Category: Immigration

  • JOHN MENADUE. Attacks on refugees tell us more about Malcolm Turnbull than Peter Dutton.

    Power doesn’t always corrupt. Power can cleanse. What I believe is always true of power, is that power always reveals.’ Robert Caro.

    Peter Dutton has ‘form’, so his comments about refugees although disgraceful are not that surprising.

    The big disappointment has been Malcolm Turnbull who described Peter Dutton as ‘an outstanding immigration minister’. Instead of a firm rebuke from our Prime Minister, Dutton got praise and with his winsome way with words Malcolm Turnbull even suggested that Peter Dutton was being ‘demonised’.

    (more…)

  • SPENCER ZIFCAK. PNG Supreme Court Trumps Detention on Manus Island and Australia’s High Court too. It is regrettable that Australia does not have a similar Bill of Human Rights

    In the latest legal saga to beset the Government’s troubled offshore processing program, the Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea declared that the mandatory detention of asylum seekers from Australia on Manus Island was unconstitutional. The Court held that the detention of some 900 men on Manus violated the right to liberty guaranteed by PNG’s Constitution.

    A closer look at the decision discloses just how far the Australian and PNG governments have been prepared to go in conspiring to keep asylum seekers, travelling by boat to Australia, out of the country and incarcerated indefinitely offshore. (more…)

  • CARMEN LAWRENCE. When in doubt, rewind to the politics of fear.

    Peter Dutton now makes no distinction between asylum seekers and refugees who come through regular or irregular channels. He now demonises all refugees. John Menadue.

    It has been an article of faith for the Coalition that “real” refugees from UNHCR camps dotted around the globe deserve our compassionate support while the “illegal” asylum seekers who try to arrive by boat are little more than cashed up opportunists who deserve to be exiled in remote camps; object lessons to other would-be intruders. (more…)

  • JOHN MENADUE. Never underestimate a survivor, but Peter Dutton obviously under estimates refugees. They may be ‘takers’ in the early years, but they become great contributors.

    The following are extracts from a blog I posted on 27 June 2013.  John Menadue

    As responsible members of the human family, we have a strong moral case to provide protection for refugees who are the victims of persecution and violence.

    There is also a strong case in our own self-interest Refugees are almost by definition risk-takers and entrepreneurial. It can be argued that refugees are amongst the most highly motivated and determined in the Australian community. (more…)

  • ARJA KESKI-NUMMI. Peter Dutton should know better – rather than demonise refugees we should stand tall and proud of what we have achieved over the past 70 years.

    The problem with refugees and asylum seekers is that they are not us – so it is OK to demonise them. Dutton is not dog whistling when he puts people into boxes describing them as “these people”, asserts that they are barely literate or numerate in their own languages, can’t speak English and at the same time says they would take Australian jobs and at the same time assert that they will languish on the dole and Medicare! You can’t have it both ways Mr. Dutton. (more…)

  • Our better angels.

    Wasim Buka was sentenced recently on two charges of people-smuggling.  He came to Australia as a boat person and has settled in Australia.  Unfortunately, two of his brothers were executed in Iraq and one sister, following in his footsteps to Australia, drowned along with her husband and five children in the waters between Australia and Indonesia.

    Her Honour Judge Hampel decided to release him upon a recognizance release order to be of good behaviour for a period of two years. He was released on a $1,000 bond.

    See the link below for the full transcript of Judge Hampel’s decision. It is a succinct and moving judgement.  John Menadue.

    http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VCC/2016/75.html

  • ‘Refugees don’t self-harm because of me, Peter Dutton, they self-harm because of you.’

    One of the many disappointments of Malcolm Turnbull’s prime ministership is that he reappointed Peter Dutton as Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. This disappointment is reinforced by his attempt to blame refugee advocates rather than his own policies for the self-harm of asylum seekers.  Sarah Smith, a supporter of refugees, tells of the heartbreak she feels at the pain inflicted by Peter Dutton.  But he blames others.

    See link to article by Sarah Smith in The Guardian of 5 May 2016. John Menadue.

    http://gu.com/p/4tqv5/sbl

  • Kerry Murphy. Blaming refugees.

    Blaming instances of self-harm by refugees and asylum seekers on ‘refugee advocates’ or the undeserving asylum seekers is not a new political tactic. Back in 2001 then Minister Ruddock was interviewed by Four Corners about the problems of self-harm by asylum seekers in detention, especially in Curtain, Woomera and Port Hedland detention centres. Journalist Debbie Whitmont asked the Minister Philip Ruddock how he explained the number of cases of self-mutilation in Australian detention centres.

    PHILIP RUDDOCK: I think there are a variety of explanations, and I think the principle explanation is that there are some people who do not accept the umpire’s decision, and believe that inappropriate behaviour will influence people like you and me, who have certain values, who have certain views about human rights, who do believe in the sanctity of life, and are concerned when people say, “If you don’t give me what I want, I’m going to cut my wrists.”

    DEBBIE WHITMONT: Are you saying they’re doing it to attract attention?

    PHILIP RUDDOCK: I’m saying that there are some people who believe that they will influence decisions by behaving that way.   …the difficult question for me is, “How do I respond?”

    Because I think if I respond by saying, “All you’ve got to do is slit your wrist, “even if it’s a safety razor — ” — which is what happens in most cases — “..you’ll get what you want.”

    DEBBIE WHITMONT: Do you accept that these people are showing a certain desperation?

    PHILIP RUDDOCK: Well, I mean, you say it’s desperation, I say that in many parts of the world, people believe that they get outcomes by behaving in that way.” (http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/s344246.htm)

    More recently in 2014 then Minister Morrison was quick to blame the Save the Children workers for self-harm incidents in Nauru:

    “They are employed to do a job, not to be political activists. Making false claims, and worse allegedly coaching self-harm and using children in protests is unacceptable, whatever their political views or agendas,”

    “The public don’t want to be played for mugs with allegations being used as some sort of political tactic in all of this.” (http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/scott-morrison-rejects-call-for-apology-to-save-the-children-staff-deported-from-nauru-20150323-1m5eao.html)

    After the Moss report cleared the Save the Children workers in 2015, the Minister refused to apologise to workers who were forced to leave Nauru because of allegations, which he broadcast, but were later found to be without merit.

    Then we have the self-immolation of two refugees from Nauru, and the response of the Minister:

    “I have previously expressed my frustration and anger at advocates and others who are in contact with those in regional processing centres and who are encouraging some of these people to behave in a certain way, believing that that pressure exerted on the Australian government will see a change in our policy,” (http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/scott-morrison-rejects-call-for-apology-to-save-the-children-staff-deported-from-nauru-20150323-1m5eao.html)

    Many reports of psychiatrists and psychologists have confirmed that mandatory detention and temporary protection visas acerbate and may even be causative of post traumatic stress disorders (PTSD). In a 2006 report, Dr Steel and Dr Silove and others noted in the British Journal of Psychiatry:

    The present study suggests that both prolonged detention and temporary protection contribute substantially to the risk of ongoing depression, PTSD and mental health-related disability in refugees. The independent influence of these two risk factors remained robust after controlling for other variables previously identified as risk factors , including female gender, greater age, extent of past traumas, length of residency and family separation. (BRITISH JOURNAL OF P SYCHIATRY ( 2 0 0 6 ) , 1 8 8 , 5 8 – 6 4)

    After the self-immolation of a refugee in Manus in April 2016, UNHCR was also been critical of such policies:

    “There is no doubt that the current policy of offshore processing and prolonged detention is immensely harmful. There are approximately 2000 very vulnerable refugees and asylum-seekers on Manus Island and Nauru. These people have already been through a great deal, many have fled war and persecution, some have already suffered trauma. Despite efforts by the Governments of Papua New Guinea and Nauru, arrangements in both countries have proved completely untenable.

    The situation of these people has deteriorated progressively over time, as UNHCR has witnessed firsthand over numerous visits since the opening of the centres. The consensus among medical experts is that conditions of detention and offshore processing do immense damage to physical and mental health. UNHCR’s principal concern today is that these refugees and asylum-seekers are immediately moved to humane conditions with adequate support and services. (http://unhcr.org.au/news/unhcr-calls-immediate-movement-refugees-asylum-seekers-humane-conditions/)

    How does the Government respond to such reports and criticism? It is ignored because to do otherwise means the people smugglers are back in business and people die at sea. This is the default mantra that is repeated, as if that trumps all sensible analysis and debate.

    Maybe we should listen more to the health and international experts, and also to the refugees themselves. Our policies are stuck in the ‘Stop the Boats’ slogan and fail to look at the consequences of harsh and punitive policies. These policies are punishing people who are not just awaiting a decision on their case, but are found to be refugees and therefore legally entitled to international protection.

    Before he set himself alight, the Iranian refugee Omid Masoumali reportedly said to those nearby:

    “This is how tired we are,” “This action will prove how exhausted we are. I cannot take it any more.”

    Kerry Murphy is solicitor specialising in immigration and refugee cases.

     

  • John Zaw. No end in sight to Rohingya suppression in Myanmar.

    The hardline Buddhist Arakan National Party (ANP) that holds a majority of seats in Myanmar’s religiously divided Rakhine State has promised to fight any attempts to grant up to 1 million stateless ethic Rohingya citizenship.

    For the new National League for Democracy (NLD) government in Myanmar, the first civilian administration in the country in more than five decades, the issue of Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine poses one of its most formidable challenge.

    While the NLD’s landslide win in the November 2015 election has brought optimism to the Rohingya community, its leader Aung San Suu Kyi has been silent on the issue.

    International rights groups have criticized her for failing to speak out for the Rohingya, even as local NLD lawmakers have admitted they must tread carefully.

    Yanghee Lee, United Nation’s special rapporteur on Myanmar, in her annual report submitted to the UN in March, has given the NLD-led government 100 days to improve conditions for Rohingya Muslims.

    But the government, which officially took office in April, is yet to reveal its policy on the Rakhine state issue publicly.

    Pe Than, a lower house parliament member from ANP in Rakhine, said that they will cooperate with the NLD-led government for the state’s development but will stand for the people’s desire on nationalism and on Bengalis — the name given to the Rohingya by many people in Myanmar including government lawmakers.

    “We have much concern that ethnic Rakhine people would be overwhelmed by rapid population growth of Bengalis,” Pe Than told ucanews.com.

    “The NLD-led government doesn’t need to bow down to international pressure on prevailing human rights in Rakhine as we have lived with our own sovereignty for decades,” Pe Than who has been twice elected from Rakhine State told ucanews.com on April 28.

    Awaiting ‘right timing’

    The recent boat tragedy, where at least 21 people died, shows a restriction on the freedom of movement by Rohingya despite the state of emergency issued by the previous government in 2012 being lifted on March 29.

    Win Naing, an NLD lawmaker in Rakhine State parliament said that that the central government will eventually decide on how to tackle the Rakhine crisis.

    “It is a very delicate and sensitive issue for the new government and especially a big challenge for Rakhine’s chief minister,” Win Naing said.

    “If we move on right now, unexpected problems may occur and engender further opposition as nationalism is growing,” he said adding that the ANP is “closely monitoring” the steps the NLD is taking in this regard.

    Still, Win Naing said he understands that confining more than 150,00 people to refugee camps for almost five years is not appropriate nor good for the development of Rakhine State — besides tarnishing the image of the state and country.

    “It is the legacy of the previous governments that failed to solve the issue but the new civilian government can’t neglect and delay this,” Win Naing added.

    Nationalism versus human rights

    The Rohingyas remain in often squalid internal displacement camps –with little access to healthcare, education and employment since deadly violence between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in 2012.

    Aung Win, a Muslim elder from Bume village near the camps, was hopeful that the government had considered the Rohingya issue and drawn up a plan already.

    “But they are waiting for the right time to move on their plan as they might face strong opposition from nationalist groups and the Buddhist hardline party,” he said.

    “I think the view of Rakhine people would also need to be considered, so the new government, military and Rakhine people need to discuss tackling the issue together,” he told ucanews.com.

    Win Naing, the NLD lawmaker, pointed out that “if we emphasis on nationalism too much, the development of our Rakhine State may be delayed.”

    Hatred and bigotry toward the minority Rohingya have been deeply rooted in Rakhine.

    In recent years there has been growing nationalism spearheaded by hardline groups such as the Ma Ba Tha that is led by senior Buddhist monks.

    Hundreds of Buddhist nationalists, including monks protested at the US embassy in Yangon on April 28 denouncing the word “Rohingya” which was used by the embassy’s statement of condolences for those who died in the recent boat tragedy.

    By not recognizing ‘Rohingya’ and referring to them as “Bengalis,” Myanmar’s governments have implied that they are illegal immigrants from neighboring Bangladesh, despite vast numbers of them having lived in Myanmar for decades.

    The controversial 1982 citizenship law denies citizenship for Rohingya and so rights groups have repeatedly called for amending the law.

    Pe Than said that Rohingya would need to be scrutinized by the 1982 law and those deemed to be citizens get the right to move freely in the country.

    For those who are not deemed as citizens, it is the responsibility of the government on where they were to be lodged. “We would strongly oppose and fight against any NLD plan to amend the citizenship law,” Pe Than said.

    This article was first published in UCANews.com

  • Arja Keski-Nummi. Manus – “The Worst Angels of Our Nature” 

    The PNG Supreme Court decision has again thrown into stark relief the bankrupt nature of Australia’s asylum policy and the disingenuous way that both sides use trite slogans such as “ saving lives” and not “starting up the people smuggling business” as justification for their cynical and inhumane policies.

    People working with asylum seekers and who have processed and resettled refuges from within and outside of Australia have all urged Australian political parties to find a way to return to a bipartisan policy based on treating all people with dignity and common human decency, even if in the end they are not found to be refugees. But this has fallen on deaf ears.

    Despite many experienced commentators in the past day offering reasonable policy advice and approach it is clear from the statements of both parties that they will not take such advice.

    The scene has been set. Cynical political calculations ahead of a July election trump good policy or treating people humanely. Indeed, one could argue that there is a de facto bipartisan policy – one based on cruelty and selfishly inward looking in its intent.

