Category: Politics

  • John Dwyer. Politics trumps health policy yet again.

    Current Affairs.  Health.

    A new medical school in Perth will create more problems than it will solve.

     As must also be true for many colleagues who have been focussed on evidence based solutions to the serious shortage of Australian trained doctors working in rural communities, I am frustrated and annoyed by the Prime Minister’s capricious decision to fund a new medical school in Perth. In an attempt to solve the maldistribution of Australian trained doctors that has resulted in almost 50% of the General Practitioners available to people in rural and remote communities having been trained overseas, governments have applied a “market place” philosophy to the problem. This logic suggested that if we doubled the number of Australian trained doctors there would inevitably be competition for rural careers, as metropolitan opportunities would all be taken! In 2016 our intake of Australian students into medical schools will peak and many readers will know that (a) we are already having difficulty in finding quality clinical placements to maintain educational standards and (b) the flood of new graduates has done nothing to ease the shortage of Australian doctors working in “the bush”. This continuing problem is responsible for much unacceptable inequity with health outcomes in all categories being less satisfactory for rural Australians. Were rural patients able to access medical services as readily as their city cousins it would increase Medicare payments by two billion dollars a year!

    Here is the irony. To solve this problem we do need new medical schools but not schools situated in metropolitan areas providing a standard metropolitan centric curriculum. Here is the major cause of frustration. At least three thorough enquiries seeking evidence-based strategies to address the above inequity have been conducted in the last four years and all have agreed on the major initiatives required. These have been presented to government and as far as I know only one of the suggestions has been accepted (but not implemented).

    There is abundant national and international experience that tells us that medical students who will actually want and pursue a rural career are students who are emotionally, intellectually and even financially wedded to a preference for rural life and hence a rural career. The closest we have come to applying this knowledge involves all medical school having a quota for 25% of their students to be “rural”. The definition of what constitutes “rural” is ridiculous. You are so designated if you have spent five years of your life in a rural postcode. You could have been born in Broken Hill, moved to Melbourne when you were five and not laid eyes on a cow since then but still qualify as “rural” student. The accepted suggestion referred to above would see medical schools fined if they did not achieve their 25% quota.

    At least five universities have been lobbying government for funds for rural based medical school.  In general these would involve expansion of excellent existing rural clinical schools into rural medical schools. I have been heavily involved in developing an evidence-based initiative proposed by a Charles Sturt/ Latrobe partnership for the Murray Darling basin. As had been true for other universities both the Gillard and Abbott governments have said they were attracted to the models but there was no money available. In the background many existing medical schools, concerned that such developments might require them to reduce the number of students they admit, have argued against the establishment of rural schools. Now to have the Abbott government, without consultation with key players, announce a Perth based medical school is nothing short of disgraceful; a “keep WA happy” imperative trumps any need to improve the health of rural Australians.

    What are the key recommendations that we must continue to pursue despite the damaging political intransigence so far on display? Space will only permit a summary.

    Create opportunities for whole of medical education requirements to be fulfilled in the country, too many medical graduates dependent on city placements for vocational training will not return to a rural community. For this reason rural medical schools should be based on undergraduate programs. Admission to a rural based medical school will involve “affirmative action” philosophies to provide for example, the flexibility to overcome rural high school educational disadvantage and an interview to assess genuine “rurality”. Students will enjoy a rural specific curriculum with an emphasis on early development of procedural skills and a focus on indigenous health issues. The medical course will have strong inter-professional learning modules that will involve shared learning with other health related students. Team learning to prepare for team medicine is an imperative for the best use of a scare workforce in the country. Graduates will be guaranteed an internship in a rural based hospital. It is worth debating the merits of redistribution of existing medical school placements rather than increasing further the number of enrolled students.

    A lot of work by dedicated knowledgeable professionals from a number of universities, rural community advocates, the now defunct Health Workforce Australia and numerous rural health organisations has generated the above suggestions and all would have expected that a rural based medical school with the above features would be the “next cab of the rank”.  ‘How naïve’ says Mr. Abbott.

    John Dwyer is Emeritus Professor of Medicine at UNSW. 

  • Michael Keating. Fixing the Budget – Part 1

    Fairness, Opportunity and Security.
    Policy series edited by Michael Keating and John Menadue.

    According to the Treasurer, Joe Hockey, the ‘timetable back to a budget surplus is unchanged from last year’. Furthermore, the Government is asking us to believe that unlike the savage and unfair spending cuts in last year’s budget, now it can all be done with no pain. Indeed restraint has been thrown away, and in pursuit of popularity the Government’s policy decisions since the previous 2014-15 budget have actually added as much as $13.4 billion to the cash deficits for the four years 2014-15 to 2017-18[1].

    But if it was all so easy to restore fiscal sustainability surely the public is entitled to ask why did the Government break so many promises and insist that the unfair cuts in last year’s budget were absolutely necessary and any opposition was irresponsible. Or alternatively is the Government’s new narrative that this latest Budget will get us back to a surplus in 2020 not really credible.

    In this article I will first discuss why a return to a balanced budget or even a modest surplus is desirable, although the rate of progress towards that target should make some allowance for the present soft economy operating at less than full capacity. Second, I will then explore the reasons why the claimed fiscal surplus in 2020 might be doubted, and the unfortunate implications of achieving a surplus in the way the Government plans and which they are not really transparent about. In two subsequent articles I will address an alternative approach to restore fiscal balance on a more sustained basis, and which I will argue would also be more cost effective and acceptable.

    Overall fiscal strategy

    While much, even most, of the Government’s previous rhetoric was over-blown, there are good reasons for getting the Budget back into surplus over the next few years. The policy debate has never been about this objective but about the means chosen in the last 2014-15 Budget, which were demonstrably unfair.

    Nevertheless, despite our strong starting point with relatively low public debt, continually adding to it, fair weather or foul, over the years ahead really is not, or should not be an option.

    Australia is a large commodity trading nation, heavily dependent on foreign capital inflows, and is exceptionally exposed to external shocks which must be expected in the years ahead. Prudent economic management therefore demands that Australia make steady progress within a reasonable time frame to restoring the fiscal position to a modest surplus. That would ensure adequate scope for future counter-cyclical policy, and mean less reliance on foreign capital inflows which can be uncertain in difficult times.

    Furthermore a credible strategy for getting the Budget back into balance, and a modest surplus in the good years would have a significant impact on confidence, sufficient to lower the risk premium on long-term interest rates, perhaps by around 1 per cent. The alternative of continuing fiscal deficits would risk less confidence and less capacity to deal with shocks. While the increased reliance on foreign capital would on average result in higher interest rates and a higher real exchange rate over the long term, leading to some structural adjustment, and disadvantaging that part of the economy exposed to international competition.

    So given the agreement with the Government’s intent to restore the budget balance over the next few years, I now want to consider their latest approach to this task and whether it really represents a credible strategy. 

    Revenue projections

    In the forthcoming financial year 2015-16, total Australian government revenue is forecast to be equivalent to 24.0 per cent of GDP, compared to 22.8 per cent in 2013-14 when this government first took office. And by 2018-19 government revenue will amount to as much as 25.2 per cent of GDP. In effect the Government is projecting that revenue will rise by 2.4 percentage points relative to GDP in five years, while the fiscal deficit is projected to fall by 2.7 percentage points relative to GDP over the same five year period. Clearly these figures show that revenues are doing almost all the work to reduce the budget deficit, with government payments falling relative to GDP by only 0.2 percentage points over these five years.

    Now perhaps this reliance on increasing revenues would be the best available option if it represented a considered choice and was achieved through tax reforms to improve the effectiveness and equity of the tax system. But that is not the case. Instead the bulk of the increasing reliance on revenue to restore the budget reflects the impact of bracket creep as people move into higher tax brackets as their incomes increase over time.

    Thus personal income tax receipts are projected to increase from 10.4 per cent of GDP in 2013-14 to 12.1 per cent in 2018-19, and this increase of 1.7 percentage points is a good measure of the impact of bracket creep on the budget bottom line. So according to this measure bracket creep on its own will account for 63 per cent of the projected improvement in the Budget deficit over the five years to 2018-19.

    But is this projection really sustainable or will tax changes have to be made which will negate it? Already this projection implies that someone on average weekly earnings can expect to move into the second highest tax bracket in 2015-16. More generally average tax rates will move up, especially for those moving into another tax bracket, with someone on average weekly earnings moving from an average tax rate of 21.7 per cent to 27.4 per cent over the next decade. Realistically it is only reasonable to assume that the pressures for tax relief will lead to tax reductions for many people if not all, and thus negate the basis of the government’s projected return to surplus.

    Indeed the Government itself seems to acknowledge that something will have to be done to offset the impact of bracket creep on average tax rates. However, according to the Government this is a problem to be addressed after its projected return to Budget surplus in 2019-20. But can the Government afford to wait until then and even worse what if as is likely the return to surplus is even further delayed?

    In effect if the Government wants to rely on tax increases to achieve a return to an enduring budget surplus then it will need to persuade people of the need to deliberately change the tax scales. It is not, however, realistic to assume that average taxes can continue to increase by stealth as it were. Instead people will need to agree that this deliberate increase in taxation is part of the best package for achieving fiscal sustainability in the long run. At present the Abbott Government is a long way from achieving that outcome.

    Expenditure projections

    As numerous commentators have picked up, the projected return to a Budget surplus assumes that the savings measures in the previous Budget which are still being opposed will in fact be implemented. Some of these in fact require legislation and in the case of the reduction in payments to the States for hospitals and schools, the Prime Minister has agreed to talk to the States, presumably about what might be done to ameliorate the impact of the cuts. So again whether all these savings will in fact be realised is questionable.

    An indication of the magnitude of these questionable reductions projected in government payments can be obtained from the recent Intergenerational Report (IGR). In that report the scenario described as the ‘currently legislated’ scenario uses all the savings measures that had actually passed the Parliament by last March, and while it projects that the budget will almost return to surplus in 2020, it projects that after that the budget balance will deteriorate continuously until it amounts to as much as 6 per cent of GDP by 2055. As the IGR made clear at the time continuing budget deficits of that magnitude are not considered to represent a sustainable fiscal outcome.

    But since the publication of the IGR there have not been any new savings measures legislated. Indeed the Government has now given up on some of those measures which were then in contention, and not all of these abandoned measures have been offset with new savings.

    So unless the Government can get agreement to the remaining disputed measures in the previous budget plus some more, the only reasonable assumption is that this 2015-16 Budget will at best lead to something close to budget balance in 2020, but after that the Budget will slip back into deficit. And the best indication of the size of that deficit is something approaching the 6 per cent of GDP projected in the most relevant scenario in the IGR only two months ago.

    In short this Budget does not represent a credible plan to restore the long run sustainability of the Budget, as shown by the Government’s own documents.

    Conclusion

    Last week’s Budget fails in its main economic purpose to repair the Budget. It may succeed in achieving its political purpose in restoring support for the Government – time alone will tell. But to ensure long-run fiscal sustainability we need to develop an alternative strategy. That will be the topic of the next two postings, tomorrow and the next day.

    Dr Michael Keating AC was formerly Secretary of the Department of Finance, and Secretary of the Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet.

     

    [1] The media have widely reported the Government’s contention that since the Mid-Year Financial and Economic Outlook (MYEFO) published last December the net impact of the Government’s policy decisions has resulted in total net savings of $1.6 billion over the five years ending 2018-19. This statement is, however, misleading as it doesn’t allow for the net addition to the deficit of $4.1 billion after the 2014-15 Budget and before the MYEFO. In addition, the Government’s figure of $1.6 billion incorporates alleged savings accumulating to $10.4 billion as a result of the decision to abandon the previously promised Paid Parental Leave Scheme, the Levy and the Company Tax Cut. But as the Budget documentation shows, no provision for these policies was ever made in the Government’s forward budgeting, so they cannot legitimately be counted as savings now.

  • Parliament of Australia. Russia in the Region.

     Current Affairs.  

    Beyond the attention assigned to the arrival of Russian naval vesselsin the Coral Sea coincident with the G20 meeting in Brisbane in November last year, there has been little public scrutiny of Russia’s recent activities in the Asia-Pacific, and particularly in Southeast Asia.

    Russian engagement with Southeast Asia is certainly not a new phenomenon, with Presidents Putin and Medvedev clearly pursuing Asia-oriented foreign policies since the late 1990s. Recent efforts to expand relations with China have been teamed with attempts to expand links with Southeast Asia and promote investment in Russia’s Far East and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Over the last year or so Russian engagement with Southeast Asia has picked up markedly—in terms of overall economic cooperation, but notably in terms of strategic arrangements, nuclear energy discussions, and weapons sales.

    Strategic Arrangements

    Russian Prime Minister Medvedev visited both Vietnam and Thailand over 6-8 April. Vietnam is key to Russian strategies in Southeast Asia. Now involved in a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’, the two countries are economically tied across diverse fields including energy, finance and trade. The Vietnamese have recently agreed on an FTA with the EEU while, during his visit to Thailand, Medvedev also urged an FTA between Thailand and the EEU.

    The importance of Cam Ranh Bay for Russian aspirations in the region needs no explication. To apparent US chagrin, Russia is now being allowed to operate tankers from the airbase there to refuel Russian bombers operating in the West Pacific. Last year, Russia and Vietnam also signed an agreement to simplify procedures for visits by Russian ships to Cam Ranh for servicing, repairs and crew rest. Cam Ranh Bay is now the base for three submarines (being equipped with cruise missiles) bought by Vietnam from Russia, with two more expected by early in 2016.

    Thailand is a new agenda for the Russians and this nascent attention is a response to the advent of the new military administration of General Prayut Chan-ocha and Thailand’s movement away from traditional allies. Increased defence cooperation has been proposed, and a Russian battle groupvisited the Thai naval base at Sattahip in March this year. During the Medvedev visit, discussions centred on trade growth, defence cooperation and weapon sales, while several deals in areas including investment, energy and tourism were signed.

    Russian ships also visited Myanmar in 2013, while a Myanmar military delegation travelled to Russia. The range of Russian visits in 2013 and 2014 highlights the various areas of cooperation. A jointRussia-Myanmar Military Technical Cooperation Joint Commission has been created, and some 150 Myanmar students and officers are currently studying at Russian military schools.

    Nuclear energy

    After a visit to Myanmar in March 2015, Nikolay Spassky, the deputy director of the Russian atomic energy agency Rosatom, claimed that Myanmar had agreed to cooperate with Russia in nuclear matters. The Myanmar Minister for Information U Ye Htut confirmed only that Myanmar was seeking to ‘use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes’.  Russia and Thailand also signed an MOU on the peaceful use of nuclear energy in September 2014.

    Late 2014 saw the Indonesian National Nuclear Energy Agency advising that it was working with Rosatom in order to develop a nuclear power plant in the country.  It was announced in April 2015 that a Russian-Indonesian consortium had won a tender to design a multi-functional research reactor in Indonesia.

    Golubev Aleksey Viktorovich, chairman of Rosatom, visited Vietnam (Ho Chih Minh City and Khanh Hoa) in October 2014, promoting Russia’s capacity to assist with nuclear energy production. Vietnam has had plans—now somewhat delayed—to establish two Russian reactors totalling 2000 MWe at Phuoc Dinh in southern Ninh Thuan province by 2020. To service these facilities, several hundred Vietnamese students have been trained or are now studying nuclear energy subjects in Rosatom’sclosed cities.

    Weapons sales

    Russia is promoting its military products across Southeast Asia and has been doing so for some time. Powerful efforts are now being put into selling Sukhoi Su-35 jet fighters to Indonesia to modernise its air force, with Russia promising to include technology transfers in the deal. Other weapon sales being discussed include electric submarines, amphibious armoured vehicles and helicopters.

    Russia is also anxious to sell passenger aircraft in the region with Russia’s Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Yuri Slyusar, who accompanied the Medvedev mission, seeking opportunities to sell Sukhoi Superjet 100 airplanes to Vietnamese carriers.

    During the Medvedev visit, Russian Trade Minister Denis Manturov suggested that Russia could sell military aircraft and other defence equipment to Thailand to be offset by much increased Russian purchases of Thai rubber. After his return to Russia, Manturov revealed that deals on rail services, military aircraft, and the sale of three Sukhoi Superjet transport planes were also in train, while Thai military sources suggested that battle tanks might also be purchased. Thai Defence Minister Prawit Wongsuwon has been spruiking the expansion of arms purchases from Russia.

    Premier Medvedev noted during his visit to Vietnam that ‘cooperating with Vietnam also means extending Russia’s reach to the 10 ASEAN economies’. In this expanded endeavour, Russia will have to compete with a spectrum of other ardent suitors, including the US, China, Japan, India and Australia.

    This Australian Parliamentary Library Blog was published on 8 May 2015.

  • Stephen Morey. How 37% of the vote in the UK resulted in 51% of the seats.

    Current Affairs. UK election

    On Thursday, May 7 2015, the Conservative Party won the national election in the United Kingdom – despite the fact that nearly two-thirds of ballots were cast for other candidates. With only 36.9% of the vote – some 3% more than opinion polls predicted – the Conservative Party won a 50.9% absolute majority of seats, 331 out of 650, in the House of Commons.

    The 61.1% of voters who supported other candidates will thus be represented by a minority in the Commons. There have been public protests at an outcome that some feel was not a democratic expression of voters’ will.

    Labor made bigger vote gains, but lost seats

    Here are a few facts about the election results that may surprise readers:

    • The Conservative Party increased its vote by 0.8%, but increased its number of seats by 28 seats.
    • The Labour Party increased its vote by a greater percentage than the Conservatives did, 1.5%, but its number of seats decreased by 24.
    • Most voters cast their votes for defeated candidates, so most are “represented” by an MP they did not support.
    • Some parties are over-represented in the House of Commons relative to their support among voters. So the governing Conservatives, with 36.9% support, have 50.9% of the seats, and the Scottish Nationalists, with 4.7% support, have 8.6% of the seats.
    • Other parties are grossly under-represented, most notably the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) with just one seat, yet 12.6% support.
    • The percentage swing to UKIP was the biggest for any party in the UK for at least a generation, but the 3,881,129 people who voted for them – the third-biggest vote after the Conservative and Labour parties – are almost all unrepresented in the House of Commons now.
    • Both the Labour and UKIP leaders resigned following their parties’ disappointing number of seats won, even though the votes for their parties significantly increased.

    ‘First past the post’ distorts multi-party contests

    Why is this so? The problem with UK elections, highlighted previously in The Conversation, is that single-member electoral districts, combined with the lack of preferential voting, means that election results usually strongly distort the voters’ wishes.

    Here’s how it happens.

    Consider the county of Cornwall. With six electoral constituencies, the overall vote was as follows:

    43.1% Conservative

    22.4% Liberal Democrat

    13.8% UKIP

    12.3% Labour

    5.8% Green

    2.5% Others

    Although 57% of voters in Cornwall voted for parties other than the Conservatives, the Conservatives won every seat. This is because, under the first-past-the-post system, each winner needs to be just a nose in front of each of the other candidates, even if most of the voters didn’t vote for him or her. In fact, only one Conservative candidate exceeded 50% support in Cornwall.

    The full details of what happened are given in the table below:

    Breakdown of voting in six seats of Cornwall

    Author provided
    Click to enlarge

    The only voters whose ballots count for the election of an MP are those who support the candidate who gets the biggest share. This biggest share is usually well under 50%, because there are five or sometimes six parties getting significant support in the UK. There is no preference voting, so if – for example – you vote for a Greens candidate, as 3.8% of voters across the UK did, your vote is effectively discarded (in all but one seat) because at least one other candidate gets more votes.

    The Conservatives were able to win a clear majority of seats because their candidates got ahead of others in more than half of the 650 seats, even though they received several million votes short of a majority of votes. Across the south-east and west of England the same picture we see in Cornwall was repeated in many places – with overall votes of less than 50% the Conservatives won all, or almost all, the seats.

    But in the rest of the UK the story is different. In the north-east of England, for example, around Durham and Newcastle, out of 28 seats, Labour won 25 and the Conservatives only 3. But, again, Labour’s vote was well under a majority, being just 45.1% of the vote.

    What happened in Scotland? Well, the Scottish Nationalists (SNP) are celebrating a huge win, but actually a majority of voters, albeit a very slim majority, voted for other candidates. Final figures show that the Scottish Nationalists won 49.97% of the vote, but 94.9% of the 59 seats in Scotland (56 seats).

    Some have said this result in Scotland presages a vote for independence in any future referendum, but the SNP did not win a majority of votes in Scotland last week, nor a majority in the 2014 referendum. A win in any further referendum doesn’t seem likely soon.

    So this is why many people in the UK are upset by the election result. Most voters didn’t vote for the outcome they got, and most voters are not represented in the House of Commons – which is the only elected House – by the candidate they voted for.

    Is this distortion really the best that democracy can offer? I would say a definite no.

     

    Stephen Morey is Australian Research Council Future Fellow, Linguistics at Latrobe University. This article first appeared in The Conversation on 11 May 2015.

  • Ian McAuley. Role of government

    Fairness, Opportunity and Security
    Policy series edited by Michael Keating and John Menadue.

    Australia to the 1980s – Government at the commanding heights

    For almost 200 years, from 1788 to the early 1980s, governments held the commanding heights of the Australian landscape.

    The Australia in which I came of age, the Australia of the 1950s and 1960s, would now be described as a “command economy”, notwithstanding the anti-communist rhetoric of the postwar era, championing the liberties of the “free world”.

    The journalist Paul Kelly commented that while we didn’t live under totalitarian rule, we did live under a condition of state paternalism. Governments, state or federal, Labor or Coalition, determined what we could read (remember the fuss over Lady Chatterly’s Lover), whom we could have sex with, and what time the shops should close.

