Unraveling the myths of the Ukraine conflict

Toy tanks with Ukrainian and Russian flags.

In my first piece for Pearls and Irritations, I cautioned about Australia’s involvement in Ukraine and alluded to the strikingly similar circumstances of the conflict to the war in Vietnam.

One can recollect that the verb “escalate” entered our lexicon via the spirited speechmaking of Lyndon Johnson, from the US noun for “a moving stairway.”

The escalator on which we find ourselves is carrying us to World War III. It will require an act of will to step off.

Conflicts are often portrayed in binaries – aggressors and victims, righteous causes and unprovoked invasions. The current conflict in Ukraine is no exception. However, a closer examination of the historical parallels between the conflict in Ukraine and the Vietnam War reveals the prevailing narratives are often false, and that myth-making always accompanies geopolitical conflicts.

The Vietnam War, much like the current conflict in Ukraine, was not merely about the significance of Vietnam itself but rather a demonstration of US power against perceived communist expansion. This was a reflection of the long-standing impact of the Red Scare mentality, a fear of communist influence that significantly influenced US foreign policy. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, an alleged unprovoked attack by North Vietnamese forces on a US destroyer, provided the justification for a resolution that gave then-President Lyndon B. Johnson the congressional authority to wage war in Vietnam.

Similarly, the current conflict in Ukraine is justified as a necessary measure to contain Russia. However, recent revelations suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin was not averse to negotiations regarding the Ukraine crisis. These revelations challenge the narrative of Putin’s unwavering aggression and demonstrate that the UK and the US played a significant role in the escalation of the conflict.

The first red scare and its influence

The First Red Scare in the United States was a political reaction to the Bolshevik Revolution, a political force that had no conceivable way of physically threatening the United States. Ideologically, it remained an existential threat, a direct challenge to a God-given right to hold private property in perpetuity, and to gain more by force.

This anti-communist sentiment, and a barrage of propaganda aimed at Russia, has subsequently influenced US foreign policy. It was then that a relationship with the Ukrainian nationalists began, sowing the seeds for the Cold War and the repatriation of the Galen SS to Canada.

Both the Vietnam War and the Ukraine conflict at its outset were supported by a mythology founded on unchallengeable truisms. To contest the narrative of Putin’s unprovoked “invasion” flagged you as a Putin apologist.

In the case of Vietnam, the Gulf of Tonkin incident was used to justify US involvement.

In Ukraine, the narrative of an unprovoked Russian aggression serves a similar purpose.

However, these myths dissolve under scrutiny. Over the last month, evidence has come to light that Ukrainian and Russian negotiators came very close to an agreement for a ceasefire and a comprehensive peace solution to the conflict in March of 2022. Contrary to the now canonically accepted truth that Putin is seeking to restore the Soviet Empire with military force, Ukraine and Russia even agreed that the planned NATO expansion was the reason for the war.

The US has no vital interest in Ukraine. The US sees Russia itself as a problem. The real reasons for US hostility towards “revolutionary forces” like Russia and China are that they pose an obstacle to US imperial influence. They seek to reorder their position in the existing status quo in ways that, at a minimum, create more favourable circumstances for the pursuit of their own objectives. At a minimum, they seek to limit the reach of the U.S within what they perceive to be their legitimate sphere of influence.

The counterproductive approach of the Ukrainian government

The Ukrainian government’s approach leading up to the war was counterproductive. Despite the opportunity to reach an agreement with Putin in March of 2022, the Ukrainian government failed to seize this opportunity. This failure to negotiate peace with Russia and bring the war to a quick end contributed to the escalation of the conflict.

The conflict in Ukraine, when viewed through the lens of historical context, NATO expansion, and recent revelations about diplomatic negotiations, emerges as a multifaceted and deeply complex issue. Similar to the Vietnam War, the narrative of unprovoked aggression reveals an interplay of Ukrainian nationalism, American exceptionalism, and the legacy of the Cold War that continues to shape the conflict and is therefore, precisely the reason why the US must negotiate an end to the war. The potential for nuclear escalation is too great a risk to ignore. As we unravel the complexities of this conflict, we need to strive for a peaceful resolution that respects the sovereignty and autonomy of all nations involved.

The current underlying premise of the security state, that there exists between nations no law or justice, no conception of right or wrong, no morality, but only a struggle for survival, is no longer a useful creed. Yet our militarists, war planners, and strategists will have you believe that we live in a state of war, by every state, against every state, and that the acquisition of power and aggrandisement at the expense of other states in a quest for absolute national security is our fundamental right and the fundamental fact of international politics.

The only fundamental fact of international politics that I discern is the ebb and flow and yin and yang of the two components of the world system: the East and the West.

The community today is the planet, not the bounded nation; the patterns of projected aggression which formerly served to coordinate the in-group now only break it into factions. In the nuclear age, we cannot afford the so-called realism of the realists.

Even Churchill acknowledged that the only viable future empires were “empires of the mind”.

Man himself and the causes of war remain the crucial mystery, the alien presence, with whom our ego’s must come to terms.

Otherwise, it’s a case of “good night and good luck.”

Kari McKern, who lives in Sydney, is a retired career public servant and librarian and IT specialist. She has maintained a life time interest in Asian affairs and had visited Asia often, and writes here in a private capacity.