    Asylum policy does not change many votes, handling the economy, education, health and industrial relations does. However the Government knows it does them little harm to raise the spectre of uncontrolled boats. Equally the Opposition is stuck in its defence of its decision to reopen offshore processing centres and then, in the heat of an election campaign in 2013, to extend that to no resettlement in Australia.

    This seismic shift in Australia’s asylum policies and its abrogation of any moral responsibility towards people who have reached its territory is deeply troubling. It is not clear that this genie can easily be put back into the lamp.

    This unseemly debate sits uncomfortably with anyone who actually looks outward – we live in a interconnected world, more than ever people are on the move because of diminishing economic opportunities, civil war and other conflicts, environmental degradation and exploitation and a combination of all of these factors in any one cohort.

    We should not be squabbling over 800 men stuck on Manus, shifting the responsibility to PNG and offering to throw money in their direction to make the problem go away. There are perfectly reasonable and common sense approaches to resolving the status of all those on Manus. The Howard government did just this with the remaining Nauru population in 2005-6.

    There are over 50 million displaced people globally, Australia’s issues with asylum seekers does not amount to a hill of beans – so focused are we on Manus and Nauru that we have not yet honoured our small commitment to resettling Syrian refugees from the Middle East.

    Both parties could make a difference by agreeing to take a reasonable bipartisan approach by working to resettle people found to be refugees and building a stronger regional cooperation framework – taking the politics out of an issue that demeans us all.

    But this will not happen, because both major parties are focused on narrow, immediate political gain.

    Arja Keski-Nummi was formerly First Assistant Secretary in the Department of Immigration and Citizenship. Her primary responsibility was in the field of humanitarian and refugee programs.

     

  • Frank Brennan SJ. Manus Island proposal.

    Asylum seekers on Manus Island should be brought to Australia and processed.  Those who are refugees should be permitted to stay in Australia.

    Neither the Liberal Party nor the Labor Party agree. The race to the bottom and the race against time is now on as the country prepares to go into election mode on or about 12 May 2016.  The Labor Party is adamant that the Rudd government’s MOU with PNG was posited on the firm understanding that the processing and resettlement of the asylum seekers would be done and dusted within 12 months.

    So here is my proposal for consideration by the major political parties.

    Before the Turnbull government goes into caretaker mode, it should move the asylum seekers to Christmas Island for processing.  To move more than 850 single men to Nauru would be highly irresponsible behaviour, no matter how much money we were prepared to offer Nauru.

    The government should guarantee that all refugee claims for this cohort would then be determined within 12 months, ie by 12 May 2017.  The government should also guarantee that all those proved to be refugees will be resettled within 18 months, ie 12 November 2017.  For many of these people, that will have meant a five year delay between initial detention and resettlement.

    The Labor Party should then endorse the plan so that there is bipartisan commitment to the plan before the election commences.  Both parties need to accept that they were in government when their ministers knew or ought to have known that the initial MOU was posited on illegal, unconstitutional activity by the Government of PNG.  If resettlement places cannot be provided for any proven refugees in this cohort by 12 November 2017, there will be no option but to resettle them in Australia.

    Fr Frank Brennan SJ
    Professor of Law

    Australian Catholic University

  • Frank Brennan. Cheque book solution on asylum is unconstitutional

    A bench of five justices of the Supreme Court of Justice, the highest court in Papua New Guinea, has unanimously ruled that the detention of asylum seekers on Manus Island is unconstitutional.

    The successful applicant in the case was Belden Norman Namah, the PNG Leader of the Opposition. Unlike the Australian Constitution, the PNG Constitution contains a list of basic human rights including section 42 which deals with ‘liberty of the person‘. That provision states that ‘No person will be deprived of his personal liberty‘ except in specific circumstances.

    Back in 2001 when John Howard’s government instituted the first Pacific solution, there was only one exception which came even close to dealing with the deprivation of liberty of asylum seekers being brought to PNG and detained there. That was section 42(1)(g) which permitted deprivation of liberty ‘for the purpose of preventing unlawful entry’ into PNG.

    But it was a long stretch of the bow to argue that this provision could cover the entry into PNG of persons brought there with the PNG government’s agreement on receipt of a cheque from Australia.

    The Australian government and its lawyers have been on notice about this illegality for 14 years.

    When the now grandfather of the House of Representatives Philip Ruddock was Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, he made a habit of criticising Australian judges whom he thought too soft on asylum seekers wanting to vindicate their legal rights in court.

    At the same time, he had gone ahead instituting Australia’s first edition of the ‘Pacific Strategy’ for warehousing asylum seekers offshore. I wrote to him on 9 June 2002 saying:

    ‘Despite your recent adverse comments about the Australian judiciary, I note that you have not refuted my concerns about the legality of the Pacific Solution preferring simply to observe that no court proceedings have been instituted in Nauru and that the action in PNG was struck out for non-appearance of counsel on 6 May 2002.

    ‘I concede that the PNG government may well have issued conditional visas to the detainees on Manus Island but any visa with a condition amounting to detention would still be unconstitutional.’

    Mr Ruddock replied on 22 August 2002:

    ‘I note your continuing concerns about the legality of the government’s Pacific Strategy. The constitutionality of the arrangements for accommodation of asylum seekers in Nauru and Papua New Guinea is a matter for the governments of the countries concerned.

    ‘It is relevant to note, however, that to the extent that the asylum seekers in those countries are subject to restrictions on their freedom of movement, those restrictions were imposed by the legislation of Nauru and Papua New Guinea respectively.’

    Needless to say, the constitutionality of arrangements was not the province of the governments of Nauru and Papua New Guinea. The thing about constitutions is that they bind governments and even parliaments, and they are definitively interpreted not by governments but by courts. Legislative restrictions have to comply with constitutional constraints.

    In 2003, I published the first edition of my book Tampering With Asylum. I wrote:

    ‘The detention of asylum seekers is contrary to the constitutions of Papua New Guinea and Nauru. Imagine if every first-world country decided to engage in this sort of unlawful people trading.’

    After Kevin Rudd revived the Pacific Solution on 19 July 2013 and once Tony Abbott perfected it on his election as prime minister, the PNG government decided to amend its Constitution to try and legalise the detention second time around.

    In 2014, the PNG parliament purported to amend the Constitution by adding a further exception to section 42, thereby permitting deprivation of liberty for the purpose of holding a foreign national under arrangements made by Papua New Guinea with another country’.

    “Just because Australia does not have a constitutional bill of rights, that is no excuse for our governments exporting their cavalier disregard for human rights to our mendicant neighbours.”

    Unlike the Australian Constitution, the PNG Constitution permits the parliament to amend the Constitution without the need for a referendum of the people. But the PNG Constitution does specify that amendments to the Constitution paring back constitutional rights can only be made subject to strict conditions in relation both to the content and form of the new law.

    In relation to the content, a new restriction on an existing constitutional right can be legislated only if it is necessary to advance defence, public safety, public order, public welfare or public health, or if it is necessary to protect the rights of others, or if it is necessary to resolve a conflict of rights.

    In all these cases, there is a need to establish that the proposed law ‘is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society having a proper respect for the rights and dignity of mankind’. The proposed law legalising detention of asylum seekers sent from Australia did not get to first base according to the judges.

    The judges, having quoted UNHCR’s adverse report on the Manus Island Processing Centre, agreed with the Leader of the Opposition’s contention

    ‘that treating those required to remain in the relocation centre as prisoners irrespective of their circumstances or their status save only as asylum seekers, is to offend against their rights and freedoms as guaranteed by the various conventions on human rights at international law and under the PNG Constitution’.

    In relation to the form of the new law, it needed to state the purpose for which it was made and to ‘specify the right or freedom that it regulates or restricts‘. The court ruled that the new law ‘did not specify the purpose of the amendment or the right which it purported to limit. On that ground alone the amendment is invalid and should be declared so.’

    So the law aimed at legalising long term detention of the asylum seekers being held in the Manus Island Processing Centre was struck down. It’s unconstitutional.

    Yet again, Australia has been complicit in its Pacific neighbours (PNG and Nauru) prostituting their Constitutions and undermining the rule of law in exchange for a fistful of dollars, with hapless asylum seekers, most of whom are ultimately proved to be refugees, being left to languish.

    Just because Australia does not have a constitutional bill of rights, that is no excuse for our governments exporting their cavalier disregard for human rights to our mendicant neighbours. The PNG judges thought their legal reasoning would be even more compelling ‘if the conditions of detention are such as to damage the rights and dignity of the detainees or, worse, cause physical or mental suffering’.

    “So the spiral of abuse continues until ultimately Australia convenes a royal commission to get to the bottom of our complicity in the abuse of asylum seekers and trashing of the rule of law in our region.”

    These asylum seekers now have a claim for damages for wrongful detention. The PNG court has ordered that ‘both the Australian and Papua New Guinea governments shall forthwith take all steps necessary to cease and prevent the continued unconstitutional and illegal detention of the asylum seekers’.

    No doubt we will hear unctuous pleas from Australian ministers that Australia was not even a party to the court proceedings. Our government was no more involved in the unconstitutional detention of these asylum seekers than was Channel 9 in the attempted abduction of the children in Lebanon last fortnight. So the spiral of abuse continues until ultimately Australia convenes a royal commission to get to the bottom of our complicity in the abuse of asylum seekers and trashing of the rule of law in our region.

    Of course, Peter Dutton, the Australian Immigration Minister says these asylum seekers and proven refugees being detained on Manus Island ‘won’t be coming to Australia’. For months now he has been insisting that the 263 asylum seekers here in Australia awaiting return to Nauru after medical treatment must be sent for fear that their remaining in Australia might send a message to people smugglers.

    That cry is starting to ring hollow. The boats have stopped, and they will stay stopped. And those 263 are still here.

    Not only should those 263 be allowed to remain; those 850 held in detention on Manus Island should be brought to Australia under an agreement whereby they receive prompt processing and resettlement in exchange for their agreeing to drop their substantial damages claims for unlawful, unconstitutional detention in unconscionable conditions on Manus Island.

    It’s time to close the Manus Island Processing Centre and to allow PNG to return to the rule of law. It’s better that Australia cut its losses now, rather than waiting for the inevitable royal commission which will lay bare the long term cost of what has been done in our name.

    And have no fear, the boats will stay stopped provided only that our defence and intelligence services do their job in cooperation with Indonesian authorities.

     

     

    Frank Brennan SJ is professor of law at Australian Catholic University and Adjunct Professor at the Australian Centre for Christianity and Culture. This article was first published in Eureka Street on 27 April 2016.

    Footnote:  Incidentally, it’s worth noting that one of the main two judgements in the case was written by Justice Higgins, one time Chief Justice of the ACT.  The ACT has its own Human Rights Act, so His Honour is well familiar with the jurisprudence required to interpret the human rights provision in the PNG constitution.  John Menadue.

     

  • John Menadue. Slogans or advocacy.

    At the last election, Tony Abbott gave us a long list of slogans.

    One of them was to ‘axe the tax’. And he did axe the carbon tax. But it was a serious mistake. With the continuing strong evidence of global warming, we badly need a carbon tax or an ETS to reduce carbon pollution. In addition to reducing our capacity to reduce carbon emissions, axing the tax meant that the Commonwealth Budget lost $7.6 b. p.a. in revenue. The slogan won the day. The losers were the planet and the budget.

    Tony Abbott said that he would ‘cut the budget deficit’. But we now know that under his leadership and that of Joe Hockey, the budget deficit has doubled over the forward estimates. Budget repair is still essential if we are to reduce annual interest payments and be in better shape to face possible global economic recession or collapse. The simplified slogan of cutting the deficit has not been delivered.

    Tony Abbott said that he would ‘eliminate the debt’ but net government debt has increased by almost $100b in the last two years. Yet Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull tell us that they are superior economic managers.

    Tony Abbott and Scott Morrison said that they would ‘stop the boats’. They didn’t. And it seems likely that Malcolm Turnbull in his commitment to ‘continuity and change’ will continue to make the claim that the Coalition stopped the boats.

    The facts tell us something quite different about how the Coalition triggered an increase in boat arrivals in the first place and then did not stop the boats. But the slogan ‘stop the boats’ served its political purpose and an uncritical media accepted then and continues to accept the Coalition’s spin that it ‘stopped the boats’.

    Forgive me for stating the facts again, as Peter Hughes and I set out in two posts in December 2015, ‘Slogans versus facts on boat arrivals Part 1’ and ‘Slogans versus facts on boat arrivals Part 2’.

    There are two important issues relating to boats.

    The first is that the action of Tony Abbott, Scott Morrison, together with the Greens, in opposing the Malaysian Arrangement, opened the door for a dramatic increase in boat arrivals from about four boats per month at the time the Malaysian Arrangement was rejected in September 2011, to 48 boats in July 2013.

    The second is that the decision of the Rudd government in July 2013 to refuse settlement in Australia of anyone who came by boat resulted in boat arrivals falling from 48 in July 2013 to 7 per month in December 2013 when the Abbott government’s Operation Sovereign Borders commenced.

    By December 2013, boat arrivals had fallen dramatically.

    The Abbott government was only involved in the end-game and in a very marginal way. It was the Rudd government’s decision of July 2013 that was the game-changer and not Tony Abbott’s Operation Sovereign Borders and a few turnbacks to Indonesia. Yet Tony Abbot and now Malcolm Turnbull contend that they stopped the boats. The facts just do not show that at all.

    When he became Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull promised us ‘advocacy rather than slogans’. He told us that there would be a ‘more mature and adult conversation’ about important issues.

    Whether it is on boats or negative gearing, we are seeing a continuation of slogans and very little mature conversation.

    Disappointments continue to mount.

  • Richard Woolcott. A modern Australia for the 21st century.

    Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has said it is a great and exciting time for Australia.  Indeed, it is a time of great opportunity for the Australian Government elected later this year to take bold action which will transform Australia into an updated, modern member of the Asian and South West Pacific Region.

