Brian Toohey’s challenging post (19 October) concerns what we want our submarines to do. In light of the recent Defence Strategic Update, the ADF needs to build a force capable of deterring an attack by a major power.
Because of a submarine’s stealth and ability to act as a force multiplier, it is probably the most important military asset in an ADF structured around deterrence. This is particularly the case where a middle power like Australia needs assets that best provide the wherewithal to deliver an asymmetric strategy for countering the potential ambitions of a great power like China.
Contemporary naval doctrine suggests a submarine’s deterrent effect will be best realised if it operates in an offensive role ‘up threat’. This doctrine is reflected in the Commander of the US Submarine Force’s statement of the role of the nuclear-powered submarines under his command: “to hold the adversary’s strategic assets at risk from the undersea — their homeland, SSBNs on patrol, carriers, critical undersea infrastructure, cyberspace, strategic ports and chokepoints, and submarines”.
The Force Commander has also revealed that the US has concluded a protocol with Australia whereby the two countries work together in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations. It seems clear these would occur in and around the South China Sea. So we can conclude that Australian submarines work together with their American counterparts to detect and track the PLA Navy’s submarines and, no doubt, other naval assets as well. They could only do this with access to America’s extensive and highly expensive command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) system. The RAN’s role is likely to be similar in many ways to that of the Royal Navy in the North Atlantic during the Cold War. Like the RN, we can also assume that, for reasons of sovereignty, the RAN would retain operational control over Australian submarines, which would be subject to very carefully defined rules of engagement.
A major difference is that on these missions Australia deploys conventionally powered submarines, which the British withdrew from front line operations against the Soviet Union forty years ago. This means that with a six submarine force and a distance of 3,500 nautical miles to our primary area of operations, we can maintain one submarine on station for only half the time. Although they still have some advantages in terms of their acoustic signature, which are reducing over time as SSNs become ever quieter, conventional submarines are particularly vulnerable because of both their periodic need to snort and their low sustainable speed.
Toohey says these joint operations are dangerous, which they are, and are becoming increasingly so as ASW detection technologies improve and the PLA Navy invests in more and more assets that deploy them. Perhaps the greatest danger, however, is if the strategic objectives of the US and Australia diverge and a RAN submarine was on station when, by accident or design, a kinetic event developed in the South China Sea and triggered a wider conflict between the PRC and America. If the Australian government had no intention of going to war, could we withdraw from such a conflict in time and detach our force in good order?
Toohey’s solution is for Australian submarines to operate around the archipelagic chokepoints in a defensive posture, presumably to intercept a hostile fleet on its way to attack Australia. This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, we would need a lot of submarines – Hugh White says between 24 and 32 – to cover all the possible chokepoints. (Q: If it takes us 40 years to acquire 12 submarines, how long would it take to procure 32? How long would it take to recruit the required number of submariners?) Secondly, the enemy may not come through the chokepoints at all. They may instead stand a long way off and attack Australia with long-range bombers or missiles. Thirdly, if the enemy deployed nuclear-powered submarines to the chokepoints in advance of a planned attack, they could loiter around and sink our conventional boats on patrol when they came up to snort.
But the main reason that Toohey’s solution is unconvincing is that submarines, particularly conventional submarines, have never performed well in delivering a defensive strategy. For example, there were 40 German U-boats – seven of them with the latest snorkel equipment – deployed to attack the Allied invasion fleet in June 1944 and their failure was comprehensive. Yet the size of the theatre off Normandy was far smaller than the one we are considering to the north and west of Australia.
But I certainly agree that the timetable for deploying the Attack class is totally inadequate and the capability eventually to be delivered not cost-effective. For an outlay of $90bn, we will be waiting for over thirty years before we can guarantee that one slow and vulnerable submarine will be on station in its primary area of operations at any time. Since the submarine would be highly vulnerable, we would also have to reckon on a material level of attrition. Whether the Attack class would be fit for purpose in terms of both effectiveness and survivability is therefore open to serious doubt.
