through a gas delivery agreement with Turkey, of more limited yield and at reduced price.

For the longer term, in October Putin signed a gas delivery agreement with China worth $400 billion. But, it requires substantial investment for its development, the sources of which are not established, and has a lead  time of some 10 years before its impact will be felt in the Russian economy.

Russia’s need of investment is of basic importance and as a consequence of sanctions, the rate of foreign investment has declined substantially, mainly as western banks have become averse to investment in Russia. Moody’s rating Agency has moved Russia to marginally above junk bond status. In addition, capital flight from Russia, disinvestment, has grown to a record level of $85 billion in 2014. Russia was obliged, in December 2014, to make payment of $40 billion to service sovereign debt, in circumstances where national currency reserves are declining.

The inevitable consequences of these trends have occurred: the value of the Ruble has collapsed. During the last year it has lost at least 40% of its value, and price inflation has doubled. The Russian Ministry of Economic Development has estimated, this week, that the economy will contract by 0.8% next year and that both household disposable income and GDP will decline by 2.8%.

Worst of all for Russia’s prospects, the price of oil continues to collapse. It has fallen nearly 50% since June 2014 and may fall further. This is of the deepest importance for Russia as every reduction of $1 in the per- barrel price brings a drop of $2 billion in revenue for Russia.

Possibly symbolic of the pressures upon the economy, as being felt by ordinary people is that buckwheat, a staple of the Russian diet, has doubled in price and in parts of Russia has disappeared from shop shelves. This has, in fact, largely been the result of bad weather but coming at the time of sanctions and price inflation generally, it has possible political implications.

These are significant trends and there are persistent reports that senior figures in the economy, both within Government and in the private sector, are expressing anxiety to President Putin.

On the micro level, daily life is becoming tighter for citizens although one notable consequence of the new circumstances is that many citizens are entering into import replacement; growing, farming, manufacturing domestically, goods and commodities people need, in replacement of formerly imported goods. In some measure, this is a positive development for Russia. President Putin made this point in his address to the nation on December 4^th, 2014.

Ironically, in some limited respects, sanctions could prove to be positive for the internal economic and social development of Russia. It would, in fact, be consistent with the overall experience of sanctions in a variety of countries in the past. When large economic interests are targeted, such as Banks, sanctions can prove to be effective, although always mitigated by cheating. But, as far as the bulk of the people are concerned, while sanctions cause pain, people find solutions and they often rally to support their government. This was the case with sanctions in Iraq from 1991 to 1999.

EU sanctions are causing concern to some of its members and they are breaking ranks. Hungary, a member of both EU and NATO has violated EU policy by entering into an agreement with Russia on the construction of a nuclear power plant and, Finland has also signed a nuclear energy development agreement with Russia.

Russia is now working towards replacing some of its significant economic dealings with the West with new relationships in the East and South: the BRICS, established in 2010, (the cooperation agreement between Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) China as a major bilateral partner, Turkey, the Shanghai Cooperation Council, established in 1996, ( Russia, China and four former Soviet Republics in Central Asia) and within its own sphere, the Eurasian Union (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) which will be launched at the beginning of 2015, providing a common market and possibly include the adoption of a common currency. Kyrgizstan is likely to join the Union.

It must be emphasized however, that there will be no early result for Russia in replacing reliance on western markets and western sources of finance. In many respects, the prospect of significantly diminished economic interaction with the main EU States – German industries, UK Banks, could border on a disaster for Russia.

Even so, the possibility remains that the West could lose from Russia’s turn away from it, but to what extent and how seriously this will be taken is yet to be calculated. No calculation is required in predicting that divisions within the West, on relations with Russia, will emerge.

The critical questions that arise in conjunction with the strong relationship between foreign policy and the economy are those of: the balance between policies designed to win approval on a nationalist basis, such as the annexation of Crimea and the price paid for such policies in terms of sanctions and political isolation; and, at what point does the combination of heightened nationalism and the associated resentments of others on the one hand, with rising economic hardship on the other, translate into bellicosity.

Going to war is both intrinsically costly and a stimulus to domestic production but the reasoning or sentiment which comes to prevail can be: We are being treated so badly that there is little to lose from attacking those who have so seriously harmed us, our situation can barely be worse; and we can, by our actions, rectify it and salvage our national self respect.

While this may seem exaggerated, such reasoning is not unknown in history and, it must be said, that the level and style of propaganda currently being deployed in Russia with respect to the West; xenophobic and nationalist, is characteristic of situations which, in the past, led to war.

Clearly, a solution to the situation in Ukraine is needed and attention must be then given to problems within the Russian economy, although obviously this will not include manipulating the price of oil. That is determined by a combination of market forces and OPEC production decisions.

