Pressure on UNRWA and the International Criminal Court points to a much larger transformation in Gaza – one in which existing international institutions are being weakened as new political and administrative arrangements take their place. Part one of a two-part analysis.
On 1 July 2026, the Board of Peace account on X posted: “UNRWA has no place in the new Gaza. We are turning the page on the complex of perpetual aid dependency & conflict. The people of Gaza deserve better.”
These statements were not separate from a parallel development on the ground. On 27 July, Israeli army forces raided UNRWA’s Qalandia Technical and Vocational Training Institute in Qalandia refugee camp, north of occupied Jerusalem, firing tear gas inside and around the institute. They also detained teaching and administrative staff and 80 students inside one of the halls.
On 25 August, Israeli occupation forces raided the institute again, accompanied by National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, with the participation of police and other security agencies, and on the decision of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
This coincided with a new political track led by the United States through Trump’s Board of Peace, which emerged during a genocide inflicted on the Palestinian people for three years, an unprecedented decline in Israel’s standing globally, and the expansion and growing impact of the war.
According to official announcements, the board was established to oversee the Gaza Strip, supervise reconstruction, oversee Israel’s implementation of the terms of the agreement signed in October 2025, provide relief to Palestinians, and assist during the transitional phase until Palestinian elections are held.
But one year after the board’s establishment, its practices and statements reveal a different trajectory and raise questions about its actual objectives, and whether its role is limited to managing the transitional phase in Gaza or is moving towards reshaping the institutions and arrangements governing the Strip and the Palestinian cause.
One of the most prominent issues is the board’s position on UNRWA. It has made two statements about UNRWA during its period of operation. On 25 September 2026, it said: “The Board of Peace’s policy as it relates to UNRWA’s involvement in Gaza is unchanged. We will only work with trusted partners who will deliver for the people of Gaza and contribute to a deradicalized Strip. UNRWA fails on those litmus tests.” (Israeli ministers have long called for the dismantling of UNRWA, accusing it of terrorism and supporting terrorists.)
This position points to a clear trajectory towards reducing UNRWA’s role in Gaza and possibly replacing it with new administrative arrangements that would assume its functions. This is not only about an institution that provides humanitarian and educational services, but about one whose existence has been linked for decades to the Palestinian refugee issue.
Throughout its history, UNRWA has witnessed a broad part of the suffering of Palestinians and has accumulated records and documents concerning Palestinian refugees, their conditions and their needs over decades. It carries an accumulated institutional memory of the refugee issue since 1948, including the displacement of Palestinians and different stages of wars and attacks.
From this perspective, targeting UNRWA raises concerns that ending or replacing its role could weaken the institutional presence of the Palestinian refugee issue and link the refugees’ future to new arrangements that do not necessarily include recognition of their political rights, foremost among them the right of return.
Replacing UNRWA does not appear to be separate from a broader reordering of how Gaza is governed and raises a fundamental question: who will take over its functions afterwards, who will determine the nature of the institution or entity that replaces it, and what standards will it operate under?
The issue is not limited to UNRWA. Israel’s genocide against Palestinians since October 2023 has exposed the limits of international institutions’ ability to enforce international law and demonstrated the extent of the influence of major powers, particularly the United States, over these institutions. This confrontation became clear in the case of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued arrest warrants for Israeli officials.
In an interview with CNN on 20 and 21 May 2024, after announcing his request for arrest warrants for Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, former ICC prosecutor Karim Khan said: “Of course, I heard some elected leaders speak to me very frankly. One senior leader said to me: ‘This court was built for Africa and thugs like Putin.’” Khan also mentioned US threats, including a letter sent by 12 Republican senators in April 2024 threatening to target him, his family, and court staff if Israel were targeted.
On 13 July 2026, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio wrote in the Wall Street Journal: “Using all the tools at our government’s disposal, working beside every ally with whom we can make common cause, we will dismantle the ICC – brick by brick, if necessary.”
These statements are consistent with the sanctions imposed in February 2025 by the United States on ICC officials, including asset freezes, financial transaction restrictions and restrictions on entry into the United States.
In September 2026, the US administration began preparing sanctions targeting the court itself, including restricting its dealings with the US financial system and preventing Americans from providing it with funds or services.
Here, UNRWA and the ICC represent two different cases, but both raise the same question about the limits of international institutions’ operations when their roles conflict with the interests of major powers.
If UNRWA represents the international institution linked to the Palestinian refugee issue, the ICC represents the legal institution seeking to pursue accountability for international crimes.
In both cases, US and Israeli pressure on these institutions has emerged, opening the door to a broader question: is the pressure limited to existing institutions, or is there also an attempt to build new arrangements to replace them? Here, the Board of Peace emerges as one of the most prominent tools in this potential transformation.
Refaat Ibrahim
Refaat Ibrahim is a Palestinian writer from Gaza and the founder of The Resistant Palestinian Pens ( https://resistantpens.org/ ). A graduate in English Language and Literature from the Islamic University, he writes about political, social, and cultural issues in Palestine. Through his work, he amplifies Palestinian voices under occupation, believing writing is a bridge between truth and people’s hearts and minds.