A new parliamentary report identifies major opportunities for deeper trade with Africa. The harder task is ensuring Australia sustains its attention long enough to act on them.
Australia’s Parliament has again explained why the country needs stronger economic relations with Africa. The diagnosis is familiar. What remains unclear is why successive recommendations have produced so little lasting change.
The parliamentary report, Strengthening Australia’s trade and investment relations with the countries of Africa, released earlier this week, presents 17 recommendations covering diplomatic engagement, trade diversification, market intelligence, regulatory cooperation and institutional partnerships. The report provides a constructive assessment of opportunities across the continent of 54 countries, although the continent accounts for less than one per cent of Australia’s total international trade. The problem is not the absence of commercial opportunities or policy recommendations, but the persistent challenge Canberra faces converting intermittent political attention into sustained institutional engagement.
Familiar diagnosis
Previous parliamentary inquiries in 2011 and 2018 identified many of the same challenges, including limited diplomatic representation, inadequate understanding of African markets, excessive concentration on mining and insufficient institutional support for commercial engagement. The latest report acknowledges little has changed in important areas since 2018. The Advisory Group on Australia–Africa Relations, established in 2015 to strengthen engagement and provide advice to government, was disbanded in 2024 following a period of inactivity. Its disappearance highlights the broader problem. Institutional arrangements intended to support long-term relationships are extremely vulnerable to changing priorities.
Australian engagement has depended on individual commercial interests, diplomatic personalities, occasional ministerial visits and particular foreign policy objectives. Mining companies have maintained substantial commercial relationships across Africa, but their activities have generated limited diversification into other sectors. Political attention has also fluctuated. Australia’s successful campaign for a United Nations Security Council seat generated renewed African engagement, but as the parliamentary report acknowledges, diplomatic activity subsequently diminished. This pattern raises an uncomfortable question. If Australia has repeatedly identified the same shortcomings, will another parliamentary report produce a different outcome?
More institutions not necessarily the answer
The committee recommends a whole-of-government Africa trade and investment strategy, an Australia–Africa Advisory Council, expanded diplomatic and Austrade representation, improved market intelligence and new mechanisms for engaging African diaspora communities. These are worthwhile proposals, but institutional expansion should not be confused with institutional effectiveness.
The creation of additional advisory bodies, strategies and coordination mechanisms will achieve little unless responsibilities are clearly assigned, relationships are maintained and performance is assessed against tangible outcomes. Australia faces genuine resource constraints. Africa competes for diplomatic and commercial attention with Southeast Asia while the Pacific and other regions remain more prominent in Australian foreign policy. Expanding Australia’s diplomatic network across Africa without a clear assessment of costs, priorities and expected outcomes risks repeating earlier mistakes. A more practical approach would strengthen existing relationships and institutions with targeted expansion of Australia’s presence guided by clear commercial opportunities.
Three tests for implementation
The committee’s recommendations could be assessed against three straightforward questions.
First, who is responsible? A national strategy requires identifiable institutional ownership. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Austrade, Export Finance Australia and relevant industry and research organisations must have clearly defined responsibilities. Implementation should survive changes in ministers, departmental personnel and immediate political priorities.
Second, who can Australia work with? Australia need not construct an extensive new institutional presence across Africa to become more effective. Partnerships with African governments, regional institutions and established international partners offer opportunities to extend its reach. Japan and India both maintain substantial African relationships and share Australian interests in critical minerals, infrastructure, agricultural productivity and secure supply chains. Cooperation could allow Australia to contribute specialised expertise without duplicating existing diplomatic and commercial infrastructure.
The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) provides another opportunity. Australia’s June 2025 memorandum of understanding with its secretariat already establishes a framework for technical cooperation. The committee’s recommendation to operationalise joint taskforces offers a practical starting point for work on regulatory harmonisation, trade facilitation and professional expertise.
Third, what constitutes success? Diplomatic visits, advisory meetings and new strategies are activities, not necessarily achievements. Success should be measured through sustained commercial partnerships, increased non-extractive trade, functioning technical cooperation, stronger institutional capacity and relationships capable of continuing without constant government intervention.
From recommendations to results
Rather than attempting to implement every recommendation simultaneously, Australia could begin with a small number of carefully selected initiatives where existing capabilities align with demonstrated African demand. Critical minerals governance, agricultural research partnerships, technical standards and regional trade facilitation all offer possibilities. Each could combine Australian expertise with established African institutions and commercial partners, supported by clear responsibilities, realistic timelines and measurable outcomes.
These initiatives would also reveal whether the proposed whole-of-government approach can function beyond Canberra. The committee has made a useful contribution by identifying the scale of Australia’s missed opportunities and outlining practical responses. The recommendations deserve serious consideration. Australia has repeatedly recognised Africa’s growing economic and strategic importance without establishing the institutional continuity needed to translate that recognition into lasting results. The measure of this latest parliamentary report will not be the strategies it inspires, but the commercial relationships, institutional partnerships and practical achievements that remain when political attention inevitably moves elsewhere.
Christopher Burke
Christopher Burke is the Senior Advisor WMC Africa and an Australian national drawing on over 30 years of experience in conflict transformation and governance across Africa and Asia including work with The Carter Center on the implementation of the 1999 Nairobi Peace Agreement between Sudan and Uganda.