     

    After World War II the United States wanted to implement ideals and practices it believed should be applied throughout the world.  The spread of democracy was the overarching goal.  Now, however, the United States, exhausted by unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, now faces the rise of States with greater economic growth rates and rapidly expanding middle classes, such as China, India and Indonesia in our own region, and a more assertive Russia which regards itself as both a Pacific and an Atlantic power, as well as countries such as Brazil and Mexico in South America.

    From 1948 to 2000 will probably be seen as a brief period of history when global order was based on American idealism and traditional concepts of the balance of power.

    America wanted to expand a co-operative international order of countries following common rules which included liberal economic systems, respect for national sovereignty, and the general adoption of democratic systems of governance.
    Western “rules” of world order are no longer  accepted by other major countries as the basis of world order.  United States leaders, with the possible exception of Donald Trump who ,for the wrong reasons, seems reluctant to accommodate the major changes in power now underway.

    The goal for leaders in our region – Asia and the South West Pacific – must be to build a regional community which will reflect the world ahead.

     

    On the basis of more than 60 years of experience, including Special Envoy roles for both Coalition and ALP Prime Ministers, I would strongly recommend that the incoming Government after our General Election demonstrates the agility and forward-looking approach to respond to change.

    Such changes will be resisted by yesterday’s political leaders including, in particular, Abbott, Andrews and others on the far right of the Coalition and even some ALP politicians, including Stephen Conroy, the Shadow Minister for Defence.  To maintain policies rooted in the past, will undermine our ability to determine what Australia’s real national interests are.

    What needs to be done?  The first priority in updating Australian Trade and Security Policy is to focus on the Asia and South West Pacific Region.  In what is now generally called the Asian Century we should focus on our own region.

    The former Indonesian Ambassador to Australia, Sabam Siagian, and now Editor in Chief of the Jakarta Post, wrote last year when Tony Abbott was Prime Minister “Australia is still stuck in the 20th Century mode.  It is a monarchy, with a Head of State in London and its security arrangements are largely Cold War relics … Australia is out of sync with the emerging geopolitical environment of Asia today”.

    Australia needs a fundamental change of our national psyche focussed more on Asia and the South West Pacific than on our well established, traditional links with the US, UK, Canada, NZ, and Europe.  Australia should have much more regular and sustained discussions with our neighbouring counties, including New Zealand.

    Secondly, the Government should look discretely towards the evolution of an Asia Pacific community.  Meanwhile ,we should use existing organisations that do meet at Head of Government level, such as the G20, APEC (although it does not include India), the East Asian Summit (which now includes both the US and Russia), the UN Leaders Week in New York, and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (although they are a relic of British Colonialism ,some Asian leaders attend and discuss regional issues ).

    Thirdly, the above policy will require an updated and more balanced Australian approach to the relationship between the United States and China.  There is a danger that adversarial attitudes towards China, based on mainly Japanese policies, could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  The present debate on China seems mainly to assume that Australia has no choice but to support American primacy in Asia against what is perceived as a rising Chinese hegemony.

    This is a simplistic approach which has been challenged by Hawke, Keating, the late Malcolm Fraser and most of our former Ambassadors to China as well as a number of academics.  While China can be expected to resist American hegemony in the Asian region, it does accept a continuing and constructive US role in Asia.

    Fourthly, Australia should not take sides on China/Japan or Vietnamese, Malaysian and Philippine disputes within ASEAN, on rival territorial claims, as the U S has done. Australia’s focus should be on unimpeded passage to China through waters in the South China sea.

    Fifthly ,and Importantly in readjusting the main focus of Australian policies, we should withdraw our forces from Iraq and Syria.  Our presence in the Middle East will not contribute meaningfully to defeating ISIS or to securing stable, democratic, corruption free governments in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Our involvement was in support of the American alliance, although US policies appear to be failing.  The reality is that our participation is peripheral and symbolic.

    We should move out of this very complex, changing kaleidoscope of warring Sunni, Shiite and Kurd religious factions  and involved countries, including Saudi Arabia, Iran , Yemen, Iraq, Turkey and Syria. We should not pretend to ourselves that we can really influence an outcome, which may be years away. The considerable financial savings could be much better used in shaping our next budget, including on defence (submarines),health and education.

    Sixthly, we should remove our remaining troops in Afghanistan. While there were reasons for joining the US led invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, 14 years later, with 40 Australians killed, over $550 billion spent and more than 13,000 Afghan civilians dead, objectives once deemed to be indispensable, such as national building and effective counter insurgency, have been downgraded or abandoned because there are no longer adequate resources, time or a publicly supported US will to achieve them.

    Seventhly, we should avoid, in our references to the ISIS, suggesting that it is a State. It is not a State. It has no air force or navy and even the territory it controls in Iraq and in Syria is relatively limited.  There is a tendency to regard all terrorist activities as being conducted by ISIS. In fact, Al Qaida, the Kurds and other groups ( e g Boku Haram in West Africa ) have been  responsible for a number of recent terrorist activities.The ISIS probably welcomes this insofar as it is Western intervention in the Middle East which it believes leads to an increase in terrorism ,rather than a lessening of it.

    Eighthly, a very important policy priority for Australia is to give a greater priority to Indonesia.  In the long term no bilateral relationship will be more important to Australia than that with Indonesia.  The stability, unity and economic growth, of a peaceful, predominantly moderate Muslim (81 %) nation of 250 million people, stretching across our North, a distance from Broome to Christchurch in New Zealand, is vital to Australia.  The empathy towards Australia evident in the 1980’s and early 1990’s needs to be rebuilt ,especially with the relatively new Indonesian President Joko Widodo.

    Ninth, the elected Australian Government should place the Republic back on the front burner.  An Australian Republic will increase Australia’s international standing as a more independent nation.  Continuing foreign perceptions of Australia as a Constitutional Monarchy whose Head of State is the Queen on England ( quaintly called here the Queen of Australia )and who’s flag is dominated by the Union Jack are anachronisms in the 21st Century.  The establishment of the Republic of Australia will be like Federation – a defining moment in the history of our country.  This is not simply a symbolic issue.  It lies at the core of our national and international identity.

    Tenth, and in the same context, we should call our High Commissioners Ambassadors and our High Commissions Embassies, which is what they really are.

    To conclude, Australian attitudes must reject and suppress religious intolerance, bigotry, latent racism, insularity and self-satisfaction. The Australian Government, to be elected later this year, should seize the opportunity to embrace the changes outlined above – major, and as difficult politically as they will be. If it does, Australia will be a more secure, prosperous and outward-looking modern nation, genuinely more welcomed in our region of the world, and internationally.

    If we do not make these bold policy changes, we may find Australia left behind and wallowing in a bog of lost opportunities.

    Richard Woolcott was Australian Ambassador to Indonesia and the Philippines, and High Commissioner to Malaysia, Ghana and Singapore. He was Australian Ambassador to the UN and President of the UN Security Council. He was Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade from 1988 to 1992.

  • ‘We are the forgotten people’; the anguish of Australia’s invisible asylum seekers.

    Nearly 29,000 asylum seekers are in Australia on temporary ‘bridging visas’. These people may be free from detention but – with many denied education, healthcare and the right to work – they remain locked in desperate poverty and with no idea what their future holds. See link below to an article in The Guardian Australia. The preparation of this article was assisted by the Asylum Seekers Centre in Sydney and other organisations and people across Australia.

    http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/apr/13/we-are-the-forgotten-people-the-anguish-of-australias-invisible-asylum-seekers

  • Graeme Hugo, Janet Wall and Margaret Young. Migration between Australia and South East Asia is a two-way process.

    Migration flows between countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Australia are generally viewed as going in one direction: toward Australia. In practice, however, data on this migration system reveal a much more complex picture that includes Australian emigration, significant temporary movements in both directions, and close connections between the two regions even after migrants permanently return to their country of origin.

    Australia has experienced significant inflows, particularly in the post-war period; almost half of its population of 23.2 million is either foreign born or has at least one immigrant parent. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it is usually regarded as a traditional destination country, drawing students and skilled workers from around the world and across the ten-member ASEAN region. Australia also sends a significant number of emigrants out from its shores. The last official estimates, back in 2003, put Australia’s diaspora at approximately 750,000. Unpublished Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) data reveal that for every two people who moved permanently to Australia from the ASEAN region between 1991 and 2013, one person moved in the opposite direction.

    To cast Australia as a destination country and ASEAN members as sending countries thus oversimplifies this regional migration system and fails to recognize the multidirectional movement taking place. Migration flows vary significantly across ASEAN countries, and over time. For example, while flows to Australia from Malaysia and Singapore have remained constant over time, Indochinese refugees dominated flows in the 1970s and 1980s. More recently, migration from the Philippines has increased. Recent trends in part reflect a shift in Australian immigration policy away from encouraging settlement toward drawing skilled (temporary) labor migration. Today most emigration from Australia to ASEAN destinations is to the fastest-growing economies, such as those of Singapore and Malaysia. Return migration to Vietnam is notable, while few are going back to Myanmar or the Philippines.

    Aside from permanent movements, DIBP data reveal significant levels of temporary mobility between Australia and the ASEAN region, in both directions. These include the movements of new settlers, visitors from Southeast Asia, Australian residents with roots in Southeast Asia, and former Australian residents from Southeast Asia who have permanently left Australia. Many ASEAN-born Australian settlers and residents make at least one overseas trip per year; more than half of those who once resided in Australia make at least two trips to Australia per year. The data also record nearly 600,000 nonresident ASEAN nationals traveling repeatedly to Australia, with 78 percent making at least one trip a year. These data on temporary mobility reveal the circular nature of migration flows between Australia and the ASEAN region, and indicate the strong ties that nonresidents, former residents, and current residents maintain simultaneously with both Australia and their country of origin.

    Migration flows between Australia and the ASEAN region are mostly skilled. Most ASEAN residents migrate to Australia as students, or through skilled temporary worker programs. This is reflected in the educational profile of the ASEAN-born population in Australia, compared with the native born: 35 percent of the ASEAN-born population has a tertiary-level degree, compared with around 15 percent of the native-born population. Migration flows in the opposite direction are similarly highly skilled. Of those who permanently move from Australia to the ASEAN region, most work as skilled professionals (38 percent), managers (21 percent), or technicians (13 percent). Given that many ASEAN countries are experiencing skilled labor shortages, policies to engage with diaspora members and encourage skills circulation are crucial.

    Evidence on migration flows between Australia and the ASEAN region reveals that many ideas about return migration are outdated. Traditionally, return migration has been thought to primarily comprise retirees returning home after a career working abroad, or “failed” migrants who could not make a success of their time overseas. Data for returning Australian and ASEAN nationals contradict such beliefs. Most migrants returning to Australia are in their 20s, 30s, or early 40s, with return rates falling with the 40-to-44 age group and older cohorts. Most migrants returning from Australia to the ASEAN region, meanwhile, are of working age (the highest return rates are found among the 30-to-49 age group), and are often accompanied by their young children. There is clearly a window of opportunity for expatriates in their 30s and 40s to seriously consider returning to their country of origin.

    Meanwhile, considerable improvements in communications and the reduced cost of international travel mean that expatriates can significantly contribute to their country of origin without having to permanently return. This offers major opportunities for development in the ASEAN region—and improved economic links between Australia and Southeast Asia. A growing number of diaspora engagement policies encourage the temporary or even “virtual” return of expatriates, recognizing the valuable contributions they can make while settled overseas. Policymakers can seek to tap the potential of diasporas in a number of ways, such as by encouraging them to send remittances, providing them with investment opportunities in their homeland, encouraging diaspora trade with (and exports to) destination countries, and facilitating technology and information transfer back to the homeland.

    The Australia-ASEAN migration system offers prime lessons for transatlantic sending nations. Unlike many countries, Australia records the movements of individual migrants in and out of the country, along with their motivations. Such data provide a remarkable opportunity to analyse migration patterns in this region. They show that international migration increasingly consists of temporary and repeat cycles of movement, and is far from a zero-sum game. Contemporary migrants maintain close ties with both sending and destination countries, potentially opening up new economic and development opportunities for both, regardless of where they choose to permanently settle. Rather than viewing emigration through the lens of “brain drain,” and focusing efforts solely on encouraging expatriates to permanently return home, policymakers in sending nations should instead try to better engage diaspora members—wherever they may be—to benefit from their accrued skills, experience, and networks.

    This is excerpted from the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) report, The Southeast Asia-Australia Regional Migration System: Some Insights into the ‘New Emigration’, which can be read in full here.

    This article by Graeme Hugo, Janet Wall and Margaret Young is run as a tribute to Graeme Hugo who died recently after an outstanding contribution to Australia’s understanding of migration.  John Mendue

     

  • John Tulloh. Erdogan leads Turkey back to the Ottoman era.

         It is the time of the year when we have our annual bout of sentimental reflection on the heroics of the Anzac forces at Gallipoli a century ago. One of the Turkish military commanders whose resistance wore down the Anzacs and other allies was Kemal Ataturk, who went on to be the founder of modern Turkey in 1923. His name remains so revered in Turkey for modernising his country and transforming it into a secular state that insulting his memory is a criminal act.

    Ataturk would be startled at what is happening to his country today. His vision has gone into reverse. The U.S. conservative Breitbart news website has this to say about the man in his footsteps, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan:

    He has been ‘using his political clout, both as prime minister and now as president, to reverse the country’s direction. He seeks to undo the miracle Ataturk created in Turkey, returning it to its old Islamic ways. Clearly, Erdogan hopes this redirection will eventually place him in the seat of power abandoned by the last Ottoman sultan. Just as Ataturk was a catalyst in Turkey’s independence movement, Erdogan has proven to be a catalyst in its Islamic movement’.

    The Turkish leader is certainly a man of the moment. His country, a NATO member, is no longer the democratic example the West hoped it would represent to its Arab neighbours. Nor is it the dependable bulwark for Western interests against threats from the neighbourhood. Turkey is beset by terrorism, most of it blamed on Kurds, who make up 20% of the population. They are more restless than ever in their quest for autonomy. Erdogan is more active than ever in cracking down on them. For him, the Daesh activity just across the border in Syria is a secondary matter. Indeed his critics accuse him of supporting it. Then there is tension with Russia after the downing of one its jets. Moscow has imposed sanctions which have hit Turkish business and tourism. Ankara hoped the lifting of sanctions against Iran would lead to more business and tourism except Tehran has cosied up to Erdogan’s enemy in Damascus. Many liken Erdogan to Vladimir Putin. Both are bullies, says Daniel Pipes, of the Middle East Forum.