    In the economic sphere government was even more dominant. With all the authority of Soviet central planning, governments determined the shape of the Australian economy, through tariff and quota protection, partial or full ownership in key industries (banking, airlines, railroads, aircraft manufacture, pharmaceuticals, telecommunications), and sanctioning internal restraints on trade. In disregard of Section 92 of the Constitution (the free internal trade bit), for example, local brewing monopolies were protected by prohibitions on trading beer across state borders.

    This economic system must be seen in its historical context, namely the decision, at the time of federation, that Australia would not go down the path of “plantation economies”, such as Argentina, characterised by wide disparities in income and opportunity. Rather, Australia would go down a path of industrialisation as a means of spreading income and opportunity – a process well-described in Ian McLean’s 2012 work Why Australia Prospered. Even the White Australia Policy, although strongly based on racism, had its liberal supporters who saw it as a means of stopping Australia from becoming a society of white masters and colored coolies.

    Also there were the demands of industrial mobilisation during the Pacific War and of national development after the war. There were no private investors waiting to invest in rail gage standardisation, in an international airline, or in a hydro-electric/irrigation/conservation scheme in the Snowy Mountains. (To put the Snowy Mountains Scheme into perspective, its total project cost was about 6 percent of one year’s GDP, which would come to about $100 billion in today’s terms – enough to fund an east coast high speed rail and a proper national broadband system, with change left over to fix up the Pacific Highway.)

    The withdrawal of state paternalism

    The Dunstan Government in Adelaide – “the city of churches” – was the first to push socially progressive legislation on censorship, anti-discrimination, consumer protection and decriminalization of homosexuality, while encouraging multiculturalism and engagement with Asia. Nationally the Whitlam Government was to follow a similar reforming zeal. In social policy state paternalism was on the way out, and Labor was leading the change.

    In the economic sphere it was the Hawke-Keating Government that made the greatest progress in withdrawing state paternalism and giving freer rein to market forces – implementing tariff reform, significant deregulation of the finance sector, a float of the exchange rate, and effective competition policy.

    An enduring myth of Australian politics is that Labor has been the party of “big government”, but in reality Labor has been the party of liberal reform. The myth, which has so well-suited conservative politicians, lies in selective interpretation of what is meant by “big government”, and, more basically, the assumed role government is to take in our lives.

    We often look for quantification of terms such as “big” and “small”, and one that stands out is the size of government spending in relation to GDP – a metric with huge variation even among the 34 member countries of the OECD (from 23 percent in Mexico up to 58 percent in Denmark, with Australian near the lower end at 35 percent).

    But in itself such a metric carries little meaning. A government can be “small” by this measure, while imposing a heavy burden of oppression on its citizens, as was the case with many South American countries in the 1980s. It doesn’t take much expenditure to run a surveillance and police apparatus. Government can be so small as to be absent, leaving citizens to the ravages of gangs and warlords, as in failed or failing states. At the other end of the spectrum are countries with “big” government expenditures, such as Sweden and other Nordic countries, which guarantee civil liberties and offer an attractive environment for business investment.

    In most democracies, including Australia, government expenditure has grown because the legitimate demands citizens have placed on government have grown.

    But what are those demands and what makes them legitimate?

    The wisdom of a US Republican

    Abraham Lincoln stated the role of government:

    “The legitimate object of government is to do for a community of people whatever they need to have done, but can not do at all, or can not so well do, for themselves–in their separate, and individual capacities.” 

    That statement was made 160 years ago in a different political context but it encapsulates what most independent economists and political scientists still see as the legitimate role of government.

    It has two important parts.

    The first is about what people cannot do at all (in their separate and individual capacities). That’s uncontentious: even those on the hard right accept that governments must guarantee the integrity of the currency, provide national defence, and maintain internal security – in fact on these last two functions they tend to go to extremes.

    The other is about what people cannot do so well, and this has become contested territory, particularly in the last 35 years since the rise of the Thatcher Government in the UK and the Reagan Government in the USA. If one believes that the private sector always does better than government, then logically the government should not be involved in anything the private sector can conceivably do. It should vacate education, health care, research, environmental protection and so on – all areas where there is some possibility of private sector provision.

    The Howard Government, for example, adopted what Minister for Administrative Services David Jull called a “Yellow Pages” test for what should be in and out of government: if an activity appeared in the Yellow Pages directory it should be left to the private sector.

    It’s an idea of government, when taken to an extreme, would see a very diminished state. Of course any government pursuing such an agenda confronts electoral opposition, which means that governments of the right concerned with political survival aren’t don’t go the whole hog of privatisation, but the vision remains as an aspiration.

    Opposition to the “small government” aspiration is construed as a reaction of a people who have become too accepting of the “nanny state” and too recalcitrant to accept the need for change. Christopher Pyne’s reaction to the Senate’s blocking of his higher-education “reforms” is a textbook illustration of this attitude – we just don’t know what’s good for us.

    Those on the right fail to notice the irony of this form of paternalism. And the idea that there is validity in the idea that governments can do some things better than the market doesn’t enter their ideologically-primed minds.

    There is a mountain of evidence, however, of the economic benefits of publicly-funded education, health insurance, transport infrastructure and other services where governments do a much better job than the private sector. There is similar evidence that only governments can efficiently mobilise resources for projects with long-term benefits, such as transport systems and broadband networks. There is a whole established economic literature on the limits of markets – the textbook and real-world theory of “market failure” – but politicians who are confident in the intrinsic competence of the private sector can safely ignore evidence and argument, particularly when they have an unshakeable belief in their own economic competence.

    The most extreme version of this belief is not just that the private sector is better, but that the public sector is entirely worthless, as captured in the explicit “beliefs” of the Liberal Party, where it is stated that: “businesses and individuals – not government –  are the true creators of wealth and employment”, implying that the efforts of police, teachers, nurses and others on the public payroll are worthless, as are public assets such as highways and art collections.

    Even those few on the right who do accept that markets fail tend to respond with the claim that government failure is always worse: it’s better to put up with the lesser evil of monopolisation, injustices of asymmetric market power, administrative duplication in the private sector, the short-term focus of corporations and so on, than the greater evil of government incompetence and waste.

    Public choice theory

    The idea that incompetence and waste are inevitable in government undertakings is given a fig leaf of academic respectability in a theory known as “public choice”, which has been popular in some Australian universities (the nurseries for treasury officials and most politicians).

    The nub of the theory is that governments face inexorable pressure to grow. Public servants and ministers, whatever their left/right labels, always enjoy the benefits of bureaucratic expansion, just as (it is supposed) business executives enjoy managing a big company rather than a small one, and voters’ demand for more services is insatiable. President Reagan summarized public choice theory even more succinctly when he said “Government is like a baby. An alimentary canal with a big appetite at one end and no sense of responsibility at the other”.

    While the expansionary aspirations of business executives are kept in check by shareholders (a naive assumption), governments have the power to tax – or, better still, to incur debt and to push the pain of repayment on to future voters (an argument that ignores the power of oversold IPOs and share issues to lure mug shareholders in the private sector).

    A related aspect of the theory is that governments offer too many openings for rent-seekers – those who can use political clout to secure privilege such as a protected monopoly or a favourable re-zoning of land. It’s best not to have the agencies which have the discretion to offer such privilege.  (There is no acknowledgement that good government is about upholding community interests, and that in an unregulated laissez faire situation monopoly and collusion will prevail.)

    The net conclusion from public choice theory is that good government is about applying countervailing pressure to these drivers of growth.

    The ultimate model of government to emerge from public choice theory is that government is just another “interest group”, like the trade union movement or the mining lobby – admittedly with some differences, but still with the motivation of self-interest – rather than any notion of the public interest or public service. It may hold certain assets, but only as a reluctant owner, rather than as a custodian of the common wealth. (Listen to the language – it’s not about “our” government or “your” government, but rather “the” government.)

    The weakness of public choice theory is that it rests on weak or false assumptions: an infantilized view of the electorate (as if people are too stupid to see the connection between taxes and services); an expansionist assumption about the motivations of public servants; and  a complete dismissal of any motivational idea other than self-interest.

    It also misinterprets the relationship between people and the governments they elect, a misunderstanding illustrated in the heated debates over privatisation.  Governments pushing privatisation behave in the same way as investment bankers may – “sell BHP, buy RIO”, “sell the electricity grid, buy tollways”. That detached role is not the way the public see it.  It’s their government, with a custodial responsibility for their assets.

    The outcome of these ideas – weakened and distanced government

    This faith in the intrinsic virtue of “small government” may arise from genuine belief or it may be a rationalization to give respectability to ideas serving the interests of those who can profit (in the short run at least) from a weakened state – crony capitalism in other words.

    The vision of the public purpose is that it is best served by the government retreating as far as possible.  (An extreme manifestation is to dismiss the very idea of public purpose. If, as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said there is “no such thing as society”, logically there can be no “public purpose”.)

    Governments infused with these ideas grudgingly go on providing public services, only because it would be costly to their survival if they did not, and a less fiscally responsible government may take their place. That probably explains the Federal Liberal Party’s “beliefs” and electoral strategies, which are focussed almost exclusively on keeping Labor out of office, rather than articulating any agenda – it’s not “negative politics”, just a frank description of the political scene through the eyes of a Party member. It’s a paternalistic guardian, rather than a party of competing ideas. That’s why it’s so devoid of inspiration: it’s hard to inspire political enthusiasm when your political aspiration is to close the show down.

    A related idea is that if it’s hard to wean an electorate off public spending, then its best to do so by diverting the composition of government outlays away from spending on services and on to spending on cash transfers. Rather than providing schools, clinics, roads and so on, public spending is best directed at cash handouts (such as family benefits) or tax concessions (such as those applying to superannuants). That way some of the evil of public spending can be ameliorated, because the final spending decisions are in the hands of individuals rather than public servants. Choice is left to the individual. (In reality choice is left to those who , through advertising and other market manipulations to shape people’s consumption.) 

    The Howard Government’s generosity with the proceeds of the mining boom, which went to cash transfers for “middle class welfare” while spending on education and infrastructure was squeezed, is illustrative of this philosophy. When we look at the growth of government expenditure over the last 50 years, we see that spending on government services has risen modestly, from 15 percent to 18 percent of GDP, while the growth in personal transfers has doubled from 4 percent to 8 percent of GDP. At the Commonwealth level the trend is even more marked.

    It would be wrong to attribute these attitudes entirely to any one party. They may be most clearly manifest in the Liberal Party, but they have infected Australia’s public discourse to the extent that it is now accepted almost without question that the only way to achieve a fiscal balance (in itself an over-simplified goal) is through cutting expenditure rather than raising revenue.  (When did you last hear an ABC journalist, quizzing a minister about a budget cut, ask “Yes Minister, but have you looked at the possibility of raising revenue – after all Australia is getting by with very low taxes?”)

    It was a Labor Government in the 1980s that instituted a set of “reforms” which ultimately saw fiscal management take over from economic management – to the extent that documents such as those comprising the Charter of Budget Honesty and the Intergenerational Report effectively posit fiscal management (in reality fiscal stringency) as the sole aim of economic policy. Economic policy should be about the whole community’s interests, while fiscal policy is simply about public expenditure and revenue.

    “Reforms” under the rubric “new public management” transformed the public servant from a servant of the public to a servant of the minister, with responsibility not for the public interest, but for controlling expenditure within his or her own agency’s appropriation. If budgetary savings can be made by denying services or by shifting costs “off budget” (for example from education departments to parents, from health departments to private insurers), that’s good management, even if there is a net economic cost to the community.

    Gone are the ideas of benefit-cost-analysis, which consider the community’s costs (e.g. travel time in location of schools and libraries).  At best benefit-cost-analysis is used only as a tool for dealing with limited funds for capital spending, to get the best out of miserly allocations.

    And gone is the idea of the common wealth.  Even the name of our nation – The Commonwealth of Australia – looks like an anachronism in this brave new world of “small government”.

    Restoring the common wealth

    There’s no need to go looking for some new role of government – Lincoln laid it out.

    Of course there are changes in how this role is realised. Demographics change, which means there is more need for spending on age pensions. Technologies change, which means that more options for health care become available, while some functions once reasonably reserved for government, such as telecommunications, can have more private sector involvement. And relative prices change, which means that while many items of private consumption (cars, travel, entertainment) have become cheaper, some services provided by government, including education, health care and policing, necessarily remain labour-intensive and therefore expensive: it is quite reasonable that relative expenditure on these public services should go on growing for some time (a consideration entirely overlooked in banal fiscal documents such as the Intergenerational Report.)

    A restoration of Lincoln’s common-sense understanding of the role of government or the value of the common wealth isn’t going to arise from a simple change in political actors. There is no messianic political “leader” who will take us out of this neoliberal darkness. Public ideas develop over time, through the contributions of many. The task is up to all of us, and let me conclude with some advice to those who have voice in the community.

    Politicians (established and wannabe) – question the assumptions of your platforms and of the strategists in your party. Take it on yourselves to learn about the workings of the “mixed economy”, that has contributed so much to Australia’s prosperity in the past. Learn a little basic economics about how and why markets sometimes work well and sometimes fail. 

    Journalists – put at least as much effort into reporting on public policy as you do on politics, and remember that fiscal management is only one small aspect of economic management. Remind Australians of some hard facts, such as our low tax base.  And don’t let a concern for “balance” displace your concern for seeking the truth. Don’t be afraid to expose lies and hypocrisy.

    Public sector unionists – don’t campaign about your jobs. Every time you complain that some privatisation or cutback will cost your members’ jobs, the public interpretation is that the activity in question is overstaffed, playing straight into the hands of your detractors. Campaign about public services – and then your jobs will be secure.

    Business lobbies – it may be clever in the short term to campaign for lower taxes or cuts in public spending. Such measures will naturally help your immediate profitability to the pleasure of your shareholders and managers. But remember that the success of capitalist economies rests on a wise mix of public and private goods, and on public policies that link contribution to reward and protect the vulnerable. It has taken strong governments to protect capitalism from its own self-destructive tendencies.

    “Social progressives”, “greens”, “the left” – engage with economics.  It’s not difficult. If you don’t, others will, perpetrating the absurd but glibly appealing ideas that there are conflicts between economic and social objectives and between economics and environmental objectives. If you don’t state your case, these false ideas will dominate.

    Australia and similar democracies have done well because economic progress  has been a shared venture between the public and private sectors. Our prosperity is built on that shared venture, including the accumulated contribution of governments in education, health care, physical infrastructure and a host of other services that we’re too inclined to take for granted.

    As Aristotle warned “That which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it”. We need care for our common wealth.

    Ian McAuley is Adjunct Lecturer, Canberra University.

    The ideas in this paper are expanded in a book ‘Governomics: Can we afford small government?’ written by Ian McAuley and Miriam Lyons, which was published on 1 May 2015 by Melbourne University Press.

  • Michael Keating. The Role and Responsibilities of Government.

    Fairness, Opportunity and Security
    Policy series edited by Michael Keating and John Menadue.

    Different possible conceptions of the responsibilities and roles of government are an important backdrop to the policies that will be examined later in this series of articles. The purpose of the present article is to show that despite the ideological debate between the extremes on the Right and the Left of the political spectrum, in practice:

    • The responsibilities of governments have changed little in the last thirty years
    • The roles have changed, but changes in regulatory regimes and the ‘marketisation’ of some services has enabled governments to better fulfil their continuing responsibilities. 

    Government responsibilities

    At the end of World War II governments for the first time took responsibility for delivering full-employment and introduced a much more comprehensive system of social welfare. In addition, the government commitment to national development was continued and enhanced through an expanded migration program and the encouragement of new industries, such as automobile production.

    This enhancement of government responsibilities was widely supported, including by all sides of politics, and for a long time there was no significant challenge to this broad scope of government responsibilities. Indeed probably the most divisive issue affecting government responsibilities in the last seventy years was State aid for non-government schools, and even that issue was resolved more than forty years ago.

    In more recent years, however, the extent of government responsibilities has been questioned by some people, mostly on the Right of the political spectrum. The Treasurer Joe Hockey, for example, has mused about whether Australia should continue to support what he terms ‘an age of entitlement’.

    This criticism is, however, essentially based on a narrow conception of government responsibilities promulgated by some neo-liberals. In their view, as far as possible individuals able should be free to pursue their own private interests and the State’s responsibilities should be limited to the provision of a narrow class of goods that the market cannot provide, such as defence and law and order.

    The alternative mainstream view is that as citizens we are interdependent and have a mutual obligation to other members of our society. In this interdependent society there are some social goods and services that should be available to all.

    The reality is that the vast majority of Australians seem to endorse this broader conception of our interdependent society. Accordingly, and notwithstanding criticism of the ‘age of entitlement’ and the scope of the welfare state, most Australians want to maintain present government responsibilities, and have even supported some further expansion in recent years.

    For example, very recently there has been widespread agreement that assistance to disabled people and for child care should be extended. In addition, over time technological progress and increasing international economic integration (globalisation) have inevitably led to structural adjustment in some industries, but governments continue to be held responsible for national development and economic growth, even if they have felt that they needed to change the means. As a result government regulation and the ratio of government expenditure to GDP have increased under both the major political parties.

    Indeed insofar as there is a difference between the two major parties, what stands out is that Labor has more tightly targeted welfare, while the Coalition has sometimes eased means testing and extended government subsidies to essentially private activities such as health insurance. So although this may well be an ‘age of entitlement’, that ‘entitlement’ seems to be deeply entrenched historically and is what we Australians continue to expect.

    It would be prudent therefore for strategic policy development to be based on the premise that there will be no major reduction in government responsibilities. On the other hand, it can equally be expected that the public will continue to demand improvements in the performance of those responsibilities, and this may well lead to further changes in the role for governments. 

    The changing role of governments

    Since the economic reforms, which started in the mid-1980s, there has been a major change in the role of governments. These reforms are sometimes described as neo-liberalism or economic rationalism, probably because they have been distinguished by governments now making greater use of markets and/or market mechanisms to achieve their policy objectives.

    Some people on the Left, however, are critical of this marketisation of service delivery and the associated change in regulations. They argue that these reforms have changed the role of government in a way that is inconsistent with the underlying purpose of government. Instead the critics on the Left argue that in a mutually interdependent society, the role of government is not only to ensure the provision of social goods and services. In addition, government should be the sole provider, so that services are common to all, freely or almost freely available, and used collectively.

    Accordingly these critics from the Left are concerned about the changing role of government as other non-government and/or private groups have been allowed to provide social services on behalf of the government, user charging has been introduced, and clients are allowed to choose their service provider. These critics sometimes also question regulatory changes that provide less direct government control and rely more on creating incentives and disincentives.

    The alternative view taken here is that while the means employed by government have changed, government responsibilities and their values, fundamental goals and objectives have not changed significantly. In short, this has meant a shift in the role of governments in favour of governments ‘steering not rowing’.

    Furthermore, these reforms in favour of a greater role for markets were essentially driven by the need to respond to changes in our economic environment and changes in our society.

    First, the experience of stagflation in the 1970s and beyond showed that macro-economic management could no longer guarantee full employment unless our markets became much more competitive and flexible. Hence the importance of tariff reductions, competition policy and the shift to enterprise bargaining to determine wages and employment conditions. And while much has been achieved, more still remains to be done before the full competition policy agenda is complete, especially in the area of infrastructure pricing.

    Second, there have been major changes in the delivery of public services in response to changes in the character of our society. In particular, we have become a much better educated and more individualistic society. People are now more likely to question authority and to express their dissatisfaction with long-running programs which don’t seem to be making adequate progress towards achieving their objectives. Often the coordination of programs is at fault and people are sick of being shuffled from one government agency to another.

    Another major concern is whether the traditional program approach of one size fits all continues to be appropriate, if it ever was. There is now an expectation that, within reason, services will be tailored to meet the needs of each specific individual, and that often the individual is the best judge of their own needs.

    In effect, equity has been re-defined. Uniform provision of public services directly by the State, and based on the same treatment for all, is no longer always seen as equitable. Today the objective of many public services is to achieve equality of opportunities, or even more difficult, to achieve equality of outcomes. But in that case uniform service provision is likely to be insufficiently responsive to individual client needs to meet these new and different objectives. Instead individual clients need to be able to choose the combination of services that best meet their personal needs, and that usually also requires a choice of the service provider.

    For these various reasons governments have been seeking to provide more client choice by making greater use of markets for the delivery of human services. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that government has lost its responsibility and power to ensure the provision of these services. Governments still provide much of the funding, and so governments can largely control access to the market by both clients and providers for these public services. Governments can also largely set the quality standards by a combination of regulation and their purchasing power, and frequently governments influence the pricing structures.

    In short markets can be managed by governments to induce willing changes in behaviour, consistent with government objectives. This new means of retaining government control is a considerable achievement in an age where:

    • More critical citizens need to be persuaded and command and control regulation is much more difficult to sustain; and
    • These critical citizens have ready access to legal redress to contest government decisions where they disagree.

    As will be discussed in subsequent articles in this series, much still remains to be done in improving government services. Better coordination of health services for people with chronic conditions and education and training and other support services for the most disadvantaged people is especially important. Better provision of services in both these areas may well involve appointing a budget holder who would coordinate the provision of multiple services for each client using a market-based approach to achieve best value for money.

    Conclusion

    The change in the role of governments in favour of making greater use of markets essentially represents a change in means, often in an attempt to enhance or restore the power of government to achieve their traditional responsibilities and objectives.

    The attractiveness of this shift in favour of markets is that market-based instruments can be structured to create desirable incentives for individual actors to pursue the government’s policy objectives. Even globalisation, while it releases very powerful forces, can usually be managed now that the government has floated the exchange rate and the economy is sufficiently flexible to achieve the necessary real price adjustment to external shocks.

    In effect governments can aim to construct and manage markets so as to create a synergy between the objectives of the individual, or individual interest groups, and the broader objectives of society. In that way the apparently independent activities of free agents become the instruments of government, and these instruments are politically attractive because they are the least coercive and most effective possible. To paraphrase Adam Smith, the government can guide the “invisible hand” of markets so as to ensure that individuals pursuing their own self interest are also acting in the public interest.

