Our political leadership will never be the subjects of the Office of the Special Investigator or the Australian Federal Police, nor, therefore, will they ever be charged. Indeed, in their exaggerated innocence they will display only the inevitable hypocrisy of the failed war-maker: a passion for condemning others and a total unwillingness to accept responsibility for their role in their crimes.
The higher military command structures were equally deaf and blind to the warning signs; worse, they might even have ignored them.
Human ingenuity is seldom kind to immutable laws and the concept of effects invariably following necessary and sufficient causes is, therefore, best left to explanations of avalanches and earthquakes. But there are human events that give themselves to confident predictability – namely, when the trends are serious, persistent and their trajectory has historically and almost invariably shown to be realised as an unavoidable and corrupt state of affairs. The Report on the Afghanistan Inquiry by the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force provides another affirmation of such degeneration among certain elements of elite units in the Australian Army.
An initial, sad reflection of this is that the themes in the accounts to date are all too familiar from notorious precedents: allegations of premeditated and/or gratuitous murder and torture of incapacitated prisoners or non-combatants by personnel embracing a “warrior” culture which, inter alia, included initiation by ritual killing, falsification of records, and a code of silence all embedded in an atmosphere of calculated criminality and impunity over several years.
The higher command structures were deaf and blind to the warning signs; worse, they might even have ignored them. It was, in all major characteristics, it was operationally scripted in Sparta with overtones of the mafia (or the other way round).
Mutatis mutandis, and briefly, the report details a reprise of the British Army in Yemen in the 1960s, Northern Ireland after 1968, and Afghanistan between 2010 and 2013; the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia in the early 1990’s; the New Zealand SAS in Afghanistan in 2010; and the US in Vietnam (the Phoenix Programme and Tiger Force should suffice).
Context is extremely important to explain inevitability: the wars in question were, from the start, or became, wars of choice reflecting imperial power politics rather than principle – hence usually illegal, unethical, and unwise. Exacerbating this, they were in theatres of operation that were culturally and politically alien, against enemies difficult, if not impossible to distinguish from the general population, and in which the strategic objectives were either fundamentally unclear, unrealistic, or ridiculous.
Then there is war itself. Given that Australian strategists maintain that Clausewitz is to be taken seriously, then Afghanistan is not the place for reckless alliance enthusiasts to unleash “primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam.”
Yet the analyses of the political decision to commit to war in Afghanistan indicate that Clausewitz’s warning was precisely what was ignored; it was careless and taken without due consideration of the consequences in general, or the likely failure of the whole enterprise given the record of US in wars of the type likely to evolve.
Add to this, repeated deployments of the special forces units for tasks more appropriately undertaken by conventional formations, combined with no prospect of victory, and the creation is the military equivalent of the realty of both the law of diminishing returns, and mission exhaustion. Eventually, the conviction emerges that victory is a mirage; the campaign, in Yeatsian terms, no more than “a trouble of fools,” and legal constraint an absurdity.
And all the while the enemy’s strategy, which included a suite of atrocities masked as tactics, and for which they did not have to apologise, haemorrhaged what remained of the moral fibre of the intervening force.
The predictable consequence for some as the time frame is extended, especially in the elite units and/or those famed for their audacity, and overburdened with dangerous missions requiring exceptional skill, is a process of convergence. They become what they revile and their recourse and refuge is found- in blood-crazed, self-delighting violence which offends even the criminal essence or war in the first place. They become, eventually, unrecognisable to their comrades, as is attested to in various accounts.
The findings of the Afghanistan Inquiry, then, are no surprise. Indeed the genesis of the incidents – many of them obvious – meant that their ultimate realisation was to be anticipated. The country itself was never clay to be moulded by the hands of the West and its occupying armies. It is, rather, an ideal incubator for the developments which have necessitated the Inspector-General’s investigations.
