The purchase of nuclear submarines via AUKUS is turning into an open–ended nightmare in terms of cost that will deliver nothing positive for Australia’s security. Meanwhile, the need for action both on disarmament and on nuclear risk reduction has never been more pressing. Even at the height of the Cold War, the metaphorical hands of the Doomsday Clock have never been at 90 seconds to ‘midnight’, writes John Hallam in an open letter to Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.
Dear Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Foreign Minister Penny Wong, and Defence Minister Richard Marles:
I am writing because I note that ICAN has recently lobbied you in respect to the TPNW (Ban Treaty).
This letter is written quite independently of ICAN who have had no input into it. It is written entirely on my own initiative. Nonetheless, I am sure we are both urging the same thing – signature, ratification, and the urging of others including the United States itself (not to mention Russia and China) to sign and ratify, the TPNW. In addition I urge prioritisation of nuclear risk reduction initiatives.
I also wish to draw your attention to issues with respect to nuclear risk reduction/No First Use, and the acquisition of submarines.
The Government has expressed certain concerns over whether or not the TPNW might be in some way, quite mysterious to the workings of commonsense, be incompatible with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.(NPT)
There is, bluntly, zero evidence that this could be the case, and absolutely no legal foundation for such a claim. Rather, signature and ratification of the TPNW is in fulfilment of our Art VI NPT obligations.
It is also simply not possible that signature and ratification of the TPNW could dilute or degrade Australia’s nonproliferation commitments. Whatever standard is adopted by the TPNW itself for nonproliferation obligations, nothing prevents a Government from adopting commitments that are MORE STRINGENT than those of the TPNW if indeed that is the case.
The need for action both on disarmament and on nuclear risk reduction has never been more pressing. The metaphorical hands of the Doomsday Clock have never – even at the height of the cold war – been at 90 seconds to ‘midnight’, where midnight denotes the use of nuclear weapons in numbers that end ‘civilisation’. There seems to be a notion that – both on disarmament and on nuclear risk reduction – ‘now is not the time’ for measures that would fulfil the need to diminish the risk of an (accidental or deliberate) apocalypse.
Yet disarmament and risk reduction measures are designed precisely, to lower the risk in times of crisis such as this.
And such measures are binding precisely on governments such as Russia who repeatedly and explicitly threaten to bring about the end of the world if geopolitical realities do not bend to their will.
I urge that the government see at least nuclear risk reduction and preferably risk reduction measures AND signature/ratification of the TPNW, as greater priorities than ever in the light of the current fraught geopolitical situation, in which nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail are so freely bandied around.
It is vital NOT to succumb to such nuclear blackmail. To fail to press for measures that make the outbreak of global thermonuclear war less rather than more likely is to succumb to that blackmail. To refrain from pressing as an absolute existential priority for both the signature and ratification of the TPNW and for effective measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war in the current geopolitical situation is an incomprehensible failure of nerve, and an abandonment of our international obligations – one that will profoundly negatively impact Australia’s own security. Finally, the purchase of nuclear submarines via AUKUS is turning into an open – ended nightmare in terms of cost that will deliver nothing positive for Australia’s security.
Initially costed at an eye-watering $368 billion, it seems poised to deliver submarines at a minimum, ten years AFTER the immediate-term threats they are supposedly being purchased to counter.
The claim that Virginia class subs are overall quieter that Collins or ‘Son of Collins’ is belied by a number of instances in which Collins Class subs have evaded Virginia class subs, as well as the one in which a Swedish sub of the class that Collins is derived from, ‘sank’ a US aircraft carrier.
Also, the ability of the Swedish Gotland Class (on which Collins is based) sub to ‘sink’ the USS Ronald Reagan:
It is a naval commonplace that whereas nuclear submarines always make some
noise that can be minimised but never completely eliminated, an advanced nonnuclear sub becomes a ‘black hole in the water’. Of course in surface running of a not-so-advanced conventional sub (without AIPS) there are thumping diesels but
even these are completely silent in ‘silent running’. To claim that nuclear submarines are across the board ‘more silent’ than advanced conventional (i.e.,’Son of Collins’) is entirely misleading and verges on the fraudulent.
The reasons for nuclear subs relative noisiness is simple – reactors require pumps that are always running even at dockside. When operating nuclear subs have a huge number of such pumps plus turbines, gears, and generators. Hence,
ineradicable noise.
The bottom line of this is that we are being ‘sold’ at a horrendous and ever Increasing price, a piece of technology that no matter how ‘advanced’ is in reality LESS silent (contra to what we are being told) than what we have now and that will
arrive so late in the piece that according to one former Prime Minister, we may not have subs at all for up to 10 years.
We should abandon the AUKUS submarine project forthwith, and replace it with ‘Son of Collins’, if a replacement is indeed necessary for Australia’s security. Australia should, as a matter of the highest national security priority:
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- Sign, ratify immediately, and urge others to sign and ratify, the TPNW.
- Promote a variety of nuclear risk reduction measures including but not limited
to, No First Use, reductions in operational readiness, and restoration of mil to mil
communications especially between the US and Russia. - Drop the AUKUS submarine project immediately and replace it with something more continuous with our existing capabilities, experience and skills that can be delivered in a much shorter timeframe.
(Institutional affiliations for identification purposes only)
John Hallam, Co-Convenor, Abolition 2000 Nuclear Risk Reduction Working Group; Convenor, PNND Australia; Nuclear Disarmament Campaigner, Human Survival Project, People for Nuclear Disarmament.
Australian Coordinator PNND, People for Nuclear Disarmament UN Nuclear Weapons Campaigner, Human Survival Project, Co-Convenor Abolition 2000 Nuclear Risk Reduction Working Group