Sanae Takaichi has consolidated extraordinary political power, but the economic conditions that sustained the Abe era have changed and Japan’s fragmented opposition may not remain her only problem.
Since her landslide victory in the February 2026 House of Representatives election, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has appeared remarkably dominant in Japanese politics. Her Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration’s coalition partner – the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin) – has fallen into line and there is virtually no opposition to Takaichi’s agenda from within the LDP. The reluctance of opposition parties – such as the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) – has diminished even further.
This immense political leverage has paved the way for controversial domestic policies to enter the mainstream agenda. These include criminalising national flag desecration, revising the Imperial House Law relating to succession, adoption and marriage in the imperial family, modifying the national referendum law to set constitutional amendment procedures and potentially reducing the consumption tax rate. The administration is also accelerating defence cooperation with foreign partners, driven by shared narratives about the threat posed by China.
The immediate foundation of the Takaichi administration’s power lies in the LDP’s overwhelming and still-high voter approval ratings.
A more structural factor is the legacy of political reforms from the 1990s, which enhanced the power of the prime minister on policy decision-making. The 1996 electoral reform that shifted the House of Representatives to a mixed system of single-member districts and proportional representation expanded the influence of party leadership – particularly the prime minister – over rank-and-file lawmakers. Institutional changes aimed at strengthening cabinet functions have also allowed prime ministers to launch independent policy initiatives more easily.
The leaders who most successfully leveraged these structural changes were former prime ministers Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe. Koizumi pushed forward socioeconomic reforms and actively supported the United States in the Iraq War. The second Abe administration became the longest-running in modern Japanese history. Growth-oriented economic policies known as ‘Abenomics’ were deployed domestically and Abe executed a historic foreign policy shift by partially permitting the exercise of the right to collective self-defence through new security legislation.
As is widely recognised, Takaichi is attempting to inherit Abe’s policy direction and decision-making style. Her administration’s growth-oriented economic policies led by the Kantei (Prime Minister’s Office) and proactive values-driven diplomacy closely mirror those of the second Abe administration. The Kantei is also staffed with officials seconded from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, maintaining continuity from the Abe era.
At present, there is little visible resistance to Takaichi within the LDP. For many LDP lawmakers and supporters, the second Abe administration is remembered as a clear success story. Within an LDP that has grown increasingly conservative since the 2010s, Takaichi’s proposals – such as revising the Imperial House Law and taking a hardline diplomatic stance towards China – are welcomed. Her approval ratings among LDP supporters remain high, exceeding 85 per cent.
But it is difficult to predict how long this honeymoon period will last. Even if Takaichi enjoys high support by retracing Abe’s steps, the external environment has changed dramatically since the 2010s. If the administration ignores these shifts and relies solely on past successes, both Takaichi and the LDP will inevitably face severe challenges.
For instance, the low interest rate policy designed to promote economic growth by stimulating corporate investment was a core pillar of Abenomics, but it is unsustainable in today’s environment of rising global inflation.
With low interest rates devaluing the yen amid ongoing inflation – perhaps with some pressure from the Trump administration – the Bank of Japan independently raised the policy interest rate to 1 per cent in June 2026. As rising interest rates fuel scepticism about fiscal sustainability, it will become increasingly difficult for the government to maintain its current levels of aggressive spending. The same applies to cutting the consumption tax rate.
If the government is unable to counter persistent inflation while maintaining an aggressive spending program, the Takaichi administration will struggle to maintain its current approval ratings. The LDP’s baseline party support hovers at just 35 per cent. Even if the administration retains the fierce loyalty of LDP supporters, a defection of unaffiliated voters would trigger a sharp drop in poll numbers, as is becoming apparent. This will be the first true ordeal for the administration.
Yet it is unlikely that this discontent will lead to a change of government through political takeover between the ruling and opposition parties, given the enduring fragmentation of the opposition.
The merger of the Constitutional Democratic Party and Komeito to form the CRA just one month before the February 2026 general election made sense considering the ideological proximity between the two parties. But voters were left with the distinct impression that it was a hasty last-minute deal and decisively rejected it. Despite being the main opposition party, the CRA won only 49 seats out of 465. That failure has dealt a blow to any efforts to consolidate a political force capable of challenging the LDP–Ishin coalition.
Parties like the Democratic Party for the People and Team Mirai – which sit ideologically between the LDP and the CRA – pose another barrier to opposition unity. These centrist parties will find it easier to coax the ruling coalition into partially adopting their policies than to join a unified opposition front. Deal-making will also be incentivised by the composition of the upper house, where the ruling coalition lacks a majority.
Japanese politics in the near term will very likely see a continuation of the Takaichi-led LDP–Ishin coalition even if it lacks broad public backing. But voter dissatisfaction with the status quo will also mount over time. While it is by no means an easy task, if the opposition parties can engage in full-scale electoral cooperation based on policy consultation and leverage the public’s growing frustration, an opportunity to seize the reins of government could eventually emerge.
Republished from East Asia Forum
Satoshi Machidori
Satoshi Machidori is Professor of Political Science at the Graduate School of Law, Kyoto University. He currently serves as the director at the Kyoto University Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of Law and Policy (KILAP). He obtained his MA from University of Wisconsin-Madison and PhD from Kyoto University. He received the Suntory Prize of 2012 for his work The Japanese Premiership: An Institutional Analysis of the Power Relations (in Japanese). His works in English includes Political Reform Reconsidered: The Trajectory of a Transformed Japanese State (Springer, 2023).