Category: Defence

Formal speeches about Australia’s Great War normally follow simple rules. The focus is upon military achievement, and defining national values – service, sacrifice, and mateship. Hardship and horror are added, giving lustre to military achievement. National awakening is emphasised: the diggers were ‘the founding heroes of modern Australia.’[1] Audiences are flattered: the Anzacs were ‘our mighty forebears.’[2]

But the objects of that war – the ‘war aims’ for which so many Australian lives were lost – are seldom mentioned. Ignorance of purposes is assumed. ‘Few of us can recall the detail,’ Tony Abbott told the Gallipoli Dawn Service in 2015, ‘but we have imbibed what matters most: that a generation of young Australians rallied to serve our country, when our country called.’ And fought for what? Generalities suffice. ‘It was for country, Empire, King, and the ideal that people and countries should be free.’ The diggers fought ‘for duty, loyalty, honour and mates: the virtues that outshine any cause.’[3]

But what cause? Many speechmakers simply confuse 1914-18 with 1939-45. They retrospectively democratise Britain’s Great War. Thus, our diggers fought for ‘freedom under the law, representative democracy and the universal decencies of mankind.’[4]

This draws a veil over everything difficult: the expansion of war aims, the Great Powers’ jostling to redivide the colonial world, the private corporate interests masquerading as national interests, and the blundering ‘old diplomacy’ – all the systemic evils that prolonged the slaughter of Australians.

Why did Australians die by the thousands at Gallipoli in 1915? At Fromelles in 1916? It is not enough to point to the wickedness of the German enemy.[5] We must explain the prolongation of the war. We must dig deep into our ‘war aims’.[6]

As a self-governing dominion within the British Empire, but without control of her own foreign policy, Australia was bound by Britain’s diplomatic deals. These included:

The Pact of London, 4 September 1914 (PUBLIC)

Britain, France and Russia became ‘Allies’ and promised not to conclude peace separately. Russia pressed for this. Britain and France truckled to Russia, to keep her loyal. Tsarist Russia – Europe’s most reactionary power – was already eyeing annexations in Eastern Europe, Turkey, and beyond, the so-called ‘Thirteen Points’. Tsar Nicholas II and his ministers dreamt of stifling democratisation in Russia with victory. In signing up, Britain and France accepted the risk that the war would go on – until Russian war aims were achieved.

The Straits Agreements, 8 and 12 March 1915 (SECRET)

After great pressure from Russia, Britain and France agreed to plans for Russian annexations in Turkey. These included control of the Straits (Gallipoli and the Dardanelles), and Constantinople (Istanbul) – Russia’s great prize. As compensation, Britain gained the oil-rich ‘neutral zone’ in Persia (Iran). France won Russian backing ‘for the realization of plans which they [France] may frame with reference to other regions of the Ottoman Empire or elsewhere’, such as Syria. The agreements were secret. Thus, Australians died at Gallipoli so that Russia might rule in Constantinople. Truly, a Gallipoli ceremony should be held every year in London – outside Chesham House, Belgravia, the old Russian embassy.

Cabinet Document ‘The Spoils’, 25 March 1915, CAB 63/3/104-7. (SECRET)

On Gallipoli’s eve, Lewis Harcourt, Britain’s Colonial Secretary, drew up ‘The Spoils’. It outlined a repartition of the colonial world. Britain must ‘dictate any terms’. If Russia gained Constantinople, Britain had a long shopping list: annexations in Mesopotamia ‘from the Persian Gulf to Baghdad’, and a brace of colonial seizures and swaps among the victors, in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Africa and the Pacific. Britain, her Dominions, and Japan would take all German Pacific colonies – anticipating ‘great trouble’ with Australia. To counter ‘Australian prejudices’, Britain aimed at ‘sweetening the pill’, giving Australia in addition Bougainville and the British Solomons.[7]

The Treaty of London, 26 April 1915 (SECRET)

During March 1915, Italian negotiators in London bargained on the price of Italy joining the war. The landing at Gallipoli closed the deal. It opened up the prospect of the Ottoman Empire’s collapse. So, the day after Anzac, the Italian elite signed the Treaty, agreeing to bounce Italy into war. In return, Italy would gain swags of Austro-Hungarian territory, in the north and along the Adriatic. Italy was offered a slice of the Ottoman Empire, a war indemnity, and a £50 million loan. Under Article 15, the Entente agreed to support Italy in ‘not allowing the representatives of the Holy See [the Pope] to undertake any diplomatic steps having for their object the conclusion of peace or the settlement of questions connected with the present war.’ Catholic Anzacs, perhaps 25% of the AIF, had no inkling of this. The treaty was secret.

The Sykes-Picot agreements, January-May 1916. (SECRET)

British and French diplomatic negotiators struck a deal in May 1916. The victors planned to gobble up the great bulk of the Ottoman Empire. Later Britain and France also agreed to Russian and Italian gains. Again, secrecy prevailed. Australians would fight on in the Middle East from 1916 for all these objectives – and 1,400 died – knowing nothing about them.

The Inter-allied Paris Economic Conference, 14-17 June 1916 (the ‘Paris Resolutions’) (PUBLIC)

Britain, France and Russia agreed to form a trade bloc after the war. The ‘Paris Resolutions’ proclaimed a post-war economic boycott of the enemy. German commerce would be shut out. This would hobble the defeated, as the victorious empires became exclusive economic zones. Protectionism would triumph across the British Empire. This public deal strengthened the hands of the German militarists: they argued that Germany’s war was now indispensable. Sadly, Australia’s Prime Minister Hughes loudly promoted the ‘Paris Resolutions’.

For such ‘war aims’, mostly secret, Australian troops endured their 5,533 casualties in one night at Fromelles on 19 July 1916. One hundred years later, the dead deserve better than to be washed into their graves afresh with a cascade of clichés and hyperbole. To honour them truly, we should ask ‘Why?’

Assoc. Prof. Douglas Newton is a retired academic. He has taught history at Macquarie University, Victoria University of Wellington, NZ, and Western Sydney University. He is the author of a number of studies of war and peace, including most recently, The Darkest Days: The Truth Behind Britain’s Rush to War, 1914 (London, Verso: 2014) and Hell-bent: Australia’s Leap into the Great War (Melbourne: Scribe, 2014). He is currently writing a book tentatively entitled, Ending Armageddon: The Search for a Negotiated Peace during the Great War, to be published by Scribe in 2017

[1] Prime Minister Abbott, ‘Anzac Cove Address’, 25 April 2015, https://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/release/transcript-24397

[2] Prime Minister Abbott, ‘Address to Legacy Clubs of Australia’ 18 Oct. 2013, https://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/release/transcript-23045 and ‘Address to the Anzac Day National Ceremony, Canberra’, 25 April 2014, https://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/release/transcript-23446

[3] Prime Minister Abbott, ‘Lone Pine Address, Gallipoli’, 25 April 2015, https://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/release/transcript-24398

[4] Prime Minister Abbott, ‘Remarks at unveiling of the Sir John Monash Centre winning design, Villers-Brettonneux’, 26 April 2015, https://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/release/transcript-24400

[5] As Fritz Fischer has argued, ‘There is no question but that the conflict of military and political interests, of resentment and ideas, which found expression in the July crisis, left no government of any of the European powers quite free of some measure of responsibility – greater or smaller – for the outbreak of war in one respect or another.’ Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First World War (London, 1967), 87.

[6] For surveys of ‘war aims’ on the Entente side, see David Stevenson, 1914-1918: The History of the First World War (London, 2005), David Stevenson, The First World War and International Politics (Oxford, 1988), David Stevenson, French War Aims Against Germany 1914-1919 (Oxford, 1982), Christopher Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion (London, 1981), V. H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy, 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1971), William A. Renzi, In the Shadow of the Sword: Italy’s Neutrality and Entrance into the Great War (New York, 1987), Jukka Nevakivi, Britain, France and the Arab Middle East, 1914-1920 (London, 1969), Ronald P. Bobroff, Roads to Glory: Late Imperial Russia and the Turkish Straits (London, 2006), Sean McMeekin, The Russian Origins of the First World War (Harvard, 2013), Wm. Roger Louis, Great Britain and Germany’s Lost Colonies, 1914-1919 (Oxford, 1967).

[7] Lewis Harcourt, ‘The Spoils’, Secret. Cabinet Paper. Printed for the use of the Cabinet, dated 25 March 1915, in CAB 63: War Cabinet and Cabinet Office: Lord Hankey: Papers. ‘Magnum Opus files’, CAB 63/3, 104-107 (The National Archives, London).

The algebra goes something like this: EU ref: Brexit – Scotland = indyref2? In other words, if England overwhelmingly votes to leave the European Union while Scotland votes to remain in and the overall result from England, Northern Ireland and Wales, (known since the debate on independence in Scotland as rUK – rest of the UK) is to leave, will this automatically mean a second referendum on Scottish independence? The answer is maybe.

Certainly, the Scots are the most pro-European of the four nations of the UK. The Scots have consistently shown over a number of polls that they favour remaining in the EU. There are economic reasons for staying in such as the £2 billion benefit to the Scottish economy. There are social reasons such as the protection of human rights through legislation which the Westminster Parliament wishes to change but which the Scottish Government champions. Above all, there are strong historic reasons for the Scots feeling European.

