Category: Defence

  • Commercialisation and the casualness of going to war

    Repost from 23/04/2015.

    If we feel overwhelmed by the crass commercialism of Gallipoli and Anzac, take a deep breath because there are three years to go.

    Target has sponsored ‘Camp Gallipoli’, Woolworths has asked us to ‘Keep Fresh in our Memories’ the losses of Gallipoli ; VB depicted for us actors on the steps of the Melbourne Shrine of Remembrance who  tell us to bow our heads and raise a glass of VB in memory of the first Australians who charged and died at Gallipoli. There have been endless advertising and sales of Gallipoli kitsch. Even our Governor General a few years ago fronted at the hotel bar for VB to raise a glass and  money for veterans.

    But the slipping TV ratings suggest we are getting tired of the saturation media coverage and the $400 m spent by the Australian Government on a whole range of Anzac ‘educational’ programs.

    When the myth making all started in 1915 Charles Bean, the official military historian carefully burnished the Anzac myth. Soldiers were strong, adaptable, cheerful, laid-back, but faithfully serving the empire. Not for Bean the harsh realities of war unless they were laced with humour. He didn’t tell us much about the fear, desertion or boredom of soldiers far from home or the horror of it all. He was gilding the lily about the terrible nature of the war in which young Australians were killing and being killed.

    We are told endlessly about how Australians fought in WW!. We are never really asked the very important question of why we fought… in the interests of Britain’s colonial and economic interests,including access to oil in the Middle East for Britain’s navy.

    The last surviving Anzac, Alec Campbell said in 2002 ‘For God’s sake don’t glorify Gallipoli..it was a terrible fiasco, a total failure and best forgotten’. But the Anzac obsession continues.

    To burnish the conservative interpretation of our military history we, and particularly the Australian War Memorial, are very selective about the story we tell. We have selective amnesia. We ignore the Frontier Wars, a race war by white landowners in which over 30,000 indigenous people were killed defending their homeland. In proportion to our population it was the largest loss of life in war in our history. But there is scarcely a grave or a memorial to remember the people who died in the Frontier Wars. Our first military alliance with New Zealand was not at Gallipoli but in the Maori race wars in the 1850s and 1860s.

    Best we forget the Frontier and Maori Wars.

    We choose to make WWII almost a footnote to our military history, but it was far more important to our survival than any other foreign war.

    Old soldiers will scarcely ever tell us about their experiences. They were haunted for years with the horror of it all. But today we don’t seem able to stop talking about Anzac and Gallipoli. We have seen so often on TV a long-lost cousin or a great uncle that has been forgotten. It seems more like sentimentality than grief.

    The careful selection of people and events by Bean diverted attention from the enormous political, strategic and personal tragedy of Gallipoli. We do the same today. We are encouraged to forget the blunders we made as a nation, involving ourselves in wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. Like Bean, we divert attention by focusing on the sacrifice and losses by ordinary servicemen and women. We seem to turn ourselves into a knot to avoid facing the history of our military blunders. The same process is now under way with our expanded commitment to Iraq. What we will not acknowledge is that there was no national interest in sending Australian troops to Gallipoli just as there is no national interest in sending troops again to Iraq.

    On Anzac Cove Tony Abbott has told us that our involvement at Gallipoli was ‘right and just’. Others talk of ‘defending freedom’. In my view none of these claims stand up to serious scrutiny.. We were there for the empire.

    The Bean myth-making was essential for conservatives to divert attention from the military, political and personal tragedies; the division at home over conscription; the sectarianism of Billy Hughes and the poverty and unemployment in the great depression. It was not a land fit for heroes. WWI sundered our nation and it wasn’t until 1945 that we really started to put it together again..

    There are two bookends in our celebration of our military history. They are out dependence on the UK and the USA. We try to invent reasons why we fought at Gallipoli, but I have yet to hear a believable account of what we fought for there, except serving the empire. At Gallipoli Australian soldiers flew the Union Jack.  Today we also try to invent reasons why we are fighting in Iraq, but the real reason is the call of the latter-day imperial power, the USA.

    How can we possibly believe that Gallipoli and Iraq is about nationhood? Our involvement in both was for quite opposite reasons – serving the empire. Unfortunately some people believe that nationhood, like manhood can only only be proven in war and violence.

    My main concern about the Gallipoli myth-making and our military history is because it is pushing us steadily further and further down the military path. Our foreign policy has become overwhelmingly militarised. Combatting asylum seekers in Operation Sovereign Borders is an example of how civil policies and programs are being turned over to the military. We are again appointing military generals as governors and governor generals.

    This militarisation of Australia has contributed to making our involvement in wars a quite casual event. The latest addition of 300 Australian service people to Iraq scarcely raised any attention at all.

    Taking a country to war used to be considered the most serious step that any government could ever take. But no more. The parliament doesn’t even debate a new overseas commitment. In an almost unthinking way we decide to go to war again. We commit to war after war and then refuse properly support returning service people.

    As Henry Reynolds put it

    ‘The threshold Australian governments need to cross in order to send forces overseas is perilously low. Because there has never been an assessment of why Australia has so often been involved in war, young people must get the impression that war is a natural and inescapable part of national life. It is what we do and we are good at it. We “punch above our weight”. War is treated as though it provides the venue and the occasion for Australian heroism and martial virtuosity. While there is much talk of dying, or more commonly of sacrifice, there is little mention of killing and never any assessment of the carnage visited on distant countries in our name.’

    In Australia today it is becoming much easier to go to war. War is becoming commonplace and the celebrations surrounding Gallipoli make it more so. Step by step we are moving into very dangerous territory, something that the diggers of Gallipoli or the Western Front would have warned us about. It was so horrible; they didn’t want to talk about it. But we talk about it endlessly.

    We should behave with restraint and put some of the drums and bugles away. Let’s pause and think what we are doing.

    The lesson of Gallipoli must surely be to avoid making the same mistake again…whether it be in Vietnam,Afghanistan or Iraq.

     

  • Peter Drysdale. Taiwan’s Political Choice.

    On Sunday, Taiwan will elect its next president, the successor to President Ma Ying-jeou from the Kuomintang (KMT) party who has been in power for the past eight years and is ineligible to run for another term. The vote will almost certainly record a decisive choice for political change.

    In the run up to the election, the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, appears to be heading towards a runaway victory — with polls suggesting that she has about 45 per cent voter support. This puts her far ahead of the ruling KMT party candidate, Eric Chu, with around 20 per cent, and the smaller People First Party (PFP) candidate James Soong with 10 per cent. Around 25 per cent of voters remain undecided. With three-quarters of a million more voters this election than last time, the many young, first-time voters are likely to vote for non-mainstream parties or the DPP.

    A series of political stumbles — with the governing KMT forced to change presidential candidate midway through the election — and a steady trend towards independent-mindedness, especially among the younger generation in Taiwan, has left the KMT government struggling to mobilise its support base. The polls suggest that the KMT might also lose control of the Legislative Assembly for the first time in Taiwan’s history.

    The coming election result will be widely, if wrongly, read as a referendum on cross-Strait relations. President Ma has focused on improving relations with China and negotiated a succession of agreements with the mainland that have seen relations between Beijing and Taipei at their most cordial since the end of the Chinese civil war. The opening of cross-Strait economic relations was given a major fillip in 2008 after the election of Ma and the return of a KMT majority in the Taiwanese legislature. There followed a series of high-level exchanges between then Chinese and Taiwanese leaders that laid the foundations for steps that saw a major breakthrough in the relationship with the eventual signing of Cross-Straits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) on 29 June 2010.

    But implementing follow-on arrangements to give effect to the agreement wasn’t all smooth sailing. The passage of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement through the Taiwanese legislature was disrupted by the emergence of the Sunflower Student Protest Movement in 2014. The movement gave vent to concerns about incomplete disclosure regarding the nature and potential costs of the agreement, as it related to telecommunications and other issues. And the backing it gained, from the opposition DPP and among students and young people, exposed the underbelly of anxiety about the deepening economic relationship with Beijing and its political implications. Taiwanese are glad to see tensions with Beijing reduced. But many also fear the Ma administration and the KMT might have made Taiwan too economically dependent on the mainland; that might lead to loss of independence and inability to fend off pressure one day to reunify with China on unfavourable terms.

    In fact, the profound political shift in Taiwan is more closely associated with the economy’s failing struggle to re-invent itself. With per capita income around US$22,000, Taiwan is above the middle income threshold, but it has been unable to emulate its neighbours like South Korea and Japan in Asia in climbing up the income scale. Its export-dependent manufacturing sector faces competition from South Korea from above and emerging economies, like China, from below. GDP grew a measly 1 per cent in 2014; wages are stagnating and unemployment, at 4 per cent, is considered high. The irony is that Taiwan’s tortured, ‘one-sided’ economic relationship with China — which Ma had been trying to correct — might well be a core element in Taiwan’s economic woes. While direct trade has opened up across the Strait, Taiwan has continued to restrict Chinese imports and investment, essential to enjoying the fruits of fuller integration into the regional and global economy. South Korea has imposed no similar burdens on its international competitiveness.

    This week’s lead essay from Mark Harrison points out that while the KMT government may have overstayed its welcome domestically, Taiwanese affairs have looked very different internationally. While the Ma–Xi meeting last November seemed merely to confirm the voters’ view that the KMT had lost sight of Taiwan’s democratic ideals and their everyday concerns, internationally it looked like an historic moment in cross-Strait relations and a step towards resolving one of modern history’s longest-standing ideological conflicts. Indeed, one conception of China’s diplomatic intention in agreeing to the meeting was that it was designed to lay down new benchmarks in cross-Strait relations in preparation for working with a DPP leadership.

    ‘Should Tsai be elected president, managing these two very different perspectives will be a key task for the incoming administration’, says Harrison. ‘As president, she will need to take heed of the international view of Taiwan and communicate the reasons why the electorate have voted for a more circumspect relationship with Beijing. Tsai’s task will be complicated by memories of the last DPP president, Chen Shui-bian, which still rankle foreign ministries around the world. At the same time, the United States and Japan have both become far warier of China’s assertive regional policies and a Taiwanese government that is less accommodating towards Beijing may suit their policy responses and leadership inclinations’.

    It’s true, as Harrison says, that from an international perspective, policymaking in Taipei by a government that will base its legitimacy on its openness to public debate and political activism may appear less reassuring than the policies of accommodation with Beijing under Ma. Certainly Washington was anxious to be reassured that Tsai was not going to disturb the status quo on that front. But this is the tide of Taiwan’s modern political history. Beijing has shown respect for the process and provided a bridge to Tsai and an incentive to meet in the middle. And the policy outcomes that open government can deliver on China and other issues will ultimately stand on stronger foundations of political legitimacy.

    Professor Peter Drysdale is Editor ANU East Asia Forum. This article was first published in the East Asia Forum on 11 January 2016.

  • John Menadue. Australians who fight in overseas wars.

    Repost from 02/03/2015

    The government has been concerned, as many of us are, about Australians fighting for IS in Syria and Iraq. The government is threatening to revoke the Australian citizenship of dual nationals who involve themselves in this war.

    Whether this will be successful is a very moot point. It is asserted by many that prosecution under our existing laws would be much more effective. But a government in trouble about its own security has to be seen to be ‘doing something’, e.g. revoking citizenship.

    There are an estimated 100 or so Australian citizens fighting with the IS in Syria and Iraq. That number looks to be increasing.

    Estimates suggest also that at least a similar number of dual Australian citizens are fighting with the Israeli Defence Forces. Australians have fought in all of Israel’s wars since 1948.

    The Muslim community in Australia has been very critical of Australians who go and fight under the IS flag but rightly asks why Australian citizens are able to fight with the IDF but not with IS. I would have thought that the policy on this matter would be quite clear – that no Australian citizen should be allowed to fight overseas without the approval of the Australian government and if they do they will be prosecuted and if found guilty severely punished.

    There are several reasons that our Prime Minister and ASIO have given for the apparent double-standard in treatment of Australian citizens fighting for IS and for IDF. The first is that IS has been described as a terrorist organisation, whereas the IDF has not. Second, fighting with an overseas army of a recognised national state is different. Thirdly, the Israeli’s are not under sanctions so the IDF is a ‘free port for Australian volunteers’ according to the former Director General of ASIO.

    If it is maintained that Israel has not been designated as a terrorist state or is under sanctions, it cannot be said that the IDF is not a lethal organisation. In its savage attack on Gaza last year, the IDF made over 5,000 air strikes in which 2,104 people were killed. According to the UN estimates, 69% of persons killed in Gaza were civilians. The Israeli’s lost 67 soldiers and six civilians.

    Where is the balance and logic in the way successive Australian governments have favoured Israel in so many ways? One thing stands out very much; the power of the Israeli lobby in so many countries including our own.

  • Richard Butler. Nuclear North Korea: Profound and Dangerous Hypocrisy  

    During the last 10 years, North Korea has resigned its membership of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and conducted four nuclear test explosions. It claimed that the latest of these, detected four days ago, was of a hydrogen (fission-fusion) bomb. It made no such claim for the earlier three tests; said to be merely atomic (fission) bombs.

    Argument about the veracity of the current claim is underway. There was seismic evidence of a test, but there is good reason to doubt that it was of a hydrogen bomb. We might have a clearer reading on that soon. The UN Security Council has condemned the test, as it has done in the past, describing it as constituting a “threat to international peace and security”. North Korea’s statements have spoken of a remarkable scientific achievement and their ability to threaten the destruction of its enemies, chiefly the United States.

    Any rational appreciation of this current piece of theatre would begin by recognizing its elemental ludicrousness, but then acknowledge the great dangers and deadly earnest politics it incorporates.

    Life in North Korea is appalling. Its people have little to eat and as Justice Michael Kirby has reported to the UN, there are virtually no human rights there, just widespread and relentless abuses. Expenditure by the regime of its resources and technological efforts on nuclear weapons is cruel.

    Interested western oriented countries, particularly US, Japan, South Korea have attempted to have North Korea end its nuclear program, offering a range of economic and political incentives In return. These have failed. Attempts have also been made to engage China and Russia in diplomatic efforts to the same end. These have also foundered.

    China is crucial to any solution given its alliance with North Korea and the depth of the latter’s reliance upon China for economic survival. China is known to be angry with its partner and has joined in the Security Council’s condemnation of the nuclear testing program, but it has taken no serious action against it.

    At a fundamental level, the North Korean nuclear weapons issue is now emerging as possibly the paradigm case, even more so than the Iran case, of two pervasive phenomena in contemporary international relations.

    1. The reversion by most States to traditional forms of competition and balance of power politics as the determinant of outcomes in international relations. This development has specifically rejected the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN; the post Second World War compact.It has resulted in the wretched failures we have witnessed in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and a number of countries in Africa and the Middle East.
      The abiding aspect of these failures has been the refusal of key States, particularly Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, to permit collective action to make or keep peace, if it would disadvantage them as such, or in their competition with others. Permanent members have also been the most egregious violators of the Charter by invading or attacking other States, for which actions they have not been sanctioned.
    1. As the key extension of this first notion, which places the possession of power, particularly military power, at the centre of legitimacy; the second phenomenon is the insistence by those States which possess nuclear weapons that they alone are legitimately able to determine who else might and might not have those weapons.
      That they are able to make this determination, including through the use or threat of use of their own weapons, is beyond doubt, in the short term. That it is legitimate for them to do so, given global legal and moral commitments to nuclear arms control and disarmament, and the dangers nuclear weapons pose, is preposterous.
      Above all, the consequence of the elemental hypocrisy involved in the attempt to manage the world on such a basis is that it will fail and possibly lead to horrendous war.

