Greg Barnes writes ‘the IHRA definition of antisemitism is not problematic’, reserving his criticism for some of the contentious ‘examples’.
In reality, the IHRA doesn’t define anything. (Even Justice Fagan noticed this!) Further, by incorporating a non exhaustive set of ‘examples’, it allows identification of ‘iterally anything’ as antisemitic and by allowing unspecified ‘context’ to determine application, it permits exclusion of ‘literally anything’ from identification as antisemitic. Insofar as it identifies anything, its concerns are with forms of expression, to the virtual exclusion of ‘physical manifestations’. There is nothing in the IHRA ‘working definition’ that would allow identification of the Bondi massacre, for example, as antisemitic. It does countenance identifying factual statements about Israel as antisemitic.
It is obviously susceptible to considerable further criticism of the substance of the ‘examples’ and ancillary verbiage, but any one of the points adduced suffices to demonstrate that the IHRA is not fit for purpose, to say the least.