    Mike Keating AC was formerly Secretary of Finance and Secretary. Prime Minister and Cabinet.

  • Stuart Harris. What Australia’s Foreign Policy Should Look Like

    Fairness, Opportunity and Security
    Policy series edited by Michael Keating and John Menadue. 

    The focus in Australia’s foreign policy has shifted back and forth between the global and the regional, and between multilateralism and bilateralism in economic and political relationships, due only in part to party political differences. While some policies, such as immigration, refugees and to a degree defence, are widely debated in Australia, many are not. Moreover, foreign policies are often not just linked to domestic interests but become part of domestic electoral politics – whether as photo ops with foreign leaders, muscularly assertive security stances or support for influential domestic pressure groups. This often leads to opportunistic political decisions lacking long-term vision and analysis.

    We concentrate here on two broad and interrelated challenges to our present foreign policy: first, the choice between the global approach and the regional approach and second, avoiding a choice between the political and economic relationships with the US and China. These two challenges embrace much of what is in practice a wide and complex set of influences.

    Among those complexities, the international environment for Australia’s foreign policy is changing with globalization and greater porosity of borders. Inter-state conflict has greatly diminished but intra-state conflict has risen, with consequences for international refugee flows. Population movements more generally will grow and, like political refugees, will target Australia among other well-developed countries. Emerging issues, such as climate change, stressed global commons – oceans, biodiversity, cyberspace and the atmosphere – as well as traditional economic, food and energy issues will shape international relations. Moreover, foreign policy objectives – national security, wealth and prosperity, and a geopolitically stable environment – have become more interrelated. This is even more so if we desire to project a moral dimension through aid and human rights efforts.

    Looking at the first of our two challenges, given our multicultural society, a global conception of our foreign policy is inevitable. Australia arguably supports the international system of international law and global rules. Yet despite Australia’s eagerness to participate in international developments, its political support for global institutions has in practice been equivocal. Scepticism about support for the United Nations is often expressed by political leaders, notably in response to criticism of Australia’s indigenous affairs and refugee policies. Australia worked effectively within the UN framework in the East Timor crisis and during its Security Council membership. Its participation in UN and G20 efforts to develop climate change responses, however, has been grudging. Support for the US in the first Iraq war was within UN auspices; that for the second Iraq war was not. While US belief in its exceptionalism means that it is not bound by its own rules, for smaller countries including Australia international rules are crucially important.

    Australia’s substantial contribution in developing regional cooperation processes and institutions started in the 1970s, with largely bipartisan domestic acceptance in the 1980s and early 1990s. The Coalition government in the mid-1990s switched the emphasis back to Britain and the US, and this was reinforced particularly after al Qaeda’s attack on the US in 2001.

    Asian regional dynamics are changing. Population growth and development in the region is rapid; the importance of countries such as India, Indonesia and Vietnam in particular will grow for Australia. This means there will be a need for a more active foreign policy toward the region. Solutions to many of Australia’s problems, not limited to people smugglers and terrorism, will increasingly need cooperation from regional neighbours.

    Asian developments also have significance for our defence policy, requiring greater emphasis on a regional response. Shifts in the geographic focus of Australia’s defence policy in the past have been between either the defence of Australia and its immediate neighbourhood, or forward defence as with our Vietnam involvement. Recently, more emphasis has again been given to alliance support.

    In terms of the second challenge, the Australia-US relationship has undergone various transformations. In early post war years, it reflected acceptance of a US international leadership within a range of global trade, finance and arms control institutions, international rules and cooperation. Then, as part of the Western alliance during the Cold War and fear of nuclear war, US bases were and remain as Australia’s contribution to early warning and arms control objectives. Although the Western alliance is now more amorphous, Australia has become closer to the US in recent decades. That we have tended to follow US strategies in the Middle East that failed to reflect the complexities of tribalism, religious divisions or sectarian wars – as in Afghanistan and Iraq – should hold lessons for the future. At the same time, the US has become more unilateral in its actions under Presidents Bush and Obama in particular, and is inclined to define what is acceptable or not for Australia.

    The US link has increasingly shaped Australia’s defence, security and foreign policies. More importantly, we have followed the US in seeing solutions to international problems largely in military terms. Sometimes this is sensible as in East Timor and Solomon Islands. Sometimes it is not. Australia’s global approach outside the UN has had mixed results. Our operations in the Middle East – Afghanistan and Iraq in particular – have raised two issues: was the emphasis central to our vital interests; and were we successful? The answer to the first is doubtful; to the second, the failure of those efforts is not in doubt, despite the skills of the Australians involved; the continuing costs, including to domestic security, are substantial.

    It is hard to separate the Australia-US relationship from that of the Australia–China relationship. The US is a Pacific power, but it is an outsider in Asia. Australia, however, is linked to the region from within. China is the largest trading partner of virtually all Asian countries including Australia. Australia’s future relations with the region, in Northeast Asia and with ASEAN in particular, will depend upon relations with China as well as with the US. We should not continue to subordinate foreign policy to security policy; our influence in the region will depend not just upon our military capability but also upon our economic strength and our diplomacy.

    While Australia has enhanced its US relationship in security terms, its economic relationship with China remains largely in a separate policy box with Australia keen to enhance economic ties with China. That policy separation will be more difficult to sustain in the future, with the US increasingly seeing economic developments from a strategic viewpoint, as the ‘pivot’, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) suggest. Yet China will continue to have a critical influence on Australia’s economy, GDP and employment; despite attempts by politicians of both parties to politicize China’s limited investment in Australia, foreign investment including from China will be needed in the future to support our economic growth.

    Given the importance of China to Australia’s economic fortunes, we need to focus more on that relationship, develop greater understanding of its many dimensions, and establish depth comparable to that we have with the US relationship. We also need to decide for ourselves issues affecting China rather than seek guidance from the US, whose interests are often different to ours.

    US global leadership post-WWII contributed substantially to global and regional stability and remains essential, but that leadership is now ambiguous. It needs to come to terms with the new global and regional circumstances, primarily but not limited to the rise of China, and its own constrained relative capabilities. China undoubtedly wants to move from under the strictures of US primacy and potentially will do so in the long term. It is a long way from being able to do so at present. With a recent hardening of attitudes, the US and its military want to maintain that primacy and treat as adversarial China’s attempts to move to greater equality and reduced vulnerability to US dominance. Australia needs to avoid involvement in such a contest and must help reduce their mutual mistrust, developing an accommodative approach in its diplomacy with the US and China.

    For Australia, the US relationship also has a broader economic impact. After a long protectionist history, Australia became a strong supporter of an open, non-discriminatory trading system, supported multilateralism and a rules-based international economic system, under the GATT and then WTO, to its considerable advantage; it reverted, in the 1990s, however, to becoming a preferential bilateral trading nation. Although helping some groups of traders, overall such preferential agreements have provided limited benefit and incurred considerable economic costs, as the preferential US-Australia ‘Free Trade’ Agreement illustrated. Apparently under US pressure to create a precedent, Australia conceded some sovereignty to overseas investors in the economic policy field, through the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) instrument. Its recently concluded Korean agreement permits legal recourse (overriding Australian legal jurisdictions) if Australian policy changes are judged to affect foreign investors’ expected success. It is apparently proposed that this should be part of the preferential TPP currently being negotiated. Safeguards will presumably be sought but with considerable doubts about their likely effectiveness. The TPP is already dividing the region contrary to Australia’s interests, since not just China, but Indonesia and India in particular, will find it difficult to meet the admission conditions. There are times, as with the TPP, when we should be willing to walk away from bad deals. Rather than surrendering sovereignty in the TPP, we would gain more by putting our efforts behind region-wide efforts such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

    So what should our foreign policy look like? A successful foreign policy needs a long-term strategic vision – over decades, long enough to understand that there will be major, and not just marginal, differences to the world as we know it. That vision needs to be based on a clear direction and a careful analysis of all relevant factors and their implications. Our policy orientation should be multilateral and multidimensional, using all our foreign policy tools and recognizing that military methods are unlikely to resolve many problems we might expect in the future.

    Moreover, Australia should not automatically follow the US, but should support actively existing international institutions and their rules and rule-making processes, and contribute constructively to further development of international rules. Areas where this will be necessary are in the climate change field and perhaps international refugees. Although Australia is less well placed to lead internationally than in the past, it can still influence developments if it bases its approach on its own independent thinking and interests. Given the changes likely over the long-term in Asia, however, our efforts should be directed primarily to the region.

    In the security field, the objectives of our existing policies are unclear, as are just what constitute the aims of our military procurement and defence policy more generally, illustrated most recently by the confused submarine issue. Given our diminishing defence spending capabilities, priorities will be needed among different interests and objectives, concentrating our efforts rather than trying to foresee all potential areas in which our military could be involved. Traditional security threats directed at Australia are unlikely in the short and medium-term, but given the potential changes in the region, self-reliance and area denial would seem to have priority rather than other options including alliance support.

    This would have implications for our current considerable enmeshment with the US military. We need to avoid having to choose between the US and China, especially in the, admittedly currently low, likelihood of actual military conflict. While China has not shown real evidence of expansionist objectives, Taiwan is a qualified exception. A potential cause for conflict could arise over Taiwan in the future, in which case pressure will increase on Australia to support the US militarily. Yet opinion polls continue to show little public support for our participation and we should look to discourage any action on our part that encourages US confrontation with China. As Mr. Abbott said in 2012, the US should not take Australia entirely for granted. Inevitably, military conflict between the US and China would have massive consequences, including for Australia if involved. Democratic processes would require that no Australian political leader commit Australia to military conflict involving China without substantial public support and a full parliamentary debate. Without that, history would be unforgiving.

    Stuart Harris was Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs 1987-88. He is currently an Emeritus Professor and Visiting Fellow at the Coral Bell School of Asia and Pacific Affairs at the ANU.

  • John Menadue. Role of government . The importance of values.

    Fairness, Opportunity and Security
    Policy series edited by Michael Keating and John Menadue.

    Good government must be based on some broadly shared values that inspire and enthuse us.

    We can accept that our leaders must make some compromises from time to time, but we need to know ‘what they stand for’. We look for leaders who have conviction.

    For example, we need to discuss tax reform but so often it becomes a technical discussion when what is really at stake is the sort of society we want and how tax can help us in the goals we seek. Tax is a means to an end. It is not an end in itself. Oliver Wendell Holmes put it succinctly that taxes are what we pay for a civilised society. That is where the discussion about tax should start.

    We also need good managers but management also is a secondary issue. The important issues are the values and principles that should guide policy and programs which in turn must be managed well.

    Unfortunately values, principles and ideas have given way to ‘small target’ electioneering and the marketing of products. Money has replaced membership as the driving force of election campaigns.

    Principles as the basis for policy.

    We need leaders and political parties to express themselves in a clear set of principles which accord with the best of Australians’ values. Otherwise the political contest is reduced to satisfying short-term materialist ‘aspirations’, appeasing vested interests and managing the media cycle.

    From community values a set of principles of public policy can be developed. Those principles can underpin a coherent set of policies and programs which implement those policies.

    Values > principles > policies > programs.

    Compromising on issues such as refugee policy simply legitimises those who exploit people’s fear and is likely to drive out sensible and reasonable political debate and confuse supporters.

    Many of us take an optimistic view of human nature and recognition of the importance of the public sphere where people realise their full capabilities. These ideas can be expressed in consistent and coherent principles such as fairness, opportunity, stewardship, the common wealth, including enhancement of social environmental and institutional capital and protection of natural resources.

    Today, Australia faces great challenges – climate change, population ageing, commodity based exports, deficits in human capital and a weak base for public revenue. The politics of ‘what’s in it for me’ discourages us from facing these challenges, for there will have to be trade-offs. Some will have to pay more than others and some will have to forego benefits now for the sake of longer term benefits. Such transitions can be painful, but are more likely to gain support when people understand the principles underpinning public policy.

    When a political party is unified around a set of principles it can still have a robust debate about how to give effect to those principles. But it would be in control of its message because its parliamentary representatives can engage with the electorate in a consistent and sincere voice, with less reliance on ‘talking points’ and spin and with less concern with the immediate reaction of focus groups. Party supporters would be much more prepared to accept political compromise if they know that there is strong leadership and there is broad agreement on key values and principles. Leadership has to be patient and consistent around these values and principles – and never go backwards. Authenticity and sincerity are then easily recognised. 

    From values to principles

    Values such as fairness, freedom, citizenship, stewardship and ethical responsibility, would be generally accepted by most people. As the values are translated into practise they can be further defined as principles that then lead to policies, e.g. the value of fairness can be expressed in the principle of a stronger link between contribution and reward- a link which has become severed by hugely disproportionate executive pay, high returns to rent seekers and financial speculators and the long head-start of inherited wealth.

    The following is indicative of a set of values and their expressions in principles.

    Fairness/equity

    A ‘fair go’ is primarily about economic opportunity.

    People should be provided with a good education and those who put it to socially useful ends should be rewarded. Governor Lachlan Macquarie was no socialist but his ‘tickets of leave’ gave the outcasts and underprivileged of this country another chance. We built a nation this way. We must give a chance for newcomers and all people to have another opportunity.

    Fairness promotes social mobility and limits division and resentment.

    Fairness should not be restricted to education.

    The path to prosperity with fairness is through productivity and well-paid employment rather than government handouts. The Nordics have demonstrated that education and incentives for participation do produce fairness and economic prosperity.

    Fairness implies that we are tough towards ‘bludgers’, whether they be tax-dodgers, the vulgarity and indulgence of  those with inherited wealth, protection from competition, government hand-outs and favouritism or cheating on social services.

    Fairness implies full employment as a macro-economic goal to ensure human capabilities are not wasted.

    Areas where we fall short in fairness include

    • Unfairness in taxation,
    • Neglect of early childhood education,
    • Treatment of the needs of indigenous people and refugees,
    • Diversion of education funding to wealthy schools,
    • Inadequate ODA.

    Freedom

    We all have rights to the extent that they do not lessen the rights of others.

    Except where the rights of the vulnerable are at stake, the government should not intrude into the private realm.

    Denial of freedom does not happen overnight; it is eroded step by step.

    We must be vigorous in promoting our freedoms – freedom of speech, freedom of religion, the rule of law and free and fair elections.

    The potential abuse of power should be minimised by the separation of powers and the separation of church and state.

    Areas where we fall short in freedom include

    • The growing power of cabinet and executive which is not adequately balanced by parliament.
    • We have no Human Rights Act.
    • We have reduced freedom as a result of counter-terrorism legislation.
    • The media increasingly fails to protect our freedoms and often facilitates abuse of power by lobbyists.

    Citizenship

    We are more than individuals linked by market transactions.

    Our life in the public sphere is no less necessary than our private lives. As citizens we enjoy and contribute to the public good. It is where we show and learn respect for others, particularly people who are different. It is where we abide by shared rules of civic conduct. It is where we build social capital – networks of trust. We need to behave in ways that make each of us trusted members of the community. ‘Do no harm’ is not sufficient.

    Citizenship brings responsibilities – political participation, vigilance against abuse of power and paying taxes.

    Areas where we fall short in citizenship include

    • Our withdrawal into the private realm; there are growing gated communities, private entertainment,
    • Private rather than public transport and resulting reluctance of influential people to support investment in public transport.
    • Disregard of neighbours.
    • Government subsidies, private health insurance and private schools that discourage the coalescence of socially mixed communities around shared public schools and public hospitals
    • NGOs have increasingly become part of government.
    • Tax avoidance by large corporations. 

    Stewardship

    We have inherited a stock of assets or capital; environmental (forests/water), public and private physical capital (roads/ports), human capital (education), family capital (family and friendship bonds), social capital (trust), cultural capital and institutional capital (government and non-government institutions). That stock of assets must be retained and where possible enhanced.

    We must use our resources as efficiently and productively as possible.

    Areas where we fall short in stewardship include

    • We are amongst the highest per capital carbon polluters in the world.
    • We are placing a heavy strain on the planet which prejudices our grand children’s future.
    • We waste water and degrade the land.
    • We continue to log old growth forests.
    • We are degrading the Great Barrier Reef.

    Ethical responsibility

    Those in prominent office should promote those qualities which draw on the best of our traditions and the noblest of our instincts.

    The duty of those with public influence is to encourage hope and redemption rather than despair and condemnation, confidence rather than fear. It is to promote the common good – to encourage us to use our talents. It is to respect truth and strengthen learning to withstand the powers of populism and vested or sectional interests. This would set a tone of public discourse which nurtures public institutions

    Areas where we fall short in ethical responsibility include

    • Leaders, who appeal to our worst instincts, e.g. dog whistling on refugees.
    • Executive salaries,
    • Undue influence of vested interests and corporate lobbyists.
    • Those in public office should help the community to deal with difficult problems which may require painful adaptive change, such as climate change, rather than provide the false comfort of ignoring or downplaying them.
    • Tax avoidance by large companies.

    We need leaders and institutions that make clear what they stand for on key values and principles which are then translated into policies and programs.

  • Cavan Hogue. Australian Foreign Policy

    Fairness, Opportunity and Security
    Policy series edited by Michael Keating and John Menadue

    Summary.

    Australian Foreign Policy is dominated by fear, defence issues, the American Alliance and the search for votes in marginal electorates. We talk about the importance of Asia but instinctively cleave to Europe and North America who are said to share our values but don’t always do so. We need to look beyond the next election and question some of our basic assumptions like whether the American Alliance gets us into more trouble than it gets us out of. We should also not get involved in peripheral issues which may serve American interests but have nothing to do with Australia. The world is changing and we must look to the future instead of focusing on the past. We need an integrated and independent foreign policy which takes a hard headed view of Australian interests and which keeps in mind the old but true saying that countries don’t have friends, only interests.

    Three major difficulties.

    Thee are three major areas of difficulty at the moment. The first is the low level of political debate amongst our politicians especially in foreign policy and our inability to think beyond the next election. The second is that far too much foreign policy is driven by narrowly focused domestic politics where ministerial and media time is frittered away on peripheral issues at the expense of what really matters. The third is that foreign policy is dominated by relations with the USA and this alliance is dominated by defence issues which for the most part serve American interests first. We should take a more independent, even neutral, stance in our international relations. This should not be seen as anti-Americanism but as paying them the compliment of doing what they do – putting our own interests first.

    Subservience to the US.

    Australian foreign policy is subservient to the USA and the implications of this have not been thoroughly thought through. A major problem for any political party wanting to make basic changes is that we Australians are terrified of standing on our own two feet; we need a sugar daddy. We have a long history of being afraid of the outside world and lacking confidence in our ability to handle it. We should pursue a foreign policy that will give us dignity instead of being seen as the monkey to the US organ grinder. We need to understand our neighbours better and avoid mindless public comments that may resonate with the shock jocks in Australia but are counter-productive overseas. If we want to maintain some kind of alliance with the US it should be much looser and we should stand up for ourselves. We should not get involved in things that are not in our interests. The invasion of Iraq, the current imbroglio in the Middle East and Afghanistan are not serving Australian interests. All they have done is make us a target for terrorists. We are not part of Europe or North America. We talk about an Asia first policy but we don’t practice it. We compare ourselves with Europe or North America both in government and the media. Our major intelligence sharing arrangements are with four white English speaking countries. We are locked into a defence alliance with the USA which is not just about defence but which dominates our approach to the world. We say we don’t want to take sides between China and the US but the US doesn’t see it that way and we are locked into arrangements. That said, joining the Chinese led AIIB is a step in the right direction because, aside from economic issues, it is putting Australian interests ahead of US interests and pressure on us not to join.

    What not to do.

    Our concern over Ukraine and Russia is a typical example of what not to do. Ukraine is a European problem. NATO was created to contain the Soviet Union and seems to put Russia in the same boat. Australia is not in the North Atlantic. We mindlessly join the US which wants to maintain its position as the No. 1 world power. Russia is undoubtedly meddling in Ukraine but the US has a long history of doing the same thing in its region and even beyond. Neither country can claim the international moral high ground. We would be well advised to stay out of a complex and sensitive subject rather than engaging in hairy chested histrionics to please conservative Americans and look good domestically to unthinking Australians.

    The threat!

    For a country that faces no identifiable external threat we give far too much attention to military matters. We have made ourselves a target for terrorists by our identification with the West in general and the USA in particular. The threat has been increased by our participation in ill-fated exercises in the Middle East and Afghanistan which did not further Australian interests. It is probably too late to change our image but we should at least try by pulling out of these commitments and avoiding nonsensical public claims that our military participation in the Middle East somehow protects us from terrorism. The problem with this of course is that our participation in these activities is tied up with our integration into the US military both in policy terms and increasingly in personnel and materiel. We even had an American general telling us recently, in effect, that we should get closer to Indonesia because this would serve American defence interests in the region. He did have the courtesy to suggest it might also serve ours since we were part of the grand alliance.

    What threats exist? Whose ships are our submarines going to sink? Why do we need to be a strong military power? Who is going to invade us? The only foreseeable way in which we could get involved in military activity in our region is as part of a US operation. In other words, the American alliance is more likely to drag us into trouble than to get us out of it.

    US decline!

    The world is in a state of flux with old certainties no longer certain. This is particularly true of our region. It is too early to get worked up about the decline of the West but while the fall may be a long way off I think a future Gibbon will write that the American Empire has begun its decline. Because things are changing, we should not get locked into positions that we may find it hard to get out of. Flexibility must be our watchword. None of this should be read as an attack on the USA or an argument that we should become anti-American. Although some might argue that the squeaky wheel gets the most oil, it is in our interests to maintain good relations with the USA but not to be dominated.