    The first of the two phenomena identified above is not new, as such. But the extent to which relations amongst States have become militarized is extreme. It has been the result of: the failure to reach a new compact, following the end of the Cold War, then the convulsions consequent upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union and, the wests attempts to treat Russia as the loser. Russia will not accept this and overall, the world has progressively rejected an imperial America. The principle victim in this situation has been the UN Charter system for the resolution of conflict.

    The application of these circumstances to the North Korean case is illustrated by China’s obvious interest in the North Korean irritant to the US, Japan and South Korea, given its conflict with them over it’s South China Sea policies and actions. Simply, it can be expected to indicate that a price for it stepping up pressure on North Korea will be that the others make concessions on the South China Sea and more particularly recognize that if North Korea were to collapse it would not be acceptable for it to be folded into South Korea, as a State allied to the US. Russia could be expected to support China in such a stance.

    On the specific issue of North Korea’s bomb, the previous policy of Obama’s first term – “strategic patience”- will need to be supplemented by a refreshed diplomacy and some new incentives, but only if China has significantly stepped up its effort with The North Koreans.

    But, the current global situation described above, where nuclear weapon states attempt to hold the ring on the possession of such weapons, is failing. Israel, India and Pakistan have won that game. They have nuclear weapons and have refused to join the NPT and the Test Ban Treaty. Iran is on ice, for now, but Saudi Arabia is not. This is an unstable situation.

    The hypocrisy which is intrinsic to the NPT, which privileges States with nuclear weapons, is coming home to roost. NPT is only acceptable if those privileged States implement their Treaty obligation to progressively eliminate their nuclear weapons. Instead what we see today is their expansion of their arsenals and their manifest reversion to power, not law or principle, as the reliable determinant of political and security outcomes.

    If states were ever to become serious about ending the threat posed to all by the continued existence of nuclear weapons, they would begin a process of negotiated reductions in which all such weapons were in the frame. This is in fact what they have undertaken to do in NPT, a commitment which the International Court of Justice has ruled is an obligation in international law.

    Interestingly, Australia was once a leader in the search for progress on nuclear non proliferation and disarmament. A practical process for the safe elimination of nuclear weapons was outlined in 1996 by the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, established by Prime Minister Keating. The Commission’s report continues to be recognized as a realistic one. But, Australia’s leadership in this field was terminated by Prime Minister Howard. To widespread dismay, this saw Australia actually vote against a resolution of the UN General Assembly calling for enhanced action on nuclear disarmament.

    The Canberra Commission report was supplemented, in 2009, by a Japan/Australia study on nuclear dangers, managed by Gareth Evans.

    Axioms which the Canberra Commission identified and thought were of enduring importance were: as long as nuclear weapons exist, they will be used, whether by accident or decision; any use would have catastrophic effects; as long as any State has nuclear weapons, others will seek to acquire them.

    Were the Commission to meet again today, presumably it would add a further basic warning about the consequences of the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons capability by a group such as DAESH.

    Only if the nuclear hypocrisy ends will we avoid these outcomes whether at the hands of North Korea or any other State.

    On Australian actions, as a country possessing a major proportion of known reserves of uranium and as a permanent member of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Turnbull government should review the resumption by Australia of an active role in global efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons.

    Richard Butler AC is former Ambassador to the UN and was Convenor of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons.

  • The forgotten war – Chinese resistance to Japan.

    Repost from 17/09/2015

    WASHINGTON, Sept. 1 — Few in the West remember the fact that China was the first country to enter what would become World War II, and it was an ally of the United States and Britain from just after Pearl Harbor in 1941 till Japan’s surrender in 1945, an Oxford expert said.

    In an article titled “Forgotten ally? China’s unsung role in World War II (WWII),”circulated on U.S. TV network CNN’s website Tuesday, Rana Mitter, a professor of modern Chinese politics and history at the University of Oxford, elaborated China’s role in WorldWar II.

    As China will hold a major parade in Beijing on Thursday to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, “China’s memory of the war is becoming more, not less, important,” he wrote.

    “Chinese suffering during the war is not in dispute,” he added, referring to the fact that during China’s resistance against Japanese aggression from 1937 to 1945, the fire of war scourged half of the Chinese territory, with around 260 million Chinese involved in the war and more than 35 million people killed or wounded. The direct economic loss reached some 100 billion U.S. dollars at then price.

    The United States and China were allies during WWII and more than 250,000 Americans served in what was known as the “China-Burma-India” theater, many photos showed.

    On July 7, 1937, Japanese troops attacked Lugou Bridge, also known as Marco Polo Bridge, a crucial access point to Beijing. This was the beginning of China’s eight-year warof resistance against full-scale Japanese aggression. A year later, by mid-1938, the Chinese military situation was desperate.

    Many cities of eastern and central China, including Shanghai, Nanjing and Wuhan, fell in Japanese hands. Many foreign observers assumed that China could not hold out, and a Japanese victory over China was most likely.

    Nonetheless, China refused to surrender, retreating inland to carry on resistance. “This decision changed the fate of Asia,” Mitter said.

    If China had surrendered in 1938, Japan would have controlled China for a generation or more. Japan’s forces might have turned toward the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia, or even India, the article reads.

    The European and Asian wars might never have come together as they did after Pearl Harbor in 1941.

    As Chinese hung on, and after Pearl Harbor, the war became genuinely global. The western Allies and China were united in their war against Japan.

    China’s contributions were very important to the war efforts. China held down huge numbers of Japanese troops on its territory and acted as an example to other non-Western countries, showing that it was possible to fight with hegemonism and strongly oppose imperialism, Mitter stressed.

    This article was first published in Xinhua, The Chinese Daily, n 2 September 2015.

  • John Tulloh. The Cost of the star-spangled arms banner.

    Repost from 05/10/2015

    O say can you see, by the dawn’s early light,
    What so proudly we hailed at the twilight’s last gleaming,
    Whose broad stripes and bright stars through the perilous fight,
    O’er the ramparts we watched, we’re so gallantly streaming?
    And the rockets’ red glare, the bombs bursting in air,
    Gave proof through the night that our flag was still there;
    O say does that Star-Spangled Banner yet wave
    O’er the land of the free and the home of the brave? 

    The words of the first verse of the U.S. national anthem are now more than 200 years old. While they explode with patriotic pride of the new nation, they also celebrate war – in this case the repulsing of the British navy when it tried to invade Baltimore harbour in 1812. Since its founding in 1776, America has had a penchant for charging off to war.

    An organisation called WashingtonsBlog has come out with an extraordinary statistic: since 1776, the U.S. has been at war in one form or another for 91% of those years. Many of the early conflicts were local ones, such as the revolutionary and civil wars, fighting the Mexicans and elsewhere in Central America, the Caribbean and, of course, against its own Indian tribes. In the past 100 years, only 11 passed without Washington turning loose its military somewhere in the world.

    President Calvin Coolidge once observed that the business of America was business. It is more like military business. The U.S. Defence Department is synonymous with staggering statistics: 1.3 million personnel on active duty, another 742,000 civilian employees, a budget of 1.4 trillion dollars and hundreds of thousands of different buildings over 5000 sites covering 30 million acres (or 10 times the size of sprawling Sydney). It is possibly the biggest enterprise in the world, especially for the juggernaut of business it generates.

    USA Today, quoting 24/7 Wall Street, a newsletter for investors, reported that in 2011 the top 10 U.S. arms manufacturers employed a total of nearly 1,100,000 people and in the previous two years made a combined profit of $26.35 billion. There were scores of other companies also feeding on the military largesse. Their total turnover represents 2.3% of the U.S. GDP.

    A study last year by Morgan Stanley, the financial services company, revealed that shares in major American arms companies have risen by four times as much in the past 50 years compared with the broader market. The Fiscal Times says the Dow Jones index of defence and aerospace companies has grown by 60% in the past two years, double the rate of the S&P. The so-called angels of death are thriving like never before.

    Presidents at their peril try to reform or tame what President Eisenhower called the industrial-military complex. For members of congress, a vital electoral asset in any state is a military base or a war materiel plant. Washington is pervaded by lobbyists representing every aspect of the military economy. A naval installation in Virginia alone has more than 78,000 employees.

    Jonathan Turley, professor of public interest law at George Washington University, says: ‘While few politicians are willing to admit it, we don’t just endure wars – we need war’.

    President Obama has done his best to reduce the U.S. military presence in the world. By 2018, the army will shrink to its smallest size since before WW2. It will then number 450,000 compared with 570,000 in 2011. But now additional money is being spent on developing drones to replace boots on the ground.

    Investors in the military-industry complex can take heart from another outlet ripe for exploitation: Homeland security. ‘Hundreds of billions of dollars flow each year from the public coffers to agencies and contractors who have an incentive to keep the country on a war footing’, says Prof. Turley. ‘The core of this expanding complex is an axis of influence of corporations, lobbyists and agencies that have created a massive, self-sustaining terror-based industry’.

    The incoming Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General ‘Fightin’ Joe’ Dunford, sees the danger elsewhere. He said in July that ‘Russia presents the greatest threat to our national security. If you look at their behaviour, it is nothing short of alarming’. It was bigger than Islamic State (I.S.), he added.

    The titans of the military-industrial complex are more likely to welcome a Republican presidential victory as being even better for business. Donald Trump, the front runner, calls himself a ‘very militaristic person’. His slogan of ‘Make America Great Again’ can only mean louder bugles. Carly Fiorina, a former CEO who has impressed in debates, wants more ships, a bigger army and the restoration of missile defences to Poland. Senator Lindsey Graham proposes to send in troops to deal with I.S. and to stay there as long as it takes.

    Given that trouble in the Middle East is here to stay and with Russia upping the ante, China flexing its military muscle and booming export orders, no amount of upheaval in the international economy is likely to deter the military business bonanza.

    Americans can be rightly proud of what their armed forces have done in areas of the world where their allies often fear to tread. But they might also ponder another statistic: the rising cost of caring for the 33,000 of their military personnel, mainly troops, who were severely disabled in the line of recent duty. The Centre for Research on Globalisation estimates the overall long-term cost will be $900 billion.

    President Eisenhower ended his eight years in office in 1961 by warning Americans ‘to guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence….by the military-industrial complex’. He might as well have talked to a coyote out on the prairies for what has happened since. One of his successors concluded that it would take the occupant of the Oval Office every single day of the presidential term to have any chance of taming the Pentagon.

    The Pentagon’s own website virtually confirms that it will always be business as usual. ‘The mission of the Department of Defense’, it states, ‘is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of our country’.

    FOOTNOTE. According to British columnist Alexander Chancellor, since 1968 more Americans have died from gunfire in their home country than have died in all wars in their history. That is, from the War of Independence right through to both world wars and Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. The total war deaths, he wrote last month, were 1,171,177 over 239 years versus 1,384,171 in murders, suicides and other gun-related incidents in just the past 47 years. 

    John Tulloh had a 40-year career in foreign news.

     

     

     

  • John Menadue. Radicalism and terrorism.

    Repost from 15/10/2015

    Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull is talking a lot about his government’s commitment to counter radicalisation in the Muslim community. The NSW Premier and Police Commissioner also keep talking about countering radicalisation. At least this is preferable to the endless talk we had before about a ‘death cult’ and ‘team Australia’.

    But radicalism and terrorism are not the same thing. Radical politics and radical religion are surely acceptable and widespread. But what is not acceptable is to commit acts of violence and terrorism. Making this distinction between radicalism and terrorism is not some semantic play with language. We had better understand the essential difference between the two or we will never stop terrorism.

    Radicalism is about going to the core of a subject or issue. Radical surgery for example is attempting to address the core of the ailment. As a university teenager I was probably a radical student. I am still probably radical on many things. But that radicalism has never been about violence. It was quite the opposite.

    I am not surprised that many young Muslim teenagers are offended, indeed radicalised by the violence that the West, including Australia, has inflicted on the Muslim people of the Middle East. I think I understand how the humiliation and violence we have inflicted would radicalise young Muslims.

    Malcolm Turnbull says that John Howard was ‘our greatest prime minister with the possible exception of Robert Menzies … I learnt so much from John Howard. Every day I am PM, I’ll be benchmarking everything I do against how John Howard would have handled these challenges’. But does Malcolm Turnbull seriously believe that he should benchmark himself by justifying John Howard’s involvement in the Iraq War which is a root cause of conflict and terrorism in the world today.

    There is not much doubt that it was John Howard’s cooperation with George Bush in the invasion of Iraq that unleashed the violence and terrorism that we face today. John Howard helped open the Pandora’s Box of tribal, ethnic and sectarian violence in the Middle East and made us less secure. Most Australian people know that that is true. As I pointed out in an earlier blog, 45% of Australians feel less secure from terrorism because of our continued military meddling in the Middle East and most recently in Syria. Only 13% of Australians feel safer.

    We are reaping violence at home for what we have sown abroad. But Malcolm Turnbull doesn’t mention this and wants to benchmark himself against the person who helped trigger so much to the violence and terrorism we face today.

    Last night on the 7.30 program the Commissioner of the Australian Federal Police, Andrew Colvin said that terrorism in Australia was getting worse but he didn’t know why. He was not asked the obvious follow up question, what is the link between our military involvement in Muslim countries in the Middle East and terrorism at home.

    In 2004 a former Commissioner of the AFP Mick Kelty was very clear that ‘our involvement in Iraq made us a greater target for terrorism’. In 2010 the head of UK’ MI 5 Baroness Manningham-Buller told the Chilcott Inquiry ‘that our involvement in Iraq…radicalised a whole generation of young people…who (in addition) saw our involvement in Afghanistan as being an attack on Islam’

    The facts are clear but our leaders will not admit their mistakes. Instead they deliberately avoid an honest discussion.

    Combatting violence and terrorism will require responses on many fronts.

    The first is early intervention and active cooperation with the Muslim community to calm the hot-heads and misfits that exist in every community. Muslim leaders who can’t speak English are not going to be effective bridges between the Muslim and wider Australian communities. They will just not cut it. There may be important role models for young people in the Muslim community, but it is not clear to me.

    Secondly, we need to publicise the Jihadists who return and admit their mistake. We then need to help rehabilitate them into the Australian community.

    Thirdly, we will need to rely increasingly on the competence of our security and police forces. They are much better resourced and have more power than ever before. Yet they are invariably asking for more money and more powers. And Prime Ministers and Premiers, wanting to be seen to be doing something usually agree

    But are our security agencies and police up to the job? There is no doubt that the Man Haron Monis case was seriously mishandled by both our security services and the police, including the botched rescue attempt. We have had very few convictions of alleged terrorists. The evidence presented in many cases has just not stood up. Why?

    Organisations that operate in secret and with a lot of untested information need close and effective supervision.  The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security is under resourced to do the job.

    My experience is that our security services attract more ‘odd bods’ than I have found in any other organization. That experience was some time ago, but I doubt that much has changed. Ministers are easily seduced into the twilight world of fact, fiction, gossip and speculation. I have seen it many times. I have even fallen for it myself.