Scottish monks helped Christianise the continent of Europe in early medieval times, hence the proliferation of Schottenklöster (Scottish Monasteries) in Germany and Austria. Scots traders, soldiers and philosophers, even before the reluctant 1707 Union with England, had access to markets, armies and academe all over Europe. At one time, it was a toss-up whether French or English should be the language of the Scottish court after the decline of Gaelic and we still celebrate the Vieille Alliance (Auld Alliance in Scots) between France and an independent Scotland, called by de Gaulle in 1942, “the oldest alliance in the world”.

By anecdotal contrast, English TV celebrity and ‘University Challenge’ host, Jeremy Paxton, recently called French “a useless language” and maintained French achievements were all in the past. Nigel Farage, the leader of the pro-Brexit UK Independence Party (UKIP) commented furiously that on a train from the suburbs to central London, he was surrounded by people not speaking English. Welcome to the mentality of the Little Englander who believes in a (Great) Britain (or England – the two are often interchangeable in such a mindset) comprising a feudal Royal Family, an unelected Second Chamber (the House of Lords), warm beer, cricket pitches, chauvinism and exceptionalism.

The just published manifesto of the Scottish Government led by the Scottish National Party (SNP) for the Scottish Parliamentary elections in May this year opts for campaigning to keep Scotland and the UK in the EU. It further states that there would be a second independence referendum only “if there is clear and sustained evidence that independence has become the preferred option of a majority of the Scottish people – or if there is a significant and material change in the circumstances that prevailed in 2014, such as Scotland being taken out of the EU against our will”.

Many journalists in Scotland who have an “SNP bad” obsession speculate that the very popular First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, “secretly” wants Scotland to vote to stay in and England to vote to leave. This would mean taking Scotland out of the EU against the will of the Scottish people. If this does happen, there will certainly be a constitutional crisis, but I doubt if there will be a referendum because the first part of the manifesto statement quoted above may not pertain, i.e. that independence has not necessarily become the preferred option of the majority of Scots. To hold a referendum on Scottish independence when the polls hover around the 50% mark for and then lose would scupper Scottish independence for a generation or maybe for ever. Nicola would not want that.

In addition, the right to hold a referendum on the constitution is in the hands of Westminster as it is not a devolved matter and Cameron and other Conservatives have already ruled out another referendum. The Scottish Government could hold its own referendum but Westminster could ignore it as the Spanish government has done with the Catalan independence referendum.

On the other hand, the brouhaha created by such a vote and the ensuing British jingoism with figures such as Boris Johnston, Tory leader contender and Brexit campaigner, and Nigel Farage possibly at the helm of government would so appal the Scottish people that they may clamour for another referendum. There is the added thought that being dragged out of the EU would consign Scotland to another 20 years of rule from Westminster by the Conservative Party which the Scots haven’t voted for in any numbers since 1955. The Tories have currently one MP in Scotland, a lightweight who had to be appointed the Scottish Secretary of State not because of talent but because he was their only MP!

The Tories are taking forward austerity cuts, the semi-privatisation of the National Health Service and schooling, the £800 billion renewal of Trident nuclear subs, conveniently placed within 25 miles of Glasgow, and a bellicose foreign policy to maintain a vestige of imperial grandeur, all of which is anathema to most Scottish voters. They are also in a mood to cut the budget of the Scottish Parliament.

Interestingly enough, ‘ Yes’ and ‘No’ voters in the Scottish independence referendum were asked if the Brexit scenario came about with the Scots voting to stay in, would they vote for another Scottish referendum? The answer was 70% of the Yes voters in favour and 62% of the No voters also in favour. If such a poll were to show such figures after 23^rd June (voting day), the Scottish Government would certainly propose another Scottish independence referendum which, this time, would probably gain a majority ‘Yes’ vote.

The post-EU UK jingoistic reaction to a successful independence referendum would be, to say the least, interesting. Having read some of the blogs of English Brexit enthusiasts, some of them might welcome the departure of “the moaning Scots”. Little England searching for a greatness that is delusional in the current world of alliances will have been born.

Duncan MacLaren is an Adjunct Professor of Australian Catholic University and a PhD candidate in theology at the University of Glasgow.

On Anzac Day 2016, the centenaries of 1916 should loom large. In April 1916, the Australian divisions that had been mauled at Gallipoli were being despatched to the Western Front. The industrialised kill-chain at the Somme awaited them. Other centenary moments from 1916 are coming: of diplomatic deals that escalated the war, and of lost opportunities to end the war.

The cataclysm of that war for Australians ought to prompt hard questions – beyond the nationalist obsession over whether ‘the mettle of the men’ shone bright on the battlefield.

Why were Australians so exposed in this protracted catastrophe?

Because we plunged in, so recklessly.

From the outset, Australian politicians boasted of their absolute loyalty to the Empire. They offered men without qualification – anywhere, for any objective, under British command. George Reid, Australia’s High Commissioner in London, gushed that Britain and Australia were united, like ‘enraptured lovers’ – ‘Two hearts that beat as one.’[1]

Prime Minister Fisher told the British Colonial Secretary, in February 1915, that ‘when the King’s business will not fit in with our ideas, we do not press them.’[2] In October 1915, Prime Minister Hughes told parliament: ‘I do not pretend to understand the situation in the Dardanelles, but I know what the duty of this government is; and that is – to mind its own business, to provide that quota of men which the Imperial Government think necessary.’[3] In this spirit of imperial subservience were the men despatched to unimaginable horrors.

For what purposes were Australian lives committed?

For noble – and for dubious purposes. The noble were largely window-dressing.

War aims escalated on every side during 1916. The imperial leaders compiled shopping lists of annexations. In May 1916, Britain and France struck the Sykes-Picot Agreement, planning a carve-up of the entire Middle East. In June 1916, the Inter-allied Economic Conference in Paris confirmed plans to crush Germany, with a post-war economic boycott. In August 1916, Rumania was bribed into entering the war, with the promise of a great slice of Transylvania. These added to the fatal territorial deals struck in 1915, the Straits Agreement with Russia and the Treaty of London with Italy. All such bargains prolonged the war.[4]

One shell-shocked Anzac from the ‘Abattoirs’ at the Somme, Private E. J. Ryan, captured the soldiers’ disillusionment. In October 1916, he wrote to British Labour leader Ramsay MacDonald, urging him to resist the wide-mouthed ‘bitter enders’ and press for negotiations. ‘Has England still got her old ideal, that of Conquer & not the supposed new ideal, one of Peace? … Every man I have spoken to is absolutely sick of the whole business,’ he wrote.[5]

Why was peace not achieved in 1916?

Because promising opportunities to end the war by negotiation were stifled.

In February 1916, Colonel House, US President Wilson’s special emissary, concluded the ‘House-Grey Memorandum’. Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, agreed to invite American mediation at a moment of Britain’s choosing. But Britain never jumped. The ‘bitter enders’ preferred to speculate on more war. Armed with emergency powers, governments everywhere spooked and coerced their populations. Victory, they argued, was indispensable. In truth, reactionaries demanded it, to save as much of the old order as possible.

But there were always alternatives. Internationalists, radical Liberals, and socialists in every belligerent nation, pressed for negotiations and a new rules-based order. Even Tories tried. In November 1916 Lord Lansdowne challenged British Prime Minister Henry Asquith’s Cabinet: ‘Can we afford to go on paying the same sort of price for the same sort of gain?’ He argued that ‘the responsibility of those who needlessly prolong such a war is not less than that of those who needlessly provoke it.’[6]

Then, in late 1916 came a chink of light. On 12 December, the Germans offered round-table negotiations; a week later President Wilson issued a ‘Peace Note’, urging all sides to specify war aims, as a prelude to American mediation. The Entente Powers stamped upon the opportunity.

This year, we should remember all these telling centenaries – not just the bloodbaths at Pozières and Fromelles.

But what was ‘the Anzac spirit’? 

The posters proclaim ‘Their Spirit – Our History’. Countless sources testify that the original Anzacs were fiercely democratic and ferociously egalitarian. They hated privilege, defied hierarchy, and mocked inherited advantage. They believed in pooling resources against common dangers. Their spirit was collective – for above all else, they supported each other.

Do we have a right to invoke ‘the Anzac Spirit’ in contemporary Australia? If we tolerate widening inequality, monstrous private wealth amid public squalor, intensifying social stratification, and weakening social mobility, dare we speak of ‘Their Spirit’? If we pursue a neo-liberal agenda, that preaches an acquisitive individualism, hollows out the public sector, privileges the private provider, relentlessly privatises our pooled resources, and lauds lower taxes as the one true household god – is ‘the Anzac spirit’ alive?

And the hardest question: if egalitarianism is lost in Australia, what is the point of Anzac?

Assoc. Prof. Douglas Newton is a retired academic. He has taught history at Macquarie University, Victoria University of Wellington, NZ, and the University of Western Sydney. He is the author of a number of studies of war and peace, including most recently, ‘The Darkest Days: The Truth Behind Britain’s Rush to War, 1914 (London, Verso: 2014) and Hell-bent: Australia’s Leap into the Great War (Melbourne: Scribe, 2014).

[1] George Reid, ‘Empire Trade’, The Times, 7 Oct. 1914. Reproduced in George Reid, ‘Fifth Annual Report of the High Commissioner of the Commonwealth in the United Kingdom (printed 21 July 1915)’, dated 5 April 1915, in Papers Presented to Parliament, Vol. V, Session 1914-17, p. 247.

[2] Harcourt cited the letter from Fisher, dated 15 Feb. 1915, in Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5^th series, vol. 71, 16 (14 Apr. 1915).

[3] Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 29 Oct. 1915, p. 7022.