In a paper on: Russia’s Future in the World Order, prepared for the 2014 annual meeting of the Russian International Affairs Council, the scholar Ivan Timofeev observed:

“ The contemporary world order may appear to be paradoxical. On the one hand, we see a steady dynamic of social and economic development. In other words, there is no great shortage of resources that could lead to large-scale conflicts and violent change of the existing order. On the other hand, there are several powers in the world whose political relations and security policies may shake and overturn the world order, Russia is among such powers….. Russia’s position among great powers today is fairly vulnerable. While the country’s political resources are great, these resources are only converted into development in a limited way. The connection between Russia’s global weight and its potential for solving its own social and economic problems is tenuous.” (4)

PUBLIC SENTIMENT IN RUSSIA

The sentiment of the Russian people towards the official narrative in Russia is being measured repeatedly. The current form of that narrative is: Russia, led by Putin, has acted to prevent the West and it’s Nazi collaborators in Ukraine from seizing Ukraine; it stood up to them and rescued Crimea; for this and its attempts to defend the Russian people of the Donbas it is being punished with sanctions; Russia, in other ways too, is being treated with unacceptable disrespect; it is a great power and will never accept this; it rejects US attempts at dominance and a world based on proclaimed US leadership and exceptionalism; Russia is building new relationships, such as with the BRICS, the Shanghai Consultative Group, and is forming the Eurasian Union; and these will build a new and fairer global system, with better outcomes for Russia.

The people are told that, consistent with Russia being treated disrespectfully and in bad faith by the West, led by the US, economic punishment will be imposed on ordinary people, at least for a while.

The people are asked to accept this. For now, they are apparently ready  to do so and on the issue of how do you rate the job President Putin is doing, he is presently recording approval ratings in the 80% range.

Putin must be concerned, however, about the views of the small but powerful owners/managers of major Russian private sector corporations. One sign of this has been his banishing, incarcerating, stripping of the power and assets, of senior executives who have been reluctant to comply with his decisions. Although some of his opponents and those who have suffered losses under him, have condemned his policies, his actions seem, for now, to have relieved pressure on him. There have been loyalists willing to step into the positions thus opened up, and presumably the rewards that attach to them.

It is impossible to speculate accurately about whether or when a point will be reached when influential individuals may approach President Putin to explain, perhaps menacingly, that he and his policies can no longer be afforded. But, there have been some signals of this possibility and, it is now officially predicted that Russia is moving into recession.

THE MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY

It is clear from the public discourse in both Russia and US, that cultural and spiritual values, deeply at odds with each other, are in play.

In Russia, the perceived greatness of its long history, the orthodox culture, its spiritual nature, all in their traditional conservative forms, support a powerful nationalism, which Russians will not allow to be trashed. Putin has invoked this with great credibility. Opposed to this is seen the lazy, self- indulgent West, legalizing drugs, tolerating widespread pornography and, approving same-sex marriage. That such people would purport to lead others, tell Russians how to live, is rejected officially.

Putin has drawn significant support from the Russian Orthodox Church leadership. The control over the Church exercised by the State intelligence agencies, during the period of atheistic communism, has not only ended, but Putin has specifically deepened cooperation between the Church and the Kremlin. A number of agreements have been signed between the Church and government ministries on matters of policy, ranging from international relations to public morality.

For example, the Social Affairs Minister has rejected as unthinkable any suggestion that sex education be taught in Russian schools, saying that such teaching would violate traditional Russian values. This is the policy of the Church.

Patriarch Kiril appears prominently at public events with Putin, demonstrating the strength of the relationship with the State. Putin prominently attends important Church services. These actions and Putin’s stated policy of ensuring “ closest cooperation with religious organizations” echoes the earlier Byzantine tradition of common purpose between the State and the Church. This is in sharp contrast to the role in support of reform of government, or even revolution, that was played by the Church, only thirty years ago, in: Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and East Germany.

This relationship has at its core, the assertion of Russian national identity and patriotism. Putin’s elemental political identity is that of a staunch nationalist and, to some extent, populist. His attitude towards the Church underlines that identity.

This has specific internal political utility given the challenges to central authority flowing from: the situations in Chechnya and Dagestan, in Russia, and South Ossetia and Abhazia in Georgia, and in Ukraine. Putin seeks to justify Russian actions in these areas of conflict and challenge to Russian authority by reference to notions of cultural as well as territorial and political integrity. The Church has been made basic to that notion of sovereign integrity and Russian-ness.

A major lever deployed by Putin for the exercise of social control, and the formation and expression of opinion, has been his reassertion of strict control of mass media. Media organizations allowed to work are obliged to broadcast government approved news and interpretations. Many go beyond this and create their own narratives, reports, designed to demonstrate their faithfulness to the government and to Russia’s purposes.