    In a recent article, ‘Narrow focus on radicalisation won’t stop terrorism’ Greg Austin, Visiting Professor at UNSW put the issue in the following way. ‘Radicalisation and terrorism are two different phenomena – legally, politically, psychologically and morally. While a terrorist is by definition radicalised, the mere fact of being radicalised does not explain the transition to terrorism – a choice for violence. In most scenarios, there are many “radicals” in any cause for each person who becomes a terrorist. A policy that screens radicals for terrorists is not workable or reliable, nor scientifically defensible. It will always record significant failures.’

    We won’t get on top of our current problems with terrorism whilst Malcolm Turnbull and others conflate radicalism and terrorism and pursue policies in the Middle East that foment terrorism at home.

  • Cavan Hogue. Shia vs Sunni in Iran and Saudi Arabia.

    Saudi Arabia’s execution of a Shia cleric who criticised its policies has exacerbated the split between Shia and Sunni Nations. Politics and religion have come together in a way that will be familiar to anyone who knows Northern Ireland. Sunni Saudi Arabia is the home of the deviant puritanical Wahabi sect which is rejected by most Muslims but provides the theological underpinning for al Qaeda and ISIS. It is also a US ally and therefore an Australian ally.

    So we now have the Shia nations supported by Russia and the Sunni nations supported by the US and its Western allies facing off publicly. However, it is not that simple. There are other tribal and splinter groups to muddy the waters. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and ISIS are out of the same stable and we may well ask how a nation that beheads people it doesn’t like differs from ISIS?

    This also brings out the differences between Western rhtetoric and practice. The US criticises Assad’s human rights record but is a close ally of Saudi Arabia. Presumably the Americans will use the defence Franklin D. Roosevelt made when attacked for supporting the brutal Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza: “I know he’s a son of a bitch but he’s our son of a bitch”. Foreign intervention is not really about other people’s human rights but the foreigners’ national interests.

    There is no end in sight to the imbroglio in the Middle East. The Coalition of the Willing opened Pandora’s box and a host of old enmities came flying out. Nations like Iraq and Syria are colonial creations which are not so much failed states as states that never really were states as we understand the term. Attempts to recreate entities that were held together by force are not likely to succeed. We are seeing a struggle for political influence based on religion between the two major powers: Sunni Arab Saudi Arabia and Shia Persian Iran. Even if they reach agreement a host of other isuues will remain. For example, the Kurds surely have as much right to a homeland as the Israelis?

    Australia can have no influence there and our participation in what is effectively a regional civil war can only make us a target for extremists. This is not a crusade for freedom and democracy but a mess which only the Arabs and the Persians can sort out for themselves. Talk about “evil” is not helpful and we need to play a no trump hand. An independent Australian foreign policy would not follow the US into yet another fine mess.

    Cavan Hogue was formerly Ambassador to USSR and Russia.

  • Allan Patience. Australia and the War in Syria.

    Repost from 02/09/2015

    Australia and the War in Syria: Perverting a Noble Vision in International Law for Ignoble Domestic Political Purposes

    In 2005 a summit of world leaders at the United Nations unanimously endorsed the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Along with the establishment of the International Criminal Court, it constitutes one of the most noble contributions to international law, ever. Basically the doctrine declares that where a state is incapable or unwilling to protect its citizens, the international community should come to their aid. Intervention may take one or more of several forms: debt forgiveness, manageable loans, direct financial and logistical aid, sanctions, peace keeping operations and – as a very last resort – threatened or actual military intervention.

    Like so many modern legal and ethical advances, especially in international law, R2P has been honoured more in its breach than its observance. Since its endorsement by the United Nations, the international community has sat on its hands while vicious ruling elites around the world have unleashed mass atrocities on their pitiless subjects. The prime contemporary example is the criminal Assad regime in Syria. Where interventions in the name of R2P have been initiated (by the UN or other regional or global authorities), they have generally been too little too late, or so badly coordinated they have worsened the very problems they were intended to solve.

    It is surely ironic, therefore, that one of the main architects of R2P, Gareth Evans, and another former Labor Foreign Minister, Bob Carr, are now urging the Abbott government to accept the alleged “invitation” from President Obama to extend Australia’s bombing of Islamic State (IS) targets in Syria. They have suggested that this proposed intervention will be in the interests of the hapless victims of the Assad regime and IS, and other opposition elements in the horrific humanitarian catastrophe that is Syria today. That is, they want us to believe that it would entail a humanitarian intervention in line with the principles of R2P. Nothing could be further from the truth.

    The bombing campaigns presently being conducted by the United States, Canada, Turkey and other allies are classic illustrations of an inadequately resourced and disastrously coordinated campaign that amounts to much too little, far too late. It will not stop IS in its tracks, nor will it bring down the Assad government. Probably nothing short of a very large number of American, Saudi Arabian, Iranian, NATO and other allies’ boots on the ground will begin to achieve those objectives. As the world well knows, the likelihood of this happening is precisely nil.

    Meanwhile the Erdogan government in Istanbul is using the conflict as a cover for its brutal bombing of Kurds in southern Turkey and northern Syria and Iraq. Iran and Saudi Arabia are meddling in the various conflicts in Syria to wage a proxy war for their own nefarious purposes. Russia and China are blocking any genuine R2P attempts in the Security Council. And even if IS is destroyed and Assad and his ruthless cronies are toppled, there is no plan, no strategy, in place to bring order to the region and enable the tragically suffering peoples there begin to rebuild their lives.

    It is more than likely that extending bombing into Syria is illegal under international law. Moreover the puny contribution that the few sorties the RAAF is capable of mounting in Syria will be pointless as far as ending the conflict is concerned. Given the propensity for allied bombs to incur “collateral damage” it is inevitable that Australian warplanes will add to the wounding and killing of innocent civilians. Any attempts to dress this up as a humanitarian R2P intervention simply advances the despicable rationale advanced by Tony Abbott for plunging Australia more deeply into a conflict that makes no sense in terms of the country’s real security interests.

    Why then is Abbott urging the Americans to let Australia lend a hand in this unholy mess? Two morally grotesque answers immediately come to mind.

    First, yet again Australia is cozying up to the United States in the naïve belief that Uncle Sam needs constant assurance of our abject loyalty to the ANZUS alliance. The fact is that the US takes Australia’s uncritical support for granted, end of story.

    The second answer relates to Abbott’s electoral fortunes – or misfortunes. There is clearly a belief in the government that scaring the Australian electorate is the surest way of winning the 2016 election. This perverse rationale for recklessly spending Australian blood and treasure in an unwinnable, stupidly conducted, and cruel war reeks of the very basest kind of cynicism. Abbott’s strategy must be exposed for all to see what it truly is: a desperate and despicable attempt to cling on to power, no matter what the consequences for the country or for the world.

    It’s time for the Labor Opposition to take an unambiguous stand against sending Australian warplanes into Syria. Bill Shorten and Tanya Plibersek must denounce the plan in the strongest possible terms. They have to explain to the Australian people that their country’s involvement in Iraq and possibly Syria is in fact endangering their security, not protecting it. In addition, Labor needs to advocate a strategy for immediate withdrawal of all Australian troops and materiel from the Middle East. Bring the troops home. There is no way their presence there will end this terrible conflict or reduce the appalling suffering of the civilians on the ground.

    And Gareth Evans and Bob Carr should be turning their intelligent minds to theorizing a revised version of R2P. The first version has palpably failed. It needs a comprehensive rethinking. A future Australian government should be at the forefront of advocating the new version of this noble ideal at the United Nations and every other global forum it can attend. In the meantime compounding Abbott’s lie that America wants us by its side in Syria has to be treated with the utter contempt it deserves.

    Allan Patience is a foreign policy researcher in the Asia Institute, University of Melbourne.

     

  • John Menadue and Peter Hughes. Slogans vs Facts on Boat Arrivals, Part 2

    Reposted from 23/09/2015

    Tony Abbott did not stop the boats

    In this blog yesterday (22 September 2015) we pointed out that Tony Abbott kept the door open for tens of thousands of boat arrivals by opposing legislation that would have enabled implementation of the Malaysia Arrangement in September 2011. By this action, he helped turn on the green light for people smugglers.

    Moreover, the data just does not support the claim that, after coming to power in September 2013, Tony Abbott “stopped the boats”. The media uncritically accepted the Coalition’s line in the confused period of the changeover of governments and in the context of drama and secrecy surrounding a small number of boat turn-backs.

    The data shows that the downward trend in boat arrivals began in August 2013. By October and November 2013 maritime asylum seeker arrivals had dropped by 90% compared to the corresponding two months in 2012 (547 arrivals versus 5115 arrivals). These reductions occurred well before the first boat turnaround by the Coalition Government on 19 December 2013. See table below:

    Number of illegal maritime arrivals who arrived in Australia by month            (1 January 2011 to 31 December 2014), by port arrival date.

     

    SIEVS/BOATS IMAs
    2011 January 3 223
    February 3 149
    March 7 419
    April 6 318
    May 6 333
    June 4 235
    July 4 228
    August 5 335
    September 4 319
    September Abbott failure to support Malaysian Arrangement
    October 5 259
    November 10 734
    December 13 1,070
    TOTAL 70 4,622
    2012 January 5 301
    February 9 849
    March 3 110
    April 11 837
    May 16 1,286
    June 24 1,642
    July 31 1,756
    August 37 2,078
    September 31 2,062
    October 47 2,452
    November 44 2,663
    December 18 1,017
    TOTAL 276 17,053
    2013 January 11 541
    February 17 973
    March 35 2,320
    April 47 3,329
    May 47 3,252
    June 40 2,750
    July 48 4,230
    19 July 2013 Rudd announcement not to settle IMAs in Australia
    August 25 1,585
    September 15 829
    October 5 339
    November 5 208
    December 7 355
    19 Dec 2013 First Abbott turn-backs
    TOTAL 302 20,711
    2014 January 0 3
    February 0 1
    March 0 0
    April 0 0
    May 0 0
    June 0 0
    July 1 157
    August 0 0
    September 0 3
    October 0 0
    November 0 0
    December 0 4
    TOTAL 1 168

    The source of this data is the Senate Select Committee on the Recent Allegations relating to Conditions and Circumstances at the Regional Processing Centre in Nauru: Submission 31 from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP). Crew are excluded. 

    Note that the table refers to the number of ‘Illegal’ Maritime Arrivals (IMAs). ‘Illegals’ is not a term that we think is appropriate, but the term is used in the material from DIBP.

    Three measures put in place by the Labor Government before the election caused the dramatic fall in the number arrivals, (allowing for a short time lag).

    The first was “enhanced screening” of Sri Lankans and quick return of non-refugees to Sri Lanka.

    The second was a decision by Indonesia, at Australia’s urging, that Iranians could not enter Indonesia without visas.

    The third and most important was the announcement by Kevin Rudd on the 19 July 2013 that in future any persons coming by boat, who were found to be refugees, would not be settled in Australia. We may argue about the wisdom of that policy, but it effectively crippled the people-smugglers.

    Fortuitously for the Abbott Government when it was sworn in on 18 September 2013, the flow of maritime arrivals was well on its way to being finished as a result of measures already taken.

    By the time Operation Sovereign Borders geared up for its first boat turn-back on 19 December 2013, the number of boats was down from 48 in July to 7 in December.

    Operation Sovereign Borders was applied to the “tail end” of a phenomenon that had largely been stopped. The game-changer was Kevin Rudd’s announcement in July 2013.

    Arguably, boat turn backs would not have been ‘successful’ at all without the July 2013 decision. For example, the Navy and Customs were able to turn back three boats in December 2013. It’s hard to believe that it would have been physically possible to turn back 48 boats if they had continued to arrive at the monthly rate that occurred in July 2013 and that Indonesia would have quietly acquiesced.

    Tony Abbott’s role in “stopping the boats” was at the margins and vastly overrated.

    John Menadue was Secretary, Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 1980-83. Peter Hughes was a senior officer in the Department of Immigration and Citizenship for 30 years until he retired as Deputy Secretary in 2011.

     

  • John Menadue and Peter Hughes. Slogans versus facts on boat arrivals. Part 1

    Reposted from 22/09/2015

    How Tony Abbott helped to keep the door open for people smugglers.

    The ABC provided us with excellent coverage of the Turnbull-Abbott shoot out, but the various commentators still swallowed the myth that Tony Abbott stopped the boats. That is a great piece of spin, but the reality is different.

    This blog on 26 July 2015 argued that Tony Abbott did not stop the boats. The game changer was the announcement by Kevin Rudd on 19 July 2013, two months before the election, that any persons arriving irregularly by boat would not be settled in Australia. Boat arrivals fell quickly and dramatically as a result of this announcement, coming on top of other measures the Labor government had already taken. We will update that blog in the next day or so in Part 2.

    For the present, however, our argument is that Tony Abbott kept the door open for tens of thousands of boat arrivals in the first place. His failure to support the Malaysia Arrangement in September 2011 resulted in the surge of boat arrivals over the next two years.

    Consider key dates. In May 2011 the Australian and Malaysian governments announced an ‘in principle’ arrangement that up to 800boat arrivals would be transferred from Australia to Malaysia for their asylum claims to be heard and, in response, Australia would be prepared to accept 4,000 refugees from Malaysia. The arrangement with Malaysia was signed on 25 July 2011. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) gave it qualified support.

    At that stage, people arriving irregularly by boat were running at about 2-300 per month. The table below shows the numbers at that time and what followed in the following 28 months.

    Number of illegal maritime arrivals who arrived in Australia by month            (1 January 2011 to 31 December 2014), by port arrival date. 

    SIEVS/BOATS IMAs
    2011 January 3 223
    February 3 149
    March 7 419
    April 6 318
    May 6 333
    June 4 235
    July 4 228
    August 5 335
    September 4 319
    September Abbott failure to support Malaysian Arrangement
    October 5 259
    November 10 734
    December 13 1,070
    TOTAL 70 4,622
    2012 January 5 301
    February 9 849
    March 3 110
    April 11 837
    May 16 1,286
    June 24 1,642
    July 31 1,756
    August 37 2,078
    September 31 2,062
    October 47 2,452
    November 44 2,663
    December 18 1,017
    TOTAL 276 17,053
    2013 January 11 541
    February 17 973
    March 35 2,320
    April 47 3,329
    May 47 3,252
    June 40 2,750
    July 48 4,230
    19 July 2013 Rudd announcement not to settle IMAs in Australia
    August 25 1,585
    September 15 829
    October 5 339
    November 5 208
    December 7 355
    19 Dec 2013 First Abbott turn-backs
    TOTAL 302 20,711
    2014 January 0 3
    February 0 1
    March 0 0
    April 0 0
    May 0 0
    June 0 0
    July 1 157
    August 0 0
    September 0 3
    October 0 0
    November 0 0
    December 0 4
    TOTAL 1 168

    The source of this data is the Senate Select Committee on the Recent Allegations relating to Conditions and Circumstances at the Regional Processing Centre in Nauru: Submission 31 from the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP). Crew are excluded. 

    Note that the table refers to the number of ‘Illegal’ Maritime Arrivals (IMAs). ‘Illegals’ is not a term that we think is appropriate, but the term is used in the material from DIBP.