[4] Of course, Germany also planned annexations. As Fritz Fischer wrote, ‘all great powers had “annexationist” policies in the age of imperialism.’ Fritz Fischer, ‘Foreword’ to his Germany’s Aims in the First World War (London, 1967), p. x.

[5] Private E. J. Ryan (Service Number 4635) to Ramsay MacDonald, 16 Oct. 1916, Ramsay MacDonald Papers, PRO/30/69/1160 f. 108 (The National Archives, London). I am very grateful to Duncan Marlor for generously providing a copy.

[6] Memorandum from Lord Lansdowne, 13 November 1916, Lansdowne Papers, LANS (5) 85/9 (The National Archives, London).

Jonathan D. Pollack from The Brookings Institution quotes Ambassador Wu Dawei, Japan’s long-time leading negotiator on the Korean nuclear issue, who expressed mounting frustration that North Korea lets China’s advice ‘go through one ear and out the other ear’.  Ambassador Wu suggests that North Korea ‘ had signed its own death warrant’.  For link to Pollack article, see below.

http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2016/03/28-china-north-korea-sanctions-pollack#.Vv2jy9wxlqc.email

Seven years ago, President Obama spoke in Prague Square and undertook to “seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”. He cautioned that this outcome would be immensely difficult to achieve and may not be reached in his own lifetime, but his speech was heard and widely taken as signaling an enhanced US commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons.

A year later he called the first meeting of a Nuclear Security Summit, to be attended by Heads of State/Government. It was held in 2010 and then followed, in 2012, 2014, and last week, the 2016 Summit, held in Washington DC, was designated as the last such gathering, at Summit level.

Australia was represented in Washington by Foreign Minister Bishop, who claimed that no country has done more to ensure nuclear security than Australia. That airy claim aside, what she did do at the Summit was sign a bilateral agreement under which Australia would supply Uranium to Ukraine.

Even though they interact in critical ways, a distinction needs to be drawn between the goal of the elimination of Nuclear weapons, and the agenda and objectives of the Nuclear Security Summits.

As was evidenced in the final communiqué, the Summit was focused, virtually exclusively, on preventing nuclear materials from being obtained by non-state groups –terrorists – and criminal groups, in other words, on a particular aspect of non-proliferation.

Unquestionably, this is a deeply important objective and the mechanisms, and international cooperation that the Summit process has established, are impressive.

About half of the areas of the world in which relevant nuclear materials have been held or stored have been cleared of them and a low enrichment nuclear fuel bank is being established in Kazakhstan, with IAEA involvement, so that States needing fuel for electricity generation can obtain it from and return it, when spent, to the bank. The point is that spent uranium fuel can be reprocessed into weapons grade plutonium. Sending it back to the bank is designed to prevent this.

The Summit was characterized as taking place not only in the light of the need to address the special challenges posed by the contemporary phenomenon of actions by non-state groups and criminal organizations, but also the wider need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The cornerstone of that regime is the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT).

It is essential to recall that NPT, in fact, has two objectives; preventing new acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the elimination of those already held by states, specifically the five states recognized in the treaty as the “Nuclear Weapon States” (NWS): US, Russia, China, France, UK.

In the past, the NWS have argued that these two objectives are separate and do not rely on each other. This has enabled them to argue that their tardiness in nuclear disarmament in no way reduces the obligation of non-NWS to abstain from acquiring nuclear weapons. Few have agreed with this obviously self-serving argument, not simply because that is evidently its purpose, but also because it contradicts the negotiating history of the NPT. Indeed, it seeks to re-write it.

During the course of the Summit there was discussion of the increasingly serious matter of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and there was a side meeting of the five NWS plus EU and the IAEA, on progress in the implementation of the recently concluded agreement with Iran. These were and remain palpable issues in non-proliferation.

On the other hand, it is not clear what attention was given to the nuclear weapons programs of India, Pakistan and Israel, the three non parties to NPT, each of which have nuclear weapons, have already proliferated. These are critical issues of nuclear arms control and disarmament.

Of further importance, are the facts that: the US has embarked on an extensive program of modernization of its nuclear arsenal and the development of a new Long Range Stand-off nuclear missile; the Russians are developing new nuclear weapons and longer range missiles and torpedoes; China is developing the DF-41 long range missile, with possibly the longest range of any in existence; UK is planning to renew its massively expensive Trident nuclear force.

On March 30^th, the day before the Summit opened, the Washington Post published an Op-Ed by President Obama in which he claimed that he has “ruled out developing new nuclear warheads”. This attracted responses of incredulity in the US, including from former Defense Secretary William Perry. The fact is, 6 years ago, the President gave an undertaking to Congress to expend some $85 billion on warhead renewal in order to obtain its agreement to the ratification of the New Start Treaty with Russia, which set limits on their deployed nuclear weapons systems, leaving between 1800-2000 each. In fact, the overall planned upgrade of the US arsenal now approved by Obama is expected to cost some $3trillion in the next 30 years. The President may claim that this is not inconsistent with what he stated in his Op-Ed, by arguing that “renewal’ does not involve new weapons, just stockpile maintenance. Such semantics will be lost on others.

Furthermore, for the first time in the series of Nuclear Security Summits, Russia declined to attend last weeks Washington Summit.

India and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons developments signal unambiguously that they are engaged in a nuclear arms race.

And, the US continues to refuse to allow any discussion of Israel’s undeclared, but believed to be substantial, nuclear weapons capability. That refusal has come to threaten the existence of the NPT.

I have argued on earlier occasions, in Pearls and Irritations, in a number of contexts, that what we are witnessing now, in international politics, is a turning away from a will to live by and implement the key purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the post- World War II compact, and a reversion to the more traditional determinants of action by states; national interests, military power, the threat of use of force. There is possibly no clearer evidence for this claim than the insistence by NWS that their nuclear weapons capability is their right, and that it is legitimate for them to determine who else may or may not hold such weapons.

While, self evidently, the NWS are able to make such claims, and such muscularity is all too evident in history, including in its disastrous outcomes, the simple historicism which asserts that such behavior has always been the case, especially with strong and competitive States, is deeply flawed and today, unacceptably dangerous, given the horrendous destructive capacity of nuclear weapons.

In addition, the NWS have given the undertaking in NPT that they will progressively eliminate their nuclear weapons. Whether the NWS care to accept this or not, the undertaking on nuclear disarmament is fundamental to other states continuing to eschew obtaining nuclear weapons. Their current policies violate that undertaking.

It seems that the Nuclear Security Summit process has established some means to reduce or contain the dangers posed by nuclear materials, but in sidelining the gut issue of reductions in nuclear weapons already in existence and being further sought by those who already have them, it addressed only a portion of the nuclear security task. How much more encouraging it would have been if the Summit had been able to announce that the eight states possessing nuclear weapons had agreed to commence a process of working together to pursue overall reductions in their weapons arsenals.

The NPT was and is a two- way bargain. It is not being kept.

It is worth recalling an axiom identified by the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons: as long as nuclear weapons exist they will, one day, be used either by accident or decision, and any use would be a catastrophe.

This truth was discerned before the emergence of contemporary terrorist groups, the suicide bomber and, the miniaturized, portable nuclear weapon.

Both in his Op-Ed and in his statement at the Summit, President Obama said that he believed that, as the US is the only state that has used nuclear weapons, it had a moral responsibility to pursue ridding the world of the unacceptable danger they pose. Doubtlessly, his acknowledgement of Hiroshima and Nagasaki would have infuriated many in the US. He deserves credit for that courage, but he would move from the zone of sentiment into reality were he to seek to promote nuclear disarmament amongst holders of those weapons.

 

Richard Butler AC is former Ambassador to the United Nations and served as Convenor of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

In this article in the Melbourne Age, Hugh White comments

‘So before we decide whether to select the Japanese (submarine) bid, we have to ask if an alliance with Japan is good for Australia.’

See link to full article below:

http://www.theage.com.au/comment/if-we-strike-a-deal-with-japan-were-buying-more-than-submarines-20160314-gni3hl.html

“The Australian” of 29 March reported Murray McLean, former Ambassador to Japan, as defending the Japanese submarine bid against criticism that it would amount to a “virtual alliance” that would ultimately thrust us into conflict with China. He reportedly said that “Australia should choose a submarine based on the best technology and the best price”, taking the right decision without “thinking if some other country is concerned about it or otherwise”.

This issue has recently been ventilated both in the press and online, with articles by people including Prof. Hugh White of the ANU. His point has been not so much that China would be concerned about us buying Japanese submarines, but rather that Japan would use a successful submarine bid to enlist us on its side in its on-going rivalry with China, conceivably ending up in armed conflict.

The Japanese submarine issue also came up for discussion at an on the record conference on Indo-Pacific Maritime Security, held last month by the National Security College of the ANU. At that conference a number of Australian speakers said that “of course” the purchase of Japanese submarines would not compromise our ability to make our own decisions on involvement or not should tensions increase to the point of hostilities between Japan and China.

In my view, while in a world of pure reason they might be right, in the real world habits of close consultation and working intimately together in such a vital area of defence would certainly make disassociation difficult should a crisis arise. I think similar factors would already have this effect in regard to the US should that country decide that it had to use military force in the Asia-Pacific and sought our support.

Given the ANZUS Treaty (even though this requires us only to consult), the Marines in Darwin, the enormous amount of US defence equipment used by our armed forces, the amount of intelligence sharing, joint exercises, the secondment of Australian defence units to larger American formations, the doctrine of inter-operability, and the amount of personnel exchanges and “embedding”, including at very high levels, I find it very hard to imagine an Australian Government—particularly given the Defence advice it would most probably be receiving—bold enough to decline a US request for military support and involvement in a future Asia-Pacific “emergency”.