    Yet Erdogan has given shelter to 2,500,000 Syrian refugees, more than any Arab nation, adding 3% to Turkey’s population and causing domestic disquiet. He has agreed to take back asylum-seekers who head to Greece seeking refuge within the EU in return for the EU to take an equal number of refugees off his hands. EU members were so relieved to remove the threat of being overrun again that they wasted no time in agreeing to Erdogan’s excessive financial demands. Not once did they clear their throats and mention their saviour’s increasing crackdown on long-established freedoms, especially concerning the media and judiciary. Erdogan was now Europe’s best friend, said Der Spiegel.

    Erdogan is a wily figure. As a member of an Islamist party, he was elected Mayor of Istanbul in 1994. He gave an inkling of his attitude in 1998 when he read a religious poem that said of Islam:

    The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers’. 

         It was provocative enough to put him in prison for a spell. But when he became Prime Minister in 2003, he impressed Western allies with his Ataturk-like vision. He brought about an economic recovery, expanded universities and urged more women to be admitted, oversaw investments in infrastructure which created new roads, airports and a high-speed train network and reached an accord with the Kurds. Even the unworldly President George W.Bush was impressed.

    However, he later neutralised the military which in the past has intervened when political matters got out of hand. Slowly he imposed a growing Islamic influence on daily life and his guiding hand turned into a clenched fist. Hijabs became a common sight. Bar-tending classes and alcohol advertising were banned. So was smoking in public places. Court decisions were ignored. The constitution which stipulated the president must be above politics was disregarded. Journalists reporting government corruption were locked up, tv stations closed down and newspapers questioning his authoritarian rule taken over by government acolytes. Insulting Erdogan is now a criminal offence even in your own home.

    Unsurprisingly, Erdogan has grandiose visions for his own role as Turkey’s leader or, as is becoming increasingly apparent, dictator. As president, he took over a palace meant for the prime minister on land donated by Ataturk in Ankara for public use. It’s for the Turkish people, he declared. The fact it consisted of at least a thousand rooms was not enough for Erdogan. He is said to be adding another 300 for his own use with an elaborate security bunker.

    Erdogan greeted one visiting leader at the palace with guards dressed in Ottoman-style uniforms. ‘We were born and raised on the land that was the Ottoman Empire and its six centuries of rule’, Erdogan likes to say. He has directed schools to teach the old Ottoman version of Turkish written in Arabic script, according to Canada’s National Post. It was Ataturk who introduced Latin script. Erdogan’s critics accused him of wanting to become a ruler in the style of the Ottoman sultans. Or could it be even a caliph? The last caliphate was the Ottoman one which Ataturk wasted no time in abolishing.

    Despite the asylum-seeker agreement, Erdogan remains a bogeyman to EU leaders. Under it, provided Ankara complies with certain conditions, Turkey’s 79 million population will be granted visa-free travel throughout the EU as early as June. The Spectator, almost shuddering at the prospect and noting the number of fake Syrian passports in the hands of non-Syrian asylum-seekers, foresees fake Turkish passports to allow non-Turks also to roam continental EU at will. The spectre of jihadists among them will unnerve many Europeans.

    As the first would-be migrants were returned from Greece to Turkey this week, Erdogan took the opportunity for taking a jab at Europe for not letting ‘these people into their countries’ by putting up razor wire fences. He asked: “Did we turn Syrians back? No, we didn’t, but they did’. It was a none too subtle reminder that, despite the EU’s desperation to appease Turkey, Erdogan now regarded himself as the good guy and Brussels had better not forget it.

    The outlook all round is ominous. ’Once-dependable Turkey seems in danger of implosion’, reported the Guardian. ‘Under Erdogan, Turkey is the West’s disintegrating ally and Europe’s imaginary friend’. Daniel Pipes quotes a Turkish journalist, Burak Bekdil, saying: ‘Modern Turkey has never been this galactically distant from the core values enshrined by the European civilisation and its institutions’, which Ataturk admired. Gokhan Bacik, a professor at Ipek University in Ankara, goes further: ‘Turkey is facing a multi-faceted catastrophe (the scale of which) is beyond Turkey’s capacity for digestion’.

    One would imagine that Ataturk today would still see Turkey’s future to the west in Europe with its relative stability and economic power. Erdogan disagrees. The Guardian reported that he ‘often mocks and berates the EU, once calling it an Islamophobic Christian club’. As Breitbart noted, ‘We will recognise Erdogan’s confidence that Turkey is well on the path to Islamism when maligning Ataturk’s memory is no longer tantamount to maligning Erdogan himself’.

    ‘If Iran today is the Middle East’s greatest danger’, says Pipes, ‘Turkey is tomorrow’s’.

    FOOTNOTE. Australians heading to Gallipoli and feeling thirsty should bear in mind that, under laws introduced by Erdogan, the sale of alcohol in shops is banned between 10pm and 6am and at any time near schools and mosques. Bottles now carry warnings of the dangers of drinking alcohol. Taxes on alcohol are the toughest in Turkey’s history.

    John Tulloh had a 40-year career in foreign news.

     

  • What a godsend politicians and journalists are to ISIS.

    In The Guardian, Simon Jenkins writes about the way that the ISIS recruiting officers will be thrilled at how things have gone since their atrocity in Belgium.  He points particularly to the ‘paranoid politicians and sensational journalists’ who have perhaps unwittingly provided great support for ISIS. Jenkins comments

    ‘The atrocities in Brussels happen almost daily on the streets of Baghdad, Aleppo and Damascus. Western missiles and ISIS bombs kill more innocents in a week than die in Europe in a year. The difference is the media response. A dead Muslim is an unlucky mutt in the wrong place at the wrong time. A dead European is front-page news. … Everyone involved in this week’s reaction, from journalist to politicians to security lobbyists, has an interest in terrorism. There is money, big money, to be made – the more terrifying it is presented, the more money.’

    Simon Jenkins is a journalist and author. He writes for The Guardian as well as broadcasting on BBC. He has edited The Times and The London Evening Standard.  See link to his article below.

    http://gu.com/p/4hzgx/sbl

  • John Menadue and CPD. Building a regional framework on refugees and forced-migration.

    For several years a group of us at the Centre for Policy Development (CPD) have been endeavouring to develop a regional framework for the management of refugee issues in our region.  We strongly feel that no country in the region, including Australia, can handle refugee flows on their own. A regional framework based on cooperation and burden-sharing is essential.

    For over two years we have been pursuing the case for a Track II Dialogue in the region.  We have felt that this is necessary to break out of the impasse on refugees that Australia and other countries face in the region.  The Track II Dialogue includes people from the region with an interest and understanding of the issues. It includes members from think-tanks, government officials in a private capacity and people from international agencies.

    The first Track II Dialogue including a diverse group of people from the region was held in Melbourne last year.  The second Track II Dialogue was held in Bangkok in January this year.  That Track II Dialogue in Bangkok was followed by a meeting of officials involved in the Bali Process. That meeting welcomed the suggestions of the Track II Dialogue.  This meeting has now been followed by a ministerial meeting this week.

    The results are very encouraging as set out in the following press release from CPD.  You will also see further on, a link to an article in the SMH of 23 March, headed ‘Indonesia says Bali Process failure on refugee crisis “must not happen again.”  John Menadue.

    MEDIA RELEASE FROM CENTRE FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENT

    *FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE**

    Bali Process steps up, but action on forced migration will be critical. *

    The Bali Process can now lead a regional approach to forced migration that is effective, dignified and durable. Outcomes agreed at the Bali Process Ministerial Meeting demonstrate governments in the region can do much more on forced migration. The Ministerial Declaration and the new Response Mechanism are promising developments. The challenge now is for Bali Process countries, especially its Co-Chairs, to turn such promise into reality.

    CPD’s CEO, Travers McLeod, said:

    “Outcomes agreed by ministers can enable the Bali Process to be less about process and much more about effective, durable and dignified action on forced migration.”

    “Over 60 million people are now displaced globally, many in the Asia-Pacific region. New stories of the suffering of forced migrants emerge daily. The underlying causes, including conflict, persecution, human trafficking, people smuggling, transnational crime and now climate change, are resulting in escalating numbers. Governments are struggling to respond effectively – unilateral action will not do.”

    “It’s pleasing to see the Bali Process adopt recommendations of the Asia Dialogue on Forced Migration, which CPD convenes with regional policy institutes. A review of limitations of regional responses to the 2015 Andaman Sea crisis and improvements needed, including a new capability for the Bali Process to broker more predictable and effective responses on forced migration (even preventative action), is overdue.”

    “The challenge now is for leaders to deploy this new capability and put it to work, instead of letting short-term thinking dictate counterproductive national responses.”

    CPD fellow, Peter Hughes, a former Deputy Secretary at the Department of Immigration in Australia, also welcomed the announcement:

    “The nature of the Bali Process, with its vast size and diverse membership, means that it has stopped short of direct responses to major incidents of displacement in the past. Its role was very limited in the 2015 Andaman Sea crisis. Member countries have admitted that this is not good enough anymore.”

    “The mechanism announced today provides a vital avenue for the Bali Process to make a difference in responding to mass displacement. Ministers Bishop and Marsudi, as Co-Chairs, should be commended for showing leadership in reinvigorating the Bali Process and driving improvement in national and regional contingency planning. Their task now is to continue to advance more active and resilient regional architecture in the management of mass displacement.”

    More information about Asia Dialogue on Forced Migration at: www.cpd.org.au/intergenerational-wellbeing/asia-dialogue-on-forced-migration/

    LINK TO SYDNEY MORNING HERALD STORY.

    http://www.smh.com.au/world/indonesia-says-bali-process-failure-on-refugee-crisis-must-not-happen-again-20160323-gnpnb6.html

  • Travers McLeod, Peter Hughes, Sriprapha Petcharamesree, Steven Wong, Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti. The Bali Process can do a lot more to respond to forced migration in our region.

    The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime will hold a full ministerial meeting in Bali this Wednesday. The meeting will bring together ministers from 45 member countries for the first time in three years.

    The global context for the meeting is the current levels of displacement. Sixty million people are displaced – the highest level since the second world war. And governments around the world are struggling to respond effectively.

    This is a critical opportunity for the Bali Process to rise to a new level. Ministers should not miss the chance to reach consensus on how best to respond to forced migration in the Asia-Pacific region.

    Similar causes, longer distances

    There is every sign the underlying causes of forced migration – war, repression, ethnic conflict, climate change displacement, societal exclusion and rampant human trafficking – will continue. What’s new is that displaced people who previously might have stayed and suffered in extremely difficult circumstances close to home now can – and do – move long distances across multiple borders in large numbers in the hope of alleviating their misery.

    Information about potential migration opportunities is available in the palm of their hand through smartphones. Travel is cheaper. Facilitators of clandestine movement (whether smugglers or corrupt officials) are readily available. Mobility can be related to transnational crime too, including illegal fishing and drug trafficking.

    Economic migrants seeking better opportunities also use the same routes and facilitators as forced migrants, and are often inextricably mixed up with them.

    In the Asia-Pacific, for the time being, most displaced populations are stable. However, the problem of exclusion and displacement of stateless Rohingya from Myanmar remains fundamentally unsolved. It can be expected to continue.

    The future stability of Afghanistan, the largest source of refugees over the past 30 years, remains uncertain.

    What is the Bali Process exactly?

    Australia and Indonesia set up the Bali Process in 2002. The role of Indonesian leadership in bringing a wide group of countries into the fold was vital.

    In a region where few countries are parties to the UN Refugee Convention and forced migration issues are managed almost exclusively on a self-interested national basis, it was a great leap forward.

    The process allowed a regional forum for source, transit and destination countries to discuss their respective roles and responsibilities for the forced movement of people. It led the charge on the criminalisation of people smuggling, allowing law enforcement agencies to work together to exchange information and best practices.

    The process facilitated limited discussion of refugee protection issues. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was a key participant. A Regional Support Office was established in Bangkok to provide support and expertise to regional governments.

    The Bali Process’ inclusive nature has given governments the confidence to participate, but its vast size and diverse membership meant that it has stopped short of direct action in relation to major incidents of displacement. Its role was very limited in the 2015 Andaman Sea crisis.

    Fourteen years after its establishment, this is not enough. The challenges are too big to be managed without more concerted co-operative action by its member countries.

    Lessons from Europe

    Europe’s attempts to deal with its refugee and migration crisis are instructive.

    A union of 28 developed countries that are all parties to the Refugee Convention, have well-developed asylum laws, a common asylum system developed over many years and sophisticated immigration and border management agencies, is floundering. The core problem is lack of agreement on a strategic approach to displacement, burden-sharing and its implementation.

    The Asia-Pacific is not immune to the challenges of mass displacement. A variety of scenarios could well lead to displacement on a similar scale.

    And yet very few countries in the region are parties to the Refugee Convention. Few have comprehensive national policies or legislation. National implementation capabilities are also limited.

    What could the Bali Process do?

    Regional solutions will be different from those in Europe because of different legal systems. They will also be different to those found by the region in the past.

    The response to the Indochinese refugee situation in the 1970s and 1980s highlighted the benefits of co-operative solutions, but its model reflected the unique strategic environment of the time.

    The starting point should be agreement on avenues for concerted – rather than unilateral – action to prevent displacement before it occurs and better manage it collectively if it happens. In practice, this means the Bali Process should take the lead in convening smaller groups of “most affected” countries to broker collective action on particular situations of displacement. If possible, preventative action would be even better.

    It also means the process should drive improvement in national and regional contingency planning to enable more predictable and effective responses to forced migration. It can also provide greater support to key member countries to develop the policies, legal systems and implementation capabilities to make these happen in ways that also provide an orderly system of protection.