The inconvenient truth is that if Australia wants to operate submarines so as to deter any potential adversary in the future, not just China, they will need to be nuclear-powered, each with a capacity to deploy several Un-crewed Underwater Vehicles (UUVs). Even in the event the Americans do go home, the deterrent effect of our submarines will be maximised if they continue to operate in an offensive role ‘up threat’ and, in line with US doctrine, “penetrate adversary defensive perimeters to deny safe haven, reduce defences, and exploit opportunities created by being inside their fence line”.
It would be handy if the Americans left their C3I infrastructure in place if they withdraw, but Australia may be able to re-create some of its essential elements. A nuclear-powered submarine force could also develop more flexible operational strategies by taking advantage of their greater speed and evolving new technologies, such as autonomous vehicles and cyber.
For example, if Australia deployed nuclear-powered submarines in the absence of US support, they could operate ‘up threat’ by standing further out to sea than may currently be the case and deploying UUVs for destructive operations closer inshore. In addition, their speed and lethality would also offer other avenues to denying an adversary access to our approaches in and beyond the air-sea gap – avenues that would not be available to a conventional submarine because of its limited speed and vulnerability. If necessary, for instance, Australian SSNs could rapidly execute an offensive chokepoint strategy by re-deploying to waters further north in the approaches to the archipelago.
Jon Stanford gratefully acknowledges the contribution to this post of Submarines for Australia and comments by members of its reference group.
Comments
13 responses to “What should Australian submarines do? – Response to Brian Toohey”
Hi Ian. It is a fascinating question and submarines are not the main issue. There is no political appetite in Australia for nuclear energy and I have to admit I have long been on the negative side. I was involved in the interstate fight for construction of the Swedish-designed Collins class subs in 1985 and, as I recall, nuclear was ruled out from the beginning. Sweden and France have well-established nuclear industries. Jon’s history of U boats at Normandy was new to me.
Thanks, Jon – perfectly rational case made.
Completely setting aside the philosophies of warfare rationales, if you’re going to have a submarine, it needs to be nuclear.
I’m utterly opposed to nuclear power generation domestically, not least because it’s got such a short lifespan before there’s no more viable uranium supplies left. The metal (in a universal sense) is so valuable, that it should be reserved for uses where there in no other substitute – a submarine is a perfect example.
As a total layperson on all such matters, i can still see this is a nonsensical argument.
Firstly it assumes we would be working as part of a USA central action, presumably against China which assumes that in 30 years things will still be the same. The world 30 years ago was a very different place than it is now and there can be no assumption that in 30 years the USA will remain as it is or indeed that China will remain as it is.
Secondly any war machine that takes 30 years to deliver is absurd. Technology will overtake it way before it arrives.
Thirdly it totally ignores the rate at which China is adding to its military capacity, such that just about anything Australia might send to “upstream” an attack will be dwarfed. This is probably true of even a totally united Quad force, given that China is adding about 15-20 warships per year which presumably will include a goodly proportion of more capable submarines and a heap of anti submarine warships.
Fourthly of course it totally ignores our military dependence on fuel sources and seems to assume that if the USA and allies blockade China that there would not be reciprocation such that fuel supplies to Australia (for these submarines) would be cut off. Obviously the moment China suspects that such an attack is possible all trade lines towards key military installations in Australia would be similarly upstreamed. Fairly obviously if US military doctrine is certain that an upstream attack strategy is the most effective then we can probably assume that China will have some similar variant, which would focus on US/Australian naval. air and supply depots.
I firmly believe this is a case of “can’ t see the forest forr the trees” Are you guys listening to yourselves? Wth what’s on our plate at present I don’t think this is a wise spend at all. Please stop this insane quest. Do you really think that Australia could be defended from an attack from China? Really??? Don’t kid yourself. And if we did what sort of death and destruction would have ensued?
It always amused me what a slime-ball word “Defense” is, for a country almost continuously at war, but whose homeland has not been attacked for 200 years. At least the Poms had a “War Office” at a time when they were less hypocritical. Submarines are attack vessels whose principle use is blockading trade. That is why they are planned for use in the South China Sea.