Indeed, a “The Times” article carried in “The Australian” of 30 March quotes an Obama administration official as saying that “Australian leaders are the easiest allies to manage—our allies all give us headaches, except for Australia. You can always count on Australia”.

(Also in “The Australian” of 30 March Paul Kelly quotes Defence Secretary Dennis Richardson as saying that “what comes out of this (Defence) Department (on the submarine project) will be based on a hard-headed assessment of capabilities”, but he concludes his article by noting that “Cabinet, of course, is supreme (and) can decide whatever it wants”.)

According to press reports (“The Australian”, 9 March) the Commander of US Pacific Air Forces, General Lori Robinson, has said that negotiations are under way about rotating USAF bombers and tankers through RAAF bases at Tindall and Darwin. Press reports put this proposal squarely in the context of the South China Sea and China, and speak of the very advanced B1 bombers being involved.

If we eventually decide to purchase the Japanese “Soryu” submarine we will perhaps be getting a very good submarine, but we will also be becoming “embedded” with yet another country deeply suspicious of China. In an article in The Lowy Institute’s “Interpreter” of 30 March the experienced Asia specialist Malcolm Cook cites two recent political statements by the Japanese Government as reflecting “how deep, even neuralgic, Japan’s sense of rivalry with China is”. He goes on to say that “The Japan-China rivalry is deeper and broader than the US-China one, and it is driving deep Japanese policy changes across a wide spectrum”. Indeed many senior people in Japan are keen to build anti-China coalitions, in which they see Australia taking part, together with the US, India and Japan itself.

Our armed forces are already deeply embedded with those of the United States. This brings with it many advantages. A close defence relationship with Japan would also bring advantages. But we need to be very aware that because of this actual and potential embedding we could end up in the extraordinary position of having to join in the use of military force against our largest trading partner, and a country with which we have a Strategic Partnership.

Geoff Miller was formerly Australian Ambassador to the Republic of Korea and Australian Ambassador to Japan.  He was also Director General of the Office of National Assessments.

 

 

 

Australia, China, the South China Sea – and the uses of language.

Recent reports published in both Australia and the US—including most notably in our case the Defence White Paper—and a series of visitors to Australia from China, the US and Japan, have increased the already high degree of interest and concern over future strategic dispositions in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and over the present state of affairs in the South China Sea.

In a recent post Cavan Hogue made important points about one piece of language frequently used in discussion of these matters, namely the need to uphold the “rules-based international order”. He noted that the phrase is commonly used to refer to the current set of international arrangements essentially created by the West—but with one very important exception: the US, unlike China, has not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Another piece of language much used at a recent conference at the ANU three weeks ago was the injunction that, in the interests of maintaining this rules-based order, “we” must manage China’s rise. This was said in particular by a number of Japanese speakers at the conference, which was on the record, on the Indo-Pacific maritime Security, and held by the ANU’s National Security College. “We” were described as the “liberal, open-minded, free market democracies”, notably including the US, Japan, India and Australia. This of course describes the group of countries frequently suspected of trying to “contain” China, rather than “manage its rise”.

But that concept of “managing China’s rise”, with its connotations of from on high to below, also invites some scepticism. Given the size of China’s economy and of its foreign exchange reserves, its importance to its economic partners (which include all of the possible “managers” or “containers”) and its policy vitality as shown in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and “One Belt One Road” initiatives, it is hard to see China’s rise being “managed” by anyone.

It may not be too big to fail but it’s too big to manage!

Indeed, according to press reports (“The Australian”, 17 February) China’s Foreign Minister Wang said during Foreign Minister Bishop’s visit to Beijing that he did not see Australia’s possible purchase of Japanese submarines as a deliberate tactic to contain the rise of China because “no country in the world can stop that”.

A recent Chinese visitor to Australia said something akin to that: he did not see the US as the main obstacle to China’s rise: “if there is to be any obstacle it will be ourselves”.

So if China isn’t to be contained or managed what are we to do about it or with it? “Live with it, engage with it, influence it if possible, oppose it if necessary” would seem to be the practical answer. One of the recommendations made by Dr Elsina Wainwright in her recent US Studies Centre paper on the ANZUS alliance was to seek to involve and engage China to the maximum extent possible.

Once again language comes into play. It’s very common to read or hear of Australia’s US-China choices or dilemma spoken of as a choice between Australia’s major strategic ally and its biggest trading partner. But both the US and China are very big countries, both can “walk and chew gum at the same time”. The US is very important to Australia economically as well as strategically. And it is important for Australians to remember that our relationship with China is not only about trade and investment, but also represents a long-standing, major and successful policy, pursued on a bipartisan basis by both major Australian political parties, to encourage and support the entry of China into the international community as a successful and engaged participant, rather than remain as a feared external “other”. China has done and is doing this in so many ways, and we should, and do, welcome that. Indeed in 2013 Australia and China expanded their relationship to become a “Strategic Partnership”, with regular talks at the highest levels between the two governments.

Of course things have not remained as they were, and some changes have been very difficult for some to accept. Japan is no longer the pre-eminent Asian power, for example, and that has not been welcomed by many patriotic Japanese. But, in my view, to seek to counter or reverse this by constructing an anti-China coalition is not a constructive course.

Needless to say this does not mean that points of difference or difficulty don’t arise, and Chinese actions in regard to contested – or formerly non-existent! – territories in the South China Sea are a case in point. There are various possible reasons for China’s behaviour, some more justifiable or presentable than others. Once again language comes into play. The United States’ Naval passages or over-flights aimed at challenging China’s position are designated as “Freedom of Navigation” operations, and various Australian commentators, including Opposition Defence spokesman Senator Conroy have called on Australia to conduct similar operations, and to proclaim them publicly.

But in this regard it is worth noting that at the ANU’s Maritime Security Conference Emeritus Professor Carl Thayer, of the Australian Defence Force Academy, said that there were many areas of at least verbal agreement among all parties, including freedom for maritime commerce. (He also noted that China has not announced baselines or promulgated zones; and that much “militarization” can be dual use, and could usefully be defined.) A recent senior Chinese visitor to Australia also gave guarantees about the freedom of trade through the South China Sea.

If we are concerned about freedom of navigation in the South China Sea our concern at this stage should not be about freedom of sea-borne trade. Indeed, if commercial shipping through the South China Sea is of concern to us it must of even more concern to China, the destination of the largest share of our exports, and dependent on its East Coast ports for energy and other raw material imports and for its enormous export trade.

What is going on? One thing that is going on is a contest between the United States, the established dominant maritime power in the Western Pacific, and China, which in 2012 announced its intention of increasing its maritime role and presence both in its own region and beyond.

The rise of China as a Naval power, even though its capacities will for many years remain far below those of the United States, has of course created competition with the US, and with the US Navy. US Pacific Fleet Commandeer Admiral Swift spoke strongly against Chinese activities in the South China Sea at the ANU Conference, though he went on to speak of good Navy-to-Navy relations, and good relations which he has personally with senior Chinese naval officers.

We don’t know how the clash between these two great powers will be resolved. But I believe we can conclude that it’s not a matter for or against freedom of trade, but rather a struggle for position between a super-power and its regional challenger, taking place near the challenger’s homeland. It’s not in our interest to become involved in such a clash, particularly militarily, and particularly when our relations with both contenders are both very good and very important.

However it is impossible to overlook the fact that other things are going on as well, namely the construction by China of air and naval facilities on real or constructed islands in the South China Sea, and the pressure it is exerting on other claimant states in regard to real – fisheries – and potential – oil – resources. The clash some days ago between an Indonesian patrol boat and Chinese fishing and coastguard vessels indicates that even more countries, including Indonesia, the largest ASEAN country, could become involved in the South China Sea dispute.

This raises the crucial and tantalising question, “why is China behaving like this, in particular in regard to the other claimant states?”.   Our Prime Minister has called its behaviour counter-productive, and it’s hard to argue with that description in regard to its regional and international reputation, whatever the immediate imperatives or perceived benefits may be.

At the ANU conference on Maritime Security the distinguished Japanese strategist Masashi Nishihara said that the “basic question” is whether we “can expect an eventual partnership with China, or increasing tensions?” That is indeed a basic question, and China’s recent behaviour has been concerning.

Some time ago the respected Sinologist Linda Jakobson presented a picture essentially of disaggregated Chinese decision-making in regard to the South China Sea, with the military and agencies to do with oil and fisheries playing a large part in deciding what happens, rather than simply following an established central policy line. But this seems hard to reconcile with the current Chinese emphasis on central control, and Xi Jin Ping as the “core” of authority and policy-making.

There are indeed many possible reasons for, or factors contributing to, China’s stance in the South China Sea. To an outside lay observer they include:–

• the Chinese Government actually fully believes in China’s historical claim, and is simply prosecuting it
• China seeks to strengthen its naval position against Unites States Naval and air activities near its coast, including the possibility of an attempted US blockade of its trade routes, which has been advocated as a possible strategy by some US academics
• it seeks the potential to interdict the trade routes of its North Asian neighbours
• it seeks to ensure access to South China Sea resources, notably oil and fish
• the forward policy in the South China Sea is essentially domestic in its drivers:-
  • It appeals to nationalism as a counter to slackening of and troubles in the economy; and
  • It is a sap to, and ensures the support to the government of, the PLA.