Social media is widely utilized by individuals not only for personal messaging but also as an alternative source of information to the official sources. As a consequence, the government has repeatedly sought to restrict the operations, and content of social media.

These circumstances are a cause of serious concern both inside Russia and internationally. It is sensible to recognize, however, that a parallel phenomenon exists in the west, particularly the US, with respect to Russian issues. Censorship and shaping of opinion is clearly carried out much less blatantly in the west, but it occurs, and this is noticed in Russia and viewed as propaganda.

Much of such propaganda is conducted through public media, on both sides, and on both sides it is signaled that there are notions that are clearly not acceptable, within the public discourse. Unfortunately, gross characterizations of “the enemy” are not amongst these, but questioning of the purposes of one’s own Nation are.

The salient point to make here is that, at present, attempts to forge a dialogue based on facts and evidence, freed from a priori national purposes and stereotypes, is struggling. This is typical of situations which, in the past, have spun out of control.

THE WESTERN REACTION.

On western policy more broadly, it has three main structural elements: the US, the European Union, and NATO. The basic point about this Troika is that there is internal tension between the three elements.

While the EU has progressively transformed itself into a continent wide supranational institution, with all of the elements of government: legislature, judiciary, bureaucracy, and a range of standard setting Treaties, it experiences on a continual basis substantial tension between members of different weight and outlook. These tensions have been pronounced on the issues of both Ukraine and overall relations with Russia.

It is safe to predict that the EU would split over any suggestion of serious conflict with Russia and indeed, internal questioning of the sanctions policy is continuous. In this context, it is worth recalling that the fundamental motive for the establishment of the EU was to ensure that serious war would never again arise in Europe.

NATO is another matter. It is, in an elemental sense, all about war, deterring it and when necessary waging it, collectively.

The Treaty provides, in it’s 5^th article, that an attack on any member will be considered an attack upon all. It’s not clear how seriously this is taken

by Russia. For example, if Russia were to move to protect the Russian speaking population of Estonia, now a NATO member, from suppression by the government in Tallinn, would NATO then attack Russia, pursuant to Article 5?

This introduces the particular role of the US. It is very attached to NATO. It provides its military command and a good deal of the lethal hardware. It conceives of its doctrines. There seems to be a good measure of support for US approaches, as the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales showed, from the UK and the newer, smaller, apparently more insecure States members, but a smaller degree of enthusiasm for its doings from France, for example.

Finland, which remained neutral during the Cold War, is now undergoing a lively debate on whether it should join NATO, in the light of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its pattern of military incursions in the Baltic space. Were it to join NATO, the Alliance would again move closer to Russia’s borders.

The relevant point in the present context is, what does Russia think and calculate about this Atlanticist structure? At least one point is clear: As long as this hostile Troika exists, aimed at Russia; the US having withdrawn from the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, and refusing to postpone further anti- missile system development, Russia calculates that it will need to maintain an effective array of nuclear weapons, targeted at both Western Europe and the US.

The issue of nuclear weapons is a serious, yet under discussed aspect, of the current stand-off between Russia and the West. The facts are that in violation of policy undertakings and Treaty obligations, both the US and Russia, during the last year have: authorized new nuclear weapons development/renewal, involving massive expenditures and, Treaty obligations for critical nuclear material management, inspections, and missile testing, have been broken.

A NEW WORLD ORDER AND GOVERNANCE?

What are the elements of a new world order or system of governance that Russia appears to want to see replace the present system?

The obvious first priority would be a reduction in the role played by the US. This is, of course, almost exclusively in the hands of the US and it’s very difficult to imagine how this could be brought about from outside the US. The only way the US would moderate its behavior, listen more to others, share authority and decision making, would be if it came to the conclusion, from within, that such action would be in the best interests of the US. Everything we witness from the current state of the US polity, points in precisely the opposite direction.

It could be said of Russia that it is in something of a symmetrical position, especially given the extent to which Putin has played upon nationalist and traditional sentiments within Russia. But there is a difference and it could be important.

What needs to be examined is precisely how much of the current system Russia wants to revise. Its detractors in the US charge that it wants the lot, to dominate, but this would appear to be hyperbole.

What President Putin has said is:

“ The allegations and statements that Russia is trying to establish some sort of empire, encroaching on the sovereignty of its neighbors, are groundless. Russia does not need any kind of special, exclusive place in the world – I want to emphasize this. While respecting the interests of others, we simply want for our own interests to be taken into account and for our position to be respected”. (5)

Statements of a general character, such as this one, are only illuminating to a limited degree. But, it is important that it has been made and can serve as a basis for testing what can be achieved, practically.