    We have begun to adapt in some ways. Joining the Chinese AIIB despite US lobbying against it was a positive step. We have established important relations with China and Japan although it is hard to maintain a fine balance between these two countries. We do, however, have a tendency to lecture other countries in the region on how they should run things internally. This is not well received. While we should not apologise for our views on government and human rights we must avoid sliding into arrogant missionary activity.

    We have had some successes with trade policy but Australia faces an uncertain future which most Australians don’t understand. Promotion of our trade interests should be a focus of our foreign policy and this is mixed up with domestic politics. The world does not owe Australia a living and there is a very real danger that our standard of living will drop because we can’t compete internationally. If we do not adapt domestically we may well find that the late Lee Kuan Yew was right to warn us we could become the poor white coolies of Asia.

    Our diplomatic service.

    We need to strengthen our diplomatic service and pay less attention to amateur advisers whose knowledge of and interest in international relations is in inverse proportion to their devotion to reading the entrails of domestic polls and focus groups. We had perhaps the most respected and professional diplomatic network in Asia but this seems to have been eroded by budget cuts. There is no substitute for experience and professionalism.

    In short, Australia needs to start from scratch and take a hard headed look at how traditional attitudes will serve our interests in the future. All aspects of our relations with the outside world form an integrated whole and we cannot decide policies on each of them in isolation. Clausewitz was right to link diplomacy and war so we cannot separate foreign policy and defence policy. Our defence policy colours the way other countries perceive us as a nation. If we want to be respected as something more than a junior partner in an alliance of countries whose location and interests are far distant from us then we need to stop relying on others. Despite the fine rhetoric, the United States has always remained fiercely independent and has always followed policies which served its own interests first – or at least which it perceived to serve its interests. We should pay the Americans the compliment of imitating them. 

    Cavan Hogue was Australian Ambassador to Mexico, High Commissioner to Malaysia, Ambassador to the USSR and Russia, and Ambassador to Thailand.

  • John Menadue. The Budget and Liberal economic management.

    Current Affairs:  The Budget

    Opinion polls and the public generally seem to believe that the Liberal Party is a superior economic manager to the Labor Party. There are also signs that the Liberal Party believes this about itself.

    But the somersault in last night’s budget  was extraordinary. I don’t think I have ever seen a government repudiate so quickly – what it had been telling us for years – how it was necessary to ensure our future. We had dire problems of debt and deficit that the former government had bequeathed to the Abbott/Hockey government.

    The debt and deficit rhetoric and actions taken in the 2014 budget have now been abandoned. The 2014 budget is a smoking ruin. 

    If a private or public company was managed like the Australian economy the whole board would be sacked. 

    The budget may be politically cute but our economic future is prejudiced. The headline in today’s AFR sums it up ‘Hockey spends up as deficits hung out to dry’. In the SMH Ross Gittins said ‘This is the budget of a badly rattled government that has put self-preservation ahead of economic responsibility. It will do much to restore Tony Abbott’s political fortunes but next to nothing to return the budget to surplus or hasten the economy’s return to strong growth.’  John Menadue

    See below a post I made on this subject on 23 March 2015.

    There is not fire after all. There is no emergency.

    For the last 18 months Tony Abbott and Joe Hockey have been talking endlessly about a deficit and debt disaster. Clearly we should have been calling in the fire brigade to quell the fire that the Labor Government had lit.

    We were told that there was a 13% debt to GDP ratio that the government had inherited. That debt would bring disaster unless the government took dramatic action to fix it. Joe Hockey told us only last week in releasing the report of the Intergenerational Review that the budget projections were so bad that we would ‘fall off our chairs’ when we saw them.

    Yet since this government came to power, the budget deficit has deteriorated $80 billion over the Forward Estimates.

    So in light of the desperate situation the government inherited and the deterioration in the budget under its own watch, what does the government do?

    Tony Abbott now tells us that we can forget about any budget emergency and all the dire predictions of the past.  He told us only a few days ago that the next budget would be dull and that all the heavy lifting had been done. He assured us that there would be no more unpleasant medicine. He inferred that a nett debt of even 60% to GDP was no problem. He indicated that in the next budget, we would have tax cuts for small businesses and a revamped child care and family package.

    I don’t think I have ever seen a government repudiate so quickly what it was telling us was so necessary to ensure our future. We had dire problems that had to be fixed. The government has now abandoned the rhetoric and its policies of the last 18 months.

    And its 2014 budget is a smoking ruin.

    How can Joe Hockey with any credibility present his next budget? The narrative of the last 18 months has all been torn up.  He and the government by their own actions have discredited their own claims to being good economic managers.  Billie McMahon did better than this.

    In the Australian Financial Review on March 19, 2015, Laura Tingle put this mess together under the heading ‘Being governed by fools is not funny’. She is dead right. See link to her article below.

    http://afr.com/opinion/columnists/laura-tingle/being-governed-by-fools-is-not-funny-20150319-1m2wd1

    The government now wants us to believe that there was no emergency and no fire at all. It was all made up.

    But the problem is that we do have budget difficulties that must be soberly and carefully addressed without penalising the vulnerable in our community.

    What a mess!

  • Richard Butler. Foreign Policy. An Independent Australian Foreign Policy  

    Fairness, Opportunity and Security
    Policy series edited by Michael Keating and John Menadue.

    Summary:

    For fifty years, since Australia entered the war in Vietnam in 1965, Australian foreign policy has been made increasingly subservient to a specific concept of Australia’s relationship with the United States. That concept, first enunciated by Prime Minister Menzies in 1955, was that for its survival, Australia needed ”a great and powerful friend”. All of our key decisions in foreign policy since then have been shaped by our own construct of what loyalty to the United States and the Alliance demanded. That construct has been to follow the US practice and to identify foreign policy with military and security policy.

    By acting in this way we have substantially compromised our independence and, contrary to what this policy supposedly intends, we have exposed ourselves to increasing danger. The latter fact derives in good measure from: the disarray within the US polity, which is now endemic, the distortions and self-delusions which have shaped US policy, particularly the notion that the US is “the exceptional country”. We need to free ourselves from the habit of echoing the Americans.

    This is a matter of maturity, self respect, national interest, and our security.

    The Problem:

    In the recent period, significant decisions were taken by Australia in implementation of the notion that our national interest dictates that we support US policy and actions.

    On Vietnam, the Menzies Government misled the Australian Parliament and people when claiming that it had been invited by the Government of South Vietnam to participate in the war. The Labor opposition pursued this claim, specifically the alleged letter of invitation, and this revealed that the Menzies’ Government had in fact asked the Diem Government in Saigon, to invite Australia to join the war.

    These actions reflected Menzies’ conviction, which he stated publicly, that every such step taken by Australia would tie the US ever more closely to Australia’s national defence, and the determined representation, in the United States, of the civil war of Vietnamese national unification as the “downward thrust of communism”, the so called “Domino Theory” of the expansion of communism in South East Asia. Australian policy imbibed and broadcast that same false narrative.

    On the Middle East, Australia’s participation in virtually all of the United States’ ill judged, contrived and unproductive ventures into that region, particularly since the terrorist attack upon the US on September 11th, 2001, have lacked reason or substance in terms of Australia’s direct interest or stated attachment to principles governing the conduct of international affairs.

    The US led invasion of Iraq in 2003 was illegal. It rested on a rationale – the continuing existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq – that was fabricated by the US Administration. The invasion violated the fundamental provisions of the Charter of the United Nations yet the Howard Government considered it to be of national importance to join the US and the UK, in that venture. In taking that decision, the Howard government ignored the largest public protests ever seen in Australia. They eclipsed the very substantial protests that had expressed opposition to Australia’s involvement in Vietnam.

    The harm that was done by the 2003 invasion is proving to be massive and by no means over. Analysts, scholars, and area experts from many parts of the world are demonstrating, that the central cause of the current extreme violence and political breakdown in the Middle East, and the rise of ISIS, is that 2003 invasion and the subsequent continuing interventions by the United States, including the widespread use of drones.

    Australia has supported all US decisions on Iraq and participated in consequent combat operations. No amount of fulmination by Prime Minister Abbott about the “death cult” of ISIS can divert attention from the absence from the Abbott government’s current decisions on Iraq of a persuasive assertion of Australia’s concrete interests in and a remotely clear eyed assessment of where the continuation of selective western intervention in the Middle East will lead.

    A fundamental aspect of America’s policy in the Middle East is its protection of Israel. Virtually the whole international community of nations recognises that the United States’ unbending protection of Israel, irrespective of whatever crimes its government commits and including its role as a state possessing nuclear weapons, constitutes a distortion in international affairs which is doing immense harm and has the capacity to cause a major war. And, there is widespread rejection of the offensive notion, widespread in the US, that any criticism of the policies of the government of Israel constitutes anti-Semitism.

    On Afghanistan, again no serious interests or principles based analysis of Australia’s interest in NATO’s military action in that country can be identified other than if fundamental importance is placed upon an extended notion of western loyalty.

    Australian Foreign Policy:

    A sound Australian foreign policy would give expression to our nationally determined, intrinsic, interests and values. At present others could be forgiven for assessing that our stance is, in fact, determined by American values. This is deeply harmful to us.

    Naturally, there will always be agreement that a key national interest will be in the preservation of the security of the nation. But, at present, Australia is subjugating foreign policy to national security policy, following the US model, which elementally asserts the primacy of military solutions to foreign policy problems.   

    Australia’s needs to conduct its relations with other States, through a diplomacy and foreign policy that has clearly articulated concrete objectives and supports the accepted principles of international conduct set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and derived normative Treaties and Conventions (for example: The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Conventions on Torture, the Rights of the Child, the Arms Trade Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons).

    This approach would ensure that Australia is identified as a country which attaches importance to principles of law and human decency and able to; live in amity with others, be considered by them to be a valued partner, enjoy national security.

    Clear, independent, predictable, rational foreign policy, supported and projected by open and highly informed diplomacy, is the means through which other states can be given confidence that they can pursue their interests with Australia on an acceptable basis and also enjoy security in their relations with Australia.

    The Changes Needed

    A new, independent Australian foreign policy, should be developed on the basis of the following eight main constructs and goals:

    1. We do not need to accept choices between false opposites, such that spoken and written of increasingly, particularly in American circles, of the need choose between having a strong relationship with China or the US.
      We are capable of maintaining a constructive relationship with each of those States in terms set forth by us. This question is driven by an elemental hostility in which we should not participate. It is of no importance for us to be part of an ideological team. Sensible adults know how empty ideological stances are, how readily they are jettisoned when they conflict with concrete interests, ( see the relationships of the US with Egypt and Saudi Arabia), and how dangerous they can become when they imprison their owners.
    1. On our Alliance relationship with the United States, we need to consider for how much longer we will be prepared to be formally identified with a country that: has some 800 military bases in the world; is the only State that has killed others through the use of nuclear weapons; has invaded or bombed some 40 countries since the Second World War; maintains a defence expenditure larger than the next nine states put together; is a massive arms exporter to all sides in the Middle East; jeopardises peace and nuclear non-proliferation through its protection of Israel and its nuclear weapons; proclaims itself to be the “exceptional country”, meaning that it is not obliged to conform to international law; and, holds a view of its right to use military force, including deadly force anywhere in the world where it identifies the existence of an enemy, in ways that are contrary to international law and the Geneva Conventions on the conduct of war; is now developing new nuclear weapons, in violation of its Treaty obligations. Russia is doing the same, suggesting that a new nuclear arms race is now underway.
    1. Clearly, it is in our national interest to maintain a positive relationship with the United States in all respects: politically, in economic and in trade relations, and in science and technology. This should form an important goal within our foreign policy.
      But, if that relationship were to continue as it has, particularly during the last 15 years, it would increasingly harm us.
      Our decisions have been at fault. We have decided to join the US in its conduct as the “exceptional country”. This has cost us, to an unacceptable degree: in financial and human terms, in our relations with others, in the exercise of our independence, and in a heightened threat to us and our people from anti-western, non-State groups.
      We must: separate ourselves from the excesses of the US led “global war on terror”; substantially de-militarise our foreign policy; and institute a balance between our foreign, national security and defence policies which would ensure that they worked as set of mutually reinforcing efforts in the service of our overall foreign policy.
    2. We must initiate a discussion with the United States on the future of US military and related communications installations in Australia. Our aim should be to remove them. Their presence on our soil involves us in potential nuclear war fighting, makes us a target for attack with nuclear weapons, and renders ultimately empty the notion that we are an independent nation.
      The goals of maintaining a positive relationship with the United States and carrying out the adjustments to the past Alliance relationship, outlined above, are not in irreconcilable conflict.
      Clearly a period of adjustment would be required, but as we would in fact be moving ourselves into a position virtually identical to most States which enjoy a constructive relationship with the US, that adjustment would be achieved. The alternatives are not between being a completely compliant member of the US Alliance or an enemy. This choice has been rejected by, for example, by Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Brazil, India, without doing harm to their bilateral relationship with the US. It is worth remembering that the UK refused to take part in the Vietnam War. They paid no particular price for that.
      We should begin the process of asserting our independence by withdrawing Australian armed forces from Iraq and other deployments made on the basis of alliance loyalty and far from Australia. We will need to explain to the Americans what we are doing and why but that will become very clear when we require that a discussion be started on the withdrawal of US facilities within Australia.
      There will be hostility and the US will use Australian media in their attempt to stop us. Mr Murdoch will willingly help. But this should not be permitted to divert attention from two key facts: what is at issue is our independence and integrity, principles of life and politics to which the US proclaims deep attachment; and, their reaction will be driven by their needs and interests, not ours.
      It will be difficult but achievable. New Zealand did it 30 years ago.
    3. We must focus our policy attention more deeply on our own region and area; Asia and the Pacific, South East Asia. To this end, it makes immense sense for us to work far more closely with New Zealand. That would be a useful ANZAC legacy.
      Beyond our area we need to significantly expand our contacts with the emerging affinity groups, such as the BRICS. We already have a detailed and productive relationship with China. We need a similar growth with Brazil, India and South Africa.
    1. With respect to our military postures, they must be formed on the basis of our need and right to self defence, and it is crucial that others recognize that they have also been formed independently, not simply in support of the postures and interests of others. Our defence policy must assert and reflect our commitment that our armed forces will not be used in breach of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations – that armed force will only be used in self defence, or when authorised by the Security Council.
    1. We must place at the centre of our foreign policy our Australian values and our interests. If they are clearly defined and then pursued in a foreign policy which gives effect to them, our diplomacy would then be directed to ensuring, where possible, that our policy stance is evaluated accurately by others in terms of its goals and manner of formulation. This will enhance our security.
    1. On concrete policy goals, in addition to the self-evident economic and trade objectives, the maintenance of our regional security environment, and our global intellectual and cultural relations, we need to assign high priority in our Foreign and External Aid policies to the major non-military threats to human life and security: poverty, public health, communicable diseases, migration, natural disaster mitigation and relief, climate change, the global arms and narcotics trades.
      Australia’s skills and capabilities in these fields are highly developed. Making them available to others would both deliver real value and positively reflect our values.

    Conclusion

    Australia possesses a national character and values that should not be suppressed by the demands of any imperial power, as they were by Britain until half way through the 20th Century, and which we have now permitted to happen in relation to US policies, and the continuing assertion of the notion that, as a nation, we need a protector.

    Australia is now the 12th largest economy in the World Bank list of the 192 national economies. We can look after ourselves and our national security, provided we pursue a nationally determined foreign policy.

    It is time to do so.

    Richard Butler AC. Former Australian Ambassador to the United Nations
    Distinguished Scholar of International Peace and Security,
    School of International Affairs, The Pennsylvania State University.

  • John Menadue. Democratic Renewal and our loss of trust in institutions

    Fairness, Opportunity and Security
    Policy series edited by Michael Keating and John Menadue

    We speak often about the need for new ideas and policies to fill the void in the public debate.

    We will be examining these issues in this series Fairness, Opportunity and Security.

    But I think there is a prior problem.  We need political reform to restore trust in our political system and our polity.

    In the community there is a pervasive sense of powerlessness and disillusionment with governments, parliament and political parties.  We are tired of one liners, zingers and endless rhetoric. We want to be treated as adults in a serious discussion, on issues like climate change, fairness and our colonial type dependence on the US.

    That disillusionment goes much wider to many other institutions-e the churches, the media and corporations. In late April this year the Governor of the Reserve Bank Glenn Stevens criticised Australia’s major financial institutions for treating their customers poorly and forgetting that the financial system relies on trust. He spoke of ‘the erosion of a culture that placed great store in acting in a transparent way’ He added ‘where trust has been damaged, repair has to be made’ In early May this year the former Secretary of Treasury Martin Parkinson told the Australian Financial Review ‘I think our institutions are being eroded in their capabilities and eroded in public trust’

    But my focus here will not be on corporations or government departments. It will be chiefly on our ‘political’ institutions.

    In examining our institutions, I make two important assumptions.  The first is that we need institutions for stability, cohesion and progress.  The second is that over time power exercised through institutions is always abused, even by the best of our fellow citizens. Reform and renewal must be an ongoing process.

    In January this year Essential Research outlined our alarming lack of trust in institutions. Asked how much trust they had in institutions and organizations the interviewees responded as follows.

    ABC 53%
    High Court 53%
    Reserve Bank 48%
    Charitable organizations 44%
    Environment groups 33%
    Local Councils 32 %
    Commonwealth public service 32%
    Newspapers 30%
    Online News Media 27%
    Federal Parliament 25%
    The News media 25%
    State Parliament 24%
    Trade unions 23%
    Business groups 23%
    Religious organizations 22%
    Political parties 14%

     

    It is disturbing reading.  Other surveys tell the same story. Perhaps it is noteworthy that the three most trusted institutions are public institutions, the ABC, the High Court and the Reserve Bank.

    The Nordics are probably the most successful societies and economies in the world. As I have argued the key to their success in my view is trust- trust of the government by the governed and vice versa. There is preparedness to pay quite high taxes based on a confidence that the government will spend money wisely. If only!

    Major political parties in Australia are losing support.  In the 1970s over 90 % of people were basically committed to a major party. At the 2013 federal election it fell to less than 80%. According to an ANU Social Research study 43% of Australians at the last election believed it did not matter who was in power. In particular young people are opting out. About 25% of eligible people did not enrol at the last federal election, did not vote or voted informal. According to a recent Lowy Poll 40% of Australians did not believe that democracy was the best form of government.

    Membership of the ALP and the Liberal party has declined from about 300,000 after WWII to about 50,000 today.  No one will admit how bad the numbers are. Money, not party membership has replaced membership as the driving force of political campaigns.  It is called ‘donocracy’ in the US.

    In 1950, 44% of Australians claimed to attend church at least monthly. It is now about 20% and falling.   Almost all the churches have been damaged by the cover up of sexual abuse.

    Union membership is now down from over 50% in the 1950s to about 20% of the workforce today. In terms of trust unions are on a par with organizations like the Business Council of Australia.

    This breakdown in confidence and trust in institutions is not because we don’t want to participate in institutions in our community.  The republic referendum some years ago was lost because of the quite strong view by many Australians that they wanted to be directly involved in choosing our future president.

    I don’t think the alienation has occurred so much because institutions have changed.  The problem is that they haven’t changed enough. The ground has moved beneath them and they have not responded. The information and education revolution has made us much better informed and much better equipped to participate in institutions, but we are often denied the opportunity.  Women particularly have more time to be involved in institutions outside the family, but they are often excluded.

    The media and particularly TV have contributed to the alienation.  Public figures are trivialised and their personal foibles take pre-eminence over temperate and informed policy debate.  At election times, what matters is the swinging voter in the swinging electorate, rather than the important issues of concern to the wider community.

    We are clearly not the innovators we were a hundred years ago in institution building.  In 1856 Victoria led the world when it introduced the secret ballot for parliamentary elections.  It was known internationally as the ‘Australian ballot’.  In 1859 all male British subjects in the eastern states and South Australia had the vote.  In 1894 South Australia was an international pacesetter in votes for women.  The first democratically elected Labor government in the world was in Queensland in 1899. In 1901 six disparate states joined together in our federation.

    How then can we renovate at least some of our public institutions?

    Politics is about how power is exercised and for whose benefit.  It is a noble calling and disparaged too much, particularly by those who want untrammelled private power for themselves.  But to change the way our institutions operate, faces one major obstacle – the power of those who benefit from the present system.  Insiders want to hang on to power.

    In many pre-selection ballots for either the ALP or the Liberal Party, a hundred or so members select the party candidate, yet in the wider electorate there are probably 40,000 to 50,000 supporters.  As a result of declining memberships and tight control, successful candidates are, not surprisingly, insiders – staffers of politicians, friends or relatives of faction leaders. Many of these new ‘white bread politicians’ have limited life experience.

    There are possible options to address some of the clear democratic deficiencies in our major parties.  We need to debate them.  Party members in federal electorates could directly choose delegates to federal conferences and break the power of state officials.

    Whilst guarding against abuses the community as well as party members should be able to vote in party pre-selections for parliament.

    Unless the political parties broadly represent their voter constituencies, we will continue to tread the slippery road of personalities and political spin, rather than addressing the real issues and concerns of the community.  While the major parties refuse to treat the community seriously and run away from public discussion, their natural constituencies are disenfranchised.  Those that are really enfranchised are a small group of party power brokers and aspirational swinging voters in swinging electorates.  Because the major parties are out of touch with their constituencies, the debate on the big-ticket items runs into the sand – reconciliation, the republic, relations with Asia and climate change.

    Parliaments are in need of renovation.  The cabinet and party machines dominate parliament.  The executive has become arrogant ‘Question time’ is ‘spin time’.  I am sure the community would welcome parliamentary renovation which should be guided by the principle that the separation of powers must be enhanced whether it is to discourage a Prime Minister dragooning parliament or a minister intimidating the judiciary.  Particular reforms could include: four year fixed term federal parliaments to discourage excessive and almost continual electioneering; an independent speaker to encourage a more inclusive, open and less adversarial parliaments; regular audits not only of the entitlements of MPs but also their performance; more conscience votes by MPs with less party discipline on ‘non-core’ issues.

