China’s Pacific missile test deserves scrutiny, but it should be understood in the context of decades of naval development and deterrence, not treated as proof of an imminent threat.
China conducted a successful test of an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) in the Pacific on 6 July. The launch was made from a submarine in Chinese waters, and the missile travelled more than 7,000 kilometres before splashing down in international waters south of the Marshall Islands in the Pacific.
This caused considerable concern and was criticised by Japan, the US, Australia, New Zealand and other countries, who said that the one-day notice was insufficient. Some analysts said that the test was timed to coincide with Australia signing a mutual-defence treaty with Fiji. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese called the test a “provocative act … which does destabilise the region”.
A German proverb runs, “Fear makes the wolf bigger than it is (Angst macht den Wolf grösser als er ist)”. Those most apt to embrace the “China threat” theory are most likely to regard the missile test as evidence of China’s ability to attack Australia and other countries.
A proper evaluation of the significance of the test is best made by considering China’s naval history over the last 60 years. Andrew Erickson of the US Naval College in a recently published study outlines how Mao Zedong already in 1958 committed to achieving nuclear and naval independence from the Soviet Union through Project 09, that is by developing SSN and SSBN (nuclear-powered submarines and nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines). He firmly rejected a proposal from Khrushchev for the development of a joint Soviet/China submarine fleet.
Over the next quarter century political struggles and economic hardship stymied Mao’s goal of an independent nuclear submarine capability, but finally a successful test of a nuclear submarine missile launch was held in November 1982.
This was the period of China’s “near seas defence” strategy under Commander Liu Huaqing. During the 1980s Liu visited nuclear submarine facilities in France and the US. It seems at that time other nuclear powers were not over-concerned about China becoming a military threat, and later in the 90s Russia provided technical assistance.
From 2003, “near seas defence” expanded to include “far seas protection”. Simultaneously, Australia-China relations reached a new high point in 2003 with Prime Minister John Howard’s visit to Beijing and the visit to Canberra by President Hu Jintao and his historic address to a joint sitting of the Australian Parliament. The two leaders agreed to boost defence ties including military exchanges and training.
Xi Jinping has consistently backed naval development and aims for China to become a world-class military power. Chinese strategists see this as necessary to counter US Navy strengths. The core priority is to guard against foreign intervention in the Yellow, East and South China Seas and to advance China’s sovereignty claims.
Over the last 20 years, the US has conducted more than 100 routine transits and Freedom of Navigation Operations through the Taiwan Strait and allies including the UK, Australia, Germany and Canada have sent warships through the strait particularly for joint and bilateral transits.
Over the same period, China’s overseas interests have surged from around US$13 billion annually to well over $1.5 trillion, including significant resource investments, mergers, acquisitions and real estate in the US, Australia, Indonesia and elsewhere. Its naval expansion is partly at least to protect these assets.
As Geoff Raby has written in this journal, China is “just behaving like any other great power”. It is not about to invade this country. There is no need for panic.
China’s close neighbour Japan, which is flexing its own military muscles, was more circumspect in its reactions. Having learnt in advance of the planned missile test, the Japanese Embassy in Beijing requested that the test avoid Japanese territory and this request was observed. Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara told the press that Japan was concerned “in light of security of our nation and our region”. South Korea, which is actively weighing its own nuclear submarine program, was remarkably low-key in its response. And in Taiwan, which would appear to be a possible target of attack, the strongest reaction might be that by Joseph Wu, a senior Taiwan diplomat, who posted on social media that China had “proved itself once again to be a bully on the block”.
Anxiety and terror can magnify a threat far beyond its actual size. “Fear makes the wolf bigger than he is.”
Jocelyn Chey is Visiting Professor at the University of Sydney and Adjunct Professor at Western Sydney University and UTS. She formerly held diplomatic posts in China and Hong Kong. She is a member of the Order of Australia (AM) and a Fellow of the Australian Institute of International Affairs.