    On 31 August 2011 the High Court found against the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship’s powers to transfer people to Malaysia under the Arrangement. In response, on 21 September 2011, the Gillard government introduced legislation – the Migration Amendment (Offshore Processing and Other Measures) Bill 2011 – which was designed to modify those parts of the Migration Act which caused the problem in the High Court. There was strong opposition to the Bill in the House of Representatives by the Coalition led by Tony Abbott and Scott Morrison who were bitterly critical of Malaysia. Bandt (Greens), Katter and Wilkie also opposed the Bill. Oakeshott said he would also oppose the Bill if there were not specific amendments. As the Bill was doomed, the government decided not to proceed with the legislation. (It was subsequently passed by the parliament in August 2012 after the Houston Report).

    There were some lags in the response of asylum seekers and people smugglers to gear up to the opportunities the Coalition and others had left open for them. The timing of boat arrivals were also affected by bad weather and heavy seas, typically in the period December-March.. Surges of people  of different ethnic background can also change the dynamics of people flow. But it is clear that after the legislation stalled, there was a substantial increase in boat arrivals, particularly from Sri Lanka and Iran. People smugglers saw the High Court decision and the failure of the Australian Parliament to amend the Migration Act as a clear signal that their business could proceed.

    From November 2011 monthly asylum seeker arrivals began to trend up again. In the month of May 2012 they reached 1286 and, allowing for seasonal variations, kept rising inexorably to a monthly peak of 4230 in July 2013.

    The Coalition had made clear its opposition in every possible way to the Malaysia Arrangement. That left the way open for a dramatic increase in boat arrivals.

    The Coalition under Tony Abbott was not interested in stopping the boats at that time. Its primary interest was to stop Labor stopping the boats – and they succeeded. Wikileaks revealed that a key Liberal Party strategist in 2009 told the US Embassy that ‘the more boats that come the better’.

    Political objectives drove Tony Abbott’s actions with little regard for the national interest and or the government’s attempts, in cooperation with Malaysia, to start building a regional cooperation framework to manage boat arrivals.

    There can be no doubt that the implementation of the Malaysia Arrangement, in the context of the numbers at the time, would have stopped the flow of maritime arrivals. It simply removed all incentive to make the last leg of the journey. It is unlikely that all of the 800 places would have been used. Coalition turn-backs have amounted to less than 700 people over a period of two years according to a recent announcement by the Minister Dutton.

    Tony Abbott must bear some responsibility for the more than 32,000 people who arrived irregularly by sea between September 2011 when he frustrated the Malaysia Arrangement and mid-2013 when harsher measures were reluctantly taken by the Labor government.

    As we mentioned above, we will also be updating an earlier blog that shows that Tony Abbott’s actions after the 2013 election were not the key to stopping the boats. The new Abbott Government dealt with the tail end of a dramatically reduced flow of people, but the real game changer was the announcement by Kevin Rudd on 19 July 2013 that any further boat arrivals would not be settled in Australia.

    The secrecy and drama surrounding a small number of boat turn-backs created the impression that they were the decisive factor, but, it’s time for a cooler assessment of the facts.

    John Menadue was Secretary Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 1980-83. Peter Hughes was a senior officer in the Department of Immigration and Citizenship for 30 years until he retired as Deputy Secretary in 2011.

     

  • What is the driving force behind Jihadist terrorism?

    In this article, (link below) Olivier Roy identifies the patterns of radicalism which have led to terrorism. He describes these patterns

    • Frustration and resentment against society seems to be the only psychological trait they share.
    • The majority of the radicals come from second generation Muslims born in Europe
    • Many have histories of petty delinquency and drug-dealing.
    • It is clearly a youth movement.
    • Very few of them have a history of militancy, either political or religious.
    • There is an unusually high proportion of converts.
    • The more recent pattern is the recruitment of young women to marry jihadists.
    • The main motivation of young men joining jihad seems to be the fascination for a narrative.
    • The revolt is expressed in religious terms.
    • Radicals have a loose or no connection with the Muslim communities in Europe.

    Olivier Roy suggests that the aim of policies should be to accentuate the estrangement of radicals from the Muslim population and to dry up the narrative of Islam as the religion of the oppressed.

    I first saw this article reproduced in ‘Inside Story’ on 18 December 2015.

    http://insidestory.org.au/what-is-the-driving-force-behind-jihadist-terrorism

  • ISIL is really a revolt by young Muslims against their parents’ generation.

    In Quartz on 7 December 2015, Australian journalist, Emma-Kate Symons, shines a particular light on young Muslim terrorists. She argues that ISIL is really a revolt by young Muslims against their parents’ generation. We have seen that many times on numerous issues – younger people who reject the values and materialism of earlier generations.

    See link to article below.

    http://qz.com/562128/isil-is-a-revolt-by-young-disaffected-muslims-against-their-parents-generation/

  • Magical thinking about ISIS.

    Adam Shatz is the contributing editor at the London Review of Books. He lives in New York. In this article he says

    ‘The attacks in Paris don’t reflect a clash of civilisations, but rather the fact that we really do live in a single, if unequal world, where the torments in one region inevitably spill over into another, where everything connects, somethings with lethal consequences.  … For all its medieval airs, the caliphate holds up a mirror to the world we have made, not only in Raqqa and Mosul, but in Paris, Moscow and Washington.’

    See link to article below.

    http://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n23/adam-shatz/magical-thinking-about-isis

  • Richard Woolcott. Australia’s role is in our region.

    There is no doubt that Malcolm Turnbull’s visit to Indonesia and his and Lucy’s contacts with President Jakowi and his wife have very substantially improved the situation between Indonesia and Australia that existed before Malcolm’s visit.

    The most recent and important meeting was between the Indonesian Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence with our Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence.  This meeting of the “two plus two”, as it is called and the press conference which followed underlined how the situation between Australia and Indonesia has changed and substantially improved.  This does not mean however that there are no on-going differences.  It was clear from the responses to the questions at the press conference that Indonesia, which is not a claimant state, is very careful not to adopt a negative attitude towards China’s activities in the South China Sea.  Both the Indonesian Foreign Minister and Defence Minister made it plain that all countries in the region shared an important interest in a stable peaceful approach to claims.

    Both the Indonesian Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs made it clear that they wanted Australia to maintain firmly the position that West Papua was a part of Indonesia.  The Australian Ministers in response to these comments indicated that Australia acknowledged West Papua as a part of Indonesia.  This does not entirely rule out Indonesian fears that we may over time change our position as we did in respect of East Timor.  But  East Timor had never been a part of the Dutch East Indies, as was the case with West Papua.

    My considered view is Australia needs to refocus on the important interests in our own Region – South East Asia, North Asia and the South West Pacific in what is now generally called the Asian Century.  Former Indonesian Ambassador to Australian Sabam Saigian and currently the Editor in Chief of the Jakarta Post wrote earlier this year the blunt commentary that “Australia is still stuck in the 20th Century mode.  It is a Monarchy with a Head of State in London and its security arrangements are largely Cold War relics…..Australia is out of sync with the emerging geo-political environment of Asia today”.

    I do consider we need to establish an updated and more balanced approach to the vital relationship between the United States and China.  There is a danger that adversarial attitudes towards China could become a self fulfilling prophecy.  The present debate on China mainly assumes that Australia has no choice but to support American primacy in Asia against the perceived rising Chinese hegemony, something which Xi Jinping has always denied.  Former Prime Ministers Hawke, Keating and the late Malcolm Fraser as well as most former Ambassadors to China and a number of academics can be expected to resist American” hegemony“ although they accept a cooperative and constructive United States role in Asia.  In my view Australia should not take sides on China Japan disputes or on rival territorial claims.  Our focus should be on unimpeded passage through international waters and trade routes.  Provocative actions by all claimants should be avoided.  Malcolm Turnbull was in his very recent visit to Japan cautious in this respect and very firm in opposing the resumption of whaling by Japan.

    Turning to the Middle East we should acknowledge that while there were reasons for joining the US led invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, fourteen years later with forty Australians killed, over five hundred billion dollars spent and more than thirteen thousand Afghan civilians killed on objectives once deemed to be indispensible such as national building and effective counter insurgency have been downgraded or abandoned because there are  no longer adequate resources, time or even a clear US will to achieve them.  Polls suggest that the US public  opposes US ground forces being involved in further conflicts in the Middle East.

    Australia needs a fundamental change in our national psyche focused more on Asia than on our well established links with the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand (the “anglosphere”), and Europe.    We need a much more sustained conversation with our neighboring countries in Asia and the South West Pacific.

    Essentially terrorism has to be dealt with in each country, although discussion on dealing with it internationally can be useful and there was evidence  of new discussions between the AFP and the Indonesian police ,, although the Indonesian Foreign Minister did say that Indonesia wanted to check some of the information which they had received from the AFP.

    In the long term no bi-lateral relationship will be more important to Australia than that of Indonesia.  The stability, unity and economic growth of a predominantly (81%) moderate Muslim nation of two hundred and fifty million people stretching across our north and trade routes a distance from Broome to Christchurch in New Zealand is vital to Australia.

    There is some discussion in New York at present about an Australian interest in the Secretary Generalship of the United Nations, at present held by Ban Ki-Moon.  This will come up in the middle of next year.  It would normally be for the Eastern European group to nominate a candidate but there is some doubt that they will be able to agree on a candidate.  Although he publicly says he is not a candidate, it is quite widely regarded that Kevin Rudd is interested in the position and is privately working on securing it.

    We are to some extent locked into participation in the Middle East through our cooperation with the present Iraq Government and our role in support of British air activity. The essential fact however is that Australia cannot influence the outcome of the kaleidoscope  of changing activities between extremist Shiites,  Sunnis and Kurds and a range of countries with different objectives including Saudi Arabia,  Iran, Russia, Syria, Turkey, Israel, China and the Yeman.  Because our role is symbolic in that it will not lead to a solution in the foreseeable future, it would be desirable for Australia to withdraw from the enormously complex situation in the Middle East and focus our attention on our region of the world when we can do so.

    Tony Abbott on a number of occasions said that the first duty of a PM was to increase the safety of the Australian people.In fact his approach has made the Australian people LESS safe.

  • Spencer Zifcak. Co-opting the Judiciary: Counter-Terrorism Laws at Work

    Regrettably, one matter that has drifted to the sidelines in Australian debates about the operation of counter-terrorism laws is that these laws consistently marginalise and undermine the role of the judiciary. Judicial power, and hence the rule of law, is being incrementally distorted and diminished.

    Counter-terrorism law continues to burst from the executive and the legislature.   Just a few months ago, three enormous tranches of such law swept through the parliament. These were the National Security Legislation (Amendment) Act protecting and preventing disclosure of information about special intelligence operations; the Foreign Fighters Act; and the metadata legislation.  (See my chapter on Counter-terrorism and human rights in this blog on 28/05/2015.)

    Now, only months later, three more counter-terrorism laws have passed or are imminent. These are a law to strip dual-nationals involved in terrorist activity of their citizenship; one to imprison people convicted of terrorist offences indefinitely; and another to extend the application of control orders to children as young as 14. In each of these instances, the proper exercise of judicial power is, to a greater or lesser extent, being compromised.

    Take first the citizenship-stripping law. What this does is remove Australian citizenship from any dual-national suspected of engagement with terrorism. Whether or not a suspected individual will have their citizenship revoked is made a matter for executive government. This is so, even though revocation is plainly punitive.

    Traditionally, a person suspected of engaging in criminal activity would be charged and tried. If found guilty, it would be for a court of law to determine an appropriate penalty. Under the rather remarkable new scheme created by the citizenship law, however, the judiciary is cast aside. Revocation is to occur automatically once it is determined that the prohibited behaviour has occurred.

    The scheme is remarkable because this legislation is silent upon the question of who is to decide that terrorist activity has occurred. In a previous draft, the Minister was given a role. But that would have breached the separation of powers by empowering a Minister rather than a judge to decide matters of fact and law and to impose a punishment.

    So, the automaticity mechanism was created instead. A person’s citizenship will be revoked automatically upon engaging in conduct defined with reference to enumerated terrorism offences in the Criminal Code.

    The legislation applies only to cases where the person concerned engages in the relevant conduct outside Australia or where the person has left Australia before (s)he has been tried for the offences alleged. The mechanism is not to be used against a person in Australia and, therefore, available for trial. This narrowing of the legislation’s scope is welcome.

    From thereon, however, the process is a mess. Revocation is said to occur instantly upon a determination that the terrorist activity has been engaged in. But there is no one identified to make that determination.

    Instead, it appears that the law will apply itself. This is a constitutional novelty. How it could work in practice is anyone’s guess. The High Court will have something to say about it.

    If a fair and considered decision is to be made as to whether a person has engaged in a prohibited activity and is to be punished for it, in our system of government that is a decision that should be in the sole province of the judiciary. It is not to be left to some uncertain, mysterious and secretive intra-governmental process.

    At the recent meeting of the Council of Australian Governments, the Prime Minister and the State Premiers agreed to introduce uniform State laws to provide for the indefinite detention of people convicted of terrorist activities. Indefinite detention may be authorised where it is determined that a relevant person is due for release after serving a term of imprisonment but remains a potential threat to national security.

    There is precedent for the establishment of a regime of indefinite detention. Several States have laws providing for the continuing detention of serious sexual offenders and others convicted of serious acts of violence. Somewhat surprisingly, the High Court has decided that such laws are constitutional.

    The problem with indefinite detention laws, however, is that they require State Supreme Courts to engage in deliberations that are not traditionally regarded as part of the proper exercise of judicial power. Judicial power is the power that courts have to decide upon controversies between contesting parties on the basis of pre-existing law. The existence of some pre-existing law as the basis upon which legal disputes are to be resolved is normally regarded as essential.

    In laws providing for indefinite detention, however, legal criteria for decision are absent. Instead, what the court is asked to do is make no more than an educated guess as to whether past criminal behavior is likely to be repeated at some time in the future. How is a rigorous judgment to be made that a person convicted of a single terrorist offence, say a decade ago, remains a threat to national security after the effluxion of that time?

    Psychiatric and psychological research has demonstrated consistently that predictions as to dangerousness are notoriously unreliable. And that is even where the people making those predictions are experts in the field. Judges are not.

    That is why Justice Michael Kirby dissented in the constitutional case. He said that courts should apply punishments only in relation to criminal acts committed in the past. Judges, he said, should not be co-opted into imposing penalties “for crimes that are feared, anticipated or predicated to occur in the future on evidence that is notoriously unreliable and otherwise would be inadmissible, and by people who do not have the gift of prophecy.”

    If prisoners have committed a crime while imprisoned, whether of incitement to violence, conspiracy, threat, intimidation, the infliction of actual physical harm or some other similar offence – charge and try them. If guilty, impose a new sentence.

    If not, they should be released upon the completion of their prescribed term of imprisonment, under surveillance and subject to notification requirements if necessary. And that way, the judiciary will not be required by law to perform functions that are alien to it.

    Finally, there are control orders for children. In Australia, control orders have been part of the counter-terrorism mosaic for several years. They have almost never been used. The former Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, Brett Walker SC, has cast doubt on their effectiveness. Britain recently dispensed with them.

    Control orders may be imposed upon a person where it is anticipated that the person affected may engage in terrorist activity. The controls imposed may include a prohibition on the use of electronic communications, a ban on meeting certain people or doing certain things, restrictions upon movement, and even house arrest.