    To assist members of parliament to counter the power of the cabinet and the public service the last parliament established a Parliamentary Budget Office. It provides independent and nonpartisan analysis of the budget cycle. It was a good start. But its work is restricted to budgets. Similar offices should be established in such areas as health, defence and foreign affairs. The research resources of the Parliamentary Library should also be enhanced. In the development of Gough Whitlam’s policy program the Parliamentary Library was a critical enabler.

    We need an improved parliamentary committee system where hopefully we can begin to see again the art of negation and compromise. The Senate has shown that improvements are possible.  A good start in our next parliament would be an all-party committee to consider ways in which the performance of the parliament could be improved and the power of the executive contained.

    We need a broad agenda for parliamentary reform.  The major party that is credible on parliamentary reform will reap a large electoral dividend. The best way for Tony Abbott and Bill Shorten to prove their bona fides as parliamentarians is to demonstrate by actions how they value the Parliament and use it as their forum and not television grabs, and talk back radio. What a pleasure it would be to see the parliament as a lively forum for debating policy and asking genuine questions to elicit information rather than a means to score politicall points. If only our politicians would seriously endeavour to find common ground by starting on such issues as senate electoral reform, political donations and ending the abuse of power by lobbyists. Leadership by Tony Abbott and Bill Shorten in these areas is the best way to restore confidence in parliament and politics. Don’t talk about it. Do it.

    At the political level the Hawke Government provides us with an example of the way we need to proceed. It was about building consensus- within his government, within his party, with the opposition and with the community which responded to this consensual style of leadership by being prepared to consider the need for reform. Consensus building was politically appealing and effective in policy outcomes. We are a long way from this style of politics today.

    Institutions, like people, are all prone to error and abuse of power.  Robust democratic institutions and democratic debate are critical. Too often we avoid addressing institutional failure by suggesting that they are all leadership problems.  ‘If only we had a better Prime Minister, or a better Chairman, all would be well’.  But all leaders inevitably disappoint us.  We need institutions and a public culture which are in good order.

    In addition to renewal of our democratic institutions, I suggest there is something even more essential – the values and conventions that we need to hold in common. Decades of failure to keep promises have taken an inevitable and heavy toll. Fairness, respect for others, openness, integrity and trust, are the glue that hold us together.    A democratic and free society will remain free only if the virtues necessary for freedom are alive in our community.  Democracy cannot be separated from public morality. The democratic project and institutions within it must be informed by what is right and true. Every society needs a moral compass.

    We speak about the failures of our political leaders to outline policies. That is valid criticism. But behind that failure is an even more important issue, the failure of our institutions and the institutional processes necessary to assert the public interest in the face of very powerful vested interests.

    Like individuals, institutions also depend on trust. That trust must be shared and reciprocated.

    Moral behaviour is in the end about how our words and actions enhance human dignity and human flourishing.  Robust and well functioning institutions are an important means to that end.

    We have a lot of work to do.

  • Ian Marsh. Part 2. Democratic Renewal: policy-making practice.

    Fairness, Opportunity, Security.
    Policy series edited by Michael Keating and John Menadue.

    In Part 1, I pointed out that the Westminster style two-party system is in trouble.

    Part 2. Implications for Policy Making Practice.

    At least four implications would seem to follow from the above analysis.

    The first concerns the need to create systemic capacities to address single issues. As Bernard Crick observed many years ago, the present forms and processes of parliament under the Westminster system are tantamount to a continuing election campaign. This suits majoritarian or winner-takes-all government. This mise-en-scene was designed for an era in which the major parties championed different ideologies and different medium-term agendas. It assumed that these parties enjoyed support from more or less half the community. It also assumed that their approach to particular domestic issues as they arose could be derived from their distinctive overarching programmes.

    Neither of these conditions now holds. There is no party platform or canonical document from which to infer attitudes to gay marriage, euthanasia, the financial crisis, live cattle exports, refugees or Gonski: to nominate just a few recent matters. Each of these issues is associated with distinctive alignments, distinctive agendas, distinctive coalitions and distinctive narratives. Thus there is no longer any natural nor enduring majority on many if not most of the issues that are on the current political agenda.

    Furthermore, the present system has almost no capacity to create a political conversation around single issues that is at least partially separate from the struggle for office between the major parties. It lacks any capacity for what might be termed a ‘contemplative’ phase in the unfolding of contested policy issues.

    Second (really a corollary of the preceding point), coalition-building needs to be made routine within the structure of the policy making system. As a large literature attests, where the community is fragmented and pluralised, a coalition symbolises wide support. Coalitions add important public cues to the political equation – cues that, in the majoritarian era, were largely delivered by major party brands.

    Third, to the extent possible, bi(multi)partisanship opportunities need to be explored. As noted above, on many issues there is now substantial overlap between one or other of the parties. Yet you would never know from the present political conversation. A critical moment in the public policy process occurs at the point of time at which an issue first enters the political agenda. For recent examples, think of McClure, Gonski, Higher Education funding, the debate over the deficit. If the agenda entry phase in the policy process could be made more transparent, the opportunity to explore the scope for at least partial cross-party alliances would be greatly extended.

    In a strategic phase, the political conversation might focus on: Why is this issue significant? What establishes its claim to a place in the national conversation? What are some of the options for dealing with it? If the scope for agreement around such matters could be made at least partially transparent, the public conversation might thereafter better focus on real areas of contention. This would need to occur before the executive makes more immediate policy choices.

    And finally, opportunities for ad hoc public engagement need to be considerably extended. Digital media provide a variety of opportunities for ad hoc groups of citizens to come together around particular issues and to advance policy proposals. There are already examples of this occurring beyond the formal system. But the latter has no or very limited capacities to connect to this activity.

    Recall the way citizens proposed a motion at a local branch and then followed its advance to regional and later national party conferences. This suggests how such processes now need to be orchestrated around single issues. Engagement needs to be serial and reciprocal, not sporadic or one-off. If groups of citizens propose something and it is rejected, the reasons need to be stated. More importantly, the proponents need the chance to return to their cause by augmenting their argument and by meeting a higher support hurdle. How these matters might be operationalised needs much more thought. But the principle that engagement should be serial and reciprocal is fundamental.

    In sum, in a different era the major party organisations provided much of the tissue that connected the formal system to its publics. They still have important roles. But they can no longer deliver the necessary linkages. So how can connections be rebuilt?

    System Adaptation.

    There are many proposals for system development. Deliberative democrats propose much wider use of citizen juries and similar choice mechanism. Others see a redefined role for major parties, with requirements for community engagement and policy activism expanded (e.g. Latham, Reith, Faulkner). Voting reform is another possibility although there has hitherto been no mobilisation around this issue, as for example occurred in New Zealand. Social media is just emerging – but it has no connection to the formal system. Indeed to be effective all these initiatives need to be anchored in a formal structure within the representational system. Access and engagement, which is broadened and deepened and sited at the epicentre of the representational system, is fundamental.

    It is hard to see any alternative to a much expanded and deepened role for the parliamentary committee system. Furthermore, Australia’s political system is almost purpose-built for such an outcome. The Senate was modelled on its US counterpart. In fact, the procedures that would be associated with a democratic transformation are evident in our own historic experience. Between 1901 and 1909, the electorate returned three parties – the Free Traders, Protectionists and Labor.

    Governing required at least two of these parties to reach an accommodation with each other on particular measures. Deakin, the leading political architect of the period, led minority governments. To create sufficient parliamentary support to enact contested measures, he needed to initiate a parliamentary (and hence public conversation) at the strategic end of the parliamentary issue cycle, but before the government’s own approach was determined.

    To achieve this outcome, he turned to the tried and tested vehicle, committees of the legislature. Indeed the Australian constitution provided him with an ideal structure. The Senate had been conceived as an independent House on the American model. In its initial years most members acted in this spirit.

    More recently, the (late) Liberal Senator, David Hamer, recommended converting the Senate to a Committee House. Ministers would cease to be drawn from this Chamber. Committee chairs would enjoy extended standing (as is occurring now in the UK). Senate committees could then become important agenda entry points for new and emerging issues. The adversarial culture, which is now often breached in committee enquiries, could be equally qualified in broader Senate proceedings.

    With an especial focus on emerging and strategic issues, committees could be agents of the legislature rather than the executive. They could recommend action – and the legislature would debate their recommendations. Ideally this would be free of the whips. But even with whipped or partially whipped votes, majority, cross-party support in the Senate would provide important guidance for the executive. A more diverse expression of views in the legislature prior to the executive determining a course of action would give the executive more flexibility in response. Following this debate, it would be up to the government to decide what to do. But such a change in the policy determining sequence would also represent a major change in the structure of political power.

    Conclusion

    The present adversarial system was born in 1909. It was based on two powerful party organisations that each appealed to roughly half of the Australian community. These days are long gone. The challenge in the twenty-first century is to develop a political system more aligned to Australia’s pluralised society.

    Thus, while most of the contributions to this series of policy discussion papers focus on the nature and content of future policy choices, it is argued here that actually achieving future policy reform may well depend equally on reforms to our political system and decision making processes. Furthermore, it might be noted that this is not entirely a new situation. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the outstanding economic problem of the day was ‘stagflation’, and a significant factor in the election of the Hawke Government in 1983 was its promise to seek a new approach to dealing with this problem built around a search for consensus, based on equality of sacrifice. Indeed it is arguable that at the time of the election the incoming Labor Government was more strongly identified in the public mind with its promise of “consensus” than with the actual content of its policies. Whatever the case, however, it is indisputable that that Government was able to achieve a great deal of policy reform that set Australia up to meet the challenge of globalisation.

    Now we are facing similar challenges of political and policy failure, and again we need to address the political challenge of the how to reform the decision-making system as well as the policy content. Essentially this political challenge is to change the system so that it is more conducive to producing a majority in favour of sensible reforms.

    But unfortunately to date, the potential of the parliamentary committee system to meet this need is hardly recognised. The procedural and other changes that would be required to enhance its standing and influence in the broader political and policy making system would be tantamount to a democratic transformation. Such institutional developments would align the formal system much more constructively with its publics.

    The incentive structure in parliament which presently favours an adversarial approach is a fundamental issue. Present parliamentary incentives dictate that what one declares black the other must almost invariably proclaim to be white. Until we face up to the mismatch between the formal structure of Australian politics and the society which it nominally serves, dysfunction and gridlock must be expected to continue.

    Can any of the major parties (or any of the minority blocs in the Senate) summon the resolve, the tactical guile and the political imagination that is necessary to transit to a post-majoritarian political order?

    Ian Marsh is a Visiting professor at the UTS Management School. His study Democratic Decline and Democratic Renewal: Political Change in Britain, Australia and New Zealand (with Raymond Miller) was published in 2012 by Cambridge University Press.

     

  • Ian Marsh. Part 1. Democratic Renewal: towards a post-majoritarian policy making structure?

    Fairness, Opportunity and Security
    Policy series edited by Michael Keating and John Menadue.

    Whoever wins the next election, the challenge of dealing with a hung Senate will almost certainly loom large. Perhaps also a hung House of Representatives. Malcolm Turnbull tells us that the appropriate response is a compelling narrative delivered with conviction and resolve by a sufficiently competent leader.

    Is this enough? In this short note I will argue that the problems in present political arrangements are much deeper – they are systemic and structural. The present political and policy system is largely gridlocked. This is the result not of incompetent leaders or deficient narratives, important though both certainly are, but rather of a slow-burn legitimacy crisis that has been many years in gestation.

    Put another way – recent decades have witnessed not one but two seismic shifts: economic globalisation and social pluralisation. The former has been more or less addressed by the major parties. The latter has yet to be assimilated.

    Evidence of social pluralisation and the consequent political gridlock is clear in the recent political record. John Howard passed the GST but at the following election lost the popular vote. Hardly auspicious. After much delay and much cash, he also privatised Telstra. Otherwise, despite ten years of office, tough reforms were conspicuous by their absence. Moreover, he governed with a windfall revenue gain of $283 billion. Despite this, in the ten months prior to defeat, the Howard government u-turned on not one or two but seven measures. These were not minor matters: they were issues at the heart of its programme – Work Choices, climate change, broadband, the Murray-Darling, education funding and so forth.

    Things hardly improved thereafter. The only significant policy matters to survive the Rudd and Gillard governments were based on bipartisanship – plain cigarette packaging, the NDIS and perhaps the Abbott-Morrison-led race to the gutter on refugees. Climate change is on-going.

    Short of bipartisanship, we have no recent examples of successful policy change on a major contested issue. Not one.

    If further confirmation is needed, look no further than the rise and decline of Tony Abbott. As an uncompromising and negative Opposition leader, he was lauded by some for his ruthless pursuit of office, reflected in wholly populist negative campaigns. But in government he faced the reality of office. Nemesis intervened. His slogans created expectations that even his most ardent supporters must now recognise to be contrary to Australia’s national interests. At one level, his fate is testament to combative hubris. At another, to a dysfunctional political incentive structure.

    Underlying political gridlock is a crisis of democratic legitimacy. This will afflict any government. It derives from a disconnect between the formal political and policy making system and its publics. This is a fundamental systemic problem. It has not sprung up overnight or over one government. It has been driven by a variety of structural changes. The following sections explore first, the nature of these structural shifts; second, the requirements for renewing citizen engagement; and third, the systemic changes that might be required to make this wider engagement a reality.

    Three Structural Changes

    Why has democratic legitimacy so eroded? This outcome has been driven by three structural changes: first, the decline of major party organisations; second, a convergence of major party (particularly economic) agendas; and third, and most importantly, a pluralisation and differentiation of citizen identities. Let’s look briefly at each.

    First, the story of major party organisational decline is well known. From a membership of some 8% of the entire adult voting population in 1966, the major parties now attract only some 0.8%. Moreover, whereas only 2% of citizens did not identify with either major party in 1967 the number rose to 28% in the early 2000s and has since hovered around this level. Hence, around 50% of the electorate now have weak or no identification with either major party. Further, about 20% of us vote for minor parties and independents and about another 20% of those eligible do not vote or do not enrol or vote informal. An astonishing number!

    But decline extends well beyond public support. Party organisations used to be important sites engaging activists and aggregating interests. Party branches were widespread and embedded in local communities. Party conferences were important policy making forums. Citizens could advance motions at local and regional party meetings and thus experience political efficacy. These capacities are long gone. Conferences now only occur infrequently and are largely stage managed. A small coterie of parliamentary elites substantially influence manifesto design. Member influence is marginal. The dense tissue that once connected the major parties to their publics has gone.

    A second reason for citizen disaffection arises from convergence of major party agendas. The days when they stood for significantly different directions for national social and/or economic development have long gone. The Hawke-Keating government led a national response to economic globalisation. The illusion of effective government continues to be sustained by memory of this era. But crisis-induced bipartisanship was its essential condition. The end of a shared sense of economic crisis around 1996, or even earlier, was also the end of that era.

    Remember the political incentive structure rewards differentiation. Hence the amount of illusion and make-believe in the political world that we now experience. This is reflected in the short termism, populism and often opportunistic, fabricated or manufactured difference which characterises contemporary politics Moreover, responses are framed with an eye to media impact rather than any underlying values or ideology. Leaders who do not play these games have been given short shrift by their supporters.

    These changes in the formal political system have marched in step with another more fundamental change. This is the transformation of Australian society. The social movements of the 1970s were the proximate cause. Think of the women’s, gay, environment, Indigenous rights, multicultural, animal rights, consumer etc movements, and the more conservative counter-mobilisations that they stimulated. These attitudinal changes have effected a fundamental transformation in the political orientations of Australians. The days when you could think about politics exclusively in binary or class terms are long gone

    This change in Australian political identities is absolutely fundamental. The Australian community is now pluralised and differentiated and, in some contexts, increasingly regionalised. The best image is a kaleidoscope. This reflects not only the diverse values that are held by Australians, but also the challenge in framing persuasive political narratives. The assumption that basic partisan values are widely shared no longer holds. Rather leaders need to craft appeals that can reach out to majority coalitions.

    In sum, the slow-burn crisis of legitimacy, which the three foregoing structural changes have occasioned, is perhaps only now fully apparent.

    In Part 2 I will be examining the implications for policy-making practice.

    Ian Marsh is a Visiting professor at the UTS Management School. His study Democratic Decline and Democratic Renewal: Political Change in Britain, Australia and New Zealand (with Raymond Miller) was published in 2012 by Cambridge University Press.

  • Ken Henry. Fairness, opportunity and security.

    The policy series ‘Fairness, opportunity and security’ begins on Monday May 11.

    I can’t recall a poorer quality public debate, on almost any issue, than what we have had in Australia in recent times.’  Ken Henry

    In December 1983 the $A was floated and restrictions on the free international movement of capital were abolished. On 1 July 2000 a broad-based goods and services tax replaced a plethora of highly inefficient, inequitable and unintelligible indirect taxes. These events ‘bookended’ an extraordinary period of policy reform that ‘opened up’ the Australian economy, transforming just about every aspect of microeconomic and macroeconomic policy and institutions.

    It is sobering to wonder how much of what was achieved then could be achieved today. The Australia that was capable of delivering that policy transformation seems like a very different place.

    In the early 1980s, Australian policy makers, haunted by another deep recession attributable to policy failure over many decades, found themselves on a burning platform. With high inflation and high unemployment, and another negative terms of trade shock that threatened a further hit to living standards, the imperative for action was broadly understood and accepted.

    Today, Australians find themselves in an economy that has avoided three serious recessions affecting many other countries: one associated with the Asian Financial Crisis of the late 1990s; another associated with the ‘tech wreck’ stock market crash and subsequent developed world recession a few years later; and a third, more recently, as the so-called Global Financial Crisis paralysed the rest of the developed world.

    Unlike most of the rest of the developed world, the Australian economy has continued to experience low inflation, relatively low unemployment, and rising average living standards.

    It must be tempting to conclude, as many people have, that because of our strong economic performance, Australians have simply become complacent. And that complacency could provide a reason for Australians being so disinterested in further economic reform; and so disinterested, too, in addressing the wider set of challenges and opportunities associated, especially, with unsustainable environmental practices and the economic, social and security dimensions of the emergence of Asian powerhouses in China and India.

    But Australians might not be complacent. It is just as likely that they don’t understand what is going on. Indeed, given the quality of contemporary public policy debate, I wonder that any significant proportion of the population could have a coherent view of national challenges and opportunities. The confusion in public debate seems to me to be a lot worse than at any other time over the past 25 years or so. Indeed, I can’t recall a poorer quality public debate, on almost any issue, than what we have had in Australia in recent times. Today, it is almost certain that, in almost any area, what people generally understand to be the case is, in fact, a myth.

    For example, one could conclude from commentary on the challenges facing trade-exposed Australian businesses that our future in the Asian century rests on winning a race to the bottom on wages, taxes, social protections, environmental standards and animal welfare. The truth is very different. An Australia that has made a success of the Asian century will feature Australian businesses deeply integrated into the economies of Asia, through trade and investment linkages and in partnership with regional businesses, employing people in Australia and from across the region, supplying global markets. It will feature a highly skilled and educated, dynamic and optimistic Australian community that understands the region’s diversity and builds enduring relationships with its people through tourism, education, science and research collaboration and cultural exchange. And it will feature Australian governments, at all levels and in all parts of the country, enjoying productive relationships in the region, based on consultation, collaboration and mutual respect.

    The challenges posed by the Asian century should energise a focus on the quality of Australia’s national endowments, both natural and created. But Australia’s success in the Asian century will rest on more than this, demanding the development of collaborative business relationships with Asian partners, a strong contribution to sustainable security in the region, and deep and enduring people-to-people links across a broad sweep of human activity: commercial, social, cultural and political.

    Among the many public policy requirements of this time, I would draw attention, especially, to these: the more effective protection of vulnerable species and eco-systems; the need for high yielding investments in human capability and physical capital, including both economic and social infrastructure; the development of effective commercial, cultural and security relationships in the Asian region; and insisting that national benefits are shared widely so that all Australians, especially those suffering entrenched disadvantage, have the opportunity to choose a better life.

    It is my hope that the writings you will find here will play a substantial role in improving the quality of public policy discourse, in these and many other areas. You will read contributions from people who know what they are talking about, and who care about the impact of their ideas. Many of the writers have been here before; taking responsibility for the quality of public policy debate, playing key roles in the development of better policy outcomes.

    Dr Ken Henry AC was Secretary of the Department of the Treasury from 2001 to 2011.

     

     

  • The British Election

    The Observer newspaper in the UK has an interesting background piece on the issues facing people in the UK. It raises many of the questions that concern Australians about the disfunction and the loss of trust in our political institutions. See link to article below.  John Menadue

    http://gu.com/p/48435/sbl

  • Alex Wodak. Prohibition and its discontents: who really killed Chan and Sukumaran?

    The fall out from Indonesia’s execution of Chan and Sukumaran for drug trafficking continues. In their unprecedented press conference on 3 May, the leaders of the Australian Federal Police argued that under existing laws and guidelines, they were obliged to share intelligence with their Indonesian counterparts. Moreover, under similar conditions in future, the AFP expects that similar decisions will be made. The basic problems are that many young Australians travel to countries that still retain the death penalty for drug trafficking (and some other offences) and prohibition is still the global drug policy. So the execution of Australians and citizens of other nationalities for drug trafficking in future are inevitable.

    As so often happens with tragedies, the search is now on for someone or some organization to blame. The problem is that everyone is responsible while no one is also responsible: this is in reality a system problem.