Beyond the inevitability of the events which resulted in the Inspector-General’s inquiry, there is also the inevitability of contradictions and silences: the former relate to the confusion between the report’s findings that: “commanders are both recognised and accountable for what happens on their watch,” and bear a moral command responsibility;” that the wrongdoing was widely known and often the subject of gloating by its perpetrators, and yet the higher Defence command system was at not at fault in regard to the commission of war crimes on the grounds that it/they were unaware of them.
This in relation and response to what Major-General Brereton himself describes as “possibly the most disgraceful episode in Australian military history.”
To accept this is to accept the relevance of a principle in physics which holds that the effect of certain forces – such as light, sound and gravity – on an object varies by the inverse square of the distance between the object and the source of the force until – and here the report modifies physics – the object is out of sight and, therefore, out of mind. But that cannot be the end of it: why was the focus lost?
As for the inevitable silences – these have to do with the political leadership which took Australia to a war in Afghanistan and maintained the country’s commitment to it long after it had conceivable national defence benefit to Australia. Indeed, it became an exercise in the blood sacrifice thought to be demanded by the alliance with the United States.
Specifically, this leadership will never be the subjects of the Office of the Special Investigator or the Australian Federal Police, nor, therefore, will they ever be charged. Indeed, in there exaggerated innocence they will display only the inevitable hypocrisy of the failed war-maker: a passion for condemning others and a total unwillingness to accept responsibility for their role in their crimes.
Michael McKinley is a member of the Emeritus Faculty, the Australian National University; he taught Strategy, Diplomacy and International Conflict at the University of Western Australia and the ANU.
Comments
35 responses to “The Brereton Report: the failure of political and military leadership”
The idea that not one Australian eye witness refused the murderous illegal order to kill a subdued and controlled enemy or civilian at the time, that all the Australian eyewitnesses took years to disclose the events, is beyond my comprehension. Except that even now some of the eyewitnesses fear retribution. What does that say about the ability of the Australian military command to be accessible to communications from front line troops ? Nothing if not to confirm its pitiful and disgraceful state.
UK ,Canadian and Australian Special Forces fighting American Wars get their Gungho/ Kick Ass mentality. No respect for local beliefs and traditions. Door kicking Androids. Surprised Horror at the injuries caused by IEDs and full calibre AK47s. React by attacking soft targets like civilian compounds and villages. Confuse Intel with Tribal Disputes and jealousies. When you`re holding a M4 Assault Rifle, `Kill anything moving` becomes easy.
It happens in every war. A soldier is trained to dehuminize the enemy and make them killing machines…or be killed themselves. I feel for these young blokes, I’ve seen it happen, that’s why so many come back with war related post traumatic syndrome. If you don’t want these situations don’t send our troops into other peoples war follies.
A very sad Vietnam veteran with WRPTSD, brother of one with the same syndrome and with a son who has served in three theaters of war and will most likely suffer the same fate.
Clausewitz never considered a state so corrupt as to make war for the sake of its arms industry’s profits.
Though I come late to this discussion Dr. McKinley I thank you for a truly great piece of writing.
It was enough for me that 2 years ago the former Director of the AWM, Dr. Brendan Nelson publicly criticized the Brereton Inquiry for doing its job (i.e. going through due process), at the same time complaining how “all this” might impact upon our soldier heroes. Dr. Nelson was [then] seen and heard to be publicly supporting a certain V.C. winner.
“We want to believe in our heroes,” Dr Nelson said. And the following gem: war was a “messy business” and unless there had been the “most egregious breaches of laws of armed conflict, we should leave it all alone.” [S.M.H. 01 November, 2018]. The AWM is of course only part of the problem with its untarnished narrative of digger heroics, but the balance of blame lies squarely on those who have over time and for their own dubious purposes encouraged and embellished the Anzac myth of how our soldiers fought and how Australia “came of age”. Nothing of course about why they were invading Turkey.
The ongoing mythology of the digger hero simply has to be squashed, for once and all. We don’t need any more heroes, but we do need persons to behave honourably, whether in the ADF or elsewhere.
