Australia’s historical commitment to nuclear disarmament is facing new challenges, as critics say the nation’s alliance with the United States is leading to a conflicted stance on nuclear non-proliferation.
While Australia has actively participated in global nuclear arms control initiatives, such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), it simultaneously relies on the so-called “US nuclear umbrella” for security. This duality has led to ongoing debate about whether Australia’s security policies align with its disarmament principles.
Australia’s approach to nuclear non-proliferation has shifted over recent years. In 2016, Australia voted against a United Nations General Assembly resolution aimed at creating a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons. The following year, it refused to join negotiations that led to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). As a result, Australia remains one of the few regional countries not signed onto this treaty, despite a 2018 resolution by the Australian Labor Party to consider joining under a future government.
Critics argue that if Australia were to adopt the TPNW, it would be compelled to prohibit any support for other countries’ nuclear weapons programs—potentially forcing the closure of Pine Gap, a key joint defence facility with the US. Yet government supporters claim that distancing from the US would leave Australia vulnerable, especially amid regional tensions with China.
However, questions have arisen about the reliability of this “nuclear umbrella.” Currently, US military systems, including missile defence, offer limited protection against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). After investing over $400 billion in missile defence research and development, no system has yet achieved dependable protection against ICBMs. Critics argue this leaves Australia exposed rather than safeguarded, despite assurances from the US.
In addition, Australia’s recent defence agreements, particularly the AUKUS pact and the US-Australia Force Posture Agreement (FPA), have raised concerns over sovereignty. Signed in 2014, the FPA allows the US to store and control defence equipment on Australian soil. According to Article VII of the agreement, the US retains “exclusive control” over its prepositioned military supplies in Australia, with full ownership rights, effectively restricting Australian authority over the use of these materials.
Article XII of the FPA states that US government vehicles, aircraft, and vessels are exempt from inspection by Australian authorities without US consent. This clause has fuelled arguments that the FPA has compromised Australia’s independence by allowing the US to make defence decisions within Australian borders. For instance, US B2 bombers have launched from Australian bases in operations overseas, reportedly without consulting the Australian public.
As Australia contemplates its nuclear policy, the debate over whether it can maintain both its alliance with the United States and a commitment to nuclear non-proliferation will likely intensify. This complex question has implications not only for Australia’s defence but also for its sovereignty and international standing in the movement toward nuclear disarmament.