    The members of the firing squad weren’t really responsible as they were just carrying out orders. The Indonesian police and court officials weren’t really responsible as they were merely implementing laws that their parliament had passed. President Widodo wasn’t really responsible as he was, like any good democratic leader, merely responding to overwhelming popular opinion in his country. Howard and Rudd weren’t responsible either because in their earlier support for the execution of the Bali bombers they reflected overwhelming popular opinion in their country at the time. Abbott and Bishop weren’t responsible as they inherited this mess from their predecessors. And Chan and Sukumaran weren’t really responsible because they were merely pawns of higher-level criminals who managed to evade detection. The seven mules weren’t responsible either because Chan and Sukumaran had coerced them. As is so often the case in drug trafficking cases, the fall guys who got caught and paid the ultimate price came from poor minority families.

    Compounding the tragedy is the ineffectiveness of drug prohibition, now acknowledged with increasing frequency. More than half a dozen retired and now even serving Australian Police Commissioners have conceded that drug law enforcement has minimal impact on the drug market. A year ago, Prime Minister Tony Abbott admitted that the war on drugs is a war we cannot win but nevertheless argued that it is a war we should keep fighting. In June 2011 the Global Commission on Drug Policy, consisting of more than twenty retired world leaders, released a report documenting the failure of drug prohibition and called for a consideration of options. In the last four years, the Global Commission on Drug Policy has recruited more world leaders and issued more reports. Some countries are now starting to reform their drug policy. In April 2016 in New York, a United Nations General Assembly Special Session will consider the growing crisis in global drug policy.

    The seizure of 390 kg of heroin off the coast of Part Macquarie in 1998 did not affect the price or purity of heroin in Australia. Chan and Sukumaran were executed for their role in the attempted trafficking of 8 kg of heroin. What these executions may have done for a time is increase the perception of risk for drug traffickers. That might then get translated into higher prices and greater profits which might in turn convince some wavering wannabe drug trafficker to try their luck. Whatever else drugs might be, they are also a market with buyers and sellers agreeing on a price for a quantity of a commodity. But unlike most markets, drugs are bought and sold in a pyramid market where buyers are also sellers.

    If drug prohibition was to ever be effective anywhere it should be in prisons. Yet drugs are available in most prisons. A few years ago on an international assignment I asked a prisoner in an Indonesian drug prison near Jakarta whether inmates could still obtain drugs. ‘Yes’ he replied, ‘but they are usually more expensive than in the community though sometimes drugs are less expensive inside than outside prisons’.

    So why do we keep fighting a war on drugs when an increasing number of prominent members of the community accept that this is futile?

    Professor Craig Reinarman, a US academic concluded that ‘drugs are richly functional scapegoats. They provide elites with fig leaves to place over unsightly social ills that are endemic to the social system over which they preside. And they provide the public with a restricted aperture of attribution in which only a chemical bogeyman or the lone deviants who ingest it are seen as the cause of a cornucopia of complex problems.’

    We continue to fight a war on drugs for several reasons. Drug wars are still useful politically. Many politicians still think the transitional costs of changing drug policy are too high. But there are now supporters of drug law reform among politicians of virtually all parties. Law enforcement aimed to reduce the supply of drugs employs many people. The costs of continuing the current failed policy are increasing while the costs of changing policy are declining as more countries move out from the crumbling straightjacket of international drug control.

    Australians who wish to avoid more tragedies like Chan and Sukumaran should support drug law reform and the universal abolition of the death penalty.

    Dr. Alex Wodak AM, President, Australian Drug Law Reform Foundation, Director, Australia21

     

  • LAUNCHING NEXT MONDAY. 11 May 2015. Policy Series

    Fairness, Opportunity and Security
    A Policy Series to fill the policy vacuum.
    Edited by Michael Keating and John Menadue
    .

    On May 11 in this blog- Pearls and Irritations– we will begin a series of articles on important policy issues. There will be over forty articles on sixteen policy areas from over thirty contributors. The series will run for four to five weeks.

    Each of the policy articles will be about 2000 words. They will be realistic, given our political and financial constraints.

    Ken Henry will be introducing the series.  

    In the week commencing 11 May we will post articles on

    Democratic Renewal (John Menadue and Ian Marsh)
    The role of government (Michael Keating, Ian McAuley and John Menadue)
    Foreign Policy (Stephen Fitzgerald, Cavan Hogue, Richard Butler, Stuart Harris and John McCarthy)

    In the week commencing 18 May we will post articles on

    Fixing the budget (Michael Keating)
    Taxation Reform (Michael Keating)
    Federalism (Michael Keating and John Menadue)
    Job Creation (Michael Keating)
    Productivity (Michael Keating)
    Transport and Infrastructure (Michael Keating)
    Welfare priorities (Andrew Podger and Peter Whiteford)

    Then will follow

    Health (John Menadue, Jim McGinty {workforce})
    Development of our human capital in the fields of education, science, innovation, research and development (Glenn Withers, Chris Bonnor {schools}, Glenn Withers {Universities})
    Population/migration/refugees (John Menadue, Peter Hughes, Arja Keski-Nummi)
    Retirement incomes (Michael Keating, Andrew Podger)
    Indigenous affairs (Fred Chaney, Michael Gracey)
    Communications and the Arts (Kim Williams {Arts}, Terry Flew {media regulation in internet world}, Julianne Shultz {cultural identity}, Rob Nicholls {NBN})
    Environment and climate change (Ross Garnaut, Peter Cosier, Brendan Mackay)
    Inequality (Peter Whiteford, Michael Keating, Ian McAuley)
    Security, both military and soft power (Michael Wesley)
    Internal security and freedom (Spencer Zifcak {Human Rights Act/Charter})

    Media enquiries. Please contact johnmenadue@staging-johnmenadue.kinsta.cloud.

     

     

  • Joan Staples. The Value of NGOs

    Australian civil society is again facing attacks from government and conservative think tanks seeking to silence and weaken community voices.   The Labor years of 2007-2013 saw a break from the attempted silencing of the Howard decade, but there is now a new push, that aims to detract from the legitimacy of NGOs and to deny the valuable role their advocacy plays in our democracy. The detail of the new push has been documented recently. It is not a coincidence that at the same time there are new younger voices in an energised environment movement. Many new groups of younger activists are fighting for their future by challenging coal and gas corporations as climate change looms.

    Government actions that are concerning and distracting civil society at present include:

    • Almost 600 environmental groups that hold tax-deductibility status in Australia are being scrutinised by a House of Representatives Inquiry. Government MPs have apparently identified up to 150 groups they wish to strike off the list. Other community groups having the same tax deductibility have not been included. There have been suggestions that those most directly challenging the fossil fuel industry are being targeted by this Inquiry.
    • The federal government White Paper on tax called, Re:Think, has a chapter on the NGO sector. It poses questions for discussion that ignore the advocacy role of developing good policy from community input. Instead, it posits NGOs as competing with the for-profit sector and asks if they have a ‘competitive advantage’.
    • Various state governments have proposed, or are proposing, legislation that would restrict the ability of groups to use public forms of non-violent protest.

    These attacks have been documented a number of times and in fact have been written about extensively. However, it is worth pausing and setting out the importance of this public advocacy to our society.

    The value of NGOs to our public sphere is multi-faceted.

    • NGOs respond to policy and they develop alternative proposals. This input is vital to good policy-making by both government and business.  Community people on the ground can see and predict the effect of policies in a practical and effective way, making improved outcomes possible for all.
    • NGOs are uniquely placed to support policy that looks to long term goals or that affects the future.  In contrast, governments react to the short electoral cycle, asking ‘how will it affect our chance of re-election?’, and businesses have a legal responsibility to ask ‘how will it affect our bottom line’?, but it is a special quality of the NGO sector that it has the flexibility to include the long-term in its policy interests and in its desired outcomes. Responding to the crisis of climate change is the most obvious example where a response relevant to the future is competing with party electoral aims and the business bottom line of fossil fuel companies.
    • Another most important role is to provide a balance to the views of powerful, organised, economic interests.  There is a large imbalance between the power of vested interests and that of the community.  On the occasions when government and business work together, the power imbalance is even greater, and NGOs are vital.
    • NGOs have an accountability function. They inform the community on the behaviour of governments and businesses and call them to account. NGOs can claim legitimacy for this role if their roots are in the community and they are informed by the practical impact of policy on themselves or their members. When this is the case, NGOs are uniquely placed to respond to (a) the impact of government and business policies, (b) the impact of lack of policy, (c) failure to implement promises, (d) the unintended consequences of policy and (e) the existence of unethical or corrupt behaviour.
    • NGOs can show the amount of public support or opposition there is for any policy. It is a creative challenge for NGOs to find new ways to demonstrate this. Rallies, public meetings, letterwriting, petitions etc. are traditional means and the internet has thrown up many new methods.
    • NGOs are better than individuals trying to act on issues alone, because by pooling financial and intellectual resources they improve the quality of their contribution to public debate.  ‘Two heads are better than one’ and ‘many hands make light work’.
    • NGOs can improve equity in our society by providing a ‘voice’ for marginalised and disadvantaged individuals and groups.
    • Regional and country NGOs are important for providing information to make policy specifically relevant to different geographical areas.  The same is true for special interest groups, such as the disabled, women, etc. Policy affecting any regional or special interest group is improved with their input, making it better policy for all.
    • Unlike the public service or government or large businesses, the flexibility of the NGO sector means it can respond quickly to new political situations.  New organisations frequently spring up in response to need or policy proposals. NGO flexibility can be seen as part of the variety, dynamism and vitality of the community from which NGOs come. The flexibility can also reflect different political and cultural ways of talking about the same issue and can tap into different parts of society.

    Conclusion

    It is exactly 20 years since John Howard first spoke of NGOs as part of the economic market, rather than as part of our democratic structure and our public sphere. The Howard years were a confusing period for NGOs. Practical actions of feeding the homeless or planting trees were commended in the name of smaller government, but advocacy on behalf of the homeless or the environment were discouraged by a number of means. Now neoliberal warriors in the Abbott government are opening up new fronts.

    The Australian community has heard two decades of economic language measuring the worth of NGOs as economic entities. This has resulted in a devaluing of NGO contributions and the devaluing of a healthy contest of ideas. It is time to reassert the positives of an engagement with the community.

  • Wiryono Sastrohandoyo. Getting the Australia-Indonesia relationship back on track.

    John Menadue asked me to discuss how best to get Australian-Indonesian relations back on track, although I agree  that this is a politically sensitive issue and weighing it up may not be the prudent thing to do while there is still a lot of anger in the heart of many Australians and Indonesians.

    The anger on the part of the Australians is easy to understand. Two of your citizens have been executed by firing squad, after having been found guilty of a capital crime by a duly constituted court and after all the legal processes to save their lives had been exhausted. But during the ten years between their sentencing and their execution they had reformed, become good persons who were always in the service of their fellow human beings, notably through the drug abuse rehabilitation program that they designed and carried out while in prison.

    The anger on the part of many Indonesians is different: it is born of a deep-seated grievance against Western nations with which Indonesia interacted in the past. This grievance just happened to be focused on Australia because of the awkward way the Australian government tried to save the lives of the two death convicts. They felt that they were being dictated upon and were not getting the respect they deserved. The anger seethed when the Australian PM very imprudently brought up the matter of Australian aid to Indonesia. This was regarded as an attempt to humiliate Indonesia into sparing the lives of the two death convicts. This was all they could think of whenever Australia is mentioned. Nobody remembered how Australia figured in the country’s struggle to keep its independence in the late 1940s.

    It might seem to be the dictate of common sense to let the storm blow over before saying anything about Australian-Indonesian relations, to be silent about it for a sufficient period of time to allow the negative emotions to dissipate. And yet there might be a deeper wisdom in addressing the problem right away.

    In this regard it is always a good thing to be able to see things from the other person’s point of view. When I was undergoing training to become a diplomat, we were told to cultivate the habit of two-handedness. To be able to say: on the one hand, this is how I see the issue, and on the other hand, you may have a point that I must consider.

    On one hand, Australia needs Indonesia as an economic partner; on the other hand, Indonesia equally needs Australia as an economic partner and as a collaborator in its regional architecture building. That is why I am optimistic that on both sides the wounds of recent controversy will heal. And my optimism is strengthened when I think of what PM Abbott recently said: “This is a dark moment in the relationship, but I am sure the relationship will be restored.”

    Likewise, a few days ago, Indonesian foreign minister Retno Marsudi said she hoped the relationship would normalize because, she said, “Indonesia needs Australia and Australia, I think, also needs Indonesia.”

    It would help, of course, if the dialogue between the two countries became more constructive. During the years that I served in the foreign ministry and dealing with Australia, I learned that indeed, in this age of information, countries scrutinized each other. This is a fact of international life.

    But the developed countries of the West are the ones that are doing most of the scrutinizing, as the developing countries are more often distracted by their own domestic problems. Observation breeds criticism, and when officials express their views on issues through the mass media, they tend to address the gallery and to play to the grandstand. This generates a lot of heat without shedding light on the issues to be addressed.

    And sometimes the media are part of the problem. By providing information and commentary on issues, the media help shape public perception. Politicians and public officials have to deal with these perceptions that are eventually stripped of their nuances and reduced to their most simplistic forms. The traditional media have always tended to be sensational, but the most sensational of them all are the social media. These days, so much misperception, so much prejudice and so much hatred are being perpetrated by the social media.

    The negative impact of irresponsible media reportage and commentary is further complicated by the cultural traits of peoples. It is my impression that we Indonesians are a more emotional people compared to Australians and other Westerners who are more cerebral in their approach to issues. We tend to deal with others on a heart-to-heart basis, while Australians do it head-to-head. So in the case of a controversy such as the one on the death convicts, many statements coming from Australia, which were meant to be simply sensible and practical, were received in Indonesia as hard-hearted and cold-blooded.

    It would greatly help the relationship if we spent more time learning about each other instead of debating who is right and who is wrong. And there should also be a more robust manifestation of mutual respect. While we are so unlike each other in terms of culture and traditions, the fact remains that we are geographically next-door neighbors. We are stuck with each other.

    One of the most prudent things we can do is to invest in cross-cultural communication—in a way that shows respect for one another’s views. We can disagree while still showing respect for the person we disagree with. We must avoid the blame-game and refrain from speculation. Above all, we must avoid inflammatory language. We must shun megaphone diplomacy.

    We must do more to promote our social-cultural relations. Our cooperation in the field of education must continue .

    At the same time we must make our economic partnership work for our peoples. They must feel and enjoy the benefits of that partnership.

    We must work together to form a robust regional architecture through the Asean-led processes, especially the East Asia Summit.

    These are the ballasts of our bilateral relations. If we keep on enlarging and strengthening them, if we keep on learning about each other and showing respect for each other, our bilateral relations will grow from strength to strength in all the years ahead. It is the two countries’ shared responsibility.

    Wiryono Sastrohandoyo was Indonesian Ambassador to Australia from 1996 to 1999. 

  • John McCarthy. Australia and Indonesia: hard times ahead.

    The executions of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran will leave most Australians dismayed by President Joko Widodo’s refusal of clemency, angered by the clumsy, ugly execution process and jaundiced by the attitudes of a number of Indonesians on killing two of our countrymen.

    This latest downturn with Indonesia will make us reflect—again—on what we should do. Make no mistake, it will deeply affect Australian perceptions of Jokowi through the rest of his tenure, and more widely, of Indonesia for years to come.

    Don’t blame the Australian Government. It tried its best to save its nationals. We have often made mistakes with Indonesia; this time, however, Indonesia got it wrong.

    Don’t see the executions as primarily an Australia–Indonesia issue, either. By year’s end, Jokowi would have overseen a significant number of executions. Two involve Australians. We need perspective.

    But Indonesia dismissed our representations and we have no choice but to react with uncompromising displeasure. We should withhold bilateral visits by ministers while executions continue or for the rest of the year. We can’t have high-level business as usual.

    That said, we shouldn’t compromise our own interests to the extent of jeopardising the web of civilian and military exchanges that are at the heart of the relationship, or cut our aid program in response to the executions—intended to improve the lives of ordinary Indonesians. We should keep our Ambassador in Jakarta because communication matters.

    Our longer term challenge requires two shifts in our approach towards Indonesia.

    First, our country—amongst others—often sees diplomacy in terms of relationships. Wrong. It’s about interests.

    In recent decades we’ve framed our dealings with Indonesia within various forms of ’special relationship’ only to see our interests suffer when illusions shatter.

    Our political class and external policy establishment must develop a mindset that dealing with Indonesia is a management task as much as a political one—keeping things stable and pushing our interests through unglamorous grunt work—part of which involves accommodating, where appropriate, Indonesian interests. But interests must be the basis of our relationship, not the reverse.

    Second, we have to recognise that the Australian foreign policy challenge is different to that of most Western democracies. With the exception of New Zealand, our neighbours have different political systems and traditions, levels of development and postcolonial experiences from our own. This cultural gap is most salient with Indonesia. It impedes stability in our dealings. Australians see Indonesians as callous, militaristic and corrupt. Indonesians see Australians as insensitive and condescending. Politicians in each country react to their own national prejudices in their dealings with the other. And so it continues.

    This isn’t a new problem for us. To lessen it, we must take a bipartisan path, which will require Australians to understand Indonesia and Asia more widely through education and practical exposure, and build the people-to-people and institutional relationships which encourage equilibrium in our international dealings. In the past we have gone enthusiastically down these paths only to be stalled by lethargy and partisan bickering.

    Understandably, Australians can wonder whether Indonesia really matters or is worth the trouble. It does and it is. Indonesia straddles many of our northern approaches. It is the prime mover within ASEAN. It will play a role in the ongoing evolution of new power structures in the Asia–Pacific. Its policies on terrorism and transnational crime impact directly on us. Its size and growth mean that it will soon be the dominant economy in Southeast Asia. We mustn’t allow anger or disappointment to cloud our judgement.

    This is particularly important because managing the relationship with Indonesia may become harder still.

    Since the sixties, we have dealt with two long-term, stable regimes in Indonesia: Suharto’s and Yudhoyono’s (SBY). We had our difficulties with Suharto—not least over Timor—but his strength meant a certain, if sometimes unwelcome, reliability. SBY took us seriously. Habibie, Gus Dur and Megawati all demonstrated pluses and minuses but listened to what Australia had to say.

    Jokowi has a weak domestic base which in any country cuts across sound foreign policy. His world view seems to be shaped by the need to attract investment from big players like China, Japan and the United States—complemented by some outdated non-aligned perspectives.

    We may now be entering a period in our dealings with Indonesia which is less sure than the Suharto era, less positive than the Yudhoyono years and lacking the ease of communication which we enjoyed with Habibie, Gus Dur and Megawati. It will require lowering expectations, and greater persistence and patience.

    During the Timor period, Indonesians of good will—of which there are many—used to say ‘neither of us can choose our neighbours, but we have to coexist’. It’s not euphoric advice, but they may be right.

  • Richard Woolcott. Australia and Indonesia.

    For Australia no bilateral relationship will be more important, complex and challenging in the future than that with Indonesia.

    The relationship is, however, going through a difficult period at present, especially due to the reaction in Australia to the execution of the two Australian citizens for drug smuggling.  The necessary improvement will take time and require sensitive management by both Governments.  Efforts to improve knowledge and reduce suspicion in the wider communities in each country of the other will be necessary.

    Globally, Indonesia is also of growing importance to major powers such as the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and India. This is because Indonesia ,with a population of some 250 million, is now the fourth most populous nation in the world.  It is the largest Muslim country by population.  Some 81% of its people are Muslim.

    Despite a high degree of continuing poverty, it is a country with 94% literacy, an expanding middle class and a rate of economic growth of between 6 and 7% per annum.  Indonesia is a member of the G20 and the World Bank predicts it will have a larger economy than Australia within the next two or three years.  Australia needs to acknowledge the reality that its relationship with Indonesia is asymmetrical.  Indonesia is more important to us than Australia is to it.

    Prime Minister Abbott has stated that Australia should pursue a more “Jakarta less Geneva” policy.  I consider that in the context of the great changes underway in the Asia Pacific region Australia does need a fundamental change in our national psyche.  We need to focus more on South East Asia, North Asia and the South West Pacific than on our well established links with the United States, the United Kingdom and Europe.  We need a continuous and sustained approach rather than a spasmodic one more focussed on the countries of Asia.

    The rise of Asia is closely linked to the unprecedented transfer of wealth from the West to the East, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, which seems likely to continue into the foreseeable future.  This seismic shift is driven by the spectacular growth of China, in particular, but also by the rise of India and the established economic strengths of Japan and South Korea in addition to the growing potential of Indonesia itself and Vietnam.  This constitutes a historic global turning point to which Australia must respond, if we are not to find ourselves left behind.

    It follows that the Australian Government will need to craft a more appropriate and updated balance in our relations with the United States and China, as the emerging superpower.  This will be necessary to reinforce the Government’s rhetoric about our role in the Asia Pacific region with action and adequate funding.

    In what is widely referred to as the Asian Century, Australia should maintain an unambiguous policy to the Australian public, as well as to the United States and Chinese Governments, that while we are in a long standing alliance relationship with the United States and while we have some different values and a different political system from China, we welcome the rise of China and oppose policies directed at the “containment” of China.

    A failure to co-operate with a rising China could, if mismanaged, lead to instability and frustrate progress towards Asia Pacific regional co-operation.  All countries in the region need continued peace and stability if economic growth is to be maintained and to deal with competition within the region for resources, including food and water.

    Turning back to the Australia – Indonesia relationship, when the reaction to the executions is behind us, we need to resume regular and improved consultations on a wide range of policy issues.  Australia should consult Indonesia at Head of Government, Ministerial and Senior Official level, on major global and regional issues, especially those involving the current complexities in the Middle East.  On our continuing involvement in Afghanistan and our most recent additional involvement in Iraq we should consult Indonesia especially as it is by population the largest Muslim country in the world.