    There are positive signs that the senior officials co-ordinating the Bali Process for ministers understand what needs to happen. Their recent meeting in Bangkok endorsed a set of proposals to go to ministers that embrace this core agenda.

    Some of their ideas drew on a Track II Dialogue on Forced Migration involving experts from Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Myanmar, the UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration.

    It remains to be seen whether ministers have the political will to take the Bali Process up to the next level. But if they don’t take this opportunity now, it’s highly likely they will be forced to do something under pressure down the track when a very large regional displacement crisis inevitably occurs.

    In the long run, different mechanisms may be needed to prevent and deal with displacement issues in the region, not least within ASEAN, which recently adopted a Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children. In the meantime, despite its limitations, the Bali Process is the main game in town.

     Travers McLeod, Honorary Fellow in the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne

    Peter Hughes, Visiting Fellow, Crawford School of Public Policy and Visitor, Regnet School of Regulation and Global Governance, Australian National University

    Sriprapha Petcharamesree, Director of the International PhD Program in Human Rights and Peace Studies, Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies, Mahidol University

    Steven Wong, Deputy Chief Executive, Institute of Strategic and International Studies

    Tri Nuke Pudjiastuti, Researcher, Research Centre for Politics, Indonesian Institute of Sciences.

    This article was first published in The Conversation on 21 March 2016.

  • John Menadue. A dismal humanitarian response to the Syrian tragedy: political inertia, bureaucratic failure and security obsession.

    In earlier blogs I have highlighted the contrast between Canada and Australia’s programs to settle Syrian refugees.

    Australia continues to be a laggard.

    In Parliament last week, the Immigration Minister, Peter Dutton, said that a total of 29 refugees had been settled as part of a 12,000 intake that Tony Abbott had announced in September last year.

    In November last year, the Canadian government announced that it would accept 25,000 Syrian refugees. The latest official figures from the Canadian government reveal that 26,176 Syrian refugees had arrived. Many more are in process.

    The arrival of only 29 refugees from Syria in Australia points to the lack of political will by the Australian government, the inability of the new Department of Immigration and Border Protection to respond quickly and the inordinate delays as a result of ASIO checks.

    Political inertia, bureaucratic failure and security obsession has resulted in a dismal humanitarian response.

  • John Menadue. Asian refugees, the Rohingya and a regional refugee framework.

    Despite hopes for a change of refugee policy in Australia, Malcolm Turnbull is faithfully following Tony Abbott’s path in almost every respect. As in so many issues Malcolm Turnbull is not there when we need him.

    The exaggeration of our refugee ‘problems’ by Malcolm Turnbull and others shows up in UNHCR figures. As I mentioned in an earlier blog, regional countries face far greater problems over irregular movements and displaced people than we do. For example in 2015 Malaysia had 272,000 people of concern to the UNHCR. Thailand had 625,000. Indonesia had 13,000. Bangladesh had 233,000. Myanmar had 1.5 million. Australia had 58,000 people of concern to the UNHCR.

    Regional countries are carrying a much greater burden than we are but our leaders choose to ignore that fact. Regional countries are also finding, as we have found, that we will never effectively and humanely manage displaced people by our own efforts. No country, including Australia, can do it alone. We need a framework of cooperation where we help solve each other’s problems and share the burden. As good regional citizens there is no other way.

    In addition to the large number of people of concern to the UNHCR in our region, it is necessary to anticipate likely future flows of displaced people. This is likely to occur as a result of rising sea levels and the possible displacement of millions of people in our region, not only in the Pacific but also in low-lying countries like Bangladesh. We will be asked to help. Will we suitably respond?

    We plan in advance for the management of national disasters such as cyclones. We also need to consider scenarios in the future when there will be large movements of displaced people in desperate need of assistance. We should plan and resource for such emergencies.

    There are also significant ethnic minorities in our region that are particularly vulnerable, such as the Rohingya in Myanmar. For example in May last year Rohingyan and Bangladesh migrants were stranded at sea. Hundreds died of starvation and dehydration. Asked to help, Tony Abbott infamously said “Nope, nope, nope”. Malaysia eventually agreed to provide temporary shelter to those who arrived in Malaysia. The majority of Bangladeshi migrant workers have since been repatriated. Malaysia has agreed to allow Rohingyas in need of protection to stay, on the condition that they will be resettled within a year. They are still in detention.

    I have set out below extracts from a working paper on the plight of the Rohingya prepared for the Track II Dialogue in Bangkok recently.

    The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic group living mainly in Myanmar. Rohingya are thought to be descended from Muslim traders who settled there more than 1,000 years ago. Nearly 1.3 million Rohingya live in the Rakhine State of western Myanmar, making up less than 3 per cent of the entire population (53.7 million, 2014 estimate) In a predominantly Buddhist country like Myanmar, Muslim Rohingya minorities are perceived, by the community and authorities, as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. The Government of Myanmar denies them citizenship and they are excluded from basic registration. Therefore, they hold no land rights, are subjected to forced labour, experience limitations on their freedom of movement and travel, and have little access to education and healthcare. In addition to legal discrimination, Rohingya people face systematic persecution in the community by the Buddhist majority. 

    For many years, Rohingya have been taking dangerous journeys by sea, in pursuit of a better life. However in the past several years the scale and urgency of this movement has increased in response to growing oppression and violence. Rohingya make up the vast majority of the more than 150,000 people who have fled across the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea over the past 3 years, according to UNHCR estimates. In the first 3 months of 2015, 27,000 people left Myanmar and Bangladesh by boat. About 300 died of starvation, dehydration, or beating by smugglers. Upon arrival in Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, people have faced detention, lack of assistance and protection concern.

    In Bangladesh, most Rohingya who have fled from Myanmar are denied refugee status by the authorities. An estimated 30,000 Rohingya live in official camps, where they are assisted by aid agencies, and another 200,000 reside in unofficial camps or in Bangladeshi villages where they get little or no humanitarian assistance and almost no protection from human rights abuse. As of the end of September 2015, UNHCR has registered 50,030 Rohingyas in Malaysia, however the real number of Myanmar Muslim immigrants in Malaysia could be much higher. In Thailand, 76,000 refugees were registered by UNHCR in 2014The number of Rohingya living in Thailand is estimated to be 3,000. 

    Human rights violations are a root cause of Rohingya movement and abuses against Rohingya migrants is a common feature during all points of their journey and at the destination. 

    The management of Rohingya forced migrant flows in the Asia-Pacific would have been more effective had there been an ongoing, focused and coordinated approach in the region, underpinned by consistent policy and legal frameworks. There are three key lessons to emerge from the case study analysis spanning root causes, national responses and regional frameworks and architecture. Each of these key lessons is expanded upon further below. 

    In the case of Rohingya movements, addressing the root causes remains a key issue. The circumstances of Rohingya living in Myanmar, including the seeming intractability of their statelessness, is discussed in bilateral and multilateral meetings, although few ASEAN countries are working directly with Myanmar on the root causes to Rohingya forced migration. The key barrier has been the fear of inappropriate interference in internal affairs in Myanmar. This in turn reflects on a general unwillingness among all States in the region to expose sensitive domestic issues to external scrutiny. 

    The absence of any concerted regional or broader international pressure on Myanmar to reach any satisfactory settlement on a secure future for Rohingyas, in partnership with Bangladesh, means that displacement, including forced migration from Myanmar, will inevitably continue. This will have ongoing adverse consequences for the individuals affected as well as transit and destination countries.

    In the absence of any effective stabilisation measures, there is potential for much higher levels of displacement of Rohingyas into the region. 

    Most ASEAN nations are not signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol. There is also a lack of comprehensive and robust national legal or policy frameworks to manage forced migration, leading to short-term responses and ad hoc policy. Despite humanitarian and protection focussed responses at times, issues of forced migration, including movements of the Rohingya, have increasingly been perceived through a national security lens by many states in SE Asia. There has been a criminalisation of forced migration and an increasing use of immigration law to deal with forced migrants. This has lead to arrests, detention and the denial of rights to social services and livelihoods across much of the region. 

    There is a common fear amongst transit and destination states of creating ‘pull factors’ whereby humanitarian or protection focussed responses effectively act as inducements for people to move. Specifically, there is a fear of the 1 million Rohingya who are still in Myanmar, in difficult circumstances, as well as the 500,000 in Bangladesh .Historically, comprehensive policy and program packages dealing with the full gamut of forced migration issues – from root causes to durable solutions – put forward by international agencies, have been rejected or ignored by states. 

    State responses to the ongoing flows of people are therefore unpredictable and are in some cases unacceptable in humanitarian terms. 

    At the regional level, discussions have generally been held without conclusion or significant action. 

    There is no ongoing regional process to deal actively and cooperatively with prevention, root causes, reception and treatment of Rohingya displacement, meaning that ad hoc solutions have to be hastily reinvented on an individual basis as particular crises in the ongoing movement occur.Insufficient attention has been paid to addressing the root causes of the Rohingya movements, which will continue and potentially increase in the future. Due to some gaps in the frameworks and capacities of national governments, their responses to Rohingya flows can be characterised as unpredictable and inconsistent. Regional stakeholders do not currently have a standard or timely method for coming together to deal with such forced migrant flows. 

    In response to each manifestation, the solution is reinvented. Unless something different is set up in the region, that reinvention will continue. 

    There is a key opportunity to adapt and build on regional architecture to enable it to respond effectively and proactively to the forced migration flows of the future as well as current flows. A regional approach will need to be comprehensive, addressing root causes, committing to the principle of distributed capabilities, respecting the interests of states and responding to mass displacement in a timely and effective way. 

    Regional efforts to combat trafficking in persons, such as the recently adopted ASEAN Trafficking Convention, can provide motivation and tools to tackle aspects of the Rohingya movements. Complementary national capacities and policies can be bolstered, consistent with regional frameworks and strategies. The opportunities of regional agreements should be maximised in the pursuit of other migration pathways, including labour migration. 

    The full paper prepared for the Track 11 Dialogue can be found at http://cpd.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Track-II-Participant-Pack-2-9-Feb.pdf

     

    We cannot turn our back on the plight of the Rohingya and say that it is someone else’s problem. That is precisely what we did in the May 2015 emergency. It is also counter-productive if we want to build a cooperative framework or architecture to address likely, perhaps certain, flows of refugees in our region in the years ahead.

    The root causes of the Rohingya exodus are not being addressed. Action to date has been ‘unpredictable and inconsistent’. The exodus from Myanmar will resume in the future.

    In such situations it is possible for intelligence and other agencies to forecast likely refugee movements. These agencies should be tasked to do so in order that governments can make preliminary preparations. When the exodus of refugees occurs it is often too late or impossible to adequately respond. Our region should be better prepared and Ministers, aware of possibilities should instruct officials to plan for possible refugee flows, including the Rohingya.

    What is certain is that these flows will occur and occur more frequently.

  • Terry Laidler. To Michael Pezzullo, Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

    Dear Mr Pezzullo,

    Starting to get through to you, is it? Great!

    Forget your law of the land, let alone your direction of the government of the day drivel — neither of these is some sort of absolute that lets you suspend all moral judgment!

    For, make no mistake about it: the actions of you and your departmental officers in our name are a gross violation of basic ethics and of innocent people’s rights.

    To take legitimate asylum seekers (and it actually doesn’t matter whether they are men women OR children), and to subject them to cruel and inhumane treatment that you know produces family dysfunction and mental illness, so as to deter others, is no more than state sanctioned “hostage taking” and is both immoral and potentially illegal at International Law.

    I am really so glad that the accurate description of the nature and function of detention centres as gulags and of what you are doing there as torture offends you. I hope it betrays a residual moral sensibility!

    However, if you really are ill-informed enough to think that the public numbing and indifference that occurred in Nazi Germany is only an allegation, I worry that my hope might be misplaced.

    I, for one, do not think that the indifference that you and your departmental officers show to people in detention is just an allegation or reckless; I know it is a measured implementation of government policy. And I actually hope that the cruelty involved in the detention program is calculated; to think that it was capricious would be intolerable.

    But, what we desperately need now to shore up not only staff morale but also community conscience is people in leadership positions like you with a strong moral sense and enough personal courage to speak the truth to power, so that we can develop, not mantras, but alternative, ethical refugee policies. Then, maybe, just maybe, we can start to dig ourselves out of this mess.

    Laidler_Pezzullo

    Terry Laidler (Associate Professor, Registered Psychologist)

     

  • David Isaacs. As bad as Guantanamo

    If I liken the immigration detention centres on Nauru and Manus Island to the US facility on Guantanamo Bay, even passionate advocates for those seeking asylum such as human rights lawyer Julian Burnside dismiss my concerns: “Oh we’re not as bad as that.” I will argue that we are indeed as bad as that, possibly worse.

    Many people fleeing persecution to seek asylum have been subjected to psychological trauma in the countries they are fleeing and in the often highly traumatic journeys they take to reach ‘freedom’. However, people seeking asylum who are subjected to prolonged immigration detention are significantly more likely to suffer severe mental health problems than people seeking asylum who are not detained. Furthermore, the incidence of mental health problems increases with duration of incarceration. The United Nations defines torture as “…any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions”. Since prolonged detention without trial is unlawful under international law, Australia’s immigration detention policy clearly fulfils the key elements of the UN definition.

    Arguably what makes Guantanamo so bad is four things: lack of due process for imprisoning people there, lack of accountability (limited information, no transparency), indefinite imprisonment without due process (seemingly arbitrary legal processing, lack of clear end-point to imprisonment); and severe physical and mental maltreatment. Nauru and Manus share the first three characteristics with Guantanamo. Nauru and Manus, like Guantanamo, are ‘black sites’, out of sight and mind of the public, shrouded in secrecy, with severe restrictions on reporters. The Australian Border Force Act means employees including doctors, lawyers, teachers and guards who report the truth face two years imprisonment. Yet, for an Australian offshore detention policy to be successful in deterring people-smuggling, the stated intention, none of these four things are necessary. Therefore, even if you accept the Government justification for the Australian asylum seeker policy, the current treatment is unethical.

