When international discussions turn to the South China Sea, they often focus exclusively on China-Philippines disputes over islands and reefs, overlooking the complex web of overlapping territorial claims in the region. I seldom see Chinese media coverage or scholarly analysis from the Chinese mainland address the actions of other stakeholders in these disputes.
Following his participation in The Manila Dialogue on the South China Sea, Professor Hu Bo (胡波) published an op-ed in Global Times headlined Experiencing the South China Sea Perception Dilemma in Manila (在马尼拉直面南海认知乱象).
In the piece, other than just sharing his observations, he also offers a rare critique of Vietnam’s behaviour in the region. He described Vietnam’s strategy as duplicity and double-dealing. While maintaining cordial bilateral relations with China and emphasising a “comrade-plus-brother” relationship, Vietnam has simultaneously strengthened its collaboration with the Philippines, exchanging tactics for challenging China’s maritime presence. Professor Hu noted that amid the recent China-Philippines standoff, Vietnam not only intensified its maritime activities but also played a significant role in shaping negative narratives about China’s presence in the South China Sea. (such blunt criticism is not very common)
Professor Hu is one of the most knowledgeable scholars focusing on the South China Sea issue in China. He serves as a research professor and director of the Centre for Maritime Strategy Studies at Peking University, and he also directs the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative. This Beijing-based think-tank specialises in maritime security research and provides real-time monitoring of South China Sea developments. Probably more importantly to my readers, they publish the English version of their report swiftly. In September, SCSPI released its comprehensive analysis of navigation and overflight activities in the South China Sea, presenting a data-driven assessment of maritime and aerial movements in the region.
Thanks to Professor Hu’s kind authorisation and add-up info, I’m able to provide the full-text translation of his original work.
In recent years, discussions about South China Sea issues and situations within the context of Western countries and some Southeast Asian claimant states have evolved into a stance where positions and emotions take precedence over facts. Regardless of actual circumstances and specific facts, there exists an unfounded targeting and opposition to China, with various absurd stories being fabricated, leading to the prevalence of rumors about China’s South China Sea claims, policies, and actions.
From 6-8 November, I participated in the inaugural “Manila Dialogue on the South China Sea” in Manila, Philippines. This dialogue, initiated under President Marcos’s directive, was jointly organised by several Philippine NGOs and the US think-tank Pacific Forum, with support from Philippine military and government institutions, including the National Security Council, Coast Guard, and Department of Foreign Affairs. The dialogue’s purpose was clearly to promote the Philippines’ recent “achievements” in its transparent maritime actions against China and to construct an international united front in the cognitive warfare regarding the South China Sea. Approximately 200 experts and media representatives from 19 countries, including the United States, Australia, Vietnam, Japan, Germany, and France, attended this 1.5-track conference, which included diplomatic officials, scholars, and think tank representatives.
Such international conferences on South China Sea issues typically feature a chorus of criticism against China, and this dialogue was no exception, as Chinese scholars had anticipated. However, I found that the level of provocation and intensity was less than expected and not as severe as Vietnam’s annual South China Sea conferences. This might be attributed to two factors: firstly, as the host, the Philippines showed some restraint, with a more moderate tone in its criticism of China compared to other venues; secondly, since some participating representatives were serious scholars who based their arguments on facts and truth, they couldn’t simply criticise China indiscriminately. For instance, several Western scholars, including Professor James Kraska from the US Naval War College, raised the issue of Vietnam’s land reclamation and expansion of occupied features in the Spratly Islands.
Among the attacks against China, besides the Philippine representatives, three main categories stood out: The first was represented by extreme anti-China figures like Ray Powell, head of Project Myoushu, who directly slandered China as “imperialist”. While this aligned with his usual stance and was unsurprising, few at the conference echoed his views. The second category consisted of Western ambassadors to the Philippines from countries like the US, Japan, Canada, and Germany. Their speeches were characteristically biased and “politically correct”, attributing all South China Sea issues to China while vocally expressing support for the Philippines in its confrontation with China.
The Vietnamese delegation formed the third and, perhaps, most noteworthy group. In recent years, behind-the-scenes co-operation between Vietnam and the Philippines on South China Sea issues has increased, with both countries sharing strategies and experiences in challenging China’s maritime presence. Indeed, this Manila Dialogue appears to have been modelled after Vietnam’s annual South China Sea conferences, which shared similar agendas and featured many of the same expert participants. The Vietnamese representatives, both diplomats and scholars, maintained a remarkably unified front in criticising China, often disregarding factual evidence in favour of inflammatory rhetoric. While such behaviour from Vietnamese representatives isn’t unusual in international forums discussing the South China Sea, the organised nature and intensity of their attacks at this meeting reached unprecedented levels. This aggressive stance stands in stark contrast to the otherwise cordial China-Vietnam bilateral relationship. It reflects Vietnam’s dual-track approach: maintaining outwardly friendly party-to-party, military, and diplomatic relations with China while simultaneously escalating maritime provocations and actively contributing to negative narratives about China’s role in the South China Sea.
At conferences like these, Chinese experts essentially serve as “diplomatic punching bags”. While the attendees are typically prominent figures in international South China Sea discussions, most lack detailed knowledge of the situation, and their anti-China rhetoric often prioritises predetermined positions over substantive contributions to factual, academic, or intellectual discourse. Though the opposition may appear formidable, Chinese experts who have long tracked South China Sea developments can generally navigate these challenges effectively. For instance, Professor Lei Xiaolu made a notable impact when she presented the Report on Navigation and Overflight in the South China Sea during the maritime legal rules panel. Her presentation, backed by comprehensive data, images, and factual evidence, left a strong impression on the audience.
The greatest challenge in South China Sea discourse lies in the current dominance of stance-based and emotional narratives over fact-based analysis in international discussions. China is unlikely to transform its negative image in international media for the foreseeable future, and Chinese diplomats and experts will continue to face hostile reception in international forums. This persistent challenge stems partly from the natural tendency to sympathise with the perceived weaker party, combined with China’s limited influence in international discourse.
Nevertheless, it remains crucial for Chinese officials and scholars to participate actively in such conferences. First, it provides opportunities to present China’s perspective, clarify its positions, and counter misinformation. Second, the physical presence of Chinese experts, through their presentations, responses, and discussions, can serve as a deterrent to anti-China forces and influence the conference’s direction. Finally, these forums serve as invaluable training grounds for Chinese officials, scholars, and media professionals working on South China Sea issues. Direct exposure to the intense international competition over South China Sea narratives and China’s current diplomatic challenges provides practical experience that fosters learning and improvement through both confrontation and dialogue.
Fred Gao
CGTN reporter in Beijing and worked for Guancha Net in Shanghai. My view doesn’t represent the CGTN standpoint. Feel free to contact me by email: gaoyingshi@gmail.com