How will the Royal Australian Navy, the federal government, and the Australian defence industrial base support three submarine classes concurrently: the Collins Class life of type extension (LOTE), the Virginia class sustainment support, and the design and construction of the AUKUS Class nuclear-powered submarines? My assessment, this is an insoluble task.
For reasons unknown, in agreement or otherwise with the RAN, the Morrison and the Albanese governments have made the decision that the life of the Collins class can grow until the first of 3 USN Viginia class nuclear attack submarines transition into service with the RAN from 2032.
Without LOTE the submarines will progressively decommission over the next 8 years with the last of the class, HMAS Rankin, to be retired in 2033.
The Australian government should have been cognisant when cancelling the Attack-class contract with the French that it placed significant dependency on the 10-year Life-of-type-Extension (LOTE) of the Collins class. Given the extent of design change involved, LOTE is high-risk, expensive, and may not be realizable on all boats.
While the workloads, diving depth and cycles of the submarines determine the operational life of a class, general ageing problems, parts obsolescence and availability, corrosion, and technology advances put increasing pressure on operational availability and capability on the Collins boats.
It would have been a sensible option to engage SAAB-Kockums of Sweden for an advanced Collins Class design. Kockums (KAB) designed the T-471, and, in partnership with ASC, built the Collins class based on this design in Australia. It would have been more cost-effective and straightforward to renew this partnership for at least three next-generation T-471 submarines for the RAN. It would have provided a safety net should the SSN AUKUS-class contract fail, and the US government withdraws or delays the sale to Australia of Virginia-class submarines.
While LOTE is designed to ensure Australia maintains an undersea warfare capability until the AUKUS submarines are available in the early 2040s, it places a huge demand on the already scarce shipbuilding and Navy resources, when demands from AUKUS will be increasing.
The plan to replace the propulsion system, diesel engines and generators, the power conversion distribution and cooling systems among other platform changes during a LOTE docking involves a significant redesign of the class. Structural changes to the submarine hull, including equipment foundations, fuel, and buoyancy tanks, require new stability and buoyancy calculations and an extensive submarine trials and recommissioning period. Latent conditions prevalent on an ageing platform will determine the program completion time as will force majeure events, including delayed sub-vendor deliveries, labour and engineering shortages or industrial actions. The currently scheduled 2-year completion period for this scope of work is simply delusional.
The Royal Australian Navy and ASC seem to have woken up to this predicament by now floating the idea of a LOTE-lite without identifying what that entails. A submarine life-of-type extension without replacement of the power train during the FCD deep maintenance docking will not necessarily shorten the docking period. While schedule slippage risk would be lower with fewer platform changes, submarine hull ageing problems will remain. Separating the aft section from the platform for equipment replacement would open the work front. Dealing with corrosion and material cracking problems in confined spaces on a 25-year-old submarine platform will require inestimable hours to complete.
Will the Royal Australian Navy deploy submarines in 20 years? Under the AUKUS Agreement, three Virginia class SSNs with an option for two additional boats planned for delivery after 2032. But the USN submarine build program is now under pressure with insufficient construction rates available to meet their own requirements. This has the potential to override or at least delay the Australian acquisition of Virginial class nuclear attack submarines.
The Royal Australian Navy has always struggled to maintain crew numbers to support its squadron of six Collins Class submarines. The troublesome submarine crewing issues are likely to become an insoluble problem for the RAN should, as planned under trilateral AUKUS agreement, the US-President sign off on the delivery to Australia in early 2032 of Virginia class attack (SSN) submarines. To crew and support three RAN Virginia class submarines equate to twice the numbers required for the six Collins Class boats. On top of that is the necessary shore-based support, whether uniform or civilian. It will be an enormous challenge to meet the operational tempo of a three-class submarine squadron.
Submariner training is lengthy and demanding. In the RAN, only the most outstanding naval officers passed the submariner command course (SMCC). Known to be the toughest leadership program in the Navy comprising theoretical, on-land simulations and 60 days unrelenting submarine warfare exercises at sea, it became known as Perisher because the failure rate is high with no opportunity of appeal.
To command a U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarine (SSN) is even more demanding. Under AUKUS a select group of Collins-class warfare officers have already had the opportunity to undertake training and serve on Virginia class SSNs. To qualify, the officers must attend the Navy Nuclear Propulsion (Power) School at the Charleston-Naval Weapons Station in South Carolina, take the Submarine Officer Basic Course, and finally deploy aboard a U.S. submarine to complete the course in just under 15 months. The USN nuclear school is the most demanding academic program in the U.S. military. Students must proceed rapidly through the course with high academic standards enforced in all subjects. Officers would mostly enter the course with a university degree in nuclear engineering or similar academic qualification since the high intensity naval nuclear course is cramming the degree into 6 months. On recent accounts approximately 100 RAN officers and enlisted sailors are in the U.S. Navy submarine training pipeline with a handful assigned to U.S. Virginia class SSNs.
Separately, in preparation for getting Australian industries and emergency services ‘nuclear ready’ when USN attack submarines are based in Australia some 40 personnel from ASC are apprenticed to the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and Intermediate Maintenance Facility in Hawaii for supporting USN boats in Australia and in preparation for their roles to maintain future RAN nuclear-powered submarines.