    Guantanamo is arguably worse in one respect: we know men are systematically tortured physically using techniques like water-boarding. However, Nauru is worse than Guantanamo in one hugely important respect: it includes children. When we surveyed Australian paediatricians, over 80% said immigration detention of children is child abuse. Successive Australian Governments have outdone the US Government in cruelty by torturing and abusing innocent children, all with the immoral aim of deterring other innocents.

    Furthermore, those imprisoned on Manus and Nauru are not terrorists; indeed, they are not guilty of any criminal offence, since seeking asylum is not a crime. Although the occasional innocent man was interned on Guantanamo, most knew what to expect when they went to war. In their autobiographies, Primo Levi and Nelson Mandela both astonishingly attempted without rancour to understand the motives of their captors; when they took up arms to fight injustice, they both knew the consequences if caught. On Nauru and Manus Island, in contrast, the injustice is being perpetrated against the very people seeking asylum. There can be few worse things than to be imprisoned unjustly and kept there indefinitely without right of appeal. Australia tortures innocent men, women and children who come begging for mercy. No wonder we are reviled internationally.

    When I worked on Nauru in December 2014, the predominant emotion was of utter despair and hopelessness. What would you do if you were imprisoned unjustly and indefinitely without right of appeal? In the current culture of victim-blaming, if you get depressed and self-harm or attempt suicide, you are accused by the Government of seeking preferential treatment. If you subsequently kill yourself, you had pre-existing mental health problems. If you get angry enough to riot, you are accused of violent ingratitude, with no mention of the extreme provocation that causes normally placid people to get angry enough to resort to violent protest.

    Gillian Triggs and the Australian Human Rights Commission have tirelessly and courageously exposed the harms done to children in immigration detention. The harm is also to adults, of course. But the very term ‘human rights’ implies an obligation, which risks being somewhat confrontational. Australia’s reprehensible treatment of people seeking asylum is as much a question of human decency as human rights. No civilised country should behave like this to fellow human beings. We treat refugees with respect and generosity. We treat people seeking asylum with contempt and cruelty. We talk of showing compassion, and in the same breath tell the meek to go back to where they came from. Australia is traditionally the land of the fair go, but in the words of president of the Australian Medical Association, Brian Owler, current asylum seeker policy is tearing at the moral fabric of our society. We, the public, need to prevail on all our politicians to listen to our pleas to find a new moral direction. Please help us re-discover our soul.

     

    David Isaacs is a consultant paediatrician in a University teaching hospital in Sydney, where he has run a Refugee Clinic since 2005, and is Clinical Professor at the University of Sydney

     

     

     

     

  • John Tulloh. Springtime – the season of alarm and disharmony in Europe.

       United in diversity. EU’s motto.

     

    If ever there were a line in a report to alarm European leaders, it might have been one buried in a 204-page document on the EU economy last November. It predicted that up to three million additional asylum seekers could enter the 28-nation bloc by the end of this year, according to the Washington Post.

    If the influx should come to pass, it is about now when the surge will begin. It is springtime in Europe when the Mediterranean and Aegean storms abate and the seas become a tempting risk for those seeking a new and safe home. Already 110,000 have endured a winter crossing to Greece and Italy so far this year. That is 10 times the number for the corresponding period last year. Four hundred of them perished at sea.

    Unlike 2015 when the EU had an open-door policy and more than one million asylum-seekers took advantage of it, newcomers will find a less welcoming reception and the Europeans in disarray about what to do about all these strangers suddenly in their midst.

    The EU might like to claim unity, but now self-interest, local nationalism, the growing influence of right-wing parties and the very idea of enforced quotas where asylum-seekers should be relocated have driven several EU members to enact their own measures.

    ‘The EU’s ideal of free movement is collapsing under the weight of political reality’, said the Spectator in an editorial. ‘An inability to respond to this crisis is sending millions of voters to extremists, now on the march across the continent’.

    Even the 2015 heroine for asylum-seekers, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, has suddenly had a rethink on her open-door embrace of them. In a move aimed at the restless electorate, she’s now warned the hundred of thousands of asylum-seekers who came to Germany last year that they are there only on a temporary basis and cannot stay long-term.

    Scandinavia, which once prided itself on sheltering the oppressed, has become positively hostile to these outsiders from afar. Sweden says it intends to deport up to half of the 160,000 who arrived last year. They are deemed to be not refugees, but economic migrants. But it is hard to envisage the mass deportation of tens of thousands of men, women and children. Norway, a non-EU member, wants to deport hundreds of asylum-seekers who slipped in through the Arctic Circle border with Russia. Denmark, in a bid to deter newcomers, can now legally confiscate assets valued at more than $2000 except for wedding rings. They say this will help fund the cost of sheltering them.

    Macedonia, the first country for refugees heading north along the Balkans corridor from Greece, has closed its border in order to filter the travellers. Afghans – 27% of the arrivals in Greece – have been told by Macedonia to return whence they came. Priority is given to those from Iraq and Syria. Austria is restricting entry to 580 people per day to try to choke the refugee flow. Slovenia and Croatia have followed suit.

    Their moves have been branded as “plainly incompatible” with international law, according to Euronews. Some EU officials described it as tantamount to ‘giving the finger to the rest of Europe’, it added.

    An EU scheme agreed last September to relocate 160,000 people among members under mandatory quotas has seen just 598 moved so far. Former communist states have said they don’t want any at all and have filed legal challenges.

    EU and Turkish leaders are due to hold a summit in the next few days about what to do. Ideally, the EU would like Turkey to stop the flow of asylum-seekers across the narrow Aegean strait to Greek territory. Last year, 800,000 made that crossing. Brussels has given Ankara a handsome sum of euros – some call it a bribe – to help shelter the refugees in Turkey and encourage them to remain there. There are 2.6 million Syrians camped in Turkey, the largest concentration of refugees anywhere in the world.

    Germany’s Interior Minister, Thomas de Maiziere, says the summit will be a ‘turning point’. If the EU cannot agree on a joint strategy, Germany might impose its own border controls, according to a German newspaper report. Its solution is for the EU to take in a fixed annual quota of Syrians from Turkey – perhaps a quarter of a million – in return for curbing the flow of migrants into Europe.

    Greece would certainly welcome such a deal. The EU has dusted off its old policy that refugees should be processed in the first member country where they land. It has given threadbare Greece until this month to improve living conditions in centres for asylum-seekers and provide more staff to process their applications. Otherwise it might lose valuable concessions. Greece ‘will not accept becoming Europe’s Lebanon, a warehouse of souls’, said the Greek Migration Minister, Yannis Mouzalas, referring to the huge number of Syrian refugees Lebanon has taken in since 2011.

    It is a problem of displaced people on a scale not encountered in Europe since the end of World War Two. Post-war peace then meant that many of these European people could return to their homes or what was left of them and rebuild their lives. But the very idea of achieving anything remotely peaceful in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria – where the overwhelming majority of today’s asylum-seekers are from – is highly unlikely.

    How ironic it is that the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, prompted by the plight of those displaced by WW2 in Europe, may prove the best protection for those outsiders who’ve descended on Europe because of wars 65 years later. It seems that once you are in Europe, you’re in. Unless drastic new measures are enforced, we can expect more EU members taking matters into their own hands.

     

    The greater the EU diversity, the less the unity.

     

    FOOTNOTE. If there is one group who would like to see more asylum seekers than ever, it is the predators who make money from misery. The EU police agency, Europol, estimated that people-smuggling gangs netted up to $9 billion last year. A report last month described them as ‘the fastest growing criminal market in Europe’. It warned that ‘this turnover is set to double or triple if the scale of the current migration crisis persists in the upcoming year’.

     

    John Tulloh had a 40-year career in foreign news.

  • Peter Hughes, Arja Keski-Nummi, John Menadue. Part 3: Settlement Policy and Services.

    This is a repost from 27/5/2015.

    3.1 Overview

    The migration process starts in earnest after a visa is given to a migrant. Its success or otherwise is determined after the person arrives in Australia and becomes part of the workforce and community.

    Australia, along with the other great traditional migration countries, has sought to smoothly integrate migrants into its multicultural society, by assisting them to become quickly productive through specialised assistance if necessary, and providing a relatively.

    3.2 Settlement Policy and Services

    Supporting migrant settlement is a cooperative effort between the Australian government and State/Territory and local government. The Australian government needs to work closely with other spheres of government to ensure that they are fully informed about migrant flows and their characteristics, especially the characteristics of new communities, so that they can make appropriate provision within their own jurisdictions.

    Although most permanent migrants are selected on the basis of qualities that will enable relatively quick and easy integration into the Australian economy and our multicultural society, some (such as humanitarian entrants and family stream migrants) will require specialised assistance for a short period to help them get started in Australian society.

    Australian governments should continue to maintain a suite of specialised services aimed at ensuring migrants who need assistance in acquiring English-language skills, dealing with initial settlement problems, connecting with mainstream government services and gaining employment get such assistance.

    English language capability is well recognised as being essential to gaining employment and wider social integration into the Australian community. Settlement programs need to give special emphasis to English language acquisition, especially soon after arrival, with a variety of access opportunities to suit the needs and circumstances of individual migrants. The programs should aim to bring migrants to a level of English consistent with their capability.

    More intensive services should be available to assist refugee and humanitarian entrants who may bring with them the legacies of war or other conflict and incarceration in refugee camps for years or decades. Such services might include on-arrival accommodation, initial orientation to Australia, and support for other refugee-specific health issues, including torture and trauma.

    For non-English-speaking migrants who are still acquiring English-language skills, and are unable to access commercial translating and interpreting services, governments should continue to provide targeted translating and interpreting assistance.

    The migration process progressively introduces people from many different national, regional, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds into Australian society. Initially, they may be relatively small communities dispersed across the Australian continent. It is important that settlement policy recognises and supports new communities in establishing themselves in Australia. Past experience has shown that effective leadership within new communities is absolutely vital to their quickly becoming productive. Settlement programs should provide financial support to develop community leadership and problem-solving to accelerate integration.

    There is considerable goodwill in the community towards new migrants in keeping with Australia’s long tradition of acceptance of migration. The Australian government should seek to harness the willingness of community groups to extend the hand of friendship and support with appropriately designed programs.

    Australian governments should continue to explore ways to introduce new migrants to Australian laws and social norms at appropriate parts of the visa, settlement and citizenship process.

    Ultimately, the benefits that any migrant gains from settlement services flow on to the wider community by making migrants more productive participants in the workforce more quickly and hastening their integration into a socially cohesive society.

    The effectiveness of migrant settlement programs should be regularly reviewed and evaluated to ensure that they are properly targeted and are having real impacts in improving the individual migrant settlement process.

    Specialised migrant services should operate as a bridge to broader mainstream services. The Australian government should continue to promote Multicultural Access and Equity[1] to ensure that its agencies are able to engage with Australia’s multicultural society effectively.

    3.3 Australian Citizenship Policy

    Since Australian citizenship first came into being on 26 January 1949, it has played an important role both as a national symbol for the Australian-born and in integrating millions of migrants formally into the Australian community. This parallels the citizenship policy approach taken by other great migrant receiving countries – the USA and Canada.

    Australian citizenship policy should continue to embody the following principles:

    • Australian citizenship, and the values that go with it, should be a unifying national symbol.
    • Australian citizenship policy should actively encourage the acquisition of Australian citizenship by permanent resident migrants, without unnecessary barriers, as part of building a cohesive multicultural society.
    • Acquisition of Australian citizenship should be based on close association with Australia, either through birth in Australia to an Australian citizen or permanent resident parent, descent from an Australian citizen parent or physical presence in Australia as a permanent resident.
    • Concessions to standard residential requirements should be permitted to permanent residents who have spent at least some time physically present in Australia, but only on a limited basis in special circumstances.
    • Australia should continue to permit its citizens to retain their Australian citizenship if they acquire another citizenship, in order to retain beneficial links with an Australian diaspora of over one million people.
    • Australian citizenship is strengthened by certainty; no citizen should be deprived of it except in circumstances where they are convicted of obtaining it by fraud and deprivation would not result in statelessness;
    • The process of deprivation of Australian citizenship should not be used as a substitute for criminal law to punish naturalised citizens for crimes committed after becoming an Australian citizen.

    The take-up rate of Australian citizenship by eligible permanent residents is estimated to be about 80%.[2] This is high by OECD standards and comparable to the citizenship take-up rate in Canada. Nevertheless, take-up rates vary between nationalities and there are significant numbers of eligible people who, for various reasons, have not yet taken up Australian citizenship.

    Australian governments should promote the values of Australian citizenship and its acquisition by permanent residents on an ongoing basis, with major promotions every few years in order to maintain the high Australian citizenship take up rate.

    Recognising that permanent residents are able to, and mostly do, stay and contribute to the Australian community throughout their lives, governments should resist the temptation to increase the existing limited differential between the rights of Australian permanent residents and citizens as a basis for promoting citizenship.

    Testing on aspects of knowledge of matters relating to Australian citizenship has been in existence since 2007 as a preliminary to the acquisition of Australian citizenship by migrants. It is uncertain whether this has had any concrete benefits or indeed adverse impacts on the take-up rate of Australian citizenship. Australian governments should ensure that any testing regime does not become a barrier to the acquisition of citizenship to people who will spend their lives in Australia and make an ongoing contribution to Australian society. Alternatives to testing should be made available to those who are uncomfortable with it and should be geographically accessible throughout Australia.

    The acquisition of Australian citizenship should continue to be made a celebratory event through public citizenship ceremonies conducted by local government or the Australian government.

    3.4 Australian Multicultural Policy

    Australian governments from both major political parties have endorsed broadly similar Australian multicultural policies since the 1980s, as have all Australian states and territories. Some states and territories have given multicultural policy legislative status.

    For a society as diverse as Australia’s, and largely built on immigration, a continued focus on multicultural policy is vital to social cohesion, migrant integration and community relations.

    Broadly speaking, all multicultural policies stress as a foundation that all Australians should be committed to the basic structures and principles of Australian society – our Constitution, democratic institutions, respect for the law and English as the national language. At the same time, the policies stress the right of all Australians to express their own cultures and beliefs, within the law, and the need to accept the right of others to do the same.