For example a key instrument for global governance, in the vital area of peace and security, is the UN Security Council. The community of nations overwhelmingly believes it needs reform. Given the rules of the Charter this cannot happen without the consent of its five permanent members. In practice, this can be narrowed, or at least in the first instance started off by the US and Russia indicating that they are open to change.

That reform has two obvious parts: the constituency is too small and does not reflect the post-colonial and now post Cold War world. A new composition of the membership is needed to make it representative of the contemporary and foreseeable world.  A new decision making methodology is also needed: should there be vetoes, if so, which States should hold them, in what circumstances should they be able to be used?

Perhaps President Putin had something innovative in mind when he said in October 2013;

“ In the light of the fundamental changes in the international environment, the increase in the uncontrollability and various threats, we need a new global consensus of responsible forces. It’s not about some local deals or division of spheres of influence in the spirit of classic diplomacy or somebody’s complete domination. I think that we need a new version of interdependence.” (6)

On the other hand, in his Op-Ed in the New York Times in September 2013, President Putin referred to the Security Council in terms supportive of its present configuration:

“ The United Nations’ founders understood that decisions affecting war and peace should happen only by consensus, and with America’s consent the veto by Security Council permanent members was enshrined in the United Nations Charter. The profound wisdom of this has underpinned the stability of international relations for decades”. (7)

This is not the position of a person who wants to change the system. Instead it suggests that President Putin is, in fact, not as much concerned about the need to establish systems of governance and cooperation amongst nations that are fit for the purposes of the modern world, but rather that he would simply prefer better outcomes for Russia from the existing system.

He would hardly be alone in such pragmatic thinking; indeed many argue that pragmatism is a good guide. A corollary of this is that Russia’s interests should be addressed pragmatically, not ideologically.

What is glaringly absent from the view Putin expressed in this Op-Ed is the fact that all of the permanent members of the Security Council, including the USSR/Russia have repeatedly abused the system for their own ends, causing a serious collapse in confidence in the system itself. It is this behavior, which a clear majority of Member States of the UN believe, needs to change.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. Twenty five years after the end of the Cold War, President Putin says he is convinced that the systems under which international relations and global governance are conducted today, harm and inadequately respect Russia.

2. He rejects forcefully the triumphalism the US expresses for having “won” the Cold War. In particular, he rejects, indeed seems repulsed by, the notion that the US is the “exceptional country” and what is implied by that notion, particularly, that international law and rules do not apply to the US.

3. Russia feels threatened by the policies and actions of the Atlanticist institutions: US/EU/NATO. The promises made by them have been serially broken and always in directions that have been regarded as hostile to Russia.

4. Russia will pursue vigorously the establishment of a new set of political and economic relationships, principally in the East, to the exclusion of the West. President Putin does not seem to have anxieties about what some have called an emerging Pax Sinica, in replacement of the reviled Pax Americana. These relationships will have an almost immediate political effect but they will be slow in delivering prosperity.

5. The Russian economy faces major challenges, particularly given its demographic profile. These challenges are being substantially expanded as a consequence of the sanctions currently applying to Russia and the sharp drop in the price of oil and the devaluation of the Ruble. The question of how Russia will work through these circumstances, without recourse to international conflict, is a crucial one.

6. Russia claims it wants to see a revision of the system and framework for the conduct of international relations, which will be fairer and establish a new degree of interdependence. At this stage this is a rhetorical claim, not yet given substance.

7. It is important to note that much of President Putin’s stated concerns are rejectionist – a list of the things of which Russia disapproves and will not accept. There have been few if any concrete, positive, new proposals by Russia.

8. A solution to the Ukraine problem is likely to be found, without major war, because that would be too costly and not provide a solution. But, it will not be found without a respectful consideration of Russia’s interests.

9. If the Russian economy descends into significant hardship and loss, and if this leads to an increase in xenophobic nationalism within Russia, the possibility of recourse to war, for example in Ukraine and Russia’s “near abroad” will grow.

10. As long as nuclear weapons exist, great care needs to be exercised in threatening the use of force. Neither the US nor Russia have been clear enough about this in the recent period and, indeed, their actions in strengthening and expanding their nuclear weapons systems should be a cause for serious concern.

Notes: 

(1) V Putin: Valdai Speech, Sochi, October 25^th, 2014.

(2) V Putin, Op cit.

(3) V Putin: New York Times, September 11^th, 2013.

(4) Ivan Timofeev: World Order or Anarchy, Working Paper 18/24, Russian International Affairs Council, October 2014.

(5) V Putin, Op Cit.

(6) V Putin, Op Cit.

(7) V Putin, New York Times, September 11^th, 2013.

Richard Butler AC is a former Australian Ambassador to the UN and now distinguished scholar, International Peace and Security at Penn State University.