Some of these possible drivers are of more concern than other, but together they add up to a potentially alarming picture, particularly given uncertainty over how much weight to ascribe to each factor, and the potential of missteps and escalation. US Defense Secretary Ash Carter has said that specific Chinese actions in the South China Sea will be met by specific US responses: and Chinese spokesmen are reported as saying much the same thing.

As I said earlier, we can’t “manage” China’s rise. But in regard to the South China Sea we should work diplomatically to calm the situation to the extent possible and to promote both adherence to international law, effective communication between the contending or competing parties and, where possible, an appreciation of others’ positions. Australia is in good standing with all the parties involved and, complex and difficult as it is, we may be able to assist in handling this potentially dangerous situation, and should make attempting to do so a priority.

Geoff Miller was formerly Australian Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, Australian Ambassador to Japan and Australian High Commissioner to New Zealand. He was also the Director General of the Office of National Assessments.

 

 

 

 

 

A tangled web of territorial claims threatens stability in the South China Sea. The figures appear rubbery, but a consensus is that Philippines occupies seven islands and reefs, Malaysia five, China eight and Taiwan one. Vietnam occupies twenty seven. There is also conflict over fishing grounds. Meanwhile, there seems little or no room for compromise, especially between China, Vietnam and Taiwan, all of which claim sovereignty over all of the main chain of islands, the Spratlys.

In three unusual examples of public diplomacy, both Chinese and Vietnamese officials recently put their conflicting cases to selected Australian audiences. On 1 March, Ouyang Yujing, Director General of Boundary and Ocean Affairs in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, told selected groups of Australians in Canberra and Sydney that China was the first country to name and administer the South Sea islands. Chinese sovereignty was established in the second century BC. He cited more recent treaties and maps from British, French, Chinese and Japanese official sources to reinforce the claims.

Guo Yezhou, Vice Minister of the International Department of the Communist Party’s Central Committee was less restrained. On 18 March he told Australian participants at a round-table at AIIA in Sydney that all South China Sea islands were part of China. But this, he asserted, was disputed by the United States. While claiming it was not taking sides between conflicting territorial claims, the US was marshalling its considerable military assets in the region, and busily reinforcing military alliances with Japan, Australia and the Philippines, all designed to contain China. Some littoral countries had deployed heavy weapons on islands they occupy, so China had reciprocated on the ones it occupies. Guo said China has the capacity to take back islands occupied by others, but would not do so because this would foment war. China wanted to work together with all concerned countries to reduce tensions. China supports the freedom of navigation, but freedom could be compromised by outside interference.

The Vietnamese case was put by Dr Lan Anh of Vietnam’s Diplomatic Academy, an offshoot of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry. In a meeting with AIIA councillors at Glover Cottages on 3 March, she claimed all South Sea islands belonged to Vietnam. In a complex recital, she claimed historical records from France, Britain, China and Japan ‘proved’ Vietnam’s case. Vietnam would continue to defend its claims, by force if necessary. She spoke with a fierce conviction born of painstaking research for a PhD she took at Bristol University.

At the official level in Canberra, Australia seems to be reflexively following the American lead and sleep-walking into an increasingly dangerous situation. We claim neutrality. We insist that former Prime Minister Howard’s promise to China during the Taiwan crisis in 1996 means that our alliance with the United States is not directed at China, and that his later claim that Australia does not have to choose between China and the US remains true. But these assertions look increasingly shaky. During President Obama’s visit to Australia in 2011 when he announced his ‘pivot’ to Asia, Prime Minister Julia Gillard welcomed US Marines into Darwin, the first enduring deployment of American ground troops since World War II. Australia recently countenanced deployment of USAF B-1 bombers to Darwin, later withdrawn, but not before an adverse Chinese reaction.

Meanwhile, visiting American officials ramp up the Chinese threat. In March 2016, US commander of the United States Pacific Fleet, Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr, told a naval conference in Canberra that China was building a ‘great wall of sand’ in the South China Sea.

Danger runs high for Australia in what former Defence Deputy Secretary Hugh White describes as a titanic struggle for regional leadership between China and the US. White suggests only two alternatives – either the US abandons any major role in Asia, or the US and China agree on a new order which accommodates some of China’s ambitions but preserves a major role for the US. While these choices are stark and unrefined, leaving little room for a more nuanced compromise, White is right to suggest the present situation is untenable, because there is little regional support for trying to force China to back down. The leaders of Japan and India have made it plain that they will not carry America’s banner by sending naval units through the Sea to test China’s territorial claims. Neither will South Korea, nor most of the leaders of ASEAN, or Canada, Britain, or New Zealand.

But Australia? In an article published in November 2015, Bob Carr quotes the American strategist Edward Luttwak saying that Australia ‘fully retains the Anglo-Saxon trait of bellicosity’. But to gallop off wearing our deputy’s badge in Australian ships or aircraft to test China’s resolve to protect the islands it occupies in the South China Sea would be a lonely road. We would be Washington’s only ally pursuing military means. What Australians should agitate for is agreement between Washington and Beijing which allows China space in the South China Sea as befits a great power, the kind of space the United States enjoys in the Caribbean and along its eastern and western seaboards. Can the hawks in Canberra and their advisers be persuaded to support such a plan? We should fervently hope so.

Richard Broinowski is a former diplomat and Ambassador to Vietnam, Korea and Mexico.

No. The Prime Minister’s statement in regards to the Middle East that this is not the time for gestures or machismo applies in spades to what we do in the South China Sea. Australia should act prudently and, though some will see this as a contradiction, transparently and after full parliamentary and public debate.

Australia’s relative propinquity gives us an interest in the outcome of the territorial disputes between countries in the South China Sea, but will our interest in seeing a peaceful resolution be helped or harmed by introducing an Australian naval presence? As Australia already has a naval presence in the North China Sea, and northwest Cape supports intelligence collection there, are we not bound to see the China Sea as a strategic whole? Is this not the strategic perception of the US Seventh Fleet?

Sir Arthur Tange wrote from close observation of ‘the US Navy’s global view and the nuisance they found in other people’s sovereignty’. If we put ourselves in China’s shoes would we not have the same strategic perception? Do we understand China’s thinking? What if the most recently reported militarisation of Woody Island is defensive, to improve intelligence gathering against a perceived threat, rather like the extensions built northward from the Great Wall to get better forewarning of the threat from the Mongols? If the strategic perception should be of the China Sea as a whole, the core problem is China’s unfinished reunification.

Nobody who heard Deng Xiaoping on the subject could doubt the emotional pull of seeing Taiwan rejoin the motherland, even if in accordance with Mao’s timetable of 100 years.

Australia, unlike greater powers, avoided involvement in the Chinese civil war. As Michael Fogarty described in a recent book review in Australian Outlook, had it not been for the skill of Australian diplomats it might have been an Australian warship instead of HMS Amethyst which was fired on in the Yangtze incident. The Chifley Government in 1949, unlike New Zealand, refused to send a warship to Hong Kong when the Chinese Communists took power on the mainland.

Under Menzies, numerous attempts by the Americans to get Australia to share its residual responsibilities from involvement in the Chinese civil war for the security of Taiwan were deflected. Menzies went to Washington in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade Eisenhower that Taiwan should give up the offshore islands. In 1964 Menzies involved himself in de-escalating a crisis with Indonesia precipitated by the British sending a nuclear-armed carrier task force through the Sunda Straits: diplomatic good sense to precedence over asserting rights of innocent passage. Menzies had the confidence and stature to give Eisenhower a lecture on the danger of governments taking action which risked war without having public opinion behind them. That is not a long bow to draw in the broad context of addressing the current question. As Churchill said, and Hugh White is arguing, ‘better jaw jaw than war war’.

Garry Woodard, former diplomat and Senior Fellow, University of Melbourne.

This article was first published by the Australian Institute of International Affairs.

Since announcing its arrival as a global force in June 2014 with the declaration of a caliphate on territory captured in Iraq and Syria, the jihadist group Islamic State has shocked the world with its brutality.

Its seemingly sudden prominence has led to much speculation about the group’s origins: how do we account for forces and events that paved the way for the emergence of Islamic State? In the final article of our series examining this question, Greg Barton shows the role recent Western intervention in the Middle East played in the group’s inexorable rise.

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Despite precious little certainty in the “what ifs” of history, it’s clear the rise of Islamic State (IS) wouldn’t have been possible without the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. Without these Western interventions, al-Qaeda would never have gained the foothold it did, and IS would not have emerged to take charge of northern Iraq.

Whether or not the Arab Spring, and the consequent civil war in Syria, would still have occurred is much less clear.

But even if war hadn’t broken out in Syria, it’s unlikely an al-Qaeda spin-off such as IS would have become such a decisive actor without launching an insurgency in Iraq. For an opportunistic infection to take hold so comprehensively, as IS clearly has, requires a severely weakened body politic and a profoundly compromised immune system.

Such were the conditions in Goodluck Jonathan’s Nigeria from 2010 to 2015 and in conflict-riven Somalia after the fall of the Barre regime in 1991. And it was so in Afghanistan for the four decades after conflict broke out in 1978 and in Pakistan after General Zia-ul-Haq declared martial law in 1977.

Sadly, but even more clearly, such are the circumstances in Iraq and Syria today. And that’s the reason around 80% of all deaths due to terrorist attacks in recent years have occurred in five of the six countries discussed here, where such conditions still prevail.

An unique opportunity

The myth of modern international terrorist movements, and particularly of al-Qaeda and its outgrowths such as IS (which really is a third-generation al-Qaeda movement), is that they’re inherently potent and have a natural power of attraction.