Julian, your late arrival does not in any way diminish the important point you make about the AWM. It is interesting that Admiral Barrie has made the point that the SAS display there be closed until further consideration. More generally, though, your reference to the Dr Nelson during his stewardship of the AWM reminds us that it became a form of curating myths and associating the institution with funding habits that are despicable. Thank you.
Perhaps, after a short holiday that is no doubt well earned, MajGen Brereton can be persuaded to continue his good work, by investigating the failure of leadership, at the very least within the ADF beyond the corporals and sergeants all the way up, as far as the chain goes. Assurances have been given, but I fear that these other culprits will escape serious scrutiny, and accountability – a Brereton Report #2 is needed to ensure, in this case, that those who failed the leadership test are identified and held to account.
And on that note, I fear for the Office of the Special Prosecutor, staffed in large part by the AFP (aka government puppets), and under the Home Affairs portfolio. Where is its independence? Will justice be served, or subverted?
Ed, I agree that a further investigation is required. Major-general Brereton, however, has concluded after a long inquiry that the higher command was unaware of what was going on – but that, in my view requires that an investigation be held into why they were unaware – especially given that there seemed to be a body of common knowledge that indicate a deeply disturbing state of affairs in certain units. Even if costs a small fortune (and it will) a wide-ranging Royal Commission, with powers, seems to be needed otherwise public confidence in the ADF will be diminished.
I take your point about Brereton Michael. However I am unconvinced about a RC, if headed by a judicial figure. It needs to be a person with squeaky clean military credentials, as I doubt an outsider can effectively penetrate the military codes and practices. This would not ‘just’ be interviewing people about potential crimes, this is a more subtle task.
Higher command has to answer for its failings, but the real failure was at senior NCO (CSMs, RSMs) and junior to mid level officers, the middle order between the rogue elements and more senior commanders. Identifying what went wrong there, why it went wrong, and how to avoid a recurrence, are prerequisites for rebuilding army morale, and public confidence.
Thanks Ed. Your reservations are justified: a Royal Commission could be problematic. I suggested that form of inquiry – with plenipotentiary powers – because I’m unsure what else would suffice. Perhaps a totally new type of independent, but parliament-ordained inquiry. And you’re right of course about both the type of person who should head it and the need to explain and understand the disconnections that Major-General Brereton identifies. We need, also, to understand how the higher command remained so incurious about the possibilities of corrupt military behaviour for so long. “Organisational blindness” has been mentioned but that just shifts the question; it doesn’t address the causes of the loss of the loss of sight in. the first place.
..Gypsy Daveys’ Soundtrack To War..
For you’ll be my lover my buffalo soldier
With your stunning big dumb gun
And your aiguillette shoulder:
Yes you’ll flush those terrorist families out
You’ll trample and trespass
On their mud brick house:
For you’re much too clever
For desolate prop sets
With their angsty valley
Girls in their rag chic:
Who have got Robocopper
Buy his EuroCopters
And entreats him with cryptic
Apocalyptic pop clips.
There’s a disturbing cringe a man gets
When hearing whinging Vietnam vets it’s
Like mercenary begging for mercy:
And if we didn’t take this cover
My love and I might become lovers
Of Molotovs’ cocktails:
Yes – poets always seem to express it better. That’s why they are so valued by those of us who write mere prose.
Thanks…it’s just another cry for help.
Outside article. Thank you.
It is well known that when armies move into or bomb civilian areas it is more than likely that civilian casualties will occur.