    The problem here, again, is that the judicial procedures associated with the imposition of control orders are unusual and unfair. A court may issue a control order in a secret hearing and in the absence of the person subject to it. The person will know nothing about it until he or she is arrested and served with the order. Neither the subject of the order nor their legal representative is provided with a full brief of the evidence against them. Without access to the evidence, the prospects for a successful appeal are minuscule. The judge hears only one side.

    The application of such a draconian process and penalty to a 14 year old child is hardly to be contemplated. It may reasonably be anticipated that such a partial procedure is as likely to alienate and radicalise a young person as it is to rehabilitate them.

    Speaking of this expansion of the control order regime, the former Independent National Security Legislation Monitor said recently that ‘I have a well-known opposition to control orders as, I think, a distraction from what is the fundamental task of the criminal law of investigation, prosecution and, if there’s a conviction after trial, sentencing.”

    There is a better solution to the problems these new laws attempt to address. It can be summarized in three words: ‘charge or release’. We give investigation, prosecution, trial and conviction away at our peril.

    Spencer Zifcak is Allan Myers Professor of Law and Director of Research at the Academy of Law, Australian Catholic University.  He is immediate past president of Liberty Victoria.

     

     

     

  • To solve the Syrian Crisis, we need to overcome these three obstacles.

    In the Huffington Post on 9 December, Seyed Hossein Mousavian describes the three issues that need to be addressed in order to solve the Syrian crisis. For link to this article, see below.

    http://www.huffingtonpost.com/seyed-hossein-mousavian/syria-crisis-obstacles_b_8740514.html?ir=World?ncid=newsltushpmg00000003

  • Walter Hamilton. The Great Wall in the South China Sea

    As Australians enter the end-of-year ‘doze zone’ they would do well to take time to watch a report, available online, prepared by the BBC’s Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, which lifts the curtain on China’s bid to permanently militarise the South China Sea.

    Wingfield-Hayes and his crew defied threats from the Chinese Navy in order to video construction activity at several disputed coral reefs currently being turned into military airfields and bases through massive dredging and construction operations. The BBC report shows scores of ships moored around what previously were largely submerged atolls.

    This is the modern equivalent of the Great Wall of China going up before our eyes­­––except that it’s not easy to train our eyes, or our cameras, on specks of land in a distant sea. China is counting on that.

    The Spratly Islands are variously claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and, of course, China. Beijing is intent on resolving this long-running territorial dispute unilaterally, by chasing its rivals out of the area and using its engineering and military muscle to illegally transform several of the atolls into exclusion zones.

    Wingfield-Hayes states the case succinctly:

    China is bound by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which it has ratified. The law states that sub-sea structures, such as reefs, cannot be claimed as sovereign coastline, and that building artificial structures on top of them does not turn them into sovereign territory either.

    A country that owns a natural island can claim a 12-nautical-mile territorial limit around it, both on the sea and in the air. But artificial structures do not confer any such right. In other words, we would be able to fly our aircraft right up to China’s new islands without breaking any international laws, and China should not interfere with our flight.

    But interfere China did. As the BBC-chartered aircraft flew even within 20 nautical miles it was bombarded with radioed warnings: ‘Unidentified military aircraft [the aircraft was a single-engine Cessna, about as civilian as you can get] in west of Nanxun Reef, this is the Chinese Navy. You are threatening the security of our station! In order to prevent miscalculation leave this area immediately!’ Nanxun Reef, also known as the Gaven Reefs, naturally comprise 150 hectares of coral outcrops less than two metres above sea level at their highest point. Furious reclamation activity since last year has turned it into another fortress in the new Great Wall.

    The biggest construction project, however, is at Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys, which, according to reports, is being turned into an artificial island twice the size of the US military base of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. At Mischief Reef, just 140 nautical miles from the Philippines coast, a new runway is also under construction. The BBC cameras caught a view of ‘the lagoon teeming with ships large and small. On the new land, cement plants and the foundations of new buildings’.

    The United States and its allies do not recognize China’s bid to assert sovereign rights over virtually the entire South China Sea by means of this island-building exercise. The US military has undertaken well-publicised cruise and overflight operations to uphold ‘freedom of navigation’ principles. Australia, on the other hand, is attempting to steer a middle course––exercising the freedom, but on the quiet. The BBC chanced upon an RAAF aircraft traversing the area and sending out the following radio message:

    China Navy, China Navy, we are an Australian aircraft exercising international freedom of navigation rights in international airspace in accordance with the international civil aviation convention and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea––over.

    The BBC said the message was not acknowledged. But neither was any warning directed against this Australian military aircraft, as it had been against the BBC’s civilian plane even after it identified itself.

    The RAAF overflight, conducted several weeks ago, was not publicised at the time by the Defence Department in Canberra. Only after the BBC report disclosed the incident did the Chinese acknowledge it. Beijing’s position is that it ‘resolutely opposes any country using freedom of navigation and overflight as a pretext for harming China’s national interest’. For now, however, it doesn’t want to draw Australia into the squabble and thus is content to play along with the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ gambit being run out of Russell Hill.

    There is a big game being played out here from which Australia cannot hide. If our rights and interests are being impinged by China, as clearly they are under the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, we should not hesitate from forthrightly defending them. Instead, we invite a Chinese entity, the Landbridge Group, which has close links to the PLA and the Chinese Communist Party, to operate the strategically important port of Darwin, and quietly watch as the new Great Wall goes up across the South China Sea, the main pathway to Darwin.

    When Japan sent ships into the southern ocean to hunt for whales, Australia took it to the International Court of Justice to uphold its rights under the International Whaling Convention. It was a high profile, hard-fought case on a principle. China asks: Why should Australia involve itself in the South China Sea dispute when its ships and planes are still allowed to travel through unimpeded? Japan asks: Why should Australia object to another country catching an unthreatened species of animal that Australians don’t even eat? To both of them, the answer is the same: You signed up to be a good international citizen, behave like one.

    Walter Hamilton is a former ABC Tokyo correspondent.

     

     

     

  • The Refugees and the New War.

    In the New York Review of Books, Michael Ignatieff draws a link between failure of Western policy in the Middle East, it’s failure to counter ISIS and the resulting refugee flow into Europe. He says

    ‘ISIS wants to convince the world of the world’s indifference to the suffering of Muslims; so we should demonstrate the opposite. ISIS wants to drag Syria even further into the inferno. … The US needs to use its refugee policy to help stabilise its allies in the region. … If Europe and the US show them a way out, refugees won’t take their chances by paying smugglers using rubber dinghies.’

    John Menadue.

    Michael Ignatieff is Edward R Murrow Professor of Practice at Harvard Kennedy School. He was formerly Leader of the Liberal party of Canada.  See article link below.

     

    http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/12/17/refugees-and-new-war/

  • Gabrielle Appleby. What say do our elected representatives have in going to war?

    The authorisation of military force is one of the most serious and consequential powers that governments possess. This power should be exercised with appropriate caution and, where circumstances allow, considered deliberation. Governments should be publicly accountable for its exercise.

    Across the world, debates have emerged around the extent to which the legislative branch should be involved in – and even have the final say on – authorisation of military deployment. So what are the debates, and current practice in, three key Western nations grappling with the threat posed by Islamic State (IS) – the UK, the US and Australia?

    In these three countries, the legislature’s involvement in decisions to use force has little connection to explicit constitutional or statutory provisions. Rather, it is governed by practice and convention, and the ongoing political commitment to such practices by both the government and the legislature.

    The UK: convention requires parliamentary approval

    In the UK, the power to make war, deploy military force and declare peace forms part of the “prerogatives”. The government of the day can exercise these powers without any obligation to consult, or seek authorisation from, parliament.

    Like Australia, the UK operates under a parliamentary system. As such, the government’s exercise of its powers is always subject to scrutiny by the parliament through Prime Minister’s Questions (known as Question Time in Australia) and committee inquiries, or subject to override or control by legislation.

    The government’s exercise of its powers is also often constrained by constitutional “conventions” – established practices that have strong political and moral force, even though they may not be legally enforceable.

    In the last 15 years, a constitutional convention has developed that the government will consult the House of Commons and seek its approval before deploying military force. The practice was first invoked in 2003, when then-prime minister Tony Blair asked for parliamentary authorisation for Britain to enter the Iraq War.

    Parliamentary approval for use of force is not required by any constitutional or legislative provision in the UK. But, by 2011, the government acknowledged that – except in cases of emergency – convention required it to provide the House of Commons with an opportunity to debate and authorise military force.

    There have been some calls to pass this practice into law, or at least formalise it in a parliamentary resolution. But there has been little movement to clarify it, or protect its status in this way.

    Nonetheless, the force of this convention has proven remarkably strong. In August 2013, Prime Minister David Cameron accepted the outcome of the House of Commons vote against further use of military force in Syria. Last week, Cameron again felt obliged to seek approval to expand the British military’s role in Syria. The House of Commons passed the motion after ten hours of debate.

    The US: constitutional requirement is largely inconsequential

    Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution provides that:

    Congress shall have power to declare war.

    On its face, this provision places responsibility to initiate war in the legislature’s hands. However, since the second world war there have been no formal declarations of war. The constitutional requirement is now largely inconsequential.

    But, in 1973, following the unpopular involvement in Vietnam, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution. This requires – with some emergency exceptions – the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of committing American armed forces to hostilities, and congressional approval to continue that commitment beyond 60 days.

    Despite these provisions, as a matter of practice Congress has ineffectively constrained and scrutinised the president’s power to deploy the military. Bill Clinton committed forces to the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo without seeking congressional authorisation, beyond pointing to congressional authorisation of military funding for the campaign.

    Barack Obama committed American forces to Libya in 2011 without seeking congressional approval. The president claimed that the commitment fell short of hostilities that would engage the War Powers Resolution. Congress issued Obama with a rebuke for not complying with the resolution, but brought no further sanctions against him.

    Obama’s deployment of forces in Iraq and Syria against IS reveals that the responsibility for the failure to obtain congressional approval may at least partly lie with Congress itself. That is, while presidents might be inclined not to seek authorisation, Congress has also been inclined not to insist upon it.

    Obama’s initial decision to deploy forces to Iraq and Syria in September 2014 purportedlyrelied on previous congressional authorisations to use force following the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. But by February 2015, Obama attempted to obtain new congressional authorisation. Congress, unable to agree on whether to expand or constrict the campaign, has yet to consider it.

    Australia: calls for reform grow louder

    The Australian Constitution makes no mention of the government’s power to declare war and deploy military forces overseas. Rather, this forms part of the executive powers contained in Section 61 of the Constitution. Their extent and restrictions are considered to mirror the UK government’s foreign affairs prerogatives.

    In direct contrast to the US Constitution, there is no requirement in the Australian Constitution for parliamentary authorisation – or even a requirement to consult parliament – before these powers are exercised.

    Historically, however, there was a practice that following the declaration of war or the deployment of forces, the government would inform parliament and a debate would occur. It did not amount to authorisation. But this practice was consistent with fundamental tenets of Australia’s parliamentary system, where the government’s actions should be reported to and scrutinised by parliament.

    Since the commitment of Australian forces to Afghanistan in 2001, this practice has fallen away. In contrast to the increased parliamentary involvement in the UK since 2001, in Australia there has been a general resistance across both major parties to greater parliamentary involvement by allowing more substantial debate, let alone authorisation.

    The Greens and independent MPs (and before them, the Australian Democrats) have consistently called for the deployment of military force to be preconditioned on parliamentary debate and authorisation. But government decisions to deploy the military generally receive strong bipartisan support.

    Thus, neither the government of the day nor the parliament has sought or insisted upon greater transparency or parliamentary scrutiny.

    However, there are some signs this might be changing. In October, Deputy Opposition Leader Tanya Plibersek moved a motion that parliament be given an opportunity to debate the government’s strategy in Iraq and Syria.

    Since taking office, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has made repeated promises to increase the level and openness of public debate over government policy. This is yet to materialise with respect to use of military force. But these statements provide promising signs for reconsideration of Australia’s current practice.

    Gabrielle Appleby is Associate professor, UNSW Law School. This article was first published in The Conversation on 10 December 2015P

  • Allan Patience. Fighting Holy Wars in the Middle East

    How do we deal with Daesh? The Islamic State (ISIS) has proven to be a brutally formidable force in Syria and Iraq. As we saw recently in Paris, it has spread its vicious tentacles into Europe. It is highly probable that we’ll see it erupt in North America and very possibly again here in Australia, quite soon. It is clear that for all the blood and treasure invested in the conflicts in Iraq and Syria – heavy bombing raids, military advisors/trainers on the ground, intelligence gathering on an apocalyptic scale, all to the tune of billions of dollars – little has been won and much has been lost. Death rates and injuries (especially among civilians) are mounting every day and the refugee crisis is now counted in the millions. What is to be done?

    Tony Abbott spent much of his onerous prime ministership weighing into the conceptually confused, strategically clouded, and ultimately futile military debacle in the Middle East. Most of his interventions were designed to invoke fear and loathing, especially of Islam. In his latest (post-prime ministerial) intervention he called on Islam to reform itself. He also proposed a hierarchical theory of cultures – certain cultures, he suggests, are superior to others and Islamic cultures are apparently inferior to Western cultures. The implication is that the most advanced cultures are to be found within his beloved “Anglosphere” which includes America, Britain, and the former white settler British colonies of Canada, New Zealand and Australia.

    Daesh claims to be fighting a series of holy wars. In the process its counterfeit imams are grotesquely distorting an absolutely central component of the historical human experience – viz., that humankind possesses a deeply ingrained religious instinct that the full barrage of modernity’s scientism, rationalism and secularism has failed to obliterate. In fact modernity has a worrying record of misunderstanding and distorting the deeply experienced human drive for searching for transcendental meaning in the face of a cruel and unjust world. Modern critics of religion conventionally view that drive as irrational. Moreover, its myriad distortions (whether self-made or externally inflicted) make it particularly vulnerable to attack. Yet for all its being ridiculed down the years, it has been remarkably resilient despite all of modernity’s secular (and mostly reductive) accounts of what it means to be human.

    What do we make of Abbott’s demand that Islam reform itself? First, it shows how ignorant he is about Islam. He clearly does not understand that it is one of the most sophisticated versions of the monotheism to come out of the historical Middle East. Its sister religions are Judaism and Christianity with which it shares many theological insights, ethical principles, prophetic traditions, and historical experiences. And all three of them draw heavily from Hinduism, the central wellspring of advanced religious thought.

    Nor does Abbott show any understanding of the historical causes of the contemporary crisis in the Middle East. At the forefront of those causes are the egregious colonial adventures of Britain (the centre of his Anglosphere). The role of the British in dominating Egypt for their own purposes and disregarding Palestinian resistance to the creation of Israel, and their imperial arrogance in other zones in the region, constitute one of the most ignominious eras in all of colonial history. The world is now reaping in the Middle East what the British sowed in centuries past.

    Misunderstandings abound among Islam’s critics and enemies, especially those – like Abbott – who want us to believe that it is the fons et origo of Islamist terrorism in contemporary global politics. But this ignores (probably for ulterior purposes) the fact that central to those conflicts are the brutal machinations of tribal warlords, crime bosses, crazed firebrands, mercenaries, naïve fools, angry young men, and insurgents in the contemporary Islamic world. While imposing an Islamist gloss on what in truth are fights about who wields power, occupies territory, monopolizes resources and controls states, the combatants in these conflicts are appropriating a religious identity to which they have no legitimate theological claim. They slander Islam into the bargain. This is by no means the first time a religious tradition has been maligned by being associated with malevolent political causes. Christianity’s record in this is also appalling.

