Many economists argue technical progress does not have to lead to fewer jobs but we should not assume that creating the demand to support new employment opportunities is a given.
“I am convinced, that the substitution of machinery for human labour, is often very injurious to the interests of the class of labourers.” These are the words of the English economist David Ricardo from his Principles of Political Economy, published in 1821. The question Ricardo raises here is older than the mainstream of economics itself.
For many, this is the economic and social issue associated with technical progress, be it the introduction of the steam engine or AI. For dissenters within the economics profession, Ricardo’s instincts were a legitimate concern, even if his reasoning did not impress. My own concern is with the objective economic impact of technical progress; specifically, its employment impacts.
What is technical progress? It will suffice for this discussion to interpret it as the application of new methods of producing things, using less of at least some inputs and no more of any other input.
Interestingly, the great debates about technical progress in the economics profession over the last century revolved around its consequences for the distribution of income, primarily between wages and profits. This meant that the economy could potentially pay a higher real wage or a higher rate of return (profit) on production or both.
Thus, technical progress allowed for an increase in the size of the cake. How a capitalist economy would distribute the extra slices between labour and capital was the more complex and controversial question.
The flipside, and more concerning aspect, is that, traditionally, technical progress in capitalist economies is predominantly what economists call ‘labour-saving’. To produce the same output requires less labour than before. If the quantity of output does not increase, labour employment falls, unemployment rises.
The issue is whether these unemployment effects are inevitable and long-lasting. Put another way, can the ‘inherent’ dynamics of capitalism be relied on to prevent such negative consequences.
The mainstream and dominant answer to this from the profession has been that there exist ‘market’ mechanisms to compensate for this potential rise in unemployment. If real wages and prices are sufficiently flexible, this should allow labour to become more competitive, thus allowing the labour-displacing effects of technical change to be at least partially offset.
Additionally, as the cost of producing goods and services with the new technology falls and with it the price of these goods, this should also stimulate demand for those goods and in turn for labour. (A nice paper on these arguments is by Cesaratto, et. al. in the Review of Political Economy, 2003).
Arguments of this sort are at the heart of the profession’s long-held faith in the inherent ability of capitalist economies to converge towards full employment. It is a safe bet that this argument or variations on it will be wheeled out in response to concerns about AI, particularly its consequences for unemployment.
Most recently, for example, the chief economist of CommBank, Luke Yeaman, wrote:
Higher productivity doesn’t necessarily mean fewer workers. More often, it means workers doing more valuable work. AI is likely to augment most jobs, not replace them, especially by taking over routine tasks. Early evidence shows it is already saving time, freeing up capacity and allowing firms to do more with the same workforce.
Note the words ‘freeing up capacity’. The new technology will allow the firm to produce more with the same or less. Since more output can be produced with the extra capacity, the workers who would otherwise be laid off can be kept on. Alternatively, for the economy as a whole, the structural changes brought by technical progress facilitate new avenues of production that offer employment opportunities for those adversely affected by the introduction of new technology.
What is assumed – but left unsaid in this view – is that there will be extra demand in the economy for goods and services to underpin the larger output that will supposedly negate the labour-displacing effects of technical progress.
In spite of their popularity and dominance, these arguments have never been particularly strong, as economic debates throughout the 20th century demonstrated. That markets left to themselves, however unfettered, will deliver whatever demand is required for full employment, is, as Keynes suspected (and those debates confirmed) not a correct deduction from robust economic reasoning.
The alternative position would approach the question we started with by asking how ‘effective demand’ (as economists call it), and as a result production and labour employment, could accelerate sufficiently to offset the tendency for new technology to require less labour.
That brings us to the sources of effective demand: household consumption, investment, government spending and net exports. However, assuming that consumption and/or investment will accelerate sufficiently to mitigate the unemployment effects of technical progress is problematic. The consumption impact will depend very much on how the spoils of technical progress are distributed between profits and wages.
On investment, installing new capacity requires an expectation of demand growth but the necessary acceleration of demand must be happening prior to any surge of investment. Even the view that somehow innovation itself speeds up aggregate investment spending is something the jury is still out on.
For the purposes of increasing growth in demand to offset the labour-displacing effects of technical progress, this, interestingly, leaves just government spending and net exports. The net exports channel has always been deceptive. Not all economies can experience export-led growth simultaneously. Export-led growth only benefits some economies, providing others are prepared to expand their domestic demand to suck in more imports.
One is left with government spending as a source of demand for the economy to at least ensure sufficient demand to deal with technical progress, where the private sector is unwilling to. This should well and truly set the cat among the pigeons, given all the flailing and gut-wrenching in this country about supposed excess public sector spending.