    Australian governments should continue to provide active leadership in articulating and disseminating multicultural policy as the foundation for a productive and harmonious society. This will not only make us a better society, but a more resilient one in resisting externally generated stresses and pressures. 

    3.5 Conclusion – Immigration, Refugee and Settlement Policy

    The policy approaches outlined in Parts 1, 2 and 3 constitute an integrated approach to future Australian immigration needs.

    They aim to enable Australia to continue to harness the opportunities of the global movement of people to its own national economic and social development. At the same time, they should better position Australia to deal with the growing challenges of forced and irregular migration by making a significant humanitarian contribution to contribution to global displacement, including through a generous refugee resettlement program.

    Pursuing these policies should also reinforce a united and resilient Australian society capable of resisting external and internal challenges to a harmonious community.

    They will contribute to a:

    • growing and prosperous Australia with a critical population mass to support the governance overheads of modern society
    • a skilled labour force attuned to Australia’s economic needs
    • a closer relationship with Australia’s regional neighbours
    • better management of displacement and irregular migration, including humanitarian solutions
    • a culturally diverse, confident and united society

    Peter Hughes is Visiting Fellow, Crawford School of Public Policy,

    Visitor, Regulatory Institutions Network, Australian National University

    Arja Keski-Nummi was formerly First Assistant Secretary of the Refugee, Humanitarian and International Division in the Department of Immigration

  • John Menadue. Canada’s response puts us to shame.

    In this blog on 4 February, I mentioned the failure of the Australian government to adequately respond to the Syrian refugee crisis. I pointed out that at that time only ten refugees had arrived from Syria out of a promised intake of 12,000.  I mentioned three factors for this delay.  The first was political will. The second was the failure of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection which has become focused on control and border protection at the expense of settlement. The third was the inordinate delays resulting from ASIO security checks.

    The Canadian government has just announced that it has achieved its goal of 25,000 Syrian refugee arrivals even though Canada announced its plans two months after Australia. The Canadian government is now proposing to increase its intake of Syrian refugees to 50,00 by the end of 2016.

    The Canadian response puts us to shame both for its humanity and efficiency.  See link to article in the Canadian newspaper, The Globe and Mail.  John Menadue.

     

    http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/liberals-revised-goal-met-as-25000th-syrian-refugee-arrives-in-canada/article28944527/

  • Peter Hughes, Arja Keski-Nummi and John Menadue. Part 2. Refugee Policy

    A repost from 26/05/15

    Part 2: Refugee Policy 

    2.1 Overview

    The current and future global environment for irregular migration is extremely challenging.

    Many more people are on the move globally to gain protection from persecution, security from conflict or greater economic opportunity – or a mixture of these things.

    The movement of people is being accelerated by growing awareness of the opportunities to move, new communications technology, cheaper transport and active facilitators.

    The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) states that global forced displacement of some 51 million people (17 million refugees, 33 million internally displaced persons and over one million asylum seekers) is at the highest level since the Second World War. There are many millions more people seeking migration opportunities for employment over and above the forced migration figures.

    Australia’s traditional engagement with this issue has been through our offshore humanitarian resettlement program, but over the past 15 years national policy debate has centred almost exclusively on the management of smuggled maritime asylum seekers. Australia experienced a flow of some 10,000 maritime asylum seekers, mostly from outside the region, in the period 1998–2007 and 50,000 in the period 2008–2013.

    The debate has divided Australian society and the net result has been the adoption of the harshest possible measures to disengage Australia from this flow of people.

    In the context of growing world displacement and people movement, Australia will remain an attractive destination.

    Policy responses by successive governments to date have focused on ‘quick fixes’ driven by political and community pressures. A more measured approach will be needed.

    One choice, advocated by many, would be to maintain open access for maritime asylum seekers and to accept the consequences. Experience in Australia and Europe indicates that this approach will attract very large numbers of both asylum seekers and economic migrants facilitated by people smugglers. The numbers coming to Australia reached 4,000 people in a single month in July 2013. There is no reason why they could not go much higher. Exploitation and deaths at sea, corresponding to the size of the movement, go with this inherently disorderly and unsafe movement. If significant flows of maritime asylum seekers to Australia resume from troubled developing countries, it is unlikely that many would return to their country of origin, irrespective of whether or not they are found to be refugees.

    If Australia does not want to accept renewed flows of maritime asylum seekers, it will need to make a long-term investment in global and regional management of protection and the movement of people. Australia cannot escape the phenomenon of global displacement and must re-engage with it.

    Existing solutions, which are heavily dependent on naval interdiction and small Pacific island nations, may not be sustainable in the long term.

    The demand for migration opportunities, whether forced or economically based, to Australia and other (developing and developed) countries is unlikely to be satisfied. Priorities will need to be set as to those most in need and how they can best be assisted.

    2.2 A Formal Policy on Refugees and Displacement

    At a strategic level, Australia needs to develop a formal policy on refugees and global displacement. The policy should integrate our responses to global and regional refugee issues, bringing together foreign policy, aid policy, the offshore humanitarian resettlement program and domestic asylum policy (including for both maritime and visaed arrivals). Interventions under this policy should tackle the root causes of refugee flows as well as their consequences.

    The global asylum system is under extreme pressure with host countries in both the developing and developed world struggling to cope. Many refugees are unable to get protection close to home and are subsequently exploited by people smugglers who fill a vacuum left by States. The situation is complicated by mixed flows of refugees and economic migrants.

    Australia can play a role at the global level in working with UNHCR and partner countries to develop new, more orderly and effective responses to the modern dynamics of people movement.

    At a regional level, Australia needs to be much more active in engaging regional partner countries to better manage the movement of people and develop a sense of collective responsibility in dealing with protection issues. Australian and regional partners should develop habits of routine consultation and action, based on agreed principles, in response to forced migration and other irregular movements of people in the region. This is a long-term task, as few countries in the region are parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention and few have strong national institutions for migration management.

    The regional policy aim, in partnership with UNHCR, would be to tackle root causes of displacement as well developing an improved system of refugee protection. An orderly regional system of protection should encourage asylum seekers to seek protection in a secure environment in countries of first asylum, closer to the country of origin, and have their future determined in those countries (whether it be local integration, international resettlement or return home).

    The policy should seek to provide protection and migration opportunities for those most in need and, by stabilising those populations, to minimise exploitation opportunities for people smugglers and irregular migration.

    In fostering and developing such a system, Australia should look beyond its own immediate interests and be willing to take an active role in solving the displacement problems affecting its neighbours. Australia should also recognise that its regional partners are unlikely to become parties to the Refugee Convention. Cooperative arrangements will need to be based on practical measures consistent with Refugee Convention practices.

    The Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime has been an important vehicle to date in putting questions of protection, people smuggling and law enforcement on the regional agenda. In the longer term, Australian policy should work towards more targeted regional processes possibility involving ASEAN and/or sub-regional groupings.

    The work of government in developing better regional approaches should be complemented by a Track 2 Dialogue involving selected countries in the region and bringing together government policymakers with non-government experts in a “non-official” conversation on these matters. This will provide an opportunity for constructive dialogue and development of new policy approaches in this contested area of public policy.

    At the national policy level, Australia should draw on a range of policy tools in its interventions in global displacement.

    Foreign policy and development assistance can play an important role in tackling root causes of displacement as well as the willingness of countries in the region to stabilise displaced populations in first asylum or transit mode.

    The Humanitarian Program, which has been Australia’s traditional contribution to durable solutions, should be increased to a base, ongoing program of 20,000 places a year, reflecting growing global displacement and the need for Australia to do more. This would represent about 10% of Australia’s total annual permanent migrant intake. The program should be operated flexibly, allowing for significant one-off increases from time to time to deal with acute global crises or regional displacement of particular significance to Australia.

    The resettlement program needs to be accompanied by measures that foster good employment and integration outcomes for refugee arrivals.

    Each cohort of people moving in the region is different, reflecting protection needs, security from conflict, economic pressures or a combination of all of these. Australian government responses need to reflect the unique circumstances of each national group.

    Australian government policy should involve targeted use of other available tools to promote orderly migration, as appropriate, such as alternative migration pathways, “in-country humanitarian programs” and “orderly departure” arrangements from selected source countries.

    Asylum decision-making and review processes, whether for asylum seekers who are irregular maritime arrivals or those who arrive with visas by air, should be regularly reviewed and evaluated to ensure that they remain fair, quick and efficient. They must be tailored to deal appropriately with new protection issues that arise and the unique circumstances of different cohorts of asylum seekers.

    Irregular movements of asylum seekers by sea, following journeys across vast distances, facilitated by smugglers for commercial gain, are not in the interests of asylum seekers because of the inherent exploitation and danger. Nor are such movements in the interests of regional states. Australian policy should continue to discourage irregular movements by sea (except in the most limited circumstances where Australia is the logical first asylum country) and promote an orderly asylum system.

    Regional policy measures should help to provide satisfactory protection alternatives for asylum seekers, but the maritime people smuggling option cannot be allowed to remain open in parallel.

    Firm, but humane, action is needed here. The preferred approach would be for the Australian government to negotiate readmission agreements, under acceptable conditions, with transit countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, which enable any people reaching Australia by sea to be safely returned to a transit country by air and have their future determined from that location. Acceptable conditions would include asylum seekers being permitted to remain in the community of the transit country, with asylum claims considered by UNHCR, and a pathway to local or international durable solutions for refugees. Such arrangements would be safer and more desirable than use of small Pacific countries and boat turnarounds on the high seas. If these mechanisms were seen to be effective, they would rarely need to be used. 

    2.3 Legacy caseload from 2008–2013 maritime arrivals

    Australia has a continuing responsibility to resolve the future the some 30,000 people who sought to arrive in Australia by sea in the period 2008-2013 and have not yet had final decisions on their refugee claim or resolution of their long-term immigration status.

    The first priority is to resolve the situation of the 1707 people in PNG and Nauru[1] most of whom are in detention in extremely difficult circumstances.

    The Australian government should work with local authorities in PNG and Nauru to expedite decision-making on asylum cases with a fixed deadline to finally decide all cases. Apart from those few people found to be refugees who may be able to settle effectively in PNG and Nauru, the Australian government should negotiate resettlement in third countries or, as a last resort, Australia. The assistance of UNHCR should be sought in final resolution of the caseload.

    A fixed deadline should also be set for primary and review decisions for the remaining maritime asylum seeker caseload in Australia. For those found to be refugees, the Australian government should recognise that it is unlikely that political conditions will improve in source countries in a way that will enable refugees to return home within the foreseeable future. It should therefore set a defined pathway to permanent residence and Australian citizenship.

    As noted in Part 1.6, the use of detention as an immigration tool should be minimised except for short periods for specified purposes. The Australian government should use its influence to ensure that detention facilities are of an acceptable standard in PNG and Nauru and that agreement is reached with those countries to enable the equivalent of Australian community detention arrangements while asylum cases in the regional processing centres remain unresolved.

    The Australian government should make arrangements for the repatriation of those found not to be refugees (or in need of complementary protection). Such returns are necessary to maintain the integrity of the protection system. Returns should be voluntary where possible, supported by reintegration assistance. In some circumstances involuntary returns will be necessary and these should be supported, where necessary, by written agreements with source countries.

    Peter Hughes is Visiting Fellow, Crawford School of Public Policy,

    Visitor, Regulatory Institutions Network, Australian National University

    Arja Keski-Nummi was formerly First Assistant Secretary of the Refugee, Humanitarian and International Division in the Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2007-2010.

    John Menadue was Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 1980-1983.

    [1] Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Immigration Detention and Community Statistics Summary, 31 March 2015

  • Peter Hughes, Arja Keski-Nummi and John Menadue. Part 1: Immigration Policy and Administration.

    This article and the two following articles were part of a policy series that was posted in May/June last year and subsequently published in book form ‘Fairness, Opportunity and Security’. This is a repost from 25/5/2015.

    Overview

    This paper sets out a broad design for Australia’s immigration, refugee and settlement policies for the coming decades.

    The issues are covered in three parts:

    1. Immigration Policy and Administration
    2. Refugee Policy
    3. Migrant Settlement and Citizenship Policy

    Part 1: Immigration Policy and Administration 

    1.1 Guiding Principles

    Australia’s planned immigration program has played a major role in Australia’s development over the last 70 years – directly adding 7 million people, including 800,000 humanitarian entrants, to Australia’s population and dramatically diversifying Australia from a predominantly Anglo-Celtic community to a multicultural society with more than 270 ancestries.

    Through immigration Australia has been able to gain some of the best human capital in the world to build a nation, as well as making a humanitarian contribution.

    Governments of both major parties have in recent years set Australia’s permanent migration programs at record levels in absolute terms and continue to do so (over 200,000 permanent migration and humanitarian visas planned in 2015–16). Temporary entry programs have also risen to unprecedented levels, well in excess of permanent visas.

    At the same time, however, public debate in Australia has been diverted to, and dominated by, the relatively narrow issue of asylum seekers arriving irregularly by sea.

    Immigration still has a major role to play in building Australia. It is important to our population, our economic development, to growing the workforce in an ageing society and to providing a population necessary to fund the overhead costs of a modern nation state occupying a huge continent.

    Based on a projection of the current permanent and temporary immigration framework, Australia’s population will increase to 38 million people in 2050. Without immigration, it would stagnate at about 24 million people. It is estimated that, based on the continuation of current policy settings, migration will have added 15.7% to our workforce participation rate by 2050 and 5.9% in GDP per capita growth.[1]

    Immigration also continues to play an important role in Australia’s ongoing integration with its near region by adding cultural and linguistic skills from regional neighbours that are important to Australia’s place in the Asian century.

    The benefits achieved through migration to date cannot be taken for granted. Many other countries are competing for relatively young, highly skilled, English-speaking internationally mobile people.

    In this context, Australia’s immigration policy needs to be reaffirmed and re-articulated for the coming decades to ensure that it continues to serve Australia as well in the future, as it has in the past.