    The Koranic tradition teaches that Jihad is an intensely personal struggle with one’s conscience. It entails submitting one’s self-hood to Allah through the teachings of the Prophet. It is fundamentally about being a good human being, compassionate, tolerant and peace loving. As with the Bible, its underlying message requires a deep understanding of its central hermeneutic. And precisely like the Bible, the Koran contains some horrific passages that can be simplistically lifted out of context by malevolent commentators and used as a blanket condemnation of the entire religion. This is evidence of bad faith and appallingly third-rate scholarship. Just as we should expect people like Tony Abbott to respect Christianity’s central message of loving unconditionally – despite the Spanish Inquisition, for example, or those in the Catholic hierarchy today who would cover up for pedophile priests – so we should expect them to recognize the profound dignity of Islam, despite the evil fanaticism of fundamentalist Islamism today.

    Abbott’s assertion that some cultures are superior to others is an echo from a dead imperialist past. It belongs to the discredited “class of civilizations” thesis once spruiked by the late Samuel Huntington. Edward Said reminds us that all cultures are intertwined. They all influence and transform each other all the time. All cultures are hybrid. Islam played a major – indeed vital – historical role in curating and contributing to classical Greek philosophy and scientific theorising, ensuring that this knowledge was available to the West at the beginning of the Renaissance. There would have been no Renaissance without it. In short, historical Islam has played a major civilizing role in the evolution of the West. Abbott seems ignorant of this history. His clumsy foray into cultural studies would be risible were it not so crude.

    Dealing with Daesh means we have to sort out the religious wheat from the political chaff. It will also require a general acknowledgement that the religious instinct is an unchangeable aspect of the human condition that urgently needs far greater understanding than modernity has so far been able to offer. And it will require an educated awareness that Islam is being dangerously slandered by commentators like Tony Abbott whose own religious backyard is a foul’s own nest if ever there were one.

     

    Allan Patience is a Principal Fellow in the Asia Institute, University of Melbourne.

     

  • Jon Stanford. Defence procurement and the new submarine

    When people remember Gough Whitlam, few would identify him as an economic rationalist. Economics was not his primary interest and, partly because of the perceived urgency of implementing “the programme” after 23 years in opposition, partly because of the incompetence of some of his Ministers, the budget blew out excessively on his watch. Yet in terms of microeconomic reform his record was, in many ways, better than that of previous and subsequent Coalition governments. Even including all the reforms by the Hawke/Keating governments in the 1980s and 1990s, Whitlam’s 25 per cent tariff cut in 1973 remains the single greatest stand alone initiative to open the Australian economy to international competition.

    A lesson from the past

    Whitlam’s economically rational approach also spilled over into defence procurement. This is an area, as experience demonstrates, that provides spectacular opportunities for squandering public money, not least in the naval shipbuilding industry.

    By the early 1970s, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) needed to replace some obsolescent warships of British origin, many of which had been built at high cost and over excessive lengths of time in Australia’s government-owned shipyards. Defence’s preference was to design and build locally an Australian light destroyer, the DDL project. When the Whitlam government came to power, design work on the DDL had been going on for some years under the Coalition and the Navy was an enthusiastic supporter of the project.

    While there would have been significant political benefits in endorsing the project, clearly the risks of a local design and build would have been high. The complexities of integrating a new platform with overseas sensors and weapons, even the less complex systems available in the 1970s, would have led to substantial risks. Building ships locally to an original design would have inevitably resulted in higher unit costs, even in an efficient shipyard, than purchasing a ship from a longer production line overseas. On the basis of the local shipyards’ demonstrated past performance, bringing the project in on time and on budget was highly unlikely.

    In 1973, soon after coming to office, the Whitlam government considered the proposed DDL project. While recognising the need for a new acquisition, it also considered that there was no unique mission for a surface warship in the RAN that would justify the costs and risks of designing and building a new Australian platform. The government therefore rejected the DDL and told Defence to go away and look at overseas platforms. Grumpily, Defence came up with two options. The Navy liked the handsome British Type 42 destroyer platform but not its sensors and weapons systems. It approved of the US Oliver Hazard Perry class (FFG) systems and missiles but not the platform, which had a single propeller shaft and resembled a container ship. Typically, Defence sought to mix and match. It wanted the British platform with the US missiles and radars and an American 5-inch gun.

    The Whitlam government faced Defence down again. It rejected the mix and match option as being excessively risky and an Australian build as not cost-effective. In 1974 it ordered the FFG ships with all their systems, to be built in the United States with no significant modifications. The Navy was not happy. The Perry design had been described huffily by Defence project staff as “a second rate escort that falls short of the DDL requirements on virtually every respect”.[1] But the government understood that the frigate would provide technological superiority in our region at low cost, with the Australian ships coming off a production run of over 50 vessels. The RAN did not require the world’s best frigate; it was unlikely to be confronting the Northern Red Banner Fleet in the Barents Sea.

    In service, the FFGs have been successful. They were minimalist platforms that did the job, to the extent that subsequent governments decided to build two more ships locally (a decision that initially seemed disastrous until Transfield acquired the Williamstown shipyard from government and delivered them on time and on budget). They were also tough and durable. The Perry class USS Stark survived two hits from Exocet missiles, while the Type 42 HMS Sheffield, with significant aluminium in its platform, was destroyed by one. Critically, because they were not unique ships for which the RAN had parent navy responsibilities, through life support and maintenance, undertaken in Australia to US schedules, was cost effective.

    More recent history

    To clarify, through life support for the FFGs was cost-effective during their planned economic lives, but then Defence delayed the procurement process for their replacement, namely the air warfare destroyers (AWDs). Seriously bad decisions then raised their ugly head.

    First, at a time when the US was retiring their Perry class FFGs, Australia decided on a unique major upgrade for its six ships, including improved sensors, modern systems, better anti-submarine weapons and vertically launched anti-air and anti-ship missiles. Awkwardly for those who believe we need to build ships locally in order to modify them, ADI (later Thales) in Sydney won this contract in competition with the Transfield shipyard in Williamstown that had very recently built the last two FFGs. The cost and timeline for the upgrade blew out substantially, with the modifications then being limited to four of the six ships. The other two FFGs were scrapped much earlier than intended. The cost ended up being $1.6 billion for four ships as against a budget of $1.266 billion for six, a blowout per ship of 90 per cent. Two ships short, they were also delivered two years late. In addition, there have been suggestions that the additional weight exceeds the ships’ design parameters, potentially creating stability problems.[2]

    Secondly, following the successful local construction of the Anzac class frigates, the Howard government decided to procure the AWDs locally. Compared to the Anzac acquisition, the decision was a bad one for a number of reasons. First, there was no fixed price contract for the successful tenderer or any notion of specifying a similar cost to acquiring the ships offshore. Secondly and quite extraordinarily, while the Williamstown yard with its experienced workforce on the Anzac ships still in place was a tenderer, the contract was awarded to ASC in Adelaide that had never built a surface ship. The shipyard was dedicated to submarine maintenance and had no shipbuilding workforce. Thirdly, building three ships locally (as against ten Anzacs) was never going to be economic because of limited opportunities to exploit scale economies and learning curve benefits. Overall, if we had bought three larger and more capable Arleigh Burke ships off a 100 plus production run in the US, the RAN would already be deploying them and, rather than waiting for three smaller ships to be delivered three years late, the government would have banked significant budget savings.[3]

    Lessons learnt

    There are multiple lessons to be learned from these and other recent acquisition experiences. In particular:

    1. Acquiring a unique platform, as Australia did with the Collins class submarines, brings with it substantial risks and almost certainly excessive costs compared to an off the shelf acquisition. Some of these costs are reflected in the parent navy responsibilities for a unique class, which lead to higher through life support costs – currently running at nearly $1 billion annually for Collins. Implication: if Australia does not have a unique defence mission, then we should not acquire a unique platform.
    2. Mixing platforms from one country with systems from another involves very high risks, and frequently gives rise to unforeseen costs and delays that exceed substantially any perceived military benefits. Implication: only mix and match systems and platforms as a last resort and only if the risks are understood and accounted for in the budget and timeline.
    3. Developments in technology mean that obsolescent platforms do not necessarily need to be replaced by similar assets. For example, some of the roles of a submarine could be taken over by aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles or the Australian Signals Directorate. Implication: focus on the defence requirement, not the particular platform, and assess how it might be best achieved at lowest cost and acceptable risk.
    4. Building major defence assets locally often involves very substantial risks, higher costs and contingent liabilities that are almost impossible to justify. For example, we would not contemplate designing and building in Australia a major aircraft like the F-35 joint strike fighter or a main battle tank for the Army. There are no significant defence benefits in building platforms locally and the level of protection to naval shipbuilding is higher than for the car industry. Implication: only build major platforms locally under a fixed price contract and where the cost is comparable with that of offshore acquisition – it’s time to end the age of entitlement for the naval shipbuilding industry.
    5. The main role of defence industry should be through life support – as Australia’s record with RAAF assets show, we don’t need to build platforms locally in order to sustain them at the highest level. Implication: try to shift the political debate away from building defence assets, which leads us into sub-optimal acquisitions, to focussing on the benefits of maintaining Australia’s assets in top condition for the benefit of ADF personnel.

    Implications for the new submarine

    On the basis of the above analysis, we need to consider the implications for Australia’s new submarine’s acquisition process. Currently, three broad proposals have recently been lodged by shipbuilders in France, Germany and Japan. These proposals are for a large conventional platform, unique to Australia, with a combat system and weapons systems sourced from the United States. The government intends to select one of these proposals in the near future to be taken forward in a detailed design.

    In terms of the first implication above, the fundamental question is whether Australia needs to acquire a unique submarine platform to meet its requirement and discharge its mission. The only fairly detailed definition of the new submarine’s mission was contained in the 2009 Defence White Paper:

    The Future Submarine will be capable of a range of tasks such as anti-ship and anti-submarine warfare; strategic strike; mine detection and mine-laying operations; intelligence collection; supporting special forces (including infiltration and exfiltration missions); and gathering battle space data in support of operations. [4](Page 70.)

    Subsequently, the then Chief of Navy suggested that the main task of the new submarine was “sinking hostile ships and submarines” with “the South China Sea as the area of most interest”.[5] Overall, it seemed clear that one important role for the new submarine was power projection in waters far from home.

    While this is an ambitious mission, particular for a middle power, it is by no means unique. All five of the permanent members of the UN Security Council would have a similar role for their submarines. Among western platforms, the power projection role in the South China Sea, although challenging, could be best discharged either by a Virginia class submarine from the US, an Astute from the UK or a Suffren boat from France. These are all nuclear submarines. While Australia would face some challenges in acquiring nuclear submarines, these are not insuperable. A nuclear submarine off these existing production lines may well be no more expensive than the unique conventional submarines under consideration and we would need fewer of them.

    On the other hand, attempting to undertake this mission in a conventional submarine would be less effective and more dangerous. The submarine’s slow underwater speed and significant indiscretion rate would increase the risk of detection and destruction. The recent acquisition of nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) by China and India in our region suggest that any conventional boat operated by Australia would not enjoy technological superiority in the South China Sea. By the time the new Australian submarines are commissioned in ten or fifteen years time, both countries are likely to possess a fleet of SSNs, the more modern ones of which will be quieter and more efficient than the prototypes. This raises the awkward question of whether an Australian government would be willing to send young Australians into harm’s way in very expensive but technologically inadequate kit.

    If the answer to this is “No” but the government remains unwilling to acquire nuclear submarines, then logic suggests that the mission needs to change. Specifically, the government could discard the power projection role and leave that task to a better-equipped ally. Forget discharging cruise missiles at a “major adversary” and scratch the idea of sinking ships in the South China Sea. This then leads to a sea denial role in the context of the defence of Australia, with additional intelligence gathering responsibilities. Would this require a unique platform? Again the answer is “No”. These tasks could be undertaken by existing conventional submarines available off the shelf from a number of shipbuilders, including all three of those in the design competition for Australia’s new submarine. One obvious candidate would be the existing Soryu class, which is larger than other available designs and, in its latest guise, takes advantage of advanced Japanese Lithium-ion technology.

    If the government were to change the mission to sea denial and intelligence gathering, however, then it should first look at whether a submarine provides the most cost-effective means of fulfilling this role (see the third implication above). The capability of conventional submarines in the sea denial role is compromised by their slow speed, while to send a submarine to snoop off a neighbour’s shore is not necessarily the most cost-effective way of recording wireless transmissions overseas. By contrast, some of the RAAF’s fleet of modern aircraft, including the E-7A Wedgetail airborne early warning and control platform and, in the future, the P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, have a potent capability in both sea denial and intelligence gathering.

     

    Conclusions

    In short, this analysis suggests three alternative ways forward for the new submarine:

    • Maintain the current mission and seek to acquire perhaps six nuclear attack submarines (at most) from the US, the UK or France.
    • Reduce the scope of the submarine’s role to sea denial and intelligence gathering and acquire, say, between four and six conventional boats off existing production lines overseas (possibly from Japan).
    • Examine whether the sea denial and intelligence missions can be delivered more cost-effectively by platforms other than submarines, such as aircraft already in service or currently being acquired.

    None of these options requires a unique platform or merits an Australian build. Importantly, all three options offer significant savings compared to the current approach. Even if the SSN option were to be pursued (it would require difficult negotiations with the United States and assistance in maintaining the reactors), the overall cost would be significantly lower than buying 12 unique platforms with a mixture of systems, particularly if they were built in Australia.

    All three options, however, would mean abandoning the current acquisition process. It is not too late to do that, but government would need to enter into an intensive process with some urgency to analyse the options in more detail. While strategic and technical military analysis is clearly required, it is of critical importance that these technical data should then be fed into an evaluation of risks, costs and potential pay-off for each option. It is not clear that such an approach, which would combine rigorous cost-benefit analysis with the investment appraisal disciplines of financial economics, is generally employed when Defence is assessing costly new acquisitions. Because Defence still has a single line budget appropriation (why?), its internal processes are often impenetrable to the keepers of the keys in Finance and Treasury.

    Why I began this article by reference to Gough Whitlam and the proposed DDL acquisition was to suggest, in agreement with Laura Tingle, that the government has lost its corporate memory and its ability to learn lessons from previous approaches.[6] It seems remarkable, for example, that our defence acquisitions keep repeating the mistakes of the past, from mixing and matching systems inappropriately and accepting excessive risks, to allowing political judgements to override efficiency considerations and the proper regard for the public purse. In the new submarine acquisition, we seem even to have learned nothing from the Collins class procurement. In both cases the French, surely laughing up their elegant sleeves, have offered us a dumbed down version of an existing nuclear submarine, with the reactor replaced by an updated version of the same diesel-electric technology that powered Australia’s first submarine, AE1, on its epic voyage from the UK in 1913.

    “We learn from history that we do not learn from history,” was Hegel’s gloomy prognosis. I prefer Santayana’s view, quoted by Laura Tingle, because it seems to offer a shred of hope: “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it”.