In Iraq 109,032 deaths including 66,081 civilian deaths were recorded between January 2004 to December 2009. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Iraq_War
In 1995 Vietnam released its official estimate of the number of people killed during the Vietnam War: as many as 2,000,000 civilians on both sides https://www.google.com/search?rlz=1C1GGGE_enAU419&sxsrf=ALeKk00Z1ekss9bei7Nvfam4vqDVCOaJSg%3A1606099212935&ei=DCG7X_DfONPA3LUP05Gb6AY&q=civilian+casualties+in+Vietnam&oq=civilian+casualties+in+Vietnam&gs_lcp=CgZwc3ktYWIQAzIFCAAQyQMyAggAMgYIABAWEB4yBggAEBYQHjIGCAAQFhAeOgcIIxCwAxAnOgcIABBHELADOgcIIxDJAxAnOgQIABBDUIz-BViTpAZg8acGaABwAHgAgAGVAogBsxGSAQYwLjExLjGYAQCgAQGqAQdnd3Mtd2l6yAEJwAEB&sclient=psy-ab&ved=0ahUKEwjwlb7o0ZftAhVTILcAHdPIBm0Q4dUDCA0&uact=5
I am unaware of any war in which the tragedy of civilians deaths did not occur.
It is the war itself which is the crime.
It is a credit to Australia that the tragedy in Afghanistan is being investigated.
Andrew, those facts are indeed tragic and are never appropriately discussed before the commitment is made other than in a cursory fashion. The current report goes beyond the killing of civilians in action – to the situation where civilians and non-combatants were, allegedly, gratuitously murdered. This raised another level of questioning for the investigation.
Thank you Michael.
The distinction between civilians killed “in action” and those “gratuitously murdered” is commonly in the eyes of the beholder, it is neither clear to the victims nor indeed to those overcome by fear and hate in the “killing fields”.
Once war starts distinctions between attack and defense, life and death, reality and lies disappear, but the first victim is the truth.
Well said Andrew. “Smart” bombs don’t seem to know who’s a civilian and who’s a warrior when they explode.
I understand that “David McBride, who served in Afghanistan as a military lawyer, blew the whistle on misconduct, and has been prosecuted for his public service” (per Michelle Grattan in an article in The Conversation).
If this is true, isn’t this the same kind of “cover up” that Australians have been so quick to accuse China of (in relation to the Covid-19 outbreak)? Whereas the Chinese could at least plead ignorance about how virulent a novel virus could be, a similar excuse is not available to Australia.
Kien, I have no problem identifying the dishonesty in Afghanistan as a cover-up. What authorities in China did as Covid-19 spread might also be a cover up. The reports – if they are accurate, comprehensive, and details exactly what the authorities knew – point in this direction. [Immediately conceded is that the “if” here is a major qualification]. If so, then we have a situation in which the truth is denied out of fear of the consequences – which, in China’s case are significantly larger than Australia’s.
If I follow your line of thinking, it might’ve been the case that China was unsure what it was dealing with – but then prudence and caution should then have come into play? In Australia’s case prudence and caution were absent without leave.
Couldn’t agree more Michael, particularly your last para. Effective leadership is about managing the dissemination of information so as not to cause a panic. I suspect if that doctor were alive today he would be content with the way the Chinese leadership have handled the pandemic so well. The way Australia’s defence force has handled its crimes against humanity well – is there a better word than evil?
Thanks Jack for extending the important conversation that is imperative we have. What is alleged to have taken place in Afghanistan more than justifies the term evil – remembering, of course, that one incident at least was thought to be too vile to be detailed in the version of the report reitleased to the public. Those who were complicit in the events in question – by witnessing them and remaining silent, or knowing about them from reliable sources, and remaining silent – share some of the responsibility for them even if they are not guilty of committing them. Their default meant, in all probability, that the evidence committed became the evil continued. Overall, it seems that there is no shortage of responsibility to be apportioned.
The atrocities in Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam disqualify Auatralia as a moral critic of anybody. The genocide of the indigenous should silence us. But Australia is the most hypocritcal country in the world. Values? Sure we have. For others.
Indeed!
Superb article. What the report–which has received so much space in the mass media that has assiduously avoided the larger questions–has done is to whitewash the ultimate situation of responsibility, as almost all royal commissions and reports of a similar nature do. It has not whitewashed what actually happened on the ground, but it allows any responsibility for those ultimately involved in the Afghanistan debacle to be completely abrogated. Whilst this often happens in the case of such “illegal” wars, it is also part of the larger problem of the abrogation of responsibility in every area of the federal government in Australia for the moment, a situation which has only got worse over the past thirty years.