The reality is that while modern terrorist groups can and do operate all around the globe to the point where no country can consider itself completely safe, they can only build a base when local issues attract on-the-ground support.

Consider al-Qaeda, which is in the business of global struggle. It wants to unite a transnational ummah to take on far-off enemies. But it has only ever really enjoyed substantial success when it has happened across conducive local circumstances.

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s provided an opportunity uniquely suited to the rise of al-Qaeda and associated movements. It provided plausible justification for a defensive jihad – a just war – that garnered broad international support and allowed the group to coalesce in 1989 out of the Arab fighters who had rallied to support the Afghans in their fight against the Soviets.

Further opportunities emerged in the Northern Caucasus, where local ethno-national grievances were eventually transformed into the basis for a more global struggle.

The declaration of independence by Chechnya in 1991 led to all-out war with the Soviet military between 1994 and 1996, when tens of thousands were killed. After a short, uneasy peace, a decade-long second civil war started in 1999 following the invasion of neighbouring Dagestan by the International Islamic Brigade.

The second civil war began with an intense campaign to seize control of the Chechen capital, Grozny. But it became dominated by years of fighting jihadi and other insurgents in the Caucus mountains and dealing with related terrorist attacks in Russia.

In Nigeria and Somalia, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab now share many of the key attributes of al-Qaeda, with whom they have forged nascent links. But they too emerged primarily because of the failure of governance and the persistence of deep-seated local grievances.

Even in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda struggled to transform itself into a convincing champion of local interests in the 1990s. After becoming increasingly isolated following the September 11 attacks on the US, it failed to gain support from the Afghan Taliban for its global struggle.

But something new happened in Iraq beginning in 2003. The Jordanian street thug Musab al-Zarqawi correctly intuited that the impending Western invasion and occupation of Iraq would provide the perfect conditions for the emergence of insurgencies.

Al-Zarqawi positioned himself in Iraq ahead of the invasion and deftly rode a wave of anger and despair to initiate and grow an insurgency that in time came to dominate the broken nation.

Initially, al-Zarqawi was only one of many insurgent leaders intent on destabilising Iraq. But, in October 2004, after years of uneasy relations with the al-Qaeda leader during two tours in Afghanistan, he finally yielded to Osama bin Laden’s request that he swear on oath of loyalty (bayat) to him. And so al-Zarqawi’s notorious network of insurgents became known as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

From the ashes

Iraq’s de-Ba’athification process of May 2003 to June 2004, during which senior technocrats and military officers linked to the Ba’ath party (the vehicle of the Saddam Hussein regime) were removed from office, set the stage for many to join counter-occupation insurgent groups – including AQI.

Without the sacking of a large portion of Iraq’s military and security leaders, its technocrats and productive middle-class professionals, it’s not clear whether this group would have come to dominate so comprehensively. These alienated Sunni professionals gave AQI, as well as IS, much of its core military and strategic competency.

But even with the windfall opportunity presented to al-Zarqawi by the wilful frustration of Sunni interests by Nouri al-Maliki’s Shia-dominated government from 2006 to 2014, which deprived them of any immediate hope for the future and confidence in protecting their families and communities, AQI was almost totally destroyed after the Sunni awakening began in 2006.

The Sunni awakening forces, or “Sons of Iraq”, began with tribal leaders in Anbar province forming an alliance with the US military. For almost three years, tens of thousands of Sunni tribesmen were paid directly to fight AQI, but the Maliki government refused to incorporate them into the regular Iraqi Security Force. And, after October 2008 – when management of these forces was handed over by the US military – he refused to support them.

The death of al-Zarqawi in June 2006 contributed to the profound weakening of the strongest of all post-invasion insurgent groups. AQI’s force strength was reduced to several hundred fighters and it lost the capacity to dominate the insurgency.

Then, in 2010 and 2011, circumstances combined to blow oxygen onto the smouldering coals.

In 2010, the greatly underestimated Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, a local Iraqi cleric with serious religious scholarly credentials, took charge of AQI and began working to a sophisticated long-term plan.

Elements of the strategy went by the name “breaking the walls”. In the 12 months to July 2013, this entailed the movement literally breaking down the prison walls in compounds around Baghdad that held hundreds of hardcore al-Qaeda fighters.

Islamic State, as the group now called itself, also benefited from the inflow of former Iraqi intelligence officers and senior military leaders. This had begun with de-Ba’athification in 2003 and continued after the collapse of the Sunni awakening and the increasingly overt sectarianism of the Maliki government.

Together, they developed tactics based on vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices and the strategic use of suicide bombers. These were deployed not in the passionate but often undirected fashion of al-Qaeda but much more like smart bombs in the hands of a modern army.

And the US military withdrawal from Iraq in late 2011, well telegraphed ahead of time, provided an excellent opportunity for the struggling insurgency to rebuild. As did the outbreak of civil war in Syria.

A helping hand

Al-Baghdadi initially dispatched his trusted Syrian lieutenant, Abu Mohammad al-Julani, to form a separate organisation in Syria: the al-Nusra front.

Jabhat al-Nusra quickly established itself in northern Syria. But when al-Julani refused to fold his organisation in under his command, al-Baghdadi rebranded AQI (or Islamic State in Iraq) Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham/the Levant (ISIS/ISIL).

Then, a series of events turned IS from an insurgency employing terrorist methods to becoming a nascent rogue state. These included the occupation of Raqqa on the Syrian Euphrates in December 2013; the taking of Ramadi a month later; consolidation of IS control throughout Iraq’s western Anbar province; and, finally, a sudden surge down the river Tigris in June 2014 that took Mosul and most of the towns and cities along the river north of Baghdad within less than a week.

IS’s declaration of the caliphate on June 29, 2014, was a watershed moment that is only now being properly understood.

In its ground operations, including the governing of aggrieved Sunni communities, IS moved well beyond being simply a terrorist movement. It came to function as a nascent rogue state ruling over around 5 million people in the northern cities of the Euphrates and the Tigris, and defending its territory through conventional military means.

At the same time, it skilfully exploited the internet and social media in ways the old al-Qaeda could not do – and that its second-generation offshoot, al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), had only partially achieved.

This allowed IS to draw in tens of thousands of foreign fighters. Most came from the Middle East and Northern Africa, but as many as 5000 came from Europe, with thousands more from the Caucusus and from Asia.

Unlike the case in Afghanistan in the 1980s, these foreign fighters have played a key role in providing sufficient strength to take and hold territory while also building a global network of support.

But without the perfect-storm conditions of post-invasion insurgency, this most potent expression of al-Qaedaism yet would never have risen to dominate both the region and the world in the way that it does.

Even in its wildest dreams, al-Qaeda could never have imagined that Western miscalculations post-9/11 could have led to such foolhardy engagements – not just in Afghanistan but also in Iraq.

Were it not for these miscalculations, 9/11 might well have precipitated the decline of al-Qaeda. Instead, with our help, it spawned a global jihadi movement with a territorial base far more powerful than al-Qaeda ever had.

Greg Barton is Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation; Co-Director, Australian Intervention Support Hub, Deakin University. This article first appeared in The Conversation on 3 March, 2016.

Part 3: Implications: a more efficient and less risky approach

Introduction

The purpose of this three-part article is not to question the government’s requirement for advanced submarine capability but rather to explore some of the technological, economic and financial issues, and the associated risks, around the programme by which the government is seeking to deliver this capability. After all, it is not the new submarines themselves that constitute the objective of this major programme, but rather the capability they will deliver. If this capability could be provided more efficiently and at less risk, there would be clear benefits for the community.

First of all, in this final part of the article, the White Paper’s proposal for the FSM is evaluated in the light of the previous discussion of technological and economic risks. Secondly, I propose an alternative approach to providing the desired submarine capability at less cost and with lower risk.

Implications for the White Paper approach

Defence has determined that its requirements for future submarine capability can only be delivered by acquiring a large, conventional submarine with a very long range. No such submarine is available in the global market place. Australia’s requirement is unique.

Parent navy responsibilities can come at a high cost, particularly when there are no other purchasers of the equipment. Most of the problems and risks with the proposed acquisition relate to the insistence that Australia’s requirement for submarine capability demands a unique solution. The identical view led to the acquisition of a unique submarine last time around, the Collins class. While the Collins’ record has by no means been totally negative, overall the experience has not been a happy one. According to a former Prime Minister and his first Defence Minister, the Collins class has a “fragile capability”.

Turning to the roles required of the future submarine (FSM), we have seen in Part One of this report that a conventional boat would face substantial risks of destruction were it to operate in a reconnaissance and interdiction role in any conflict in contested waters far from base, particularly the South China Sea. First of all, even by the 2020s, let alone on delivery in the 2030s, the FSM will not be the ‘regionally superior’ submarine promised in the White Paper. By that time, China, Russia and India will be capable of operating modern hunter-killer SSNs in those waters. Secondly, detection technologies will have advanced to a degree that will make force projection in contested waters by a SSK unacceptably dangerous for its crew. The FSM’s large size will also act against it in terms of its sonar footprint and acoustic signature. Crucially, while the FSM will have air-independent propulsion or much better batteries than the Collins and therefore a significantly lower indiscretion rate, it would not be able to make a high-speed exit if detected.

On the other hand, the large size of the FSM, presumably required to provide greater fuel bunkerage and better habitability on lengthy operations, will reduce its effectiveness in other roles, such as reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and sea denial operations in the approaches to Australia and its littoral zone. The desirability of nimbleness and a modest footprint in these roles goes a long way to explain why there is no requirement globally, other than in Australia, for a large SSK.