    We have tended to consult mainly the United States, the United Kingdom and, on some occasions, Canada and New Zealand on issues such as the second invasion of Iraq in 2003.  In 1989 the Hawke Government consulted Indonesia and other South East Asian countries with Muslim majorities, like Malaysia, or substantial minorities like Singapore and The Philippines on our participation “Desert Storm” in Iraq.  Since 1996 we may have notified Indonesia of our major foreign and security policy decisions but I understand that high-level regular consultations have not taken place, as distinct from notification.  If we are serious about our role in our neighbourhood this practice should be reinstated.

    A recent example of our failure to consult Indonesia in advance on policy issues which could affect that country was the hasty decision of the Gillard Government, subsequently rescinded, to ban live cattle exports to Indonesia.  Another was and still is the handling of the refugee / asylum seekers issue in the region, an issue which is much less of a priority for Indonesia than it is for Australia.

    Another decision which was not fully canvassed in advance at a Head of Government level with Indonesia was a decision, announced during President Obama’s visit to Australia in November 2011, to rotate 2,500 US marines through Darwin.  Such a decision should have been announced by our Prime Minister in the Australian Parliament.

    A group from the NSW branch of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, which toured Indonesia after President Obama’s announcement, said that one of the main impressions the group had formed was that Indonesia would like to see Australia follow a more independent foreign policy not based on either compliance with American wishes, or a fear of China.

    Former Prime Minister Rudd put this well when he said that “compliance did not equate to alliance” in respect of the United States;  similarly, “understanding did not equate to agreement” in respect of China’s policies.

    It is clear that Australians and Indonesians need to know much more about each other.  It is regrettable that many Australians still regard Indonesia mainly as a  mysterious and corrupt country in which the rule of law is weak.  According to the Lowy Institute’s polls many Australians still see Indonesia as a potential security threat.  This is largely because of historical fears, its size, its proximity, its assumed political instability and the violation of human rights in West Papua.

    The great majority of Indonesians are largely ignorant about Australia.  Those who do know Australia still tend to see it as part of the “Anglosphere”.  In terms of Indonesian culture many see Australia as uncouth and still harbouring undertones of racism and religious intolerance.  These suspicions go back to the days of the White Australia policy and more recently to public statements of politicians, such as Pauline Hanson, which are considered in Asia to be racist.  The fact that Australia’s Head of State is still the Queen of England also reinforces our association with the “Anglosphere”  and detracts from a more distinctive international and regional Australian identity.

    Many Indonesians I have encountered still express uncertainty about the depth and sincerity of our commitment to our Asian and South West Pacific neighbourhood.  While Indonesia, like Australia, welcomes a constructive and continuing United States involvement in the Asia Pacific region there is some concern in both countries about what the “pivot to Asia” – now referred to as “rebalancing” – really involves.  What is expected of Australia?  How will Indonesia react to this?  I am aware of concerns in Indonesia that the Cocos islands, so close to Indonesia and Malaysia and now part of Western Australia, might be used, including by drones, for security purposes in the South East Asian and Southern China region.

    In the context of global Islam and the deteriorating situation in the Middle East, Indonesia is the most tolerant of all Islamic countries.  Historically it is mainly Sunni but Islam in Indonesia has been influenced and softened by Hinduism and Buddhism.  Indonesia has generally dealt firmly and effectively with Islamic extremists and domestic terrorism.  Despite occasional acts like banning Lady Gaga from performing in Indonesia, it remains a moderate, secular state.  That it is so is of fundamental importance to Australia and other countries in the region.

    The election of Joko Widodo – known generally as Jokowi – formerly a small businessman with limited experience of international affairs and who is not a member of the established political elite, was seen as an important break from Indonesia’s past.  Jokowi was largely seen as a man of the people who would govern for the “orong kacil” (the poor and less influential people ) and who was seen as a challenge to the established elite.  In fact, after eight months in office Jokowi, according to a number of commentators in Jakarta and Australia, has not so far lived up to the hopes expressed after his election.

    In this context it is of interest to note that when President Jokowi ceased to be the Governor of Jakarta and became President of Indonesia, he was succeeded as Governor of Jakarta by his Deputy who is a Christian, ethnic Chinese.

    Time Magazine, in a cover story last October on Jokowi, described him as “A New Hope” which indicated a break from a corrupt political elite dominated past and a fresh beginning.  Initially, in Indonesian polls he enjoyed 75% support.  Recently, however, this has dropped to 60%.  It has been a problem for him that Jokowi  does not lead a political party and secured the Presidency in part through the support of a former President, Megawati Sukarnoputri, the current leader of the PDI – P.

    Megawati has used her position as party leader to play a role in nominating the Cabinet, some members of which were not Jokowi’s choices.  Also, for example, Budi Gunawan was pushed by Megawati for the role of Police Chief.  Initially Jokowi did not withdraw Budu’s nomination although the Corruption Eradicaton Commission (KPK), one of the most respected institutions in Indonesia, had announced he was under investigation. He has since done so.

    Jokowi is aware of the need to streamline investment procedures, including in respect of mineral developments.  He has established co-operative relations with a number of Indonesian business leaders.

    Australia’s relations with Indonesia, as I have noted, are complex and have entered another difficult phase when the Australian Governments’ and Parliaments’ pleas for clemency for Sukurmaran and Chan have failed.  This will reflect a perception that Australia is still essentially a Western country, more influenced by the other Anglosphere countries, especially the United Kingdom, than it is by its neighbour Indonesia.

    Under President Jokowi Indonesia remains a nationalist, sensitive, post-Colonial society which will not buckle under what it sees as intrusive Western pressure.  As I warned both the Government and the Opposition in January – too late as it turned out – public political pressure could be counter productive and would actually reduce the prospects of clemency.

    The pressures, related to widespread domestic opposition to the death penalty, were also seen as inconsistent (the Howard Government had supported the death penalty for Saddam Hussein and the Bali bombers), “gesture” politics related to Australian domestic politics, which put Jokowi, a new and nationalist President, into a position in which he and his supporters considered he could not yield to foreign, including Australian, pressure.  We would be well served if we lectured less and consulted and listened more.

    Jokowi also has difficulties with the Indonesian Parliament (DPR) as up till now he and his supporters do not command a Parliamentary majority.  This is a complicating factor which could change depending on Indonesian domestic policies as Jokowi’s term unfolds.

    To conclude, the importance of our future relations with Indonesia, and in the context of the Asian century, cannot be overstated.  It is essential that each country comes to know more about its neighbouring country.

    As a nation we need to be genuinely and continuously engaged – not just in a rhetorical sense or in going through the motions – with our very large neighbour of increasing regional and global importance.  It is vital that Australia does not allow single issues, such as the problems related to East Timor, or the execution of the two Australians convicted of drug smuggling in Indonesia, to influence excessively a bilateral relationship of paramount scope and importance.   Both countries will share this neighbourhood for the rest of time.

     

    RICHARD WOOLCOTT AC, Founding Director, Asia Society Australia; Former Ambassador to Indonesia (1975-78); Former Ambassador to The U N ( 1982-88); Former Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade (1988-92); Chairman, Australian Indonesia Institute (1992-1998)

    This article was first published in the Asia Society Australia Newsletter. 

     

     

  • COMING SOON. A policy series to fill the policy vacuum.

     COMING SOON.   11 May 2015

    Fairness, Opportunity, Security.

    A Policy Series to fill the policy vacuum.
    Edited by Michael Keating and John Menadue

    There is growing public disquiet. The government and the opposition keep playing the political and personal game at the expense of informed public discussion of important policy issues.

    As a community we have become concerned about the trustworthiness of our political, business and media institutions. Insiders and vested interests are undermining the public interest. Money is unduly influencing political decisions. There is gridlock on important issues like climate change and taxation. We are not satisfied with ‘small target ‘politics.

    After a near death experience Tony Abbott says he is open to new thinking and ways of governing. Time will tell. Bill Shorten says 2015 will be the year of ideas. Let’s see.

    On May 11 in this blog- Pearls and Irritations– we will begin a series of articles on important policy issues. There will be over forty articles on sixteen policy areas from over thirty contributors. The series will run for four to five weeks.

    Each of the policy articles will be about 2000 words. They will be realistic, given our political and financial constraints.

    Ken Henry will be introducing the series.

    ATF Press plan to publish these policy articles in book form later this year  

    Policy Series.  Areas to be canvassed

    Economic policy
    Fixing the budget 
    (Michael Keating)
    Federalism
    (Michael Keating, John Menadue)
    Productivity
    (Michael Keating)
    Job creating and participation
    (Michael Keating)
    Foreign policy  (Stephen Fitzgerald, Richard Butler, Cavan Hogue, Stuart Harris, John McCarthy)
    Security, both military and soft power  (Michael Wesley)
    Health  (John Menadue, Jennifer Doggett {co-payments}, James McGinty {workforce})

    Development of our human capital in the fields of education, science, innovation, research and development (Glenn Withers, Chris Bonnor {schools}, Glenn Withers {Universities})
    Transport and infrastructure (Michael Keating)
    Population/migration/refugees (John Menadue, Peter Hughes, Arja Keski-Nummi)
    Welfare priorities (Andrew Podger, Peter Whiteford)
    Retirement incomes (Michael Keating, Andrew Podger)
    Indigenous affairs (Fred Chaney , Michael Gracey)
    Communications and the Arts (Kim Williams {Arts}, Terry Flew {media regulation in internet world}, Julianne Shultz {cultural identity}, Rob Nicholls {NBN})
    Environment and climate change (Ross Garnaut, Lesley Hughes, Brendan Mackay)
    Inequality (Peter Whiteford, Michael Keating, Ian McAuley)
    The role of government (Michael Keating, John Menadue, Ian McAuley)
    Democratic renewal – the lack of trust in government and the hollowing out of our  political parties (Ian Marsh, John Menadue, Barry Jones)
    Internal security and freedom (Stephen Zifcak {Human Rights Act/Charter}, Peter Timmins)

     

    Media enquiries. Please contact johnmenadue@staging-johnmenadue.kinsta.cloud.

     

     

  • Gigi Foster and Paul Frijters. This budget … will favour the rent-seekers.

     

    Long before the release of French economist Thomas Piketty’s smash bestseller, it was recognised by social scientists that income inequality in developed countries had been rising for a while.

    Economists’ stock-in-trade explanation for this trend was that people whose skills combined well with modern production technologies had seen bigger income growth than people whose skills didn’t combine well with these modern inventions. In other words: those whose skills complement new technologies are the disproportionate beneficiaries of economic development.

    Raising your income, with complements

    The line of argument here is best illustrated by example. If the income of an illiterate apple picker in the US rose a bit between (say) 1980 and 2010, but the income of a university-educated US worker rose a lot more in that same period, then so-called skill-biased technological change could explain this divergence if excess productivity is generated when one combines the more skilled worker with modern production technologies, like computers or automated warehousing.

    Similar returns are not available to the apple picker, who uses no new technology in his work as time marches on. On the contrary, he must compete with new inventions like an automatic apple-picking machine, rather than designing or tweaking such a machine, as could be done by a high-skilled worker.

    Hence, while the educated worker brings home part of his steeply rising productivity in his paycheck, the pay packet of the apple-picker grows more weakly as his country develops.

    But economists aren’t the only ones pondering why inequality has increased.

    The old boys’ club

    Political science has for years spoken of rent-seeking interest groups whose members actively try to circumvent the democratic process, subverting the intentions of large groups like states or countries in order to get more for themselves and their chums.

    This line of reasoning paints a very different picture of inequality than that arising from skill-biased technological change. Rather than an unfortunate but unavoidable side effect of economic advance, whose fruits can ultimately be made available to all through democracy and redistribution, increased inequality that results from rent-seeking is arguably cancerous. Divisive, subversive, and unfair, it offends and cripples the very society from which it springs.

    The Aussie case

    Which of these is responsible for observed inequality in Australia? We take a first stab at answering this question in our recent paper, published in the Australian Economic Review’s Policy Forum entitled “On the Economics and Politics of Inequality”, curated by Ian McDonald.

    We examine the industries in which the richest Australians work. We argue that if they rode to their riches on the back of skill-biased technological change, then our richest residents should have invented new technologies, or combined their skills with existing production and delivery technologies like computers, specialised medical equipment, or specialised engineering technologies. Moreover, we should expect a good number of our richest residents to have made their fortunes elsewhere and arrived in Australia later in life: their economic contributions should not be country-specific.

    In fact, the vast majority of the richest Australians work in property, mining, and banking/finance. Tellingly, the highest-earning workers in these industries do not invent or use advanced production or distribution technology (as far as we can tell!). People in these highly regulated industries are handsomely rewarded when they can negotiate special favours, such as property rezonings, planning law exemptions, mining concessions, labour law exemptions, or money creation powers.

    Much as we economists might not want to admit it, our findings lend more support to the political science view of inequality than to the economist’s traditional view, at least as regards to inequality within Australia. While preliminary, our findings support the contention that the way to get richest in this country is to know people who are in a position to award special favours that circumvent democratic processes, and then ingratiate yourself to those people.

    Does the budget entrench or counteract inequality in Australia?

    The 2014 budget could almost have been written by the rich. Higher levies on the rich, such as higher marginal income tax rates at the top, are temporary whereas cuts to support for the poor, such as medical co-payments or the halving of unemployment support, are permanent.

    Some changes could have been made but were not, such as superannuation tax concessions that heavily favour the rich and distort incentives. Instead, changes were made that primarily benefit a few very rich owners or administrators. Abolishing the carbon tax, for example, mainly benefits a handful of coal-fired power station owners. University fee deregulation mainly benefits top university administrators.

    How can we improve this situation in the next budget?

    Closing off the superannuation loop-holes is a big change that would reduce inequality. Capping the salaries of top university administrators, rather than using government debt to finance exorbitant payrolls for these bureaucrats, would help a bit. Lifting the import ban for bananas, which currently benefits a few large banana producers at the expense of the rest of the population, would also help.

    Reforming the regulations around property rezoning and planning exemptions would help a lot. Reforming superannuation funds, whose very high running costs go into maintaining a few CEOs and those large buildings you see in the middle of our large cities, would help a lot. Many more such adjustments are conceivable.

    Economists at the Treasury, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Productivity Commission, and elsewhere know perfectly well how to reduce inequality and tackle the political favouritism that fuels increased inequality. The question is almost entirely one of political will. Does the population care enough about inequality for the politicians to deliver? We will see.

    If you care about stamping out the cancer of political favouritism, by all means make your voice heard. But do not be surprised to see more political favouritism in the next budget that will further increase inequality.

    Gigi Foster is Associate professor at UNSW Australia Business School. Paul Frijters is Professor, Economics at the University of Queensland.  This article first appeared in The Conversation on 27 April 2015.

  • Philippe Le Corre. World War II is also not over in Asia.

     

    Historians estimate that 14 million Chinese died at the hands of the Japanese in WWII. The Chinese economy and society was in ruins. Will Australia attend the 70th anniversary of VJ Day in Beijing on September 3 this year. John Menadue.

    All the controversy on the Russian celebration of the end of World War II has obscured the similarly problematic role of such events in Asia. Indeed, at a recent roundtable among think-tankers and government staffers, one participant candidly asked a simple question. “What will governments do when China’s official invitation letter to attend World War II celebrations in Beijing arrives?” Embarrassing silence ensued. On September 3, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) plans to host a military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II and, to use the Chinese phrasing, “victory in the World Anti-fascist War and the Chinese people’s War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.”

    There is nothing new about the Chinese communist party wanting to demonstrate its military strength in front of foreign leaders. Since the creation of the PRC in 1949, senior representatives of “friendly countries” have been in attendance at celebrations such as the 60th anniversary of the regime in October 2009. That event included a military parade with 10,000 troops and the display of many high-tech weapons held in Tiananmen Square, the precise place in which the pro-democracy movement was crushed in June 1989. This year, Western leaders feel both pressure to attend from the Chinese, and discomfort with an event that is clearly aimed at celebrating the country’s new international assertiveness.

    This discomfort is particularly acute in Asia, where China wants to play a bigger role and where Japan sees China’s rise in a region it used to dominate economically as a threat. The territorial dispute in the East China Sea has particularly been a source of tension between the two Asian powers. China would like to use the 70th anniversary events to show off its military and diplomatic strengths. The September military parade will therefore be a challenge for many non-Asian government leaders invited to attend the celebrations. Only Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose own May 9 Victory Day parade in Moscow will not be well-attended by Western leaders due to the Ukraine situation, has confirmed his presence in Beijing. Others are pondering about what to do and who to send to Beijing.

    Most European leaders are pondering whether to go. The situation is somewhat similar to the announcement in March by the United Kingdom that it was to become the first Western nation to join the board of the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). With regards to the invitation to attend the September events, the China-friendly U.K. has been avoiding the question, as it faces a general election on May 7 (the new government will have to decide.) France is focused on making the Paris 2015 climate conference a success, and therefore follows its own agenda; and Germany does not want to alienate itself from the United States and Japan by attending alone a somewhat controversial event.

    All Europeans are keen to expand economic and trade relationships with China, but they do not want to damage their relationships with Japan. They should indeed send a representative to Beijing but probably not their most senior leader in order to avoid interfering in an already complex regional situation in Asia. European governments should consult each other on this matter, and give a joint response to China. They should also consult with the United States to avoid another AIIB situation. The United States will wait for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to Washington at the end of April—as well as his annual statement marking the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II in August—to start thinking about who to send. Even more that Europe, it will seek to preserve both China’s and Japan’s pride at the same time. That will be a challenging diplomatic task.

    Philippe Le Corre is Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Centre on the United States and Europe at The Brookings Institution. This article was published on April 16, 2015.

  • James Hogan. An Unspeakable Wrongness

    And so, it has come to pass. With a dreadful inevitability, Indonesian Law has taken its course, and the sentences passed so long ago on Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran have been carried into execution. Some will wonder at our capacity to mourn these men and their fellows when we struggle to find compassion for other, more ‘deserving’ victims.  Others will take an even harder line, noting with approval the completion of a ‘fine evening’s work’, a message sent regardless of the tariff.   Yet if recent months have shown us anything, it is the  growing recognition in our community that Death has had its day, and that the time has come to take a stand for life, whatever the chances of success.

    How else can one explain the extraordinary efforts of Reprieve and the Mercy Campaign, of the Foreign Minister and her shadow, of parliamentarians from the Prime Minister down, of the Christian and Islamic leaders of Sydney? How about the tens of thousands of ordinary Australians who have attended vigils and signed petitions? Or the famous actor, tweeting quietly and with simple courtesy to the President, using whatever influence he could muster to try to make a difference?

    There have been stumbles, well-meaning but ham-fisted interventions from private citizens and holders of the highest office, words almost instantly regretted and far, far better left unsaid. These have been the exception: the rule has been cautious and respectful, allowing every opportunity for reflection and dialogue, cognizant of our own vulnerabilities – understanding, perhaps, that some games can be played only by a Great Power.

    Yet no matter how persuasive the argument, how profound the transformation in the inmate, how careful the observance of protocol, it all still ended in tragedy.

    Tragedy comes in many forms, but here it arises with surety from the act itself – the slow, methodical and deliberate taking of a healthy life, removing all promise, all hope, any skerrick of doubt that might remain about a future. Too often we focus on worthiness in the inmate instead of its absence in a system that can take a life with such calmness and professionalism.  Too often we seem concerned with method, with structure and technicalities: the feigned concern for suffering, the relative merits of one mechanism over another, the comical focus on the inmate’s dignity during his final hours.

    Such dignity as he is able to retain comes only from within, bound up with life and humanity, taken only at the last. Dignity might be stifled by procedure, but dignity isn’t in its gift. More than three quarters of a century have passed since George Orwell wrote of the scene in a Burmese prison yard as his party escorted a Hindu man to the gallows. The prose is clipped, almost official, telling of a moustache beyond proportion, an unexpected visitor, and a bumbling jailer, so inept that he could fail to organise a hanging on time. And then, the condemned man, firmly restrained by his escort, pushes momentarily against their grasp to avoid a puddle of water:

    It is curious, but till that moment I had never realized what it means to
    destroy a healthy, conscious man. When I saw the prisoner step aside to
    avoid the puddle, I saw the mystery, the unspeakable wrongness, of
    cutting a life short when it is in full tide. This man was not dying; he
    was alive just as we were alive. All the organs of his body were working
    – bowels digesting food, skin renewing itself, nails growing, tissues
    forming – all toiling away in solemn foolery. His nails would still be
    growing when he stood on the drop, when he was falling through the air
    with a tenth of a second to live. His eyes saw the yellow gravel and the
    grey walls, and his brain still remembered, foresaw, reasoned – reasoned
    even about puddles. He and we were a party of men walking together,
    seeing, hearing, feeling, understanding the same world; and in two
    minutes, with a sudden snap, one of us would be gone – one mind less, one
    world less. 

    Death, you see, is different. The  issue lies not in the machinery, the crimes of the prisoner, nor even in the repugnant camouflage adopted by the authorities to distance themselves from the act  – the fiction of a blank cartridge, the executioner’s mask, the lethal injection machine that uses a random number generator to choose between two button-pushing executioners  (no, I’m not kidding). The issue lies only in the pointless termination of a life, a life that cannot be held to be of lesser value than our own without that too being diminished, and one day disappearing altogether from view.

    That is why we must continue to speak up, that is why we must petition and appeal when a rational mind says the actions are futile or some say that the inmate doesn’t deserve to be saved. That is why we must celebrate those who have fought so long and hard in what has become a losing battle. Each time we sit back, each time we remain silent, the tide of human dignity ebbs subtly further from the shore, and the value of our lives ebbs with it.

     

    James M. Hogan is a Brisbane academic. These are his own views.  In an earlier life he was heavily involved in anti – death penalty work with Amnesty, and he has written many (unsuccessful) appeals for clemency.