Thanks for your comments Greg. Your general point about the evasions of government it very well-made. What surely is required – especially in the case of war – is an official public inquiry with plenipotentiary powers to compel disclosure of the reasons for decisions, strategies and policies. All that we are left with in the absence of such an accounting are self-serving memoirs and FOI-released documents which point to stupidity and malfeasance 30 years after there event. By that time amnesia tends to be dominant.
Why is Australia involved in so many overseas conflicts? We are a small country on the opposite side of the world, why are we even there? To make matters worse we seem to have involved local people in our mess and then when they need to leave their country because of our carelessness we disavow them and leave them to their fate. This is not a record to be proud of. This is not a military record to celebrate. It is time we really looked at the role of defence in this country and return them to our defence, assistance of our neighbours if they request it and nothing else. We have been involved in overseas conflicts not of our making since the Boer War, surely it is time to stop. We do not have so many resources in this country that we can waste them fighting other countries wars when we cannot adequately fund health, education and social services.
Elizabeth, the question you ask up front is one that needs to be asked, and with it, why both governments and parliaments and the major parties are so often in default of their constitutional responsibilities in regards to war. The commitment to a US-led campaign in Afghanistan following 9/11 (and as dramatic and deadly as that event was) by John Howard, then in the USA, was one of alliance enthusiasm and emotion bereft of the type of strategic calculation and responsibility that should be a hallmark of a Prime Minister in a self-respecting democracy.
We are involved in foreign wars because we adhere to an outdated mindset that arose in the “glory days” of European colonialism. European powers ruled, and exploited, most of the rest of the globe. Understanding of ‘how the world worked’ acquired through history, literature, ethics and the conceptual tools from philosophy and other disciplines gave a cognitive model founded in European (including North American) experience and ignorant of the cultures, of the lived experience, of the majority of the world’s population. This long persisted, came to seem ‘natural’, just ‘common sense’. But its finished, though not all have grasped this. The major phenomena in the social, economic, political space of the last century has been decolonisation. Largely achieved in explicit terms but persisting economically and in the outlook of the former colonisers who are having trouble adjusting to a changed, and changing, world. The US, overseer of the challenged system, wants to sustain the ‘rules based order’ developed in an earlier time. Australia, fearful of change, and apprehensive on xenophobic, racial, cultural and religious grounds of the region in which it is only physical located makes repeated military payments on the US insurance policy titled “continuity” without examining the context or the fine print.
Kishore Mahbubani asked “Can Asians Think ?”. To that and the mirror question “Can Australians Think ?’ the answer is self evidently a resounding “yes”. More pertinently in the latter case is whether the thinking can break free of outdated bounds threaded with colonial attitudes and get a clear grasp of the new reality.
Or to put it simply…Our political and government class are as subordinate to old establishment orders as are the infants in the military themselves.
Australia is a garrison state.. always was.
And always will be as long as the citizenry allows the devil to dance on the genuine emotions of ANZAC Day.
A powerful piece.
To paraphrase the judgement of the Nuremberg trials:
To participate in a war where your national security is not directly threatened, “therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains
within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”
Sums up where the ultimate responsibility for these disgraceful events lies.
Thanks Cameron, and your reference to the Nuremberg proceedings is most appropriate. The principles which emerged from them need to be constantly in front of all decision-makers and policy-makers who even begin to think about going to war. Until that happens, accountability and responsibility are mere invocations.
Except, in Nuremberg, a First XI was tried and executed. The trials here will never get past the Third Grade.
Sure, Howard originally, but nobody mentions, most of these murders were on St Julia’s watch. One recalls her first breathless overseas trip as PM, promising “no dilution” at a Tarin Kowt barbie.
And today, you can still see Australia’s shiny Afghan “story” at AWM. Nobody has hit pause.
She did redeem herself though and move on to be a soldier in the vainglorious Hillary Clinton POTUS Campaign.
So hup !-two!-three! – four!