This post introduces another slime-ball word, “deterrent”. Calling your attack force a “deterrent” enables you to disguise a long-term plan of attack. Even if your potential enemy can see through it, your own people tend not to, and it is their fears you are playing on. It is all about selling submarines to your own people. Ensuring that they frightened and ill-informed is part of the sales pitch.
It’s worth re-reading the final par in BT’s original piece: ‘Perhaps the best argument, however, for not wasting $90 billion on the
Attack class is that cheap underwater drones will soon have an important
military role particularly suited to use from bases in northern
Australia.’
I find this article deliberately misses the key point of the argument.
The author assumes that our role is to act with the US and goes on from there.
The rest of us are asking whether we should be acting with the US? I’d answer “No”.
Our strategic aims & environment are not the same; the enemy of my friend is not my enemy.
The time has passed where we need to hang onto hang onto the trousers of a parent; it’s weak and child like.
We should rethink exactly what the D in ADF means for us.
As for this “acting up threat” nonsense; it’s yet another soundbite to justify the stupid.
Our immediate neighbour has a greater need to keep an eye on their northern reaches than we do; we can protect their southern flank and our northern approaches with the same assets.
This would provide much greater strategic leverage.
If only we could get over our innate racism of seeing our northern neighbour as somehow lesser than us, we could work together for mutual benefit.
Imagine a joint production effort to build lots of little subs; they do the iron work; we do the fancy innards. Both play to our strengths; win-win
There is so much to gain by accepting that we’re a country in Asia and start acting accordingly.
I wonder whether the premise for the justification of such an enormous amount of money for obsolete submarines is right.
The threat is certainly directed at China. But is this reasonable? China has no record of conquering countries that are not on its immediate border, even less so at sea. On the other hand, the USA is perpetually at war somewhere outside the US and is nearly always the agressor. While the chance that Australia would be a target of the USA is extremely small, Australia could easily become collateral damage in a conflict between China and the USA. Is that what we want to spent all that money on?
Thanks for this Jon. I find you make a convincing argument, although I have been going along with Hugh White and the Collins Mark 11 steady build. Being a late starter in the nuclear game may have advantages for Australia. I would be interested to hear Hugh’s response.
Is being a starter in the nuclear game feasible for Australia. As Toohey points out the conventional submarines we now have on order are pretty large ships. Could nuclear powered submarines for Australia be smaller, cheaper and more readily delivered than conventional submarines of more modest proportions?
Been a lot of uninformed criticism of the governments defence spending . Spending a few hundred million on missiles was a good move, they are ideal for wiping out Covid hot spots. And Submarines make excellent pandemic isolation dwellings, sneaking away is difficult.
What exactly is the the threat that Australia’s submarine force is trying to defend against?
Is there any credible/foreseeable threat that would see an invasion fleet from a major power (i.e. China) coming to attack/invade Australia? If so you would think this would be defined in the Defence Strategic Update which it is not. The Update even states that the prospect of high-intensity military conflict is remote. The pre-conditions required for such a high risk (mis)adventure seem so remote as to be implausible. The unlikeliness of such a scenario is enhanced by the many other available options which modern weapon systems offer (cyber attacks, long range missiles etc) and diplomatic/economic actions that are more likely to achieve the adversaries objectives at far lower risk.
Thus the rationale for having a mega-expensive submarine fleet to defend Australia against a nebulous threat appears flimsy which doesn’t stand up to a cost-benefit analysis. It also comes at great opportunity cost to address real threats that Australia is facing, such as climate change, water, energy etc.
The really depressing issue in the discussion about Australia’s submarines is that it is predicated on the assumption that in 50 years time the only way that the world will be able to avoid war is by countries being as militarised as possible: ie. we only refrain from fighting each other because of mutually assured destruction or something similar. If this is the case, which I’m delighted to say it’s highly unlikely I’ll be around to see, it is impossible to believe that the world will have adequately tackled climate change, loss of biodiversity and all the other serious environmental threats or issues related to social justice and equity (poverty, food shortages, abuses of human rights, exploitation of workers, the North-South imbalance, etc.).