As the US signals a move away from containment in the Pacific, China’s most strategic move would be to reorient Quad members towards their respective national interests.
As the relevance of anti-China groupings such as the Quad and Aukus fades, Beijing and its neighbours have more room for dialogue. Beyond the diplomatic choreography of last month’s Xi-Trump summit, what are the structural implications of a less confrontational US–China relationship for the Asia-Pacific?
The subsequent visits by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio to India and US Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth to Singapore in late May shed some light on the question. Both Rubio and Hegseth had accompanied Trump to Beijing.
Perhaps most telling was the switch in the US administration’s use of a geographic term. In his keynote speech at the Shangri-la Dialogue on 30 May, Hegseth referred to the Pacific 17 times. In contrast to his remarks at the same forum last year, when Hegseth used the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ many times, he never once deployed that construct in this year’s speech.
The subtle change makes a world of difference. Whereas ‘Indo-Pacific’ is a concept associated with containment, Pacific – on its own – projects a vision of coexistence for the two great powers on opposite sides of the ocean. It is a vision of balance of power, where no Asian nation is forced to choose sides.
The Indo-Pacific construct was championed by Japan – particularly under Shinzo Abe when he was prime minister – to build a coalition encircling China. When Japan was the dominant economic power in Asia, there was little need to deviate from this customary designation of the region. But when it felt insecure in the shadow of a rising China, Japan began to draw a larger circle to contain China.
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the Indo-Pacific concept go hand in hand. The Quad is the institutional implementation of the idea of the Indo-Pacific. Hegseth’s recent avoidance of the term revealed the Quad’s fate. This was confirmed by the meeting of Quad foreign ministers in New Delhi, where the most substantive outcome was a collaboration on critical minerals, an area already covered by a proliferation of overlapping bilateral and multilateral frameworks. The Quad’s past failures to deliver outcomes on critical minerals foretell the new initiative’s future, with timelines likely to run into decades.
The Quad’s anti-China orientation has stood on shaky ground from the beginning. Most of its members have larger bilateral trading relationships with China than with any other economy. While US trade with China was recently overtaken by Canada and Mexico, Beijing is the top trading partner of Australia and Japan and has recently become India’s largest trading partner for goods.
As the US and China turn towards mutual accommodation, the Quad has lost its anchor. And with Sanae Takaichi as Japan’s prime minister, it will not be easy for Beijing to resolve its historical conflicts with Tokyo. Thus, a more strategic approach is for China to improve ties with Australia and India, leaving Japan out.
Australia’s current Labor Party government has adopted a more pragmatic approach towards China. Beijing could reciprocate by focusing its initiatives in Oceania on economic development and cooperation. The economies of China and Australia are inherently complementary. The two countries do not share a border.
While China is Australia’s top trading partner, Australia has the strongest bilateral investment relationships with the United States. But their historical affinity has been shaken under US President Donald Trump, who is viewed by many Australians as a greater threat to global security than China. In terms of security, the long lead times of the AUKUS security pact, the project, which is coming under increasing public scrutiny, may make it irrelevant when the nuclear-powered submarines are eventually delivered. Should China pay much attention to what may prove to be a self-inflicted folly?
China–India ties were disrupted by their border disputes. With Taiwan the paramount priority, Beijing can afford strategic patience on formalising the Himalayan boundary, an approach which seems to be bearing fruit.
After Washington imposed stiff tariffs on New Delhi, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met President Xi during the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin last August. Since then, China has lifted a range of export restrictions on India while India has relaxed investment restrictions on China. China’s exports, such as industrial equipment, can provide much impetus to India’s economic development. With Washington wary that a rising India may become another China, New Delhi should leverage China for its industrialisation on its own terms.
Out of all the Quad members, Japan paradoxically has the strongest economic integration with China. Japan was among the earliest and most important foreign investors in China and continues to occupy a major position as a source of foreign direct investment. China has been Japan’s top trading partner for much of the last two decades.
Sino-Japan trade consists of sophisticated intermediate and final products in both directions, although trade with China is much more important to Japan than the other way around. Nevertheless, given the interdependent nature of their economies, access to Japanese technologies and supply chains remain important for China’s economy. Thus, China should be calibrated in exerting economic pressure on Japan. Excessive pressure may lead to a downward spiral, only hardening Japan’s turn towards militarism.
The Chinese board game Go is about mutual encirclement rather than frontal attack. The Trump administration presents a historical opening with neither Australia nor India currently well aligned with the US. China should seize this unique opportunity to dissolve the encirclement initiated by Takaichi’s intellectual mentor Abe. Japan is too deeply placed on the board to be taken by force. China’s most strategic move would be to reorient Quad members towards their respective national interests, thus leaving the architect of containment isolated.
Republished from South China Morning Post
Winston Mok
Winston Mok, a private investor, was previously a private equity investor. He held senior regional positions with EMP Global and GE Capital, and was a McKinsey consultant and initiated its China practice. Winston obtained his bachelor and master degrees from MIT.