Bridges, not walls: Xi Jinping and the Australia-China relationship

Australia and China flags with Speech Bubbles. 3D Illustration

The relationship between Australia and China, once characterised by regard and mutual curiosity, has recently been extremely turbulent. However, it was not always this way.

This essay will examine the argument that the missed opportunities, evident mutual incomprehension, falling out, and apparent rehabilitation after the election of a Labor Government can be best understood in terms of Xi Jinping’s personal connections to Australia.

Xi Jinping’s affection for Australia is due to his father, Xi Zhongxun. Xi was 14 when, in 1967, Australia agreed to Chinese requests to allow grain exports for humanitarian reasons, over US objections. At the time, China was in a famine, and Xi Zhongxun was charged with developing the first trade ties between Australia and the new China.

Australia’s willingness to endure a rift with its senior alliance partner, which opposed the deal, to meet China’s need was greatly appreciated and made Australia interesting to Chinese academics. Our “coming to China’s rescue” had a significant role in sparking and nurturing curiosity about Australia in China. This trade relationship stimulated academic interest and cultural exchange, leading to the establishment of dedicated Australian studies programs within Chinese universities.

Dwelling on that academic interest for a moment, the next thirty years would see a high level of structured engagement with Australia, supported by a network of academic centres that benefited from substantial institutional support as the decades rolled on. Australia offered tuition in both the Arts and Sciences, was close to Asia, and had the potential to be a key economic partner.

Rehabilitated after the Cultural Revolution and appointed to the role of Guangdong Party Secretary by Deng Xiaoping, Xi Zhongxun led a delegation to Australia in 1979. He toured factories, farms, and research institutes, keen to understand what constituted a “modern economy.” This visit led to the signing of a joint declaration on Guangdong-NSW friendship and cooperation, establishing Australia’s first official sister-state/province relationship.

Xi Jinping’s first visit to Australia, in 1988, was as a guest of the Department of Foreign Affairs under a “Special Visits Program” designed to engage the future leaders of the region. His second visit was a stopover in Brisbane in 2001. In 2004, as Party Secretary of Zhejiang, Xi again returned to Australia, visiting Sydney and Western Australia, which had a sister-state/province relationship since 1987. Xi Jinping’s fourth visit to Australia was in 2010, made as Vice President, focusing on expanding commercial ties.

In 2014, Xi Jinping addressed the Australian Parliament, showing his sincere interest in and strong attachment to Australia. In his speech to a joint sitting of the Australian Parliament, Xi joked that he had visited every Australian state and deserved “a certificate for that.” After this wry and funny nod to the Australian passion for benchmarking and certifying skills, Xi Jinping then asked Australians to “cherish the memory of the past, embrace the present, and plan for the future… walk hand in hand toward a brilliant tomorrow and write a splendid new chapter in the annals of China-Australia relations.”

However, the warm relations that characterised the early years did not endure. What is known now, but was difficult to prove then, was that Australia was actually cooperating with the US in a “Trump-inspired anti-China policy” designed to derail the Australia-China friendship. This covert operation was part of a wider pattern of aggressive US actions to counter China’s influence, including pressuring close allies like Australia and Canada to adopt more hawkish policies.

This directive was part of a broader US strategy to counter China’s growing global influence and assertiveness. As part of this effort, the US sponsored a disinformation campaign about Chinese vaccines and aid during the COVID-19 pandemic. Hundreds of millions flowed to the contractor, General Dynamics.

Public health experts in the Philippines reported that the U.S. propaganda effort “contributed… salt into the wound” and was a contributing factor to the country having the highest case fatality rates in the region at 1.6%. In comparison, Singapore and Laos had case fatality rates of only 0.1%.

This disinformation campaign was renewed once and expanded to the Middle East with the goal of stoking fears that the Sinovac was faulty and violated religious law.

This US disinformation operation during the pandemic highlighted the increasingly blurred lines between informational and geopolitical warfare. And, in fact, dear reader, this was the moment I realised the necessity of dissent and formed the ambition to contribute to this platform.

I do not believe that moral ends can be achieved by immoral means, and I prefer an uncomfortable truth over dogma or cant of any kind. Mostly because Xi is not a monster, which my fellow Australians have a right to know.

The Turnbull government’s exclusion of Huawei from Australia’s 5G network without discussing the proposal with the Chinese breached the terms of the 2014 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Australia’s legislative measures to counter foreign interference were perceived by China as unreasonable and unfair.

Australia’s call for an independent investigation into the origins of COVID-19 was the last straw, viewed in China as politically motivated and designed to undermine China’s international standing and reputation.

Strategically, the deepening of Australia’s alliances with other countries, particularly the AUKUS arrangement, was seen as a direct challenge to China’s influence in the region. From Xi’s perspective, this was a betrayal of the spirit of friendship and mutual understanding his family had worked to build. The wave of trade restrictions that froze many categories of Australian exports was inevitable once the Chinese leadership grasped that Australia was distancing itself from the “special relationship.”

Despite these challenges, Xi’s long-standing personal connection to Australia suggests a genuine desire for a productive relationship. He has been encouraging leaders in both countries to be more visionary, broad-minded, and to set more ambitious goals. A renewed and sustained interest and engagement in Australia have the potential for a renewed and strengthened relationship, founded on deeper respect and understanding.

By appreciating the complex personal history that informs Xi’s view of Australia, a clearer understanding of the future trajectory of this critical bilateral relationship is possible. The lost opportunities in the relationship, seen through the eyes of Xi Jinping, must serve to remind us of the importance of mutual respect and understanding in international relations.

The friendship built by Xi Zhongxun and continued by Xi Jinping demonstrates what can be achieved when nations work together towards common goals.

As the world navigates an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape, the lessons from this relationship highlight the need to work on building bridges rather than walls.

Kari McKern, who lives in Sydney, is a retired career public servant and librarian and IT specialist. She has maintained a life time interest in Asian affairs and had visited Asia often, and writes here in a private capacity.