    Australian immigration policy should be guided by the following principles:

    • Australia should continue to have a planned immigration program for nation building.
    • Australia’s immigration program should be in the national interest – serving economic needs, but also including generous components for entry of people based on close family connections and on refugee and humanitarian grounds.
    • Australia’s immigration program should continue to be based on objective selection criteria, which are non-discriminatory on the grounds of race or religion.
    • Australia’s immigration program should retain a core focus on migration for permanent settlement with a pathway to Australian citizenship. At the same time, it should recognise the massive growth in international mobility and make continuing provision for large-scale temporary migration, where it can meet national interests in economic, social, cultural and foreign policy areas.
    • Australian governments should continue to set annual permanent and temporary immigration targets and planning figures, including indicative figures for forward years, but these should be administered flexibly without inefficient micromanagement to achieve rigid targets.
    • Australian government planning should continue to document an optimum figure for net migration gain and use this as a key reference point in permanent and temporary migration program planning.
    • Australia’s immigration program planning should be supported by research into post-arrival outcomes of migration.
    • Australia’s immigration program planning should be supported by regular consultation with key stakeholders – States and Territories, business, unions, migrant groups and the broader community.
    • Australia’s immigration program should continue to be supported by targeted services to those migrants who need them, particularly refugees, to assist with early, productive settlement and integration into the community.
    • Australia’s immigration program should continue to be supported by an Australian citizenship policy which promotes early take-up of Australian citizenship to ensure that migrants become full and formal members of the Australian community.
    • Australian government leadership is needed to articulate a vigorous, inclusive and unifying multicultural policy in cooperation with State and Territory governments.

    1.2 Migration for Permanent Settlement

    Australian immigration policy should continue to foster migration for permanent settlement to meet economic, social and humanitarian objectives (the latter discussed Part 2: Refugee Policy).

    Migration to meet labour market needs should focus primarily on skilled workers with high-level, recognised professional, technical and trade qualifications. Programs should be designed to meet both long-term social capital needs to build a stronger skills base in the Australian workforce as well as short-term variable demand by employers.

    The permanent migration program should be designed to meet longer term needs and remain relatively steady over time, leaving demand driven temporary entry programs to adjust up and down with the economic cycle.

    Over the past decade, skilled people working in Australia under various temporary entry programs have increasingly become a feeder group into the permanent migration stream. Australian governments should continue to foster this approach where it meets the needs of the migration program and does not introduce perverse incentives into temporary entry programs.

    Australia should permit permanent residence on the basis of business ownership or general investment in the Australian economy on a strictly limited basis, after detailed evaluation of the outcomes of previous programs. It has proven difficult to measure the concrete benefits to Australia of this form of migration. It exposes Australia to risks inherent in “selling” visas, dubious sources of capital, extradition problems with wealthy migrants who subsequently become fugitives from justice without clear offsetting migration benefits or economic gains.

    The Australian government should establish advisory bodies, drawing on the skills of business, unions, demographers and State/Territory governments to design permanent and temporary entry programs that remain attuned to labour market needs.

    Australian immigration policy should continue to make provision for migration based on close family connections, particularly spouses, parents and dependent children.

    Policies in relation to spouse migration should continue to focus closely on the genuineness of relationships to ensure the integrity of this migration category. Adequate planning provision should be made to accommodate numbers of spouse visas consistent with Australia’s population growth and the greater interaction between the Australian community and foreign communities, rather than constraining spouse migration numbers with artificial ceilings and long processing times.

    Policies in relation to the migration of parents of previous migrants should recognise the natural wish of some migrants to be able to look after their parents in Australia, particularly in their later years. Given the high costs that people in this age profile may impose on government budgets, such migration should continue to require a commensurate financial contribution from Australian-based sponsors.

    Australia occupies a vast continent. States/Territories and regions have differing population, economic, labour market and social needs.

    To be successful, migration policies and criteria must continue to be sensitive to the specific needs of particular industries and geographic locations.

    State and Territory governments, regional governments and business should continue to be given the ability to sponsor migrants to meet their specific needs, while accepting responsibility for outcomes commensurate with their sponsorship of migrants.

    1.3 Temporary Migration

    Temporary entry programs have grown to unprecedented levels over the last decade.

    There were some 800,000 temporary entrants in Australia as at 30 September 2014 (excluding visitor visa holders, bridging visa holders and New Zealanders temporarily in Australia – which bring the total to some 1.8 million)[2]. The flow of temporary entrants such as temporary skilled migrants, students and working holiday makers is well in excess of the permanent migration and humanitarian program, reflecting increasing global mobility and Australian entry programs designed to meet specific economic, social and cultural objectives.

    Australia is in a position to continue to benefit from further growth in global mobility with well-designed, and internationally competitive, temporary entry programs, provided that the risks inherent in such programs are carefully mitigated.

    Temporary skilled migration is an important tool in meeting short term, fluctuating skilled labour market needs and should be expected to rise and fall relatively rapidly in contrast to a steadier long-term permanent migration program.

    Immigration policy should continue to enable responsible employers to sponsor foreign workers to meet short-term skilled labour market needs that cannot be met domestically. At the same time there must be program design safeguards to ensure that foreign workers are not less costly than available Australian workers and that there are sufficient protections built in to ensure that sponsors do not exploit foreign workers.

    Immigration policy should continue to facilitate the entry and stay of people who are seeking to study in Australia and depart at the end of their studies, as part of Australia’s education export and cultural exchange. The degree of facilitation should be closely related to the immigration risk factors. A high degree of scrutiny should be applied to those areas of the education system where abusive practices are evident.

    While immigration rules should provide access to permanent stay for foreign students, on the same basis as overseas applicants, there should be no guaranteed pathway to permanent residence for international students simply because of an Australian qualification. The export of education should be internationally competitive and stand on its own merits and not be subsidised by the permanent visa system.

         International education agents are in many cases the face of Australian education overseas. For consumer protection purposes, they should be subject to quality standards, registration and sanctions for misbehaviour in the same way that Australian migration agents are regulated.

    Immigration policy should continue to foster opportunities, on a reciprocal basis, for young people from selected countries to live and work in Australia for periods of one to two years under working holiday arrangements. Domestic labour market impacts, especially on Australian youth, should be monitored and evaluated. Potential abuses need to be quickly identified and policy should contemplate annual limits on visas if required.

    More recently, Australia has, on a small-scale, commenced assisting Pacific neighbours through targeted arrangements which enable temporary entry of seasonal workers in agricultural industries (the scheme is currently available to citizens of Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu).

    Migration policy should leave scope for limited amounts of unskilled temporary migration in the context of Australia’s engagement with its region. Program design should ensure that such foreign workers are able to benefit financially from the arrangements without exploitation, that such arrangements remain competitive for employers who are unable to secure a consistent Australian labour supply and that the workers return to their countries of origin.

    As a general point, many temporary entry programs are more inherently susceptible to abuse. It must be recognised that many foreigners temporarily in Australia with work rights are more at risk to exploitation than Australian workers because of their unfamiliarity with the Australian system, lack of informed networks and/or poor English language skills. Australian government and State/Territory government authorities should cooperate to ensure that such workers are given information on their rights and access to easily usable complaint mechanisms. Workplace inspection authorities must be adequately resourced to monitor for abuses in the workplace and sanction employers. It should be a criminal offence for employers to charge temporary skilled workers for sponsorship for either temporary or permanent residence.

    Policies in relation to temporary migration should take account of the phenomenon of “circular migration” and foster this when it is in the national interest.

    Australian immigration policy should continue to facilitate genuine tourists to Australia with fast and flexible visa and stay arrangements carefully calibrated to reflect degree of immigration risk.

    1.4 New Zealanders

    Under policy introduced by the Australian government in 2001 (in the context of arrangements for a reciprocal social security agreement between Australia and New Zealand), New Zealand citizens can enter and live in Australia indefinitely without meeting globally applied visa criteria, but do not have permanent resident status. They cannot access a range of government services without qualifying for permanent residence by meeting global migration criteria.

    New Zealand citizens entering Australia on this temporary basis have an advantage over citizens of other countries in that they can freely enter and live in Australia, with access to the labour market, without meeting the permanent residence visa criteria applied globally to other nationals. As at 30 September 2014, there were over 650,000 New Zealand temporary residents in Australia[3] .

    Some of these New Zealand temporary residents are able to meet globally applied permanent visa criteria and become permanent residents with a pathway to Australian citizenship. Many others do not have the skills and other attributes that enable them to qualify. This is resulting in what is unique in Australian terms – a long-term temporary population, including Australian born children, without access to permanent residence and Australian citizenship.

    The Australian government should evaluate the outcome of the trans-Tasman migration arrangements, including the changes introduced in 2001, with a view to considering whether all New Zealanders should in future be subject to globally applied arrangements or whether existing arrangements should be retained and some concessional arrangements should be introduced to allow long-term New Zealand temporary residents to transition to permanent residence.

    1.5 Immigration Policy and Regional Engagement

    Permanent and temporary migration programs have over the years have played an important part deepening Australia’s engagement with its region.

    India and China are now the top two source countries of permanent migrants. Asia-Pacific countries figure prominently in temporary skilled worker numbers. Nine Asia-Pacific countries are in the top 10 source countries of overseas students. Four Asia-Pacific countries are in the top 10 working holiday maker source countries. Asia-Pacific countries figure prominently in overseas tourism and a number of them are given the most facilitated electronic visa arrangements which Australia offers globally[4].

    The most recent region-specific initiative has been the Pacific Seasonal Workers Scheme.

    Australia has already invested significantly in cooperative arrangements on important, but relatively narrow, border management and migration control matters with regional neighbours.

    At the multilateral level, Australia should be working to develop broader regional cooperative arrangements to ensure effective routine consultation and co-operation on management of migration within the region. This should include regular migration, irregular migration and refugee protection.

    On a bilateral basis, Australia should continue to look at opportunities to strengthen and deepen its regional ties through migration arrangements that are in the national interest – including greater facilitation of travel for citizens of selected regional neighbours, whether permanent or temporary skilled migration, working holiday arrangements, student entry, tourism or expansion of seasonal worker arrangements. 

    1.6 Program and Border Integrity

    Australia has been able to achieve high level of success and of community support for a planned immigration program (which operates at a much higher level than other traditional immigration countries on a per capita basis) over many years because of its ability to effectively regulate movements to Australia in the national interest, maintain integrity of programs and achieve a relatively low population of unlawful non-citizens.

    Well-developed entry policies, backed by a careful risk management approach, have enabled Australia to make the most of the world’s mobile talent and adjust to different potential source countries over time.

    These policies have been supported by effective border management and compliance programs. These capabilities should be maintained at a high level. At the same time, they should be regarded as “processes” in support of Australia’s global activities to gain the best social capital for Australia rather than an outcome in themselves.

    Effective intelligence, supported by domestic and international interagency cooperation is vital in responding to dynamic irregular migration, crime and security risks. Equally, domestic capability to enforce immigration law, including removal of people without lawful authority to stay, is vital to the integrity of programs and also to protecting migrants – especially temporary workers.

    Australian immigration authorities need to use a variety of tools to ensure compliance with immigration law. These tools should always be proportionate to the risk presented. The use of “held” detention, except for very short periods to deal with identity, health and security risks, or risk of absconding, should be avoided as far as possible because of unnecessarily harsh outcomes which usually follow for those held in detention. Detention of children should be avoided wherever possible and special arrangements should be made for them if short periods of detention are unavoidable.

    Alternatives to detention which enable immigration authorities to remain in touch with persons of interest who do not have authority to remain in Australia should be used wherever possible.

    Any use of detention needs to be subject to rigorous external scrutiny of detention facilities and conditions as well as case-by-case examination of the reasons for detention of individuals being held for more than a short period.

    1.7 Managing Migration – Australian Government Capability

    Effective immigration programs do not run themselves. Australia needs an ongoing national capability to achieve domestic and international goals in relation to migration.

    These capabilities include a strong policy capacity, backed by evidence based research and active evaluation of program outcomes to inform further policy. The most well-intentioned policies can have unintended consequences and these must be quickly identified and policy rectified.

    This policy capability should be supported by a strong service delivery and operational network overseas and within Australia, backed by the latest technology.

    The case for full integration of the Australian Customs functions with the Department of Immigration has never been convincingly made and no major unrealised synergies or efficiency gains identified.

    The Australian Government should revisit the existing administration model to consider whether any real gains have been achieved or whether Australian Customs should become an operational agency within the broader portfolio or separated from the Department of Immigration.

    One of the great strengths of the Australian immigration system until recently has been an integrated national administration which brings together entry policy, citizenship policy and post arrival settlement services. This has ensured a close feedback loop to entry policy based on the practical experiences and outcomes for different cohorts of migrants.

    The migrant and refugee post-arrival settlement programs transferred to other departments in 2013, including the Adult Migrant English Program, should be returned to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.

    1.8 Australian, State/Territory and Local Government management of immigration outcomes

    Consistent with its nation building objective, Australia’s immigration program necessarily impacts all states and territories, although to different degrees.

    The Australian government should put in place mechanisms to ensure that State/Territory and local government are involved in short-term and long range migration planning. Immigration, whether permanent or temporary, brings prosperity, but it also brings with it the associated costs for expanding infrastructure. It is important that governments put the necessary processes are in place to ensure that infrastructure planning and implementation reflects population growth from migration and as well as natural increase.

    The success of Australia’s immigration program has always depended upon community confidence in the efficacy of the program and its benefits for the country. All levels of government need to take responsibility for public education on immigration and its benefits.

    Peter Hughes is Visiting Fellow, Crawford School of Public Policy,
    Visitor, Regulatory Institutions Network, Australian National University

    Arja Keski-Nummi was formerly First Assistant Secretary of the Refugee, Humanitarian and International Division in the Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2007-2010.

    John Menadue was Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 1980-1983.

    [1] Migration Council of Australia, The Economic Impact of Migration (2015)

    [2] Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Temporary Entrants and New Zealand Citizens in Australia as at 30 September 2014.

    [3] Department of Immigration and Border Protection, as above.

    [4] Department of Immigration and Border Protection