The war between the US and Iran is increasingly being driven by the self-reinforcing dynamics of escalation, retaliation and mistrust that make de-escalation politically and strategically difficult.
As the US and Iran struggle to find a way out of war, they are being hampered by the entrapping and self-perpetuating nature of the conflict escalation process itself. Understanding this dynamic is a first step to preventing further escalation and engaging in conflict de-escalation.
At the heart of the Iran War are existential concerns about safety and security. Iran’s uranium enrichment and fear that Iran could build nuclear weapons are a major source of angst for the US and Israel – as are Israel’s 90 or so undeclared nuclear weapons for Iran. This is a classic security dilemma, where a state’s efforts to increase its security cause reactions from others that lead to a decrease in its security. Indeed, Iran’s nuclear enrichment led to surprise attacks by the US and Israel on Iranian nuclear facilities on 22 June.
Of course, Trump’s 2018 withdrawal (reportedly encouraged by Netanyahu) from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (painstakingly negotiated over 20 months with the P5+1 and EU), even when Iran was abiding by the agreement (as certified by the IAEA) surely undermines Iran’s trust in any agreement it may now reach with the US.
The apparent trigger for the current hostilities was a visit to Washington by Netanyahu on 11 February, where Trump and his inner circle met with the Israelis in the Situation Room. Netanyahu reportedly made a hard-sell pitch: “suggesting that Iran was ripe for regime change.” He argued that “a joint US-Israeli mission could finally bring an end to the Islamic Republic” in just a few days. Trump is reported to have ended the meeting saying, “It sounds good to me.”
Two weeks later, Israeli and US military strikes assassinated a number of senior Iranian officials, including Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei – in a major breach of the international norm against the assassination of leaders. These and other US and Israeli attacks were launched in the midst of an ongoing negotiation process between the US and Iran on its nuclear program, further undermining Iran’s trust in negotiations. Iran responded with drone and missile strikes on Israel, US bases, and US-allied Arab countries and a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
Once the threshold to armed conflict is crossed, parties typically become caught in a rapidly-spiraling vortex of aggressive interactions which ensure that conflict intensifies. As each experiences injury by the other, a desire to right the wrong strengthens – with each viewing the other’s actions as provocation that requires a response of greater intensity, causing the conflict to expand in size and importance.
This becomes a “retaliatory spiral,” in which both now have truly hostile intentions towards each other, further poisoning the relationship and making a peace process ever-more challenging.
Threats and ultimatums become ominous, as they are used to exert leverage. Trump threatened that Iran would be “blown off the face of the earth,” and “bombed back to the Stone Ages!!!” Larijani, the head of the Iranian National Security Council, posted on X: “Be careful not to get eliminated yourself.” The next day, he was assassinated.
Such reactance is strongest in relation to ‘sticks’ but also occurs with ‘carrots,’ especially when perceived as bribes, which erode one’s freedom of choice. Rather, incentives tailored to the party’s interests are more likely to influence the other than any blunt use of leverage.
When saliences, previously established limits to a conflict, are crossed, the rules of conflict are redefined. US and Israeli action violating the taboo against assassinating leaders, and Iran’s first blockade ever of the Strait of Hormuz represent two such saliences which increased outrage and extreme retaliatory behaviour. In frustration, Trump wrote on his social media account: “Open the F***in’ Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell.” A couple of days later, he warned: “A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again.”
At this point, the international community, concerned about what further saliences Trump might cross (eg, war crimes or using a nuclear weapon) insisted on a two-week ceasefire, proposed by Pakistan.
Soon after, when face-to-face marathon talks in Pakistan reached no agreement, Trump created his own blockade against Iranian ports, another first. Although there have been no further face-to-face negotiations, the Pakistani mediators have passed papers back and forth outlining the parties’ latest positions. However, one factor slowing progress is the pairing of offers with threats, since the reactance it engenders inclines parties to automatically reject the other’s offers.
Although the parties and various pundits have argued that one side or the other is “winning,” in fact, both are losing – and stand to lose even more if they cannot find an offramp.
Iran’s blockade of commercial shipping, carrying oil, gas and fertiliser, has been costly for the US – through a spike in consumer prices, significant damage to US military bases and depletion of military stockpiles. The war is projected to ultimately cost one trillion dollars, and US standing in the world has suffered. Trump’s ratings have fallen and his party could lose in the mid-terms.
Iran has suffered elimination of its senior leadership; serious damage to its infrastructure; civilian and military mortality; and significant loss of military assets. Inflation is running at 70 per cent and the IMF has projected that Iran’s economy will shrink and it will take years for reconstruction.
The rest of the world has also suffered and will continue to do so. The World Food Programme predicted that 45 million more people could experience acute hunger.
To work towards peace, both will need to recommit to and extend their ceasefire in order to allow for a well-planned mediation process. Such a process should include adequate time to create an agenda acceptable to both; exploration of their interests for each agenda item; creation of problem-solving options that might meet their respective interests; and building options into a comprehensive, acceptable agreement. Although it’s advisable for Pakistani mediators to continue in their role, it might be best to choose another venue, such as Geneva, where both delegations can feel safe. Finally, technical experts, such as senior IAEA staff, should be included to contribute technical expertise.
To arrive at such an agreement, the parties will need to reduce tit for tat attacks; lower their hostile rhetoric; and consider what inducements they could offer. They must also avoid allowing hardline factions on all sides from acting as spoilers.
Obviously, the fundamental issue is the need for better understanding and institutionalisation of the knowledge and practice of conflict prevention and resolution, so that such destructive and senseless wars can be prevented and disputes of the future more sensibly settled by constructive rather than destructive means.
Connie Peck
Dr. Connie Peck, AO, is the Founder/Former Principal Coordinator of the UNITAR Programme in Peacemaking and Conflict Prevention – the first-ever training programme in negotiation and mediation in the United Nations (now in its 33rd year). When lecturing at La Trobe University in the 1980s, she also founded Psychologists for the Prevention of War (now called Psychologists for Peace) during the height of the Cold War and acted as its first Convenor. She is the author of several books and numerous articles on conflict resolution and the nuclear threat.See also: www.linkedin.com/in/connie-peck-b92a403a0