    [Orwell’s famous essay, should you wish to link to it, may be found here:

    http://www.george-orwell.org/A_Hanging/0.html  ]

     

  • Peter Christoff. On these numbers, Australia’s emissions auction won’t get the job done.

    Last Thursday, the Abbott government announced the results of its first reverse auction of emissions-reduction projects. Using A$660 million drawn from the A$2.55 billion Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF), the government has purchased 47.3 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, as a first step towards reducing greenhouse emissions under its Direct Action plan.

    Federal environment minister Greg Hunt proclaimed the auction to be a “stunning result”, claiming that the ERF alone will get the government to achieve its existing Kyoto target.

    The Australian newspaper’s triumphant front page headline hailed the outcome as a “direct hit on carbon target”, with national affairs editor Sid Maher writing:

    The Abbott government has claimed vindication for its Direct Action policy, saying the first auction in the scheme has put Australia on track to “more than meet” its carbon-reduction target at a “fraction of the cost” of the carbon tax.

    But how effective has this first auction really been, and what might we expect in the future?

    Maths and myths

    Closer scrutiny of the package of contracts is impossible at this stage, and some of the answers won’t be clear until the projects begin to deliver (or not) emissions reductions over time. Even so, there are plenty of grounds for concern.

    Part of the answer comes down to crude arithmetic and some rather dry number-crunching. Once all factors are taken into account, Australia needs to cut its CO2 emissions by 236 million tonnes to meet its official target, agreed under the Kyoto Protocol, of cutting emissions by 5% below 2000 levels by 2020.

    Let’s assume, for argument’s sake, the going rate for carbon emissions will remain at the average of almost A$14 per tonne of CO2 paid in this first reverse auction. If so, the A$1.89 billion remaining in the ERF’s coffers will buy another 135 million tonnes of emissions.

    Assuming all the 47.3 million tonnes bought in the first auction are delivered, and the price per tonne of carbon remains the same, then the total emissions reduction bought by the ERF will be around 182 million tonnes of CO2. This is 54 million tonnes (or about 23%) short of Australia’s overall target.

    Source, Author provided
    Click to enlarge

    However it is likely that this first auction has picked most of the “low-hanging fruit” – emissions-reduction projects that are easy or cheap to implement or already under way. In future, the number of “emissions-reduction-ready projects” may decline, and the cost per tonne of emissions reductions increase. If the average price rises in subsequent auctions – or if Australian energy use and emissions continue to grow – the overall shortfall will increase still further.

    Devil in the detail

    The story doesn’t end there. The auction’s 107 participants have varying deadlines for delivering their projects. Surprisingly, only 1.5% of the contracts (by volume of CO2 to be reduced) are set to end within 3-5 years, within the target deadline of 2020. Meanwhile, 40% of emissions reductions are set to be delivered over seven years, and the remaining 58% over ten years.

    It’s hard to know when many of the contracted projects will produce their cuts. Without access to the detail of specific contracts, it is hard to assess when each contract will “mature”. About half the contracts (again, by volume of CO2) are “forest protection” projects. These can be assumed to deliver results immediately. A further 15% are vegetation regeneration and soil carbon projects, which also are likely to come “online” pretty quickly.

    But some 35% are industrial schemes – projects to capture waste methane from landfills or piggeries – which may take one or two years to become fully operational and start delivering results. If so, this could mean that these projects will contribute more emissions reductions towards the end of their contracts than at the start. In other words, emissions reduction from industrial projects is likely to be lower before 2020 than a simple annualised estimate would allow. (It’s also worth noting that no major emitters in the energy and resource sectors are among the successful first-round bidders.)

    The best we can do here is estimate the annual abatement promised by each project across the lifetime of its contract. This indicates that only 28 million tonnes of emissions – around 60% of the 47.3 million tonnes lauded as the outcome of this first auction – will be have been cut by 2020.

    Unfortunately, our shortfall just increased to 73 million tonnes, or to 30% short of Australia’s overall target.

    Are these really emissions reductions?

    Last, and not least, there is the issue of the “quality” of the emissions savings. Almost half of the projects (by emissions volume) involve “forest protection”. These are rural projects, mainly related to the previous Carbon Farming Initiative (now subsumed into the ERF), which generate carbon credits by paying farmers to stop the destruction of native vegetation for which clearing permits had already been issued (so-called “avoided deforestation”) or to enhance sequestration of carbon in soil and vegetation.

    Most people paying superficial attention to the workings of the ERF would expect public money to be spent on cutting “real emissions”, for instance by moving our industries onto renewable energy sources, rather on paying rent to rural landowners to avoid activities that may release emissions in the future. Useful though these projects are, one wonders whether they should constitute the core and bulk of Australia’s flagship climate policy.

    All up, on the evidence so far, Minister Hunt has greatly overstated the auction’s achievements. If this is to be the main mechanism used during the remaining five and half years before the 2020 emissions target deadline, then – short of economic downturn and a dip in emissions from the energy sector – Australia won’t meet, let alone exceed, even its very weak 5% reduction target.

    The ERF would need well over A$3 billion to buy all the emissions needed to meet Australia’s present target. And that is not to mention the parallel debate about whether Australia needs to adopt tougher targets.

    Moreover, the ERF’s reverse auction approach seems incapable of driving a national transition to renewable energy or encouraging substantial emissions-reducing activities by major industrial emitters. It is certainly unable to meet more ambitious post-2020 targets, of the sort recommended by the Climate Change Authority, which are the minimum that will be required if Australia is to do its fair share in combating global warming in the future.

    Peter Christoff is Associate Professor at University of Melbourne. This article first appeared in The Conversation on 27 April 2015.

  • Mark Triffitt and Travers McLeod. Hidden crisis of liberal democracy.

    A “burning platform” with big, tangible impacts on our everyday lives is often the tipping point for concerted action. We call these crises.

    Think of the G20’s actions in the wake of the global financial crisis or the global response to 9/11. Both events left governments and decision-makers with no choice but to act.

    Then there are the hidden crises. These are usually not a single, explosive event, rather a pattern of events whose impacts are difficult to connect.

    As such it takes time to bring to the surface the underlying cause and have it widely recognised as a crisis. It takes even more time to convince decision-makers to act.

    Climate change is an obvious example of this knowledge-action gap.

    For most of its “life” as a policy issue, climate change was perceived as an intangible – hard to define, connect and quantify. It was even harder to convince the public and policy-makers to respond.

    Seminal developments over the past decade have changed all that. Scientific consensus, volatile weather patterns leading to observable security, economic and environmental impacts, as well as global awareness campaigns, have persuaded new stakeholders, including the US military and Bank of England, to move into the action camp.

    Yet the evolution of climate change as an issue has exposed the least obvious crisis of the 21st century: our system of democratic governance.

    It is on the tip of our tongue every time we speak of the difficulties in resolving climate change – our frustration with the lack of future-focused, coherent action. But we rarely articulate it.

    So it remains largely hidden – and therefore largely off the agenda for action and change.

    In what ways is liberal democracy failing?

    Specifically, the failure to tackle climate change speaks to an overall failure of our liberal democratic system to:

    • deliver competent, future-focused policy that can guide and give context to the pressing need for action on core challenges

    • reconcile expert knowledge and community opinion to deal with the big issues of our age

    • gain and sustain long-term consensus on what is often complex policy action to deal with these issues

    • achieve effective action by devolving power to local communities or projecting solutions across borders through transnational collaboration.

    Climate change is the sharpest manifestation of an entirely new order of policy challenges that confront and confound democracies around the world.

    These include cybersecurity, corporate profit-shifting, deepening inequality, porous borders and the movements of people and money that spill through them.

    Yet the crisis of liberal democracy remains intangible. This is because we prefer to blame the idiosyncrasies of leaders and bad leadership, rather than the system itself and its growing pattern of policy gridlock and dysfunction.

    In the process, we overlook the fact that our delivery mechanism of democracy – liberal democracy – evolved out of a pre-21st century world. It was a world where the speed, scale and complexity of policy were of a dramatically lower order.

    So in a globalised, digitally saturated world no longer bound by speed limits, our hands are tied by political and policy machinery, like parliaments, designed to synchronise with the 20th century’s comparatively languid rhythms of decision-making.

    In a world of hyper-diversity, this “machine” is engineered to churn out responses to complex challenges within one-size-fits-all templates and packaged slogans.

    Moreover, it is largely monopolised by political parties and career politicians. They seek to choreograph the 21st-century policy world with an unimaginative two-step of 20th-century ideologies and allegiances.

    Creative coalitions and values that reflect today’s world are, as a result, largely absent.

    All this should tell us why the consensus-creating and policy-making institutions liberal democracy relies upon for action and legitimacy risk becoming a case study of failure.

    It is also why those who inhabit what is, in effect, an old-fashioned democracy “factory” retreat into the adversarial, the short-term and the sloganistic. These are the blinkers that allow them to shut their eyes to disruption and insist there is no underlying crisis.

    What can be done to overcome this crisis?

    Successfully tackling climate change and other big policy challenges depends on making tangible the intangible crisis of liberal democracy.

    It means understanding that liberal democracy’s governance machinery – and the static, siloed policy responses generated by such democracies – is no longer fit for purpose.

    It means coming up with disruptive solutions – like coalitions of countries, cities and companies to tackle climate change – that re-align this machinery with the new order of scale, complexity and speed that defines our 21st-century world.

    Long-term solutions to fix the crisis in democratic governance in Australia might include:

    • More deliberative systems that directly engage citizens and deepen debate. Such systems would work to capture and grow long-term vision, values and objectives – rather than static perceptions of incremental policy decisions made for tactical reasons.

    • Expert and citizen panels that are genuinely intergenerational and cross-sectoral. Their composition should favour younger generations and ensure the baby boomer generation cedes some control over what it leaves to the next.

    • Granting more decision-making power to institutions independent of the government of the day, but still accountable to parliaments (such as the Parliamentary Budget Office or Infrastructure Australia). This would increase the capacity of policy planning and decision processes to have staying power beyond individual political cycles.

    • Enabling the appointment of some ministers from outside the parliament. This would allow experienced hands – experts at the top of their game – to lead a portfolio while remaining accountable to the parliament.

    • Synchronising state and federal electoral terms (to be a minimum of four years), with state and federal elections to take place at two-year intervals. This would allow the meshing of short, medium and long-term planning, complete with clear milestones.

    Some of these ideas might work. Some might not. But persisting with a system that seems increasingly incapable of managing the most pressing issues of our age is not an option.

    Climate change is symptomatic of, and accelerates, the crisis across our liberal democratic systems. We cannot fix one problem without resolving the other.

    Mark Triffitt is Lecturer, Public Policy at University of Melbourne.
    Travers McLeod is Honorary Fellow in the School of Social and Political Sciences at University of Melbourne.
    This article was first published in The Conversation on 22 April 2015.

     


     

  • John Dwyer. Sliding down the slippery slope to two-tiered health care.

    Private Health Insurance gets a foothold in primary care.

    Imagine the following scenario. You are checking in with your GP’s receptionist for your scheduled appointment and are asked to produce your Medicare Card and, if you have one, your private health insurance membership card. If you have both you move into the waiting room on the right reserved for patients with private health insurance for whom the practice will provide a range of additional services not available to those in the waiting room on the left.  Health outcomes are resource dependent so patients who can expect more quality time with their doctor and a range of services from other health professionals because private health dollars make it possible will, in many cases, have better outcomes. This is particularly likely if they are troubled by chronic and complex conditions. In such circumstances it’s also not hard to imagine practices over time, deciding to accept only patients with private insurance, as is commonplace in the US.

    Unlikely scenarios for Australia? I hope so but certainly don’t know so and recent developments convince me that both health professionals and consumers need to be pro-active in making it clear to our politicians that such discrimination would be totally unacceptable. There is already much in our health system that is unfair and expensive. Unfair in that increasingly timely access to quality care is often determined by personal financial wellbeing rather than need, and expensive in that inferior care to socio-economically less privileged Australians results in much chronic disease that eventually costs the taxpayer dearly. As we struggle to reverse that situation we have, for the first time, an Australian government encouraging private health insurers  (PHIs) to become involved in our primary care space. Four of the successful tenders for the operation of the 31 new Primary Health Networks (PHNs) will utilise consortia involving for profit and not for profit private health insurers.

    Labor’s “Medicare locals’ have morphed into the Coalition’s Primary Health Networks. The health minister has explained that this new initiative will see PHN’s co-ordinating care offered by local hospitals districts (of which there are more than 150 in Australia) and local GPs. The networks are not to provide health services directly but use their 900 million dollars to “improve front line services”.  Currently private health insurers are not allowed to offer additional insurance for any services funded by Medicare. However there is every chance that Insurers involvement in PHNs, which will include input into GP training, and workforce planning, could be the start of an ever-larger role for private insurance in primary care.  At the time of the PHN announcement a spokesman for the peak body for insurers, “Private Health Care Australia”, said, “the best way to improve Australia’s health system is to increase the role it (PHI) plays in GP care”.

    While the new initiative is unlikely to be any more successful than its predecessor given the vagueness of the terms if reference and the small number of networks covering a huge country yet asked to act locally, the conflict of interest that is inherent in having PHIs involved is very real. PHIs primarily exist to benefit their members, by and large better off Australians while PHNs to be successful must target better services for less advantaged Australians.

    Global experience tells us that these networks should indeed be subdivided to become locally relevant and offer model Integrated Primary Care and secondary services. They should play a “hub” role for affiliated practices helping with IT, documenting health outcomes, continuing education, bulk purchasing, in house drug education, research etc. etc. About as different from what is on offer as is possible to imagine.

    Why are PHIs so keen to get involved in Primary Care? While business models involving large numbers of Australians buying primary care insurance may be attractive the main reason for PHIs interest in primary care is their need to have fewer members admitted to hospital. This is particularly important for those admitted frequently as a result of advanced disease. Our larger PHIs tell us that 5-10% of their members who are frequently admitted to hospital generate 50 -60 % of their costs. Better-resourced primary and community care for these members might reduce admissions and save them large amounts of money. The political and public relations dilemma is easy to understand. How can they provide their member’s primary care team with the needed resources without creating a two-tiered system?

    Of course the exact same problem, though on a much larger scale is troubling, or perhaps more accurately, should be troubling Australia’s national insurer. As has often been discussed in these blogs it is public hospital care and associated costs that are consuming most of our health care dollars, not Medicare.  With our State/Federal divide in health care responsibilities it is State budgets that are in the same boat as the PHIs, ever increasing numbers of older and sicker patients requiring hospitalisation.  A number of studies have found that as many as 600,000 admissions to public hospitals could be avoided annually if our primary carers were resourced to offer better community care.

    We hospital doctors know only too well that many of the patients who return to hospital frequently have such advanced disease that little can be done in the community to manage their recurring crises . We certainly know that many such patients will die in hospital when a better death with more dignity at much less expense is not available at home. But the real challenge is to develop a primary care system that reduces the tsunami of Australians who are at risk of developing Chronic and Complex conditions and do so.

    Is there a role for PHI in the creation of such a system? Certainly PHIs can and often do help their members with resources to improve their health literacy and their understanding of how they can best help themselves to manage their problems. Many in the private health industry are enthusiastic about the “Medical Home” model of care that I, and others, have described enthusiastically in detail herein the following link. https://publish.pearlsandirritations.com/blog/?p=3192    Some insurers have expressed interest in funding “proof of concept” practices resourced to offer the Integrated Primary Care (IPC) that is at the heart of the Medical Home model. There is proof from many countries that this model does very significantly reduce hospital admissions. Our federal government should be even more interested in this model as the majority of hospital admissions involve people without private health insurance. Canberra not the PHIs should be establishing Medical Home practices to demonstrate the benefits of the model in Australia. Some in the private health insurance industry have called on government to join them in supplying our primary care system with resources that emphasise prevention, early diagnosis and management of potentially chronic problems and care in the community for many currently sent to hospital. It is hard however to envisage a mechanism for such cooperation.

    International experience warns us of the many problems associated with a mix of public and privately funded primary care. We do not want insurers (be the private or public) interfering with decisions about treatment programs for individual patients. We do not want a two-tiered system. On balance we should be urging government to maintain the current restrictions on PHI supplementing Medicare funded services. In so saying we should immediately add that Medicare does need a major structural overhaul to become a funder of a primary health care system not a fee payer for doctors.

    The health minister has indeed just announced a review of many aspects of Medicare. The review will be led by two good people, Dean Bruce Robinson from Sydney University and Dr Steve Hambleton a former head of the AMA. The minister’s statements suggest that she feels that our current model of primary care would be fine if over servicing, rorting doctors and low value test and procedures were contained. The reviews will take 18 months and to encourage GPs to participate the current freeze on cost of living adjustments to Medicare rebates will remain until efficiencies are providing extra dollars. No talk of PHI involvement and no talk of Integrated Primary Care!

    In reality we don’t need more reviews asking, “what should we do?” but rather a health care reform commission to drive changes (“how do we do it?) that are evidence based providing us with a cost sustainable and fairer health system detailed in these columns on any number of occasions.. The result would be a generation of healthier Australians with government and PHIs spending far less on expensive hospital care. A real “win, win” situation.

    John Dwyer is Emeritus Professor of Medicine at UNSW. 

     

     

     

  • Walter Hamilton. In the Name of the Emperor

    Emperor Hirohito never made it to Okinawa. He passed away before he could fulfill that stated desire. (He was scheduled to go in 1987, until illness intervened.) Okinawa was the scene of some of the most savage fighting of the Pacific War: 100-200,000 Japanese soldiers and civilians died there in April-June 1945, as well as 14,000 Americans.

    The Okinawan or Ryukyu Islands were annexed by Japan in 1872 during the reign of Hirohito’s grandfather, the Emperor Meiji. Ever since, the islands’ ethnically distinct people have remained stuck at the bottom of Japan’s socio-economic ladder; Okinawans endured disproportionately heavy sacrifices during the war, and continue to do so.

    Once the Americans handed the islands back in 1972 (less the vast tracts of real estate occupied by U.S. military bases), Hirohito had 17 years to make the trip south. His son, Akihito, went as Crown Prince and would visit Okinawa a further nine times after acceding to the Chrysanthemum Throne. But Hirohito––who went to every other prefecture in the nation during his long reign––never made it.

    Were there political forces keeping him away? Could it be that conservative governments in Tokyo, and their patrons in Washington, feared a Hirohito visit would become a rallying point for opponents of the Security Treaty? Most Okinawans oppose the heavy American military presence in their midst, so what would they think of the emperor who effectively put it there?

    Earlier this month Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko made a well-publicised trip to the western Pacific, carrying on where Hirohito almost left off. They went to the island-state of Palau to pay their respects to those who perished in the Battle of Peleliu in September-November 1944 (the distinguished Australian cameraman Damien Parer was among the many thousands killed on that speck of land).

    The trip was a considerable undertaking for the Imperial couple: he is now 81, and she is just a year younger. It also carried potent symbolism: in the dignified and modest way in which the frail Emperor and Empress conducted themselves; in the fact that they ventured to another country––Palau is now independent––to draw attention to the terrible costs of war; and in the emphasis placed, in their remarks, on the sacrifices made by both sides in the conflict. This was no chest-beating exercise; it was a voice of reason, humbly reminding Japanese of the true legacy of their past.

    None of this symbolism was lost on the Japanese public, at a time when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is pushing a revisionist view of history by downplaying or denying some of the worst aspects of the nation’s past militarist adventures. The New York Times editorialized on 20 April:

                   Mr. Abe’s nationalist views and pressure from competing political forces have affected  his judgment on these delicate issues. He has publicly expressed remorse for the war and  said he will honor Japan’s past apologies for its aggression, including the sex slavery. Yet  he has added vague qualifiers to his comments, creating suspicions that he doesn’t take  the apologies seriously and will try to water them down.

    His government has compounded the problem by trying to whitewash that history. This  month, South Korea and China criticized efforts by Japan’s Education Ministry to force  publishers of middle-school textbooks to recast descriptions of historical events —   including the ownership of disputed islands and war crimes — to conform to the  government’s official, less forthright analysis. And last year, the Abe government tried           unsuccessfully to get the United Nations to revise a 1996 human rights report on the  women Japan forced into sex slavery.

    Japan’s Imperial family, many believe, is acting as a bulwark against Abe’s retreat from responsibility and as a restraint on his government’s ambitions for an enhanced military capability and more assertive posture towards China.

    At a news conference in February, Crown Prince Naruhito, the heir to the throne, was asked for his views ahead of the 70th anniversary of the end of World War Two. He replied: “I myself did not experience the war… but I think that it is important today, when memories of the war are fading, to look back humbly on the past and correctly pass on the tragic experiences and history Japan pursued from the generation which experienced the war to those without direct knowledge.”

    The key words are “humbly”, “correctly” and “tragic”. In a country where the sovereign (or, in this case, the sovereign-to-be) is expected to remain strictly apolitical, this was as near as one gets to a public reprimand.

    Prime Minister Abe has a special “panel of experts” preparing to advise him on the public remarks he will deliver on 15 August when the nation commemorates the war anniversary. Next week, in Washington, where he is set to become the first Japanese Prime Minister to address a joint meeting of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, many expect to hear a preview. The New York Times commented that, apart from progress on defence cooperation and trade,

     the success of the visit also depends on whether and how honestly Mr. Abe confronts  Japan’s wartime history, including its decision to wage war, its brutal occupation of China and Korea, its atrocities and its enslavement of thousands of women forced to  work as sex slaves or “comfort women” in wartime brothels.

    Australians, fresh from their commemoration of an earlier conflict, should also be attuned to the Japanese leader’s take on history. As will the Imperial family, which has made it clear it will not allow its prestige to be appropriated for any future acts of belligerency. Should Abe during his U.S. visit resort to “weasel words” about the past, there is an octogenarian monarch waiting in his palace who may be prepared to call him out.

     

    Walter Hamilton reported from Japan for the ABC for eleven years.