And, depending on which crewing and training model the RAN adopts for the AUKUS class – traditionally the RAN operates in accordance with the RN model – the industry training and assimilation program would have to operate under yet another charter and regime.
Like the USN and RN, the services have also a serious shortfall of serving submariners. Six months deployment at sea, mainly submerged, the Virginia-class submariners are distinctive to the core. Rather than waiting for an unpredictable posting to an Australian Virginia class submarine in the 2030s, opportunities in the private sector may become attractive to today’s qualified SSN officers and engineers.
Concurrently, with the training of RAN submariners and maintenance personnel in the USA, the RAN must continue to crew and maintain its Collins Class squadron. The Class has a 30-year design life. With the first boat, HMAS Collins, commissioned in mid-1996 and the last submarine, HMAS Rankin, entering service in March 2003, the notional operational life of the squadron declines between 2026 and 2033. Ageing problems, obsolescence, corrosion, parts availability, technology advances will pose increased pressure on operational reliability and capability.
The termination of the DCNS (Naval Group) contract for 12 Shortfin Barracuda submarines by the Morrison government on 16 September 2021 in favour of eight nuclear-powered attack submarines laid Australia’s future submarine capability in the lap of the gods. The French developed, Australian built, diesel electric submarine decision was always a high risk exercise, but now under AUKUS the transfer to Australia of three USN Virginia-class attack submarines in the early 2030s remains uncertain until the RAN has demonstrated its capacity to crew, safely deploy and maintain nuclear-powered submarines, and, importantly, is still subject to the President of the United States ratifying this sale of SSNs to Australia. Of further risk is the decision for ASC and BAE Systems to jointly design and build the AUKUS SSN submarine class. The complexity of the task imposes enormous risk that could lead to serious impact long term on RAN submarine capability if there is schedule delay.
After the decision by the Australian government to favour nuclear over diesel-electric propulsion the opportunity would have been available to switch from the Shortfin Barracuda to SSN Barracuda design. It was the reference design for the SSN Suffren as well as the Australian diesel-electric Attack class. At 5300 tonnes submerged and a crew of sixty it compares in size and displacement to the original Australian requirements. While smaller than the 7900 tonne Virginia class and a smaller weapon payload–with no vertical missile launch tubes–the Suffren class is a flexible all-purpose design. As demonstrated with the commissioning of the first of class boat in 2020, the Suffren class is more economical to build, operate and maintain than the USN and RN SSNs. Because of its displacement the class is more suitable for deployment in the treacherous Coral Sea as it would be in the littoral waters of the South China Sea. The Suffren class reactor uses low-enriched uranium that requires refuelling every 10 years compared to the highly enriched more toxic reactors on the RN and USN submarines that have a design life of 30 years. Both submarine classes would similarly require periodic planned maintenance and class augmentations.
If the US were not to proceed with the sale to Australia of the Virginia SSNs, and the AUKUS program suffered design and construction difficulties, major delays, or even contract termination, following the retirement of the Collins-class squadron, Australia would be left with no underwater warfare capabilities of its own.
The French Suffren class should have been the logical choice in 2020/21. Is it still a viable alternative? Most unlikely! Apart from the French feeling cheated by the Morrison government’s underhanded conduct to pull out of the submarine contract, they will not have the design and yard capacities required for the delivery of eight Suffren class submarines. In Australia, submarine builder ASC has neither the capacity nor the ability to support the design and build of a nuclear submarine in-country.
A Suffren build in Australia would require new industry infrastructure. The Suffren class specifications and work instructions would have to address Australian Standards, regulatory requirements and RAN operational imperatives. CAD and engineering documentations would require translation into English, including the use of RAN acronyms and synonyms. The French and the US governments would have to agree to replace the NAVAL SYCOBS combat management system on the Suffren class with the US-Navy’s open-architecture AN/BYG-1 system. Any changes to the USN combat, communication and weapon systems requires Australian Defence interoperability and USN sanctioning, previously approved for the French/Australian Attack class program.
These are examples why a switch from the AUKUS to the Suffren class is not a viable answer to the RAN’s submarine problem.
Eight SSN-AUKUS boats, based on a UK design, are scheduled for delivery to the RAN from the early 2040s.The British Submarine industry has a poor record of timely program deliveries. They are stressed to meet their domestic support, maintenance, and new-build programs, all of which will impact on the AUKUS SSN program.
Each of the Collins, Virginia and AUKUS teams need a critical mass of Australian design and sustainment capability concurrently. Each of the programs overlap and must evolve independently.
The diversity and range of submarine design and sustainment expertise required for the Collins, Virginia, and AUKUS programs, each with their own design philosophies, standards, regulatory requirement, supply chains, infrastructure, documentation, and training plans, is considerable. These requirements would place enormous demands on the most experienced submarine builder on earth.
Will the RAN, ASC, and Australian defence industry be able to support these programs? The answer is self-evident.
Hans J. Ohff is a visiting research fellow at the University of Adelaide and managing director of ASC during the Collins build program from 1993 to 2002
Hans J. Ohff is a former CEO of ASC who built the Collins class submarines.