     

    Jon Stanford is a Director of Insight Economics. He had a significant career as an economist in the Australian Public Service, ultimately in the department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. He has worked extensively on economic and policy issues around defence procurement and naval shipbuilding. 

    [1] Jones, Peter (2001). “1972–1983: Towards Self-Reliance”, in Stevens, David. The Royal Australian Navy. The Australian Centenary History of Defence (vol III). South Melbourne, VIC: Oxford University Press, page 220.

    [2] Defense Industry Daily (2014), http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/australias-hazardous-frigate-upgrade-04586/

    [3] In the early 2000s, the US offered to sell three second-hand Arleigh Burkes to Australia for a good price so as to avoid the risky upgrade to the FFGs. The RAN rejected this, just as previously it had, with more justification, rejected the offer of the four very large destroyers of the Kidd class.

    [4] Australian Government (2009), Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, Defence White Paper, Canberra, page 70.

    [5] Peter Layton (2015), “Australia’s next submarine – will it be the Soryu”, Defence Today, Vol 11, No 4, page 8.

    [6] Laura Tingle (2015), “Political Amnesia: How we forgot how to govern”, Quarterly Essay No. 60, Schwartz Media, Melbourne.

  • Turkey and Daesh

    In this blog on 6 December 2015 ‘Turkey’s new neighbour – Daesh (Islamic State)‘  John Tulloh referred to an article by David Graeber in The Guardian on how Turkey is obstructing Kurdish forces that are the most effective opponents of Daesh.

    In that article, David Graeber asserts that ‘Western leaders could destroy Islamic State by calling on [President] Erdogan to end his attacks on Kurdish forces in Syria and Turkey and allow them to fight ISIS on the ground‘.

    David Graeber is an American anthropologist, political activist and author. He is currently a Professor at the London School of Economics and was formerly an Associate Professor of Anthropology at Yale University.

    John Menadue

    David Graeber’s  article ‘Turkey could cut off Islamic State’s supply lines. So why doesn’t it?’ is linked below. This article first appeared in The Guardian on 19 November 2015.

    http://gu.com/p/4ebvc/sbl

  • John Tulloh. Turkey’s new neighbour – DAESH (Islamic State)

    President Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey must feel like a chess grand master playing several games simultaneously. He has far more neighbours and different cultures to contend with than most leaders: eight in all. They are a mixed bag across more than 2600 kms of borders – Iran, Iraq, Syria, Armenia, an Azerbaijan enclave, Georgia, Bulgaria and Greece. And across the Black Sea he has Russia. Now he has an unofficial neighbour: Daesh, also known as Islamic State. It has been active along Turkey’s frontier inside Syria and regards territory it has seized as part of its self-styled caliphate.

    It poses a dilemma for President Erdogan. He has 1.5 million refugees on his hands, mainly from Syria as a result of barbaric actions by Daesh. The EU has offered him what some see as a generous bribe to deter the refugees from heading west to Europe. He has joined the U.S.-led coalition fighting the Daesh, but is his heart really in it even though he has blamed it for killing 100 people at a peace rally in Turkey in October? His air force by all accounts prefers to attack Kurdish targets. His critics say he tolerates Daesh as being good for business and helping deal with what he sees as his real enemy, the Kurds. But for the U.S.-led coalition fighting Daesh, it is the Kurds who have done more than any other force on the ground in repelling its advances.

    David Graeber, a professor at the London School of Economics, thinks he has the answer to eliminate Daesh. Writing in the Guardian, he says:

    ‘All it would really take would be to unleash the largely Kurdish forces of the YPG (Democratic Union party) in Syria and PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) guerrillas in Iraq and Turkey. But instead the YPG-controlled territory in Syria finds itself placed under a total embargo by Turkey and the PKK forces are under continual bombardment by the Turkish air force. Not only has Erdogan done almost everything he can to cripple the forces actually fighting (Daesh); there is considerable evidence that his government has been at least tacitly aiding (Daesh) itself’. 

         That aid concerns oil which Daesh has looted from Syria and Iraq and sells on the black market. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin said it enters Turkey on ‘an industrial scale’. Russia a few days ago released satellite images they claim show columns of tanker trucks loading with oil at an installation controlled by Daesh in Syria, before crossing the border into Turkey.

    Last year, a member of the Turkish parliamentary opposition, Ali Edibogluan, claimed Daesh had smuggled $800 million worth of oil into Turkey from Syria and Iraq. Now a former Iraqi MP, Mowaffak al-Rubaie, has backed up that claim, saying ‘Money and dollars generated by selling Iraqi and Syrian oil on the Turkish black market is like the oxygen supply to (Daesh) and its operation’.

    But President Erdogan was indignant about such claims as well as a Russian one that he and his family were profiting from it. He said that, if there were proof Turkey was cooperating with Daesh, he would resign.

    He presides over a powerful country which possibly has the most strategic location of any nation in the world with its Eurasia presence. His ruling party now has a parliamentary majority which may give him the temptation to broaden his own powers. Since 2011, he has encouraged the Islamisation of Turkey which for nearly a century prided itself on its secular outlook. But he knows he cannot push his luck too far when EU membership remains a goal.

    It is a conundrum when Daesh is, according to Time, ‘a fibroid of territory enmeshed in a cat’s cradle of ethnic, tribal, religious and geopolitical strands so densely tangled as to defy solution’.

    Just as Turkey has a foot in both Europe and Asia, President Erdogan will need all his political wiles to maintain a balance between being seen to be supporting the action against Daesh while stopping its influence spilling over into Turkey and yet maintaining business as usual.

    Whatever happens, you can be certain that the restless Kurds, who make up 20% of Turkey’s population, will remain President Erdogan’s biggest concern, especially the PKK with its territorial ambitions.

    John Tulloh had a 40-year career in foreign news.

  • Richard Butler. Bombing Syria: Where’s our Debate?

    On December 2nd, the UK House of Commons debated for 10 hours, a motion moved by the Government, that it should authorise bombing of DAESH targets in Syria by UK airforces. (Prime Minister Cameron announced early in his statement that, henceforth, ISIL should be referred to as DAESH: the acronym of its name in Arabic).

    Some 150 members of the House took part in the debate. The motion was approved by a vote of 397 for, 223 against. Leader of the Opposition, Jeremy Corbyn had approved a “free vote” for members of his party. 66 Labour members exercised that right and voted with the Government.

    The debate saw repeated interventions on points of order and points of detail from both sides. More significantly, it was somewhat overshadowed by repeated opposition demands that the Prime Minister withdraw and apologize for remarks he was heard to have made, the previous day, that those who would vote against his motion would do so because they were “terrorist sympathizers”. He refused to do this.

    The debate was certainly lively, if not always edifying. It served to justify the notion of a house of elected representatives of the people as the key place in which matters of undoubted public importance and policy should be aired.

    That airing included the reliance, by both sides, on their gut political credo, rather than on hard evidence for any particular point of view. Prime Minister Cameron, was particularly light on evidence for his views.

    On the Conservative side, the main elements of that credo, were the beliefs in: the efficacy of military action in bringing about political outcomes; fighting the enemy abroad would keep the homeland safe; and, the notion that Britain had an indispensable role in maintaining a civilized world. This last idea seems not dissimilar from the US’ notion that it is the “exceptional country”, or indeed former Prime Minister Abbott’s now revealed notion that the current crises in the Arab and Russian worlds meant that history had, once again, handed to the “Anglosphere” the unique duty to put things to rights

    On the Labour side, the fundamental concerns expressed were: that military action was not the solution to the problem of DAESH; what was needed was concerted political/diplomatic action to bring about an end to the Syrian war, and extreme doubt that expanded military action would be effective in both curtailing DAESH or preventing further terrorist acts outside the Middle East, indeed, it might fuel them.

    The undoubtedly remarkable feature of the debate was that it took place. It was never going to fully satisfy the evident need for an improved public and revealed official understanding of the dreadful complexity of the situation in the region extending from Turkey in the North West to Yemen and the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, in the South East. The same would appear to be true of the extent to which the turmoil in that region is authoring a post-Cold War competition, by proxy, between the US and Russia.

    But, the debate will surely prove to be an important marker in the passage towards resolution of the challenges now posed by the disorder in the post colonial Arab world, the need for what could be termed a post Cold War settlement, and the challenges posed to international law and order posed by non-State actors such as DAESH.

    Where is the debate in the Australian Parliament? The Abbott government committed Australian military assets to action in both Iraq and Syria without any such debate. Labor acquiesced, for reasons unstated.

    Infamously, Prime Minister Howard committed Australia to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, ignoring massive public demonstrations against it and without Parliamentary debate. That invasion is now widely regarded as having stimulated the formation of DAESH.

    We now learn from Peter Hartcher’s series, “Shirtfronted” (SMH), that the basis of Abbott’s decisions on these matters was gut instinct.

    We have not yet heard from Prime Minister Turnbull on how he might arrive at decisions on matters which might involve Australian forces, although we also learn from Hartcher that Abbott exclude him from membership of the National Security Committee of Cabinet because he knew Turnbull would not support his gut instincts.

    In the new circumstances of a growing international coalition against DAESH and the UN Security Council resolution following the Paris attacks, authorizing states to “take all necessary measures”, the Australian people have a right to know what it is the Government proposes to do, why, and what it hopes to achieve. A debate in Parliament would serve that purpose.

     

     

    Richard Butler AC, is former Ambassador to the United Nations and Head of the UN Special Commission to disarm Iraq

  • Travers McLeod. Relaxing airstrike rules is a recipe for disaster.

    Tony Abbott has argued Australia and her allies should relax targeting rules for airstrikes to destroy the Islamic State.

    At best, he is ignorant of the lessons of the military campaigns waged in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001. At worst, he is willing to repeat mistakes to differentiate himself on national security and open a pathway to take his job back.

    Let’s assume, for the sake of argument, that Abbott isn’t as narcissistic as the latter reading suggests. Let’s assume he was insufficiently briefed on recent military campaigns or has forgotten the lessons of our longest wars.

    The battle of ideas, not body counts, will determine this war. Disproportionate use of force will only inflame and grow the Daesh insurgency. There is no military solution to destroy IS.

    “A military force, culturally programmed to respond conventionally (and predictably) to insurgent attacks,”wrote General Stanley McChrystal in November 2009, “is akin to the bull that repeatedly charges a matador’s cape – only to tire and eventually be defeated by a much weaker opponent.”

    McChrystal should know. He was commander of the United States-led coalition of forces in Afghanistan from 2009-2010 and headed up US Special Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan from September 2003 until February 2006.

    When McChrystal took over as commander he told his troops to “get rid of the conventional mindset”.

    We know the prequel. In 2005 the US was accused of being a “lawless hegemon”, one that avoided the laws of war or sought to exploit gaps within it. Commanders misunderstood the battlespace in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their “enemy-centric” mindset harmed civilians and alienated the people. David Kilcullen described US forces as “chasing their tails”.

    From late 2006 military doctrine, strategy, tactics and rules of engagement began to shift decisively. Australian military advisers and judge advocates were pivotal in this change of mindset.

    Phillip Bobbitt put the new position best in 2010: “The war aim in a war against terror is not territory, or access to resources, or conversion to our way of political life,” Bobbitt wrote. “It is protection of civilians within the rule of law.”

    McChrystal’s tactical directive to troops in July 2009 made this explicit. “We must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories – but suffering strategic defeats – by causing civilian casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the people.”

    Losing popular support would “translate into more insurgent recruits, more IEDs, and a prolonged conflict with an uncertain outcome.”

    McChrystal prohibited the use of air-to-ground or indirect fire against residential compounds with three tightly-specified exceptions, installed new battle damage assessment requirements, denied capacity for unilateral missions without regional command approval, raised the approval level for night raids, tightened escalation of force procedures and mandated civilian casualty investigations and reporting up the chain of command within 24 hours from any given incident.

    McChrystal was clear: “Our success depends on our ability to escalate force proportionally, in a manner that the average Afghan civilian can understand, and respects the fact that this is their country.”

    Successive studies of countering insurgencies reveal that if one loses legitimacy they lose the war. This means one cannot separate the conduct of operations from the broader, contested narrative of a war.

    Securing the population and killing the enemy is a necessary condition to countering Daesh. But the chief lesson of the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns is that the legality of the conduct of those operations is central to their legitimacy.

    This is why proportionality has become a watchword for countering insurgencies successfully. It requires a delicate but appropriate balance to be struck between military necessity and collateral damage, in an age when allegations of disproportionality can be uploaded to YouTube and viewed across the world in seconds.

    US military doctrine now asserts that “all interactions between security forces and the population directly impact legitimacy”. Complying with the law of war helps to gain local trust – violations “have a direct and significant negative impact on the ability to conduct successful counterinsurgency operations”.

    Abbott now advocates “less restrictive targeting rules for airstrikes”. His position may be more nuanced. He may dispute current distinctions between civilians and combatants, including what it means for civilians to participate directly in hostilities. As stated, his position is pregnant with ambiguity.

    Such hawkish ambiguity is exactly what Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull ruled out last Tuesday in his National Security Statement to Parliament. Turnbull called for “calm, clinical, professional, effective” conduct to defeat IS, not “gestures or machismo”. He said “the strongest weapons we bring to this battle are ourselves, our values, our way of life”.

    In war the most significant distinction is between civilians and combatants. The latter are lawful targets who can be killed. We water down the distinction at our peril. This is but one way in which our military forces live our (and their) values.

    Countering insurgencies, former US Central Command head General James Mattis once said, is only new if “we don’t read our own history”.

    Given our focus these past weeks on France, it’s worth recalling that the best-known military theorist and practitioner of counterinsurgency was French. Lieutenant Colonel David Galula’s formula was simple: win the support of the people. “Antagonising the population will not help,” he wrote in 1964, “rash actions on the part of the forces should be kept to a minimum.”

    An ad-hoc legal approach to fighting terrorism would return us to the fog of law within the fog of war. It is a recipe ripe for disaster.

    Travers McLeod is chief executive of the Centre for Policy Development and the author of “Rule of Law in War: International Law and United States Counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan” (Oxford University Press, 2015).

  • Michael Kelly SJ. Treating Islam’s clerics like their Christian equivalents will save lives

    There is an unexpected upside to the mayhem and carnage across the world, visited on the unsuspecting innocents of countries where Muslims are not a majority of the population – Europe and beyond. It’s something the Catholic Church has had to learn, too.

    And that is the simple fact that that misbehavior among religious adherents towards members of the faith community as well as those outside it – requires external intervention to be rectified and hopefully crushed.

    This can be done by subjecting the verification and authorization of religious officials and organizations to the same stringent tests that have either long been applied – or should have been applied to those of the Catholic and other mainstream Christian Churches.

    The worldwide crisis of clerical sexual abuse in the Catholic Church is nothing of the sort. That tragedy was and is a crisis of episcopal mismanagement. In country after country, bishops have demonstrated their incapacity to handle the scale of clerical sex abuse and the necessary measures required to address it.

    In other words the Catholic Church, in too many places, and until very recently with the implicit authorization of the Vatican, has demonstrated its inability to manage its own affairs. And in country after country, state and their police and judicial processes have had to intervene to protect the vulnerable, doing for the Church what it should have done on instinct and in line with its own moral teaching.

    But this intervention by the State and the Courts is only the latest instance of the Church and its personnel being made accountable, Internally and externally, Church institutions and their managers and operatives are held accountable in manifold ways.