Turning to the economic and financial issues and risks, the requirement to design and build twelve unique submarines for Australia has a profoundly negative impact on the outcomes projected by Defence. The effects on cost, delivery and the likelihood of a capability gap are of great concern.

First, the currently projected cost of each FSM at over US$3 billion is excessive. The capability that will be delivered by the FSM in no way justifies a higher cost than that of a much larger and immeasurably more capable Virginia class nuclear submarine (SSN). In terms of conventional submarines (SSK)s, the FSM will in no imaginable way be more than five times more capable than the current Soryu class, as the cost differential implies. Add to this the risk that the cost will blow out during the detailed design and construction process, as generally occurs with new acquisitions, and the economics of the project totally fail to stack up. The projected cost is simply unacceptable for the capability it will deliver.

Secondly, as has been pointed out extensively since the White Paper was published, the timeline for the project is far too long. The strategic situation described in the White Paper appears to require an advanced Australian submarine capability if not now at least by the early 2020s. Unless no alternative is available, delivering the first of the FSMs in the early 2030s (or later, given the history of defence projects) is an unacceptable response to the current threat.

Thirdly, if it were attempted, the cost of the proposal to undertake a significant upgrade to Collins in order to bridge the capability gap into the mid-2030s should be added to the already unacceptable cost of the FSM acquisition. But in the absence of further detail, the proposal is not credible. The White Paper provides no detail about how the upgrade will be achieved, other than by modernising the sonar.

As suggested in Part Two of this report, apart from a myriad of other barriers to upgrading the Collins class to contemporary standards, the fact that new diesels and air-independent propulsion cannot be installed means there is a high probability that the submarines will not be able to be sent on operations beyond the early 2020s. Upgrading the systems, while beneficial in itself, would also boost the power requirement and, therefore, increase the indiscretion rate. The probability of a complete gap in Australia’s submarine capability over a period of at least a decade is too high for this approach to be acceptable.

The conclusion must be that the proposal in the White Paper for providing a ‘regionally superior’ capability in submarines is highly likely to be neither efficient nor effective. Further, particularly if a local build were stipulated, the risks are all on the downside. In short, the proposal is unacceptable.

An alternative approach

An alternative approach requires the government to accept that substantial changes are required in its current proposal for procuring the submarine capability that Australia needs. The government would need to recognise that:

• The cost and timelines proposed for the FSM in the White Paper are unacceptable.
• There is a high risk that the proposal to upgrade Collins to contemporary standards so as to bridge the capability gap will not be cost-effective or even feasible.
• Given the level of threat identified in the White Paper and due to the obsolescence of the Collins class, a modern submarine capability is required in the early 2020s, not ten years later.
• Australia does not have a unique requirement for submarines but may need more than one type of submarine to provide the full scope of the capability described in the White Paper.
• Entirely satisfactory military off the shelf solutions are available to provide the capability that Defence requires from submarines in different roles.

In order to provide the capability required by Defence in an efficient and effective way and with the least possible risk to their crews, however, two types of submarine are required.

First, a modern conventional submarine, available off the shelf, would be suitable for discharging the critical role of sea denial in the waters around Australia. With a range of around 12,000 kms and the ability to operate submerged for extended periods of time, it could also undertake reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and covert operations in the waters to Australia’s north.

Secondly, a nuclear powered submarine would be required to undertake the force projection role in the South China Sea that, in the future, could not safely be discharged by a SSK. If Australia were unwilling or unable to acquire SSNs, then the RAN should no longer undertake submarine operations in contested waters far from base such as the South China Sea. This role should be left to the United States Navy or to other suitably equipped allies, at a considerable saving to Australia’s defence budget.

Acquiring SSNs may not be easy. Presently, the US opposes the acquisition of nuclear submarines by Australia. To turn this around, the government’s negotiating position would be based on the advantages to the US of Australia undertaking our share of the ‘heavy lifting’ in the Asia Pacific. As a loyal ally, no doubt Australia would note the US supply of a nuclear propulsion plant to the UK to support its first SSN acquisition nearly 60 years ago. In the face of the acquisition of SSNs by China and other countries, Australia would also emphasise the RAN’s unwillingness to undertake reconnaissance and force projection operations in the South China Sea in a conventional submarine.

The following approach is therefore suggested. Over the next year, the Australian government should:

• Initiate negotiations with the US administration to acquire four SSNs so that the RAN could undertake force projection operations in contested waters. These SSNs, preferably of the Virginia class so as to maximise inter-operability with the US Navy, would be sustained in Australia by the American supplier working with ASC in Adelaide.
• Order four leading edge conventional submarines to be delivered in the early 2020s when the Collins class would be decommissioned. They would not be built in Australia and would be supplied from a shipyard in France, Germany or Japan. These submarines would be off the shelf purchases with the exception that they would be configured to deploy a US combat system and the Mk48 Mod7 heavyweight torpedo specified by Defence. Ideally, they would incorporate lithium-ion battery technology rather than AIP.

The advantages of this approach include the acquisition of eight submarines that would provide a capability exceeding that of the 12 proposed by Defence, and delivered in the 2020s rather than 2032-50. There would be no capability gap and because they would be purchased off the shelf, with no Australian build, the submarine capability would be provided at a cost of around half the estimate in the White Paper (less than $30 billion).

If Australia were unable (or unwilling) to acquire nuclear submarines, then the force projection role in contested waters should be abandoned. A total of six new conventional submarines should then be acquired to undertake the other important roles identified in the White Paper. The cost of this approach should be under $10 billion.

Conclusion

The White Paper proposal to acquire 12 conventional submarines between the early 2030s and 2050 is not acceptable. At over $50 billion the cost would be highly excessive, delivery far too late and the risk of a capability gap extremely high.

In addition, a SSK, because it could not meet the White Paper’s benchmark of ‘regional superiority’, would be unable in the future safely to deliver force projection capability in waters contested by SSNs and characterised by advanced detection technologies. In order to undertake this activity with greater security for its personnel, the RAN would need a nuclear submarine. If the government is unable or unwilling to acquire SSNs, then it should not undertake the force projection role in the South China Sea.

Australia does not have a unique capability requirement for its submarine force. Because of the risks involved in waiting until the 2030s to deploy the new submarine, advanced conventional submarines should be ordered off the shelf and as soon as possible (within one year) for deployment in the early 2020s. At the same time, negotiations with the US should be initiated around the acquisition of four SSNs.

There are negligible benefits to be derived from building submarines in Australia but the associated risks are very high. Unless the conventional submarines were built under a fixed price contract to an existing design and with a guarantee of similar cost and delivery to imported boats, a local build should not be considered.

Finally, this is a massive investment with very high risks, rivalling the Gorgon LNG project in Western Australia in terms of capital expenditure. It is not at all clear that the proposal has been exposed to the very detailed investment appraisal process that any such substantial capital project in the private sector would undergo. With its single line appropriation, Defence can escape the scrutiny to which significant capital projects in other portfolios, such as Health and Education, routinely would be subject in the budget process. Both the ADF and the Australian taxpayer would benefit if in the future major Defence investments were subject to detailed evaluation by the Department of Finance.

Jon Stanford is a Director of Insight Economics. He had a significant career as an economist in the Australian Public Service, ultimately in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.  He has worked extensively on economic and policy issues around defence procurement and naval shipbuilding.

 

Part 2: Economic and financial risks

Introduction

The first part of this article considered the technological risks involved in the decision, as set out in the 2016 Defence White Paper, to procure twelve new submarines at an acquisition cost of at least $50 billion. The economic and financial risks of this project are discussed here in Part Two of the article.

There is a considerable literature on the economics of defence procurement but the fundamental principles of economics, including corporate financial analysis, can readily be applied to military programs. Any major investment program to acquire a new or updated defence asset should be subject to the same rigorous appraisal that a new investment in, say, a coal mine or a tourism resort would demand in the private sector. Of course, the defence asset is different in that it gives rise to a largely intangible pay-off and doesn’t produce cash flows, but the benefits of the project can still be assessed and set against the costs. Importantly, the risks around both the projected benefits and the costs need to figure prominently in the analysis.

The Defence department should be as well equipped as anybody to assess the technological options and trade-offs around the acquisition of a new military capability. Yet it is far from clear that Defence possesses the economic and financial skills required to undertake sophisticated investment appraisal and cost-benefit analysis. This may well be a major shortcoming of the Defence acquisition process. At the heart of the submarine acquisition process is the determination by Defence that the RAN has a unique requirement for submarines. This view, which is contested in Part Three of this article, means that a military off the shelf solution is not feasible. By itself, the implications of this for the cost of the project, its delivery date and particularly the associated risks are very substantial.

The effects of the decision to design and build a unique submarine are profound. Three issues should be considered, namely the cost of the new capability, the timing of its delivery and the need to address the capability gap that would otherwise exist before the new submarines come on stream.

Cost

First of all, the projected cost of the future submarine (FSM) appears to be excessive, perhaps unacceptably so. The acquisition cost, excluding weapons, for each FSM is estimated at around $4.25 billion (approximately US$3.15 billion in March 2016). By comparison, the successful Japanese Soryu class submarine, a contemporary SSK which may well be the basis for the FSM, is far less expensive, with the most recent boat, commissioned in 2015, estimated to cost US$540 million.[1] The cost in FY 2016 of a state-of-the-art Virginia class nuclear attack submarine, nearly twice the size of the FSM and much more capable, is US$2.688 billion.[2] The differential between the cost of the Soryu class SSK and the Virginia class nuclear submarine (SSN) seems entirely justified by the difference in capability. On the other hand, the projected cost of the future submarine cannot in any way be justified on the basis of relative capability. Indeed, on that basis the FSM should cost little more than a Soryu.

The projected cost of the FSM is clearly very high. Yet any rigorous financial modelling evaluation would conclude that the risks of that cost blowing out over a 17-22 year acquisition period (see below) are high, if not very high. We do not yet have an agreed design for the FSM. During the detailed design process, in response to technological progress, which is constant, the specifications could easily change on the upside. Inevitably, the integration of new systems can develop into a financial sinkhole. Unless built to a fixed price contract, there may be substantial unforeseen problems in the manufacturing process for a new and unique submarine. There are significant risks that these costs, which I believe are already unacceptably high, could blow out further, perhaps substantially.

Timeline

The second issue is delivery timelines. The tone of the White Paper is that because of the strategic situation in Australia’s region, the new FSM capability is required sooner rather than later. Yet because of the requirement for a unique Australian submarine, the timetable for its delivery extends from the early 2030s to 2050. But even this may be optimistic. According to Andrew Davies and Mark Thomson of ASPI, this schedule is based on the Defence estimate that it takes between 17 and 22 years to design and build a new submarine. On this basis, ASPI estimated in 2012 that the best case delivery date for a submarine ordered in that year was 2029 and the worst case 2034 (see Table 3 below). Presumably, on the heroic assumption that the submarine would be ordered in 2016, those estimates have now blown out to 2033 and 2038 respectively (Table 3).

Table 3: Delivery timelines for the FSM (based on 2012 order)[3]

Assumption	First delivery date
Defence best-case date	2020
Defence worst-case date	2034
Collins-like program	2028
Off-the-shelf design from overseas	Seven years from contract signature
Off-the-shelf design built locally	Nine years from contract signature

By contrast, six years elapsed between the order being delivered for the very large and complex first of class USS Virginia and its commissioning ceremony. It took four years to commission each of the first six submarines of the Soryu class after the keel was laid. These two production lines are still operating and will be for some time to come.

The risks to the timeline are similar to those identified above in regard to cost. They are material.

Capability gap

The reason why the new capability is required sooner rather than later is not only because of the naval build-up in the Asia Pacific. It also reflects the fact that the Collins class submarines are now obsolescent if not, indeed, obsolete. Admittedly the maintenance situation and crew availability have improved markedly, with five of the six boats available from mid-2016. Yet as former Prime Minister Abbott said recently (supported by the former Defence Minister), the Collins class exhibits a “fragile capability”.

The White Paper acknowledges that an updated submarine capability is required in the period before the FSM begins to come on stream. Its solution to this is to bridge the capability gap by undertaking a significant upgrade of the Collins class. The details and cost of this are not specified in the White Paper documentation beyond $100 – $200 million for new sonar equipment. More importantly, there is no discussion at all about the feasibility of such an upgrade and how a credible capability can be sustained on the Collins platform out to perhaps 2040, when only three or four of the new submarines will have been delivered. This is not only a major omission, but, given public disquiet about the Collins class, it is also quite unacceptable.

In particular, Defence needs to respond to an alternative and arguably far more realistic view that it is not feasible to upgrade Collins to anywhere near the extent required to maintain a credible capability. On this view, within about five years the boats will be obsolete and should no longer be deployed on operations. Attempting to restore their capability would be unsuccessful, would involve throwing good money after bad and would place the crews at significant risk.

James Harrap, a retired naval officer who has commanded two Collins class submarines and served on others, identifies fundamental problems with the Collins platform, including:

“Much of the existing equipment is bespoke (and often obsolete), the need for upgrades is increasing but the cost of acquiring and retrofitting equipment is high. … The Collins class has many components that we are simply stuck with for the life of the platform. For example the diesel generators fit into this category because of their size; unfortunately they are quite possibly the least reliable diesel engines ever built. They have been problematic throughout the life of the class and, despite some design modifications and improvements, are only kept running by ingenuity and sheer determination of the crews at sea and supporting contractors alongside. Because of components and immutable design issues such as these, Collins has a finite service life.” [4]

Apart from driving the submarine on the surface and while snorting, the diesel engines act as generators for the electric motors, which drive the vessel while submerged. A failure of one or both diesels while on patrol would be quite catastrophic. Yet they cannot in reality be replaced, since because of their size this would mean cutting a large hole in the pressure hull of the submarine.

Writing in 2012, Harrap goes on to note that since the Collins boats were built:

“Numerous advances have occurred in batteries, electric motors, air-independent propulsion, sonars and electro-optics – all of which have revolutionised submarine design even further. These changes have been significant and whilst it may be possible (though very costly) to keep Collins operational for another decade or more, most advances can’t be retrofitted and the boat will most likely be so technically obsolete by 2022 that the credibility of the capability it offers will be seriously eroded. … An inability to keep up with rapid technological change, coupled with high materiel failure rates has aged the boats prematurely, adding cost and complexity to through-life support. The boats must be sustained in the short term, but I do not believe a service life extension for Collins is even possible, much less recommended.”[5]

A major issue here is the absence of air-independent propulsion (AIP) in the Collins class which cannot be retrofitted. Because of the improvement in detection technology, AIP is increasingly regarded as being indispensable for conventional submarines (SSK)s operating in hostile waters because of its substantial impact on reducing the indiscretion rate while on patrol. While new electronic systems could no doubt be added to the submarines, this would likely involve higher power consumption, require more frequent snorting and therefore increase the boats’ indiscretion rate above its already significant level.

It is difficult to dispute Harrap’s conclusion that the Collins class will be obsolete by 2022 and cannot be upgraded to the degree required to sustain a credible capability. This implies that on the basis of the current timeline for delivery of the FSM, unless the RAN leases boats from overseas Australia will be left with no submarine capability for a period of about 15 years. The lease option may not be possible because of a lack of availability of suitable submarines.

A ten to fifteen year capability gap in submarine capability would have a major negative impact not only on Australia’s force structure and strategic positioning, but also on the Navy’s ability to maintain both a cadre of experienced and highly trained submariners as well as a constantly evolving naval doctrine for submarine warfare.

Unfortunately, Australian governments have form in delaying ordering new Defence assets and then having to undertake costly and risky upgrades in order to bridge the resulting capability gap. The most recent example concerns the delay in ordering the air warfare destroyers. These were originally conceived as a replacement for the RAN’s three Perth class destroyers, which were decommissioned in 1998-2001, twenty years before the AWDs will be available. To fill the air defence gap in the interim, it was decided to upgrade Australia’s six Adelaide class frigates (FFGs), a possibility the parent US Navy considered and rejected for its own ships. The program came in late, way over budget and with many lingering technical problems relating to integrating the new systems. Eventually, only four ships were conditionally accepted and the other two scrapped. The first of the upgraded FFGs (HMAS Sydney) was also decommissioned last year, leaving just three FFGs. Fifteen years after HMAS Brisbane was decommissioned, a capability gap in area air defence for the fleet still exists.

On the basis of this analysis, the risk of a capability gap, where Australia will not be able to deploy any submarines in operational areas over a period of around fifteen years, is extremely high.

Made in Australia?

One major issue that remains unclear is whether the submarines will be built in Australia. While the White Paper includes a commitment to build the new frigates in Adelaide, it temporises to some degree over the FSM: “the Government has already committed to maximising Australian industry involvement in the submarine program, without compromising cost, capability, schedule or risk.”[6]

Based on the AWD project, a local build programme would certainly compromise three of these four elements of the programme, namely cost, schedule and risk. ASC last delivered a submarine over a decade ago. It has no corporate memory of how to build one. By the time the first FSM keel was laid, there would likely be no survivors of the Collins programme either on the shop floor or in management.

In addition, there are negligible economic benefits in local construction. You don’t need to build a defence asset in order to maintain it efficiently, as was shown in the case of the Oberon class submarines and numerous aircraft and helicopters. Unless local industry can build ships to the same cost and timeline as overseas players, it imposes a burden on the Australian community. Indeed, if overseas governments see fit to subsidise the construction of warships for Australia, so much the better for us. The car industry required a much lower level of protection than naval shipbuilding and yet the Abbott government showed it the door. To treat naval shipbuilding differently would suggest that the era of corporate entitlement was still alive and well and that industry policy was characterised by windy rhetoric.

Nevertheless, there clearly is a possibility that a current or future Australian government could determine that the FSM should be built here. This would increase the risk to already unacceptable cost and delivery schedules to a degree that is difficult to contemplate.

Jon Stanford is a Director of Insight Economics. He had a significant career as an economist in the Australian Public Service, ultimately in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet.  He has worked extensively on economic and policy issues around defence procurement and naval shipbuilding.

[1] Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sōryū-class_submarine, retrieved 12 March 2016.

[2] Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Virginia-class_submarine, retrieved 12 March 2016.

[3] Andrew Davies and Mark Thomson (2016), “New subs – not so fast”, The Strategist, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 3 March, http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-subs-not-so-fast/

[4] James Harrap (2012), “Reflections of a Collins submarine captain”, Asia Pacific Defence Reporter, 3 May, http://www.asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/226/Reflections-of-a-Collins-Submarine-Captain

[5] Ibid.

[6] Australian Government (2016), Defence White Paper, Integrated investment program”, Canberra, February, page 83.