    Across the world, in authoritarian polities such as China or Vietnam and democracies alike the institutions, personnel and operations of the Church are accountable to State authorities on behalf of the wider community.

    Individual Church workers – clerics and lay people – are, in some places registered for payment by the State, in most places for taxation under various forms and are subject to determinations by civil authorities if they wish to alter buildings. In many parts of the world, clerics have to undergo training and receive accreditation before they can work with or near children.

    As well, church workers are appointed to positions in church institutions provided they have qualified with degrees and periods of probation in educational settings that frequently are subject to State scrutiny and accreditation.

    Church buildings are registered in various ways. Places of worship come under specific zoning regulations and are subject to various types of taxation. Charities, schools and hospitals are similarly scrutinized for their meeting performance criteria set by the State, which in turn issues permits to operate.

    Much of the agitation coming from the Islamic community is either stirred up or rationalized by Muslim clerics. Islamic communities will have their own standards and criteria for selecting and appointing Imams. But how does the wider community in countries where Muslims are a minority effectively minimize fears for the safety of their communities ?

    The recruitment locations for the suicide bombers and murderers terrorizing Western cities, as shown in Paris, London, Madrid and Brussels in recent times are in fact in mosques in European and other capitals. And recruits in their hundreds, perhaps thousands are coming to Daesh, or the self-styled Islamic State from across the world – Europe, North Africa, Asia, Australia.

    Ordinarily, immigrants to any country go through a process of assessment before a visa is granted to the migrant by the country of welcome. Frequently, there are processes in place to see that new arrivals are inducted in the values of their new home, that institutions and processes are explained and sometimes that the new arrival has the opportunity to join an existing community already inserted into the social fabric of the host nation.

    In the case of skilled or professional migrants, assessments of the international standing of the migrants’ qualifications are made. It happens with academics, doctors, engineers and accountants. It happens with Catholic clerics too. In an age where clerical numbers are not equal to the requirements of Catholic communities in Europe, the US and Australia, imported clerics have to establish their professional bona fides.

    One way of ensuring that clerics recruited from Muslim majority countries to serve Islamic communities in countries where Islam is a minority faith, is to insist on processes of acculturation and tertiary qualifications that are recognized in the country where the cleric arrives to work.

    The first step is to insist that Muslim clerics get a full cultural and intellectual acculturation to the country they land in to serve the Muslim community there. What is its cultural mix? What is the history of the ethnic and religious make up of the country? What are the academic courses inducting the Muslim cleric into the context where he is to serve? What are the standards the host country insists on for a cleric to be accredited?

    Then there are the internal processes within Islam for the accreditation of the cleric serving in the host country. The insistence on training and formation standards within Islam works well when the Muslim denominations have a structure to fall back on, where the formation of the clergy and laity, their expressions of faith and theology are shaped by a structure that follows a pattern and some guidelines applicable to all within those communities.

    The Islamic world has many such groups that follow a systematic framework of formation. For example, a Bohra Muslim in Asia will have the same training and background if he wants to be a cleric as in the United States or anywhere because he comes under the same scrutiny and sanctions everywhere to be able to do what he is ordained to do.

    This cannot be said for the whole Muslim world where very often local people in local communities are answerable to no one but themselves and very often follow an interpretation of doctrine that has no direct connection with the rest of those professing the same faith.

    This is where the challenge to integrate and regulate what are essentially maverick Islamic communities in the West must to be addressed.

    The groups that are hierarchical and structured within the Shia and Sunni communities tend to have more cohesion and follow checks and balances that make their clerics accountable.

    Otherwise, patterns akin to some of the practices in Pentecostal and Protestant sects, for instance – where pastors may proclaim themselves pastors and create their own congregations – develop that have nothing much in common with the common expression of faith with others, except following the same scriptural source. Indeed, this has led to problems of sometimes violent Christian fundamentalism, especially in the United States as witness by increasing frequent and often deadly frequent attacks on pro-abortion staff and proponents.

    Making Islamic communities accountable in societies where they are not majorities is not difficult and there is an existing model to follow. Pluralistic societies throughout the West have the means to do it via long tested rule of law regimes and tested regulation. Those means need to be urgently extended and adapted to Islam forthwith.

     

     

     

  • Cavan Hogue. Turkey shoots down Russian aircraft.

    Russia supports the (Shia) Assad regime backed by Iran and others while Turkey supports the Sunni backed bySaudi Arabia, the USA and others. The Turks claim the Shia are terrorists while Russia supports them as allies of the Shia, (i.e. Assad) who support Russian strategic interests.. This is an oversimplified picture but it is relevant to the shooting down of a Russian fighter. The Turks claims it was in Turkish airspace which the Russians deny. Turkey probably overreacted but it is perfectly possible that Russians were attacking anti-Assad forces within Turkey or strayed over the border in pursuit of such forces. Either way the Russians are going to deny that they were to blame and the Turks are going to say it was all Russia’s fault.

    If left to themselves, Russia and Turkey will almost certainly sort it out with much rhetoric and ittle action but the danger is that NATO will get into the act either by itself or at the urging of Turkey. This would not be a good idea. All this does, however, highlight a basic problem in the whole situation. It is not just the bad guys, ISIS, versus the good guys, everyone else. It is a host of conflicting factions and interests which overlap and vary like the bits of a kaleidascope. The more the parties involved insist on a goodies and baddies analysis the less likely it is that a solution will be found.

    Everyone has an interest in opposing ISIS but how do you do this? As has been wisely said, ISIS is not an army or a state but an Ideal. Western countries find it hard to accept that local people see the West as the baddies although a brief foray into history might show them why.

    This situation is unlikely to lead to wider conflict.  US increased training of Ukrainians to “combat Russian aggression” is a greater threat. The behaviour of both Russia and the US takes us back to the Cold War but more accurately should be seen as a contest for influence between two great powers. It has nothing to do with morals or political systems. The common fight against ISIS in particular and terrorism in general creates a bond which puts pressure on all parties to work together at least against ISIS. The question is, what happens next? The Coaition of the Willing opened Pandora’s box. Who will put the lid back on it?

    Cavan Hogue is former Australian Ambassador to USSR and Russia.

  • John Menadue. Minimising IS will take a while.

    We have had a lot of apocalyptic talk about IS – we are at war, it is a death cult, it threatens civilisation. Unfortunately these exaggerations don’t help a measured and holistic response. These exaggerations play into the hands of terrorists who hope for our over-reaction and the promotion of fear.

    We know from experience that terrorism ebbs and flows over the years in intensity. We must be ready for the long haul.

    There is no doubt that IS is a threat but we need to consider carefully some important facts and to put the matter in perspective.

    One important fact is that climate change is really an existential threat and vastly more serious than the terrorist threat.

    Many politicians seize opportunities to exploit fear. It is noteworthy that those who decry government spending in so many areas are the first to propose substantial increases in spending for intelligence and police agencies. Terrorism is good politics for conservative politicians although Malcolm Turnbull seems more sensible than most.

    The Paris attack was one of many. A larger number of people were killed in the IS bombing of a Russian aircraft over Sinai. Only a few days before the Paris attacks, there were large numbers killed in Lebanon. The most violent of all is probably Boko Haram which has conducted mass abductions and killed over 17,000 people since 2009 in Africa. Columnist David Brooks, reports in the New York Times that since 1984 an estimated 1.5 million Christians have been killed by Islamic terrorists in Sudan. There is also not much doubt that in the birthplace of Christianity, the future of Christian communities is extremely bleak.

    As an important news hub, Paris attracts a great deal of media attention, but the atrocities have been much worse elsewhere. We do have a ‘white man’s media’ in Australia. Just recall the almost never-ending coverage of the bombings of the Boston marathon.

    It is also no consolation to remind ourselves that the threat of terrorism in Australia is small compared with the other threats we face in daily life.

    The IS threat has grown out of centuries of Western involvement and humiliation of the people of the Middle East. That involvement was accelerated by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after WWI. From that time on Western countries have occupied, plundered and exploited the resources and the people of the Middle East. The most recent calamity was the invasion of Iraq by the US, the UK and ourselves. That invasion has cost trillions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives. Our intervention, which our media choses to forget, sowed the seeds of the bitter harvest that we are now reaping.

    With a history of ethnic, sectarian and political conflict, our participation in the invasion of Iraq triggered so much of the catastrophe we face today.

    And we are so unfamiliar with the determination of IS fighters. They see themselves as martyrs and the more they sacrifice and die, the more they feel justified and rewarded. Dying is seen as desirable.

    There must be a political settlement and hopefully the US and Russia can support a transitional government that will reflect the interests of all the people in the region and most importantly of all, reconcile Shia and Sunni antagonists. The Iraq war effectively disenfranchised tens of millions of Sunnis in the region. We may be called to support a peace-keeping operation. We should be willing to do that in the right circumstances.

    The powers of the regional patrons, Saudi Arabia and Iran, must be encouraged to find an accommodation and a cease-fire.

    It is also unlikely that there can be peace in the Middle East without a settlement between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

    On the domestic front, we need more proactive domestic programs to focus young Muslims away from terrorist possibilities. Muslim leaders and elders are essential in this process. They have not done well.

    Clearly, our intelligence and police agencies are keys in helping to keep us safe. They have received large increases in funding. Their powers have been increased. But what we saw in the Lindt Café siege points to the need for much improved performance and supervision.

    We will have to learn to live with terrorism for a while. Picking soft targets is in the view of terrorists a legitimate and necessary response to overwhelming military power. Too often IS and other terrorists succeed in provoking an over-reaction which helps the terrorist cause. The French reaction to the attacks by dramatically increasing bombing in Syria is likely to be counter-productive. In frustration the French took the IS bait.

    Our response needs to be holistic and the most important response must be political, backed possibly by some UN military intervention, improved performance by our intelligence agencies and police, and active participation by the elders and leaders in our Muslim community.

     

  • Richard Butler. After Paris

     

    The attacks in Paris were textbook in terms of the philosophy of terrorism: hit publicly, indiscriminately, affecting as large a group of innocent people as possible, attract maximum publicity, generate widespread fear. They also represented a continuation of terrorist actions within metropolitan Europe: Madrid 2004, 191 dead; London 2005, 56 dead; Paris January 2015, 17 dead; and now November 2015 128 dead and still counting. Naturally, statements characterizing this latest outrage have been flowing. It has been described as “France’s September 11”, and according to President Hollande, as constituting a declaration of war on France. IS has claimed responsibility for the attacks and it seems there is now independent evidence that it directed them.

    Clearly military action against IS will be increased. Indeed, French bombing of IS headquarters in Raqaa, Syria, were significantly increased, beginning 2 days after the attacks.

    King Abdullah of Jordan has described the actions of IS as constituting the conduct of “ a global war, a third world war, by other means”. Pope Francis has agreed, describing the existence of a “piecemeal” third world war.

    It is beyond any doubt that the idea that citizens going about their ordinary, even banal business; attending a concert, a football match, eating in a cafe should be arbitrarily blown away is monstrous.

    Equally, it is certain that citizens expect that arrangements in their community, policing etc., will deter or prevent such action. Politicians know this and routinely pledge it, but it is now clear in so many countries, that this promise can’t, reliably, be kept.

    It must also be accepted that the continuing series of atrocities being committed across the middle east by a variety of parties far exceeds what has happened in metropolitan Europe, and holds the prospect of further massive destruction, beyond what has already occurred, particularly in Syria.

    Thus, there is no alternative but to dig deeper into where this has come from and on that basis craft both an effective defense and a more elemental, hopefully enduring, solution.

    There are a number of identifiable sources of the present situation, stretching back to the settlement at the end of the First World War and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. But, the continuous threads are western intervention, which has never been benign, and ethno-confessional disputes, mainly between Sunni and Shia, which the west routinely ignored, misunderstood, or sought to exploit.

    Today, that disgraceful history is now assaulting the west. The invasion of Iraq, by the US, UK, and Australia in 2003 was: contrary to international law, mounted on the basis of fabricated intelligence, and in Australia’s case without parliamentary or constitutionally sound authorization. The number of dead it yielded, on all sides, the massive cost, were dwarfed only by the completeness of its failure as a concept ( to bring democracy to the middle east) and its fuelling of the enduring internal political and confessional conflicts within the region.

    It’s major achievement was that it brought IS into existence, and if King Abdullah is right, a developing third world war. He sees IS as representing “a global franchise”, incorporating branches around the world responsive to directives from headquarters but more than prepared to do their own thing in situ, ranging from recruitment to training to executing attacks. George W Bush, Tony Blair, and John Howard, have so far avoided serious public recognition of their responsibility, although Blair might face a problem when the Chillcott report is issued.

    What has been said above with respect to Iraq and Syria, is also similarly true of Libya.

    Clearly, we will now face an indefinite period of yet further surveillance and security checks in a wider number of aspects of our domestic lives. We must insist that they be effective without vitiating the elemental constructs of our rule of law and human rights based society. Were the latter not to be the case then, ironically, the enemy would have won. Also, with respect to the latter, Australia needs a Charter of Human Rights

    On the external sources, the roots of the problem, there are two key areas which now must be addressed in an entirely more committed way: the civil war in Syria; the situation in Palestine.

    On Syria, the permanent members of the UN Security Council, in particular the US and Russia, must craft a joint policy and set of actions to bring about and end to the fighting, and a political settlement in Syria. It seems that this was in fact set in motion, last week, in Vienna.

    The success of this seems to be the last hope for Syria and, if it moves ahead, should then enable other permanent members, particularly, France and Britain, to join with Russia and the US in mounting a serious effort to remove IS from Syria and Iraq.

    Given the terms of the UN Charter, this is precisely the sort of action for which permanent membership of the Council was established and has been so shockingly neglected in the period since the end of the Cold War.

    Russia’s recent unilateral entry into the fighting in Syria, for which it seems to have paid the price of one of its civilian aircraft being bombed out of the sky, seems to have opened up some willingness on its part to act in concert with the US.

    On the problem of Palestine, there must be an end to both: US and Israeli insistence that the Palestine question has nothing to do with support for IS and other anti western political attitudes and actions; and, the continuing failure of the US to deploy all of its self-evident ability to insist to Israel on the conclusion of a two State solution.

    Australia has a role to play in the international consideration of and development of actions to strengthen overall security, as well as its own. Our governments have tended to see this largely in terms of supporting the Americans, and participating in military actions, largely determined by the US. In what he has said, so far, Prime Minister Turnbull has shown a more sophisticated awareness, than his predecessor, of what is at issue in our foreign relations and the challenges revealed by the Paris events, including in Australia domestically.

    Australia can contribute usefully in intelligence sharing, and should make diplomatic action the central contribution it can make as a new international response to IS, is developed. Its current military contribution to the coalition should not be renewed, or perhaps as Canada is doing, be withdrawn. It achieves very little, not because it is incapable, but because of the flawed nature of the US operation. (1). It does serve to expose us to an increased possibility of terrorist action within Australia. We could legitimately consider a military contribution, when an international plan of action, authorized by the Security Council is adopted.

    (1) See, Patrick Coburn: “Too weak, Too strong”. London Review of Books. 5 November 2015

    Richard Butler AC, is former Ambassador to the United Nations and Head of the United Nation Special Commission to disarm